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PREFACE
This study began as the introductory portion of a crit­
ical inquiry into the validity of the several modern symbol­
isms of freedom. It became obvious that such a study could 
not be undertaken without a simple and clear idea of what 
freedom really is. Because freedom in the modern world is 
an object of psychic fixation and partisan cant, the modern 
imagination cannot offer a definitive understanding. Antiq­
uity affords an uncomplicated perspective which is able to 
instruct critical judgment about our modern notions of free­
dom. That is why we have chosen the ancient period of ori­
gins as the focus for inquiry.
This study of origins has learned that human freedom in 
history is indeed a reality, but that in its unadulterated 
meaning, it is never an independent reality. ' Freedom derives 
from divine justice, and apart from divine justice, it has 
only a sentimental and transcient importance. By this under­
standing, it is certain that the modern inflation of freedom 
has extensively transported freedom from the range of the 
real to that of the unreal. The Marxian, the existential, 
even some liberal notions of freedom implicate freedom in a 
movement which Eric Voegelin has identified as gnosticism. 
That is to say, freedom is no longer the redemptive conse­
quence of the justice whose incision into history restores 
enslaved lives and warring polities. Instead, it is the
goal of a sometimes murderous struggle whose animating inspi 
ration is the fantasy that historical existence can be so 
transformed as to end the human encounter with evil. If 
this search for the New Jerusalem were truly a search for 
the New Jerusalem, it would have to contend with the righ­
teous justice of Yahweh as part and parcel of its search.
But since the search is for a secular equivalent to the New 
Jerusalem, there is no such encounter, and the misunderstand 
ing about freedom and the neglect of real justice continues.
In the humane disciplines of the twentieth century, 
contemporaneity has become the dominating idol of the mind. 
Thousands are busy researching and reporting one set or 
another of contemporary events, institutions, personalities. 
The end of this interest in contemporaneity is unclear; in 
that it has no precedent in all of history, it seems an 
obsessive, self-gratifying quest. The inner spirit which 
drives this pursuit finds expression in the verse,
HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME
HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME
One suspects that the greatest value of the idolatry of the 
contemporary is that it helps people to pass the time.
The interest in archaic meanings is essentially dif­
ferent from the interest in contemporaneity. Plato teaches 
that the domain of memory, not the domain of here and now, 
is the source from which we receive certain knowledge about 
who we are and what we ought to do. Plato understood the
exercise of this memory to be the special talent of philoso­
phy. In our own time, we have not only a philosophic memory 
but an historic memory as well. These two memories of modern 
man complement one another. In this study, they work together 
to inquire into the origins of freedom. Historic fact in­
spires reflection, and reflection in turn illumines historic 
fact. This interactive memory is not without its own con­
temporary value and interest. To remember the meaning of 
freedom at the time of its origin is to stand against a 
confusion which beclouds our understanding of freedom and so 
weakens our ability to live as free people. When we remember 
in this way, we become mindful that freedom is the privilege 
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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the material and symbolic events 
of both ancient Israel and Greece as they pertain to the 
formation of a European culture in which freedom is a guid­
ing value.
Chapter one advances the thesis that history is the 
domain of human severality, and by consequence, of fated un­
freedom; as such, historical existence leads to doom. This 
is the political lesson of both the Iliad of Homer and the 
Yahwist's story about the fall and exile of man from the 
garden. In the pre-historic life of man, unity is pervasive, 
and thus there is no fate or unfreedom. This is the polit­
ical significance of Plato's Age of Cronos and the Yahwist's 
portrait of Adam in the garden. In both the sense of free 
choice and of liberation from bondage, freedom in history 
happens when severality is mitigated by the incursion of 
unity into history; the consequence of this incursion is the 
creative reversal of humanity's descent to fated doom. The 
Gospel of Luke's paradigm of the Neighbor illustrates this 
last tenet.
Chapter two seeks an avenue to the origins of freedom 
in high antiquity. It examines the freedom teaching of the 
later Stoa and the New Testament. In the paradoxical uni­
verse of the Stoa, "freedom" became a nominal value without 
experiential ramification. Thus the Stoic teaching is not
helpful concerning the search for origins. In the New 
Testament, however, Paul's letter to Philemon exemplifies 
the meaning of freedom in a living community. The Fourth 
Gospel's freedom pericope (John 8.34-36) indicates that 
freedom is a structured reality, involving the negation of 
a faulty past and the repositioning of life unto a future 
which is imbued with the restorative power of the unifying 
logos. This pericope also shows that the earliest clues 
concerning the beginnings of freedom are to be found in the 
J and E sagas of the household of Abram.
Chapters three, four, and five constitute the substan­
tive bulk of the study. They deal with the concrete origins 
of freedom in Mediterranean antiquity in which a dead past 
is negated, and life is repositioned unto a new and beingful 
future. These events include the positioning of Abram as 
the chosen man of Yahweh, the liberative positioning of 
Israel as a nation independent of Pharaonic slavery, the 
positioning of Moses as prophet, and the eighth century 
prophetic protest against the injustice and bondage wrought 
by an urban, monarphial society as an offense against the 
holy righteousness of Yahweh. The parallel materials from 
Greece consider Hesiod's invocation of the just and righteous 
will of Zeus against his brother Perses' dishonest attempt 
to reduce him to penury. Later, and of decisive importance 
for the history of Europe, is the Solonic liberation in 
Athens. Solon believed that the justice of Zeus mandated
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the end of class strife in Athens. In service of that end, 
he released the unfortunate from their servile bonds, and 
repositioned the polis according to the principle of consti­
tutional justice. The unifying allegiance of Solon to jus­
tice inspired Europe's seminal liberation.
Chapter six examines the plays of Aeschylus. Aeschylus 
concludes the period of origins, because in his drama, free­
dom is understood at last in an overt, political fashion; 
the same impulse which liberates the slave is seen to imply 
universal political participation. The study concludes that 
five meanings obtain from the original appearances of free­
dom. (1) Freedom is a modality of divine-human unity under­
stood theoretically as logos, practically as justice. (2) 
Freedom requires negation and position relative to the prin­
ciple of unity. (3) Freedom is essentially antinomian.
(4) Freedom is primarily economic. (5) Freedom is complete 
only with universal participation in political authority.
• « •Vlll
I
I. HISTORY AND FREEDOM
Freedom is a concern which is proper to a short period 
in human existence, but a period which is quintessentially 
important. Freedom happens in the historical existence of 
mankind. Outside of history there is neither freedom nor 
concern for freedom. Both the concern and the reality are 
exponents of human existence in history. But this vocabu­
lary requires explanation. What do we mean by "history"?
Why is there a felt need for freedom in history? How— or by 
what pattern— does freedom come into history?
In order to address these questions which introduce the 
inquiry into the historical origins of freedom, we will ex­
amine certain primary visions which have given meaning to 
the life of European humanity. In response to the question 
as to the meaning of history and the need for freedom in 
history, the Iliad of Homer is instructive. In the Iliad we 
behold a fallen mankind which is victim to its own history. 
The demonic power of this history is so intense that we un­
derstand the Iliad as a chronicle of the destruction of the 
historical world, in history. The Homeric testimonial to 
the demonic power of history, as fate, was balanced later by 
Plato's vision of a world of pre-historic innocence which 
stands before and beyond history as a paradigmatic guide to 
mankind in history. This is the perfect Age of Cronos.
This vision of extra-historic perfection is vital to our
1
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understanding of human freedom, for were there no such vision 
available as tutor to the human imagination, there could be 
no freedom in history. At last we will contemplate the 
Yahwist's account of the creation and fall of man, for the 
Yahwist's story brings together into a single narrative the 
vision of pre-historic perfection and the vision of demonic 
fate in history.
After we have examined these primary visions which sym­
bolize both the predicament of unfreedom in history and of 
perfection before history, we will turn to the problem of 
the mediation of history. By mediation we mean liberation,
the event by which mankind is set free from the fated power­
lessness whose consequence is always cruelty, slavery, death. 
There are two approaches to the question of how history is 
mediated. One is that the process of history itself has a 
propensity to self-mediation. This view finds no support in 
the documents which inform us about the origins of freedom.
The other is that the demonic course of history is mediated
when— and only when— human apperception becomes sufficiently 
deepened as to imagine the vision of pre-historic perfection. 
Consequent upon this divine imagining is the liberation of 
the slave, the release of the captive, the feeding of the 
orphan, and most importantly, the attempt to embody the vi­
sion of perfection in a permanent structure of constitutional 
order. Countries that are just and free are the enduring 
product of this powerful and true imagining which cuts into 
history and makes of mortal existence a vessel for eternal 
being.
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1. History and Pre-History 
Rachel Bespaloff says of Hector: "What he fled from,
what he now confronts, is not the 'gigantic Achilles,' but 
his own destiny; he meets the appointed hour when he will be 
sent to pasture in H a d e s . L a t e r  she interprets the fate 
of Hector and the other characters in a reflection about 
history. She writes: "For the Greeks, history is simply
the stage of the tragedies of force and the dramas of col­
lective passion; it has no awareness of divine justice and 
makes no appeal to it." This understanding of history as 
an existential domain of fated unfreedom seems strange to 
us, for we are heirs to a culture which has learned to view • 
history as somehow being the arena of God's saving march 
through the world in time. And so it is. But this saving 
project is not proper to history itself; it is opposed to 
history, as history. It moves against the demonic current 
in history to individuation and fated doom.
The analogue in our own time to the Homeric view of 
fate is the attitude of modern science to the issue of human 
freedom. The epistemology of modern sciences— especially 
behavorial sciences— is in large measure the product of 
Hume's thinking. Of the possibility for freedom, Hume wrote:
We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, but 
a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our 
motives and character; and even where he cannot, he
■^Rachel Bespaloff, On the Iliad, tr. Mary McCarthy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 42.
^Bespaloff, On the Iliad, pp. 121-122.
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concludes in general that he might, were he perfectly 
acquainted with every circumstance of our situation 
and temper, and the most secret springs of our complex­
ion and disposition. Now, this is the very essence of 
necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine.3
Hume is our key to Homer, for the spectator about whom he 
speaks is essentially the same as the poet as far as freedom 
is concerned. Neither conceives that there is a possibility 
for man to free himself in the sense of beginning anew 
through repositioning his life against the past and toward 
the future. Each attempt at newness is seen as being quietly 
but surely shaped by all that has gone before. The hero of 
our culture is Saul of Tarsus, blind in Damascus, almost 
ready to see anew and thus to begin again as a person free 
of the accumulated past.4 But to Hume and to Homer this 
character is impossible, for they are the spokesmen for his­
tory in its absolute form.
■^David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: J.
M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1962), II, 121. Compare the remarks 
of a Homer scholar concerning the transformation of Achilles 
from an ordinary prince to the extreme character whose pres­
ence dominates the Iliad. "The steps by which Achilles comes 
to this position show a causal complexity very characteristic 
of Homer. Viewed from a later vantage point, the quarrel 
between Agamemnon and Achilles appears completely inevitable, 
but as Homer narrates it in Book I, it seems like a series of 
merely unfortunate accidents." See Cedrick H. Whitman, Homer 
and the Homeric Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1958), p. 183.
^Our culture is Judeo-Christian, and its primary docu­
ment is the Bible. The Bible attitude to sacrality and the 
problem of history is unique. The Bible teaches that sanc­
tification happens within history, not in a sacred time and 
space reserved apart from history. (See Mircea Eliade, The 
Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, tr. Willard
R. Trask TNew York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1959],
pp. 110-113.) Thus, Paul's conversion took place not in the 
sacred precinct of the synagogue, but on the road, which is 
to say, in history.
Poetry and science are not the same, for they serve 
different ends. Poetry punctuates its chronicle of the 
demonic by amplifying the moments of immortal beauty which 
appear ephemerally in the pauses between successive gales. 
Science conquers the material world and thus enhances human 
existence by bringing knowledge and material comfort to man 
in historical existence. But with the peculiarly human con­
cerns the attitude of poetry and science is the same. This 
is so because both the Iliad and the modern empirical human 
sciences comprehend man in the same way. That is, the meth­
odology common to both interprets human existence as an 
affair which is severely individual and particular. It is 
for this reason that they understand man's thought, word, 
and deed either as fated or as effected. When the pattern 
of human life is synthesized by a spectatorial intelligence 
in such a fashion as to make human existence commensurate to 
the mechanical sequence of causes by which the individual 
balls upon a billiard table act and react, then man's career 
on earth will be understood as a fated affair. Fate is noth 
ing besides the totality of causes bearing upon a particular 
person. Only in poetry— not science— are we permitted to 
behold in a single moment the cumulative effects of the ac­
cumulated causes. This is the moment of doom.
This attitude then which rests upon the assumption that 
human existence is essentially particular must necessarily 
deny the possibility of freedom, for as this study will show 
freedom happens in response to the awareness that there is a
reality beyond the particular self which is superior to the 
particular self and its individual history. Only if there 
is a whole reality which transcends the self is it possible 
for the self to become estranged from the causes which pro­
pel it in the direction of doom. When this whole reality is 
sought out as the ground for action, then the causal se­
quence is interrupted. Whenever we use the word "free" this 
is what we mean. Whether we speak of the liberation of 
slaves or the exercise of free choice, we mean that there is 
a breach between achieved history and the decisive present. 
Aside from its merit as a seminal document of culture, the 
Iliad is a work of genius for its conscious portrayal of a 
world which is left to history alone, a world in which there 
is no check upon the passionate force of particular ambition 
other than the force of a counter ambition. The political 
lesson of the Iliad is that history, unmediated, leads to 
world destruction.
The Iliad is not a story about sin and fall. Rather, 
it is a story about guilt and fallenness; it knows of no 
prior state of innocence. The Iliad is a poetic heightening 
of the ongoing helplessness of mankind in historical exis­
tence, and the tale of the Trojan war with its senseless 
cruelty is the poet's medium for the deliverance of his anal­
ysis of the lot of man in history. To say that humanity is 
fallen is to say that it is divided against itself, for di­
vision leads to death. The primary division of humanity is 
the sexual polarity which sets male and female apart. The
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Iliad illustrates that the sexual division is parent to all 
subsequent division in history. For this to be clear it is 
necessary to consider some information about the cause of 
the Trojan war which the Iliad does not relate. The archaic 
deity Strife dropped a golden apple inscribed "For the Fair­
est." Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite all desired the apple, 
but Zeus refused to decide amongst them. Thus Hermes ap­
pointed Paris, son of Priam, king of Troy, to make the award. 
Aphrodite described to the youth the sexual gifts of Helen, 
the wife of Menelaus of Sparta, and promised to make Helen 
the lover of Paris if she should be chosen. Paris gave 
Aphrodite the apple, and she in turn expedited the theft of 
Helen. Agamemnon's expedition against Troy followed.^
The pattern here is as follows: Strife, an aspect of
the primal Chaos which underlies all ordered reality, broke 
forth as sexual lust (Aphrodite), which caused theft, adul­
tery and insult, which in turn caused a war which caused 
death for men, slavery for women and children, and the com­
plete destruction of a country. A similar sequence occurs 
in Book I of the Iliad. Agamemnon appropriates Achilles' 
captive concubine, Briseis. This theft causes the brooding 
wrath to descend on Achilles, and this wrath, in turn, causes 
all manner of outrage. To us, it seems that at each crucial 
step in either of these causal sequences a choice might have 
been made which would have altered the result. But the poet
^Robert Graves, The Greek Myths, II (New York: George
Braziller, Inc., 1959), section 159, pp. 269-272.
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will not permit this to happen because his project is etio­
logical in an almost scientific way. He shows just how 
great catastrophes happen. That is, they happen when the 
men who move events do not find the power which would free 
them to choose life instead of death. They do not have this 
power because each is locked inside himself, unable to imag­
ine some completion which would enable him to see keenly and 
carefully, and so avoid disaster.
In the Iliad, the character who most visibly displays 
this impotence is Achilles, the absolute lover of self. If 
there is an Homeric devil, it is neither Aphrodite nor Ares, 
for they are but deifications of elemental forces in nature, 
self, and culture. The devil must be a developed personal­
ity, like Achilles. Like Achilles he must be paradoxical, 
powerful and at the same time utterly unfree. Achilles is 
just this demonic super person in history, the hero whose 
eroticism reaches not toward life but toward death. Achilles 
personifies an aspect of human leaning which we discover 
both within self and beyond self, externalized in the world 
according to the division of labor. It is the leaning of 
the killer who makes of the other a victim, of the captor 
who makes of the other a slave, of the tyrant who makes of 
all life a mad and lamentable experiment. Achilles is a 
special kind of culture hero, the prototype of those immor­
tals of history whose project is wrought on the forge of 
unmitigated individuation. The individuation of Achilles is 
not the moral individuation of the hero which liberates from
the embrace of the Female, at once nutritive, seductive, and
murderous.*’ It is instead the false individuation of the
totally fallen, totally historical self. Achilles is like
7Bonaparte or Stalin, a moral solipsist. This character, 
whenever he appears in history, sterilizes the earth.
**See e.g. the confrontation of Gilgamesh and Ishtar,
Epic of Gilgamesh, tablet VI, and Odysseus1 victory over 
Circe, Odyssey, X. The whole Iliad is arrested within the 
pre-moral zone of Female domination. While Zeus, the Father, 
is neutral, Hera and Athena engineer the destruction of Troy. 
Aphrodite protects her votary, Paris, and preserves the adul­
tery which has caused the mess. Achilles himself is very 
much a mother's boy. The concern and help which Thetis be­
stows upon her son show him as something less than a mature 
adult.
^Some classicists would find this comparison and con­
clusion exceptionable, for they have learned to perceive 
Achilles as he was perceived by the Greek audience which at­
tended the rhapsodes' recitation of Homer. Their scholarly 
studies of the Iliad are built upon this self-limiting per­
spective. This perspective of the uncritical hearer is nar­
rower, however, than the perspective of Homer; along with 
the popular indulgence of the hero, Homer shows us attri­
butes in Achilles that are clearly demonic, and they are 
part and parcel of a syndrome which causes world destruction.
In dealing with this tendency in Achilles, one commen­
tator has it that Achilles is an entirely worthy young 
prince whose appalling truculence is the result of "acute 
neurosis." The neurosis is caused by the wrongful loss of 
Briseis and the consequent death of Patroclus, about which 
Achilles has guilt feelings. (See Andre Michalopoulos,
Homer [New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1966], pp. 95
passim.) This observation seems beyond dispute, but to em­
ploy psychologistic terminology in an effort to exculpate 
the hero is to evade the point of the whole story. Achilles 
is neurotic because he is the most visible entity within a 
powerless world. This world is powerless even to send a 
stolen woman back to her husband. To attribute some final 
importance to the neurotic consequences of Achilles' insulted 
manhood is as romantically personal as would be an assess­
ment of Bonaparte which places the conqueror's unhappy 
childhood at the center. "Neurotic" is a sub-heading within 
a larger category. It is a synonym of "unfree" equally with 
"slave" or "prisoner." Like those realities, its necessary 
condition is the extreme individuation of man in historical 
existence.
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Priam goes to the camp of Achilles to claim the body of 
his son Hector, and Achilles refrains from killing him. Is 
it largesse that Achilles shrinks from killing Priam; is 
there a flicker of the light of nobility in this otherwise 
cinderous personality; is the sparing of Priam a free act?® 
Beyond doubt the Greek audience understood Achilles' behavior 
to be noble, and perhaps even free. But we are in a position 
to know more of freedom than they— or Homer— could know. As 
the parable of the Neighbor will show, the free act requires 
more than an abatement of wrath; it must involve the giving 
of something more than a corpse in exchange for ransom. It 
must involve the bestowal of life where survival is in doubt.
Priam is too old to fight, and he is beyond the child 
producing years. For this saddened old king death would be 
merciful. Like his father Priam, the boy Lycaon is unable 
to fight, but his inability is the result of his youth. He 
is no threat to Achilles of the Achaeans, except inasmuch as 
his young life holds the promise of a future for his house 
and country. Achilles is at his demonic best in the murder 
of Lycaon. Lycaon has begged Achilles for his life, and 
Achilles answers him.
"So, friend, you die also. Why all this clamour about
it? Patroklos also is dead, who was better by far than
We will observe in the concluding section of this study 
that Aeschylus considered a psychological explanation for the 
terrified unfreedom of Orestes, and then rejected it as inade­
quate to the magnitude of Orestes' guilt. The guilt was real, 
and it required a real expiation, not an apology.
8See Iliad, XXIV, 138 ff.
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you are. Do you not see what a man I am, how huge, how 
splendid and born of a great father, and the mother who 
bore me immortal? Yet even I have also my death and my 
strong destiny [moira krataie], and there shall be a 
dawn or an afternoon or a noontime when some man in the 
fighting will take the life from me also either with a 
spearcast or an arrow flown from the bowstrong."
So he spoke, and in the other the knees and the in­
ward heart went slack. He let go of the spear and sat 
back, spreading wide both hands; but Achilles drawing 
his sharp sword struck him beside the neck and the col­
larbone, and the double-edged sword plunged full length 
inside. He dropped to the ground, face downward, and 
lay at length, and the black blood flowed, and the 
ground was soaked with it.9
Achilles' untroubled acceptance of his own death is the 
product of a conscious nihilism which can only be the atti­
tude of mankind in its radically individuated historical 
aspect. It has its match only in the saint's acceptance of 
death. Death for the saint is the gathering point of a per­
fect completion; for the nihilist it is the event of perfect 
fragmentation.
The murder of Lycaon shows compactly the central prob­
lem of the Iliad. The individual character of human life in 
historical existence is accompanied by a vacuum of meaning, 
and the consequence of this absence of meaning is powerless­
ness, unfreedom. All unfreedom in history happens according
^The Iliad of Homer, tr. Richmond Lattimore (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1954), XXI, 106-119.
•̂®A classicist in sympathy with Achilles understands the 
nihilism differently. Of Achilles he writes: "Only after
abandoning all human hope does he at last, in the scene with 
Priam, achieve his greatest communion with humanity." 
(Whitman, Homer and the Homeric Tradition, p. 205.) This 
same author (p. 160) finds Achilles' address to Lycaon as 
"friend" as an indication of a sort of "communion" with 
Lycaon. One is forced to wonder if "friend" once had a dif­
ferent meaning than it has now.
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to the format of the episode involving Achilles and Lycaon. 
There is one who is physically powerless to prevent his en­
slavement or abuse, and there is another who is spiritually 
powerless to understand why he should not satisfy himself in 
some manner by appropriating the life of another. Achilles 
murders (or enslaves— brands— castrates— tortures— sells) 
Lycaon because he understands no reason why he should not do 
so. The concrete life— like the life of Hector with his 
family— is meaningless to this disconnected individual; his 
own life and the lives of his fellow men become sublimated 
unto an infinite project of immortal fame. The quest for 
immortal fame is itself a confession of the vacancy of his­
torical existence, and both the vacancy and the infinite 
quest are inherent in history itself. Because of the mean­
inglessness of the individuated life pattern which history 
requires of its inhabitants, the infinite quest which de­
volves from this emptiness propels history to self-destruc­
tion.
If the self-destruction of peoples in history is to be 
avoided, there must be some means by which individuation can 
be retarded. There must be some means of unifying histori­
cal mankind in such a way that the inner unity can overcome 
the exterior diversity. In concrete terms this means that 
the survival and prosperity of historical mankind is con­
tingent upon the subordination of the human will to the di­
vine will. But the theology of the Iliad shows us the prob­
lematical side of this matter also. The world-destructive
13
conflict has begun precisely because the intention of Paris 
fell into accord with that of Aphrodite. Pitiable Helen, 
aflame with guilt and foreboding about the increasingly 
barren future, identifies the problem more penetratingly 
than any other character in her reproach of Aphrodite. She 
suggests that the goddess has no true claim to divinity: 
"abandon the gods' way, turn your feet back never again to 
the path of Olympos . . . The point is that not just any
god or gods are capable of assuring the survival of histor­
ical mankind. As we will observe, only the true God, the 
God whose content is righteousness, is capable of directing 
mankind in history to life and to freedom.
Homer is like a "pure" scientist. His analysis lays 
bare the pattern which binds events into a story. But it is 
not his job to improve the pattern. The poet is aware that 
the radical problem to which the nihilism of Achilles and 
the others is kindred is the inadequacy of divinity in the 
face of the need of historical mankind for salvation. In 
compensation for the absence of salvation or even its pos­
sibility, Homer urges his audience to the contemplation of 
immortal beauty. To be sure, this contemplation has been 
edifying, and is perhaps Homer's most lasting gift, but it 
has nothing to do with our inquiry into the origins of free­
dom. Freedom did not originate with beauties such as Helen 
and Hector. It gained substance within the wind-scorched 
frames of herders and farmers. Freedom arrives in the world
11Iliad, III, 406-407.
concomitant with the subordination of beauty before a real­
ity more divine.
The gods of man in historical existence are of two 
kinds. We can witness this duality in our familiar Christian 
religion. There is the nutritive god who created the physi­
cal world, who orders the seasons, and in general performs 
those many necessary functions which maintain nutritive life 
as a going concern. Above this is the God who comes to the 
soul in its longing for order and peace, a God whose command 
and blessing reveal to man the way of righteousness. Just 
as the former deity is nutritive, the latter is divine; it 
is God's reality for man as a being who is at once within 
and beyond the nutritive environment. It is this latter 
aspect of divinity which is absent from the Iliad and above 
all else it is this absence which makes of the Iliad an ab­
solutely historical document. The nihilism of individuated 
mankind in history shows itself through this mankind's fix­
ation with nutritive ends. The unbridled lusts for sexual 
gratification, for wealth, for domination, even for destruc­
tion, are essentially nutritive impulses which have run wild 
because they are not integrated within an organic structure 
of self or of culture. This is the symbolic significance of 
Aphrodite's mischief in the Iliad. The sexual impulse with­
out which life cannot continue has become as particular and 
as destructively isolate as the mortals who are its practi­
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tioners. The inadequacy of the Homeric Olympian pantheon to 
the needs of a human society adumbrates the historical in­
adequacy of Greece itself.^ ^he anthropomorphic gods them­
selves were particular fixtures Within a fallen history from 
which there was no recourse. It was against this inadequacy 
that Hesiod's new theology would rise in a rebellion which 
was only partially successful.
In Plato, the severest critic of Greek culture, we find 
an anti-Homeric, anti-Olympian vision of God and man. This 
vision is pre-history. It is the absolute ground which 
Plato sets up against history so as to elevate the level of 
life in history and thus to avoid destruction. Plato leaves 
no doubt that he is dealing in a concept of pre-history, for 
he chooses as the name of the beatific epoch before our own 
the "Age of Cronos." In the old literature— especially in 
Hesiod— Cronos, the father of Zeus, had been bad, and his 
defeat at the hands of his son represented a moral advance. 
Plato thus repudiates the symbolism of a whole culture. The 
"Age of Zeus" is coincidental with the historical period of 
human existence, and to Plato, its righteousnesses are as 
filthy rags. The rehabilitation of Cronos is part of a
l^This is not to suggest that Greece was wholly defense­
less against the kind of behavior which the Iliad chronicles. 
In both the Homeric and anti-Homeric strains of the culture, 
there is respect for the Apolline injunction in favor of 
moderation, against rapacious outrage. But even the injunc­
tion is an expression of inadequacy and uncertainty. The 
experience of the culture with its heroes, both legendary 
and historical, had taught it the value of caution. "Moder­
ation in all things" is at base a pragmatic rule which is 
likely to get one through life with a minimum of difficulty 
when there is no fuller vision to provide direction.
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larger attempt to introduce into the Greek imagination a 
novel element whose purpose is to free the culture from its 
tendency to partisan destructiveness. "Freedom" is not an 
explicit goal in the project of Plato, yet without recourse 
to the vision of wholeness before or beyond history, of 
which the Age of Cronos is representative, freedom within 
history would be impossible.
Plato was heir to the philosophic monism of Parmenides, 
and that reflective monism was itself a philosophic appro­
priation of the very oldest strata of Mediterranean symbol­
ism of the eternal condition of the world before history, 
division, and falsehood. That world is an absolute unity 
and its earliest symbol is the euroboros, the snake which 
clasps its tail in its mouth. The euroboros is truly pre­
historic because it is entirely pre-oppositional. Neumann 
writes: "It slays, weds, and impregnates itself. It is man 
and woman, begetting and conceiving, devouring and giving 
birth, active and passive, above and below, at once."13
13Eric Neumann, The Origins and History of Conscious­
ness (New York: The Bollingen Foundation, Inc., 1954), p.
10. A more differentiated visual symbol which is also made 
from the closed circle is the Taoist t'ai chi. That symbol 
represents both pre-history and history, for while the perim­
eter conveys the same meaning as the euroboros, the internal 
division of yin from yang suggests the sexual polarity which 
produces the "ten thousand things." In respect of this gen­
erative capability, the internal contents of the symbol are 
divisible into an infinitesimal number of smaller figures. 
This possibility of infinite division within the universal 
wholeness is fascinating because it seems to tell a story 
about the relationship of history to pre-history which is 
decidedly different from the Mediterranean and Western under­
standing. For this understanding history occurs as a rup­
ture of pre-history and of a radical dissociation from it
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Plato's description of life in the Age of Cronos is a highly 
differentiated, mythical representation of the same undi­
vided reality which is symbolized by the archaic visual sym­
bol of the euroboros. Plato's myth of the Age of Cronos 
couples this reality to the cyclic understanding of time.
In the Statesman, Plato accounts for human evil and 
political decline in terms of the cyclic pattern of the 
Cosmos. In one cosmic period, the Age of Cronos, God him­
self directs the rotation of the cosmos. When this period 
has ended, then begins the Age of Zeus when the cosmos ro­
tates in the opposite direction. This opposite rotation is 
the underlying condition .for the fallenness of world history. 
But here, we are concerned for the God-governed age, for it 
is Plato's vision of pre-history.
In that era God was the supreme governor in charge of 
the actual rotation of the universe as a whole, but 
divine also, and in like manner was the government of 
its several regions, for these were all portioned out 
to be provinces under the surveillance of tutelary 
deities. Over every herd of living creatures through­
out all their tribes was set a heavenly daemon to be 
its shepherd. Each of them was all in all to his flock 
— providing for the heeds of all his charges. So it 
befell that savagery was nowhere to be found nor prey­
ing of creature on creature, nor did war rage nor any 
strife whatsoever. There were numberless consequences 
of this divine ordering of the world, but we must leave 
them all aside save those concerning man, for we must 
go on to explain the origin of our traditions concern­
ing man's life in that paradise. A god was their shep­
herd and had charge of them and fed them even as men
which is repaired only with great difficulty. E.g., the Age 
of Cronos ends and that of Zeus begins with a reversal in 
the direction of the world's rotation. The t'ai chi however 
bespeaks a life experience in which multiplicity xi~~inher­
ently subordinated before the initial wholeness of all.
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now have charge of the other creatures inferior to them 
— for men are closer to the divine than they. When God 
was shepherd there were no political constitutions and 
no taking of wives and begetting of children. For all 
men rose up anew into life out of the earth, having no 
memory of the former things. Instead they had fruits 
without stint from trees and bushes; these needed no 
cultivation but sprang up of themselves out of the 
ground without man's toil. For the most part they dis­
ported themselves in the open needing neither clothing 
nor couch, for the seasons were blended evenly so as to 
work them no hurt, and the grass which sprang up out of 
the earth in abundance made a soft bed for them. This 
is the story, Socrates, of the life of men under the 
government of Cronus.14
Abundance, peace, youth— these are the most visible endow­
ments of life in this great time. In this myth, unity is 
present on three levels; there is no need for mediation in 
this perfect world. At the lowest level, most immediately 
involving the affairs of life, we note that mankind is earth- 
born. Man's sexual endowment has not yet become evident or 
necessary; each human life is integral within the greater 
unity of the world. Only in history need the family assem­
ble so as to mediate a manifest sexual polarity which bisects 
humanity. At the intermediate level, there is no government. 
Inasmuch as politics becomes a mediatory necessity with the 
rise of multipolarity of society, it also belongs to history. 
At the highest level formal unity is expressed in Plato's 
monotheism. This unity is given content in the fact of God's 
pastoral direction of human affairs. For Plato— as for Micah 
in an earlier period and another place— the reality of one
14Statesman, 271d-272b, tr. J. B. Skemp. All Plato quo­
tations are from Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds., 
The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters (New 
York: The Bollingen Foundation, 1961).
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God implies world perfection.
The truth of world unity is seen incompletely in his­
tory. The fragmentary evidence of this truth in history 
becomes intelligible only upon the complete witness of pre­
history.
More explicitly than any other Greek writing, Plato's 
Age of Cronos stands in opposition to the pattern of events 
which pervades the Iliad. It opposes pre-historic divinity, 
concord, and peace against the Iliad's historical demonism, 
discord, and war. But with regard to our special concern, 
in neither vision is there human freedom. Freedom happens 
in history only when the pre-historic vision of unity pene­
trates history, and becomes both reason and justice for his­
tory. The philosopher ruler— who is the dominant interest 
of the Statesman— is capable of rescuing history because of 
his own assimilation unto the pre-historic reality of divine 
harmony. Even if Plato does not tell us as much, we know 
from the other (and older) sources that when such a ruler 
appears in the historic world, his rule brings not only jus­
tice but freedom as well. To oppose an eternal unity against 
the causal particularity of the world in time is to set man­
kind free from its slave past and to direct it to a more com­
plete embodiment of being itself. Because of his hope for a 
beingful future, the liberator is likewise the constitution 
maker.
The Yahwist's account of the creation, perfection, and 
fall of man concludes our elaboration of the ideas of pre­
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history and history.15 The Yahwist's story is especially 
instructive for it incorporates the meanings of both the Age 
of Cronos and the Wrath of Achilles into a single literary 
structure which traces the course of the man, Adam, from 
creation to exile. In the Adam narrative there are four 
themes which have relevance here. These are (1) the pre­
history of man, (2) individuation as possession, (3) indi­
viduation as knowledge, (4) the curse of historical exis­
tence.
The pre-history man is comprehended within the symbol 
of the man in the garden of Eden. The man here is in union 
with both God and nature; indeed, he is that union, since he 
is a composite character, made of earth and inflated by the 
divine breath. The description of Adam in the garden cor­
responds generally to the vision of the Age of Cronos. The 
vision is one of abundance, timeless repose, a.id complete 
absence of sexual polarity at either the human or animal 
levels of existence. The reality of life in the garden is a 
wholly relational reality. In this world-garden there is not 
an inch of the terrain of distance and impersonality from 
which a causal order might take root and grow.
Then it occurred to the Creator that the man was alone, 
and that he needed a helper. Attendant upon the introduction 
of the female was the fall from innocence. Why then did 
Yahweh decide thus? This question cannot be answered within 
the framework of myth, and if it is pursued, the myth and its
15Genesis 2.4-3.24.
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meaning collapse beneath the pressure of an enraged ration­
ality. The question of theodicy is an exponent of the in­
tellect in history, and any answer to it will be the product
not of myth but of prose discourse. The myth is not so much
explanatory as etiological. The Adam story gives an account 
of the origin of individuation and strife in history from a 
more permanent world reality which is before all history and 
all misfortune.
Bible religion is accustomed to view the "fall of man" 
as happening coincidentally with Eve's yielding to tempta­
tion. This interpretation corresponds with the understand­
ing of the Yahwist narrator himself. But that hardly ex­
hausts the matter. The myth shows us that the "fall of man"
occurs in two sequential steps. The first of these steps is 
taken when Adam awakens from his sleep and finds that the 
unity of the garden has been interrupted by the introduction 
of the sexual principle.
This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh;
She shall be called Woman because she was taken out of
Man.16
This triumphal claim of possession is the first swaying move­
ment of the calamitous fall; it marks the instant when his­
tory b e g i n s . T h e  passage records neither murder nor en-
l^Genesis 2.23. All Bible quotations are from the 
Revised Standard Version.
■^The first sentence of Rousseau's Third Discourse is 
the secular parallel to the speech which the Yahwist attrib­
utes to Adam: "The first man who, having enclosed a piece
of ground, bethought himself as saying, 'This is mine,' and 
found people simple enough to believe him, was the real 
founder of civil society." This is a seminal inspiration of
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slavement, but we know that both will follow soon. The pos­
sessive speech of the man thus exhibits a formal similarity 
within the Yahwist narrative to the murder of Lycaon in the 
Iliad. Both Adam and Achilles show themselves as particles 
set in contrast against some other. The creature asserts 
his partiality against the unity of the Creator and the in­
tended wholeness of the creation.
This assertion of the man shows something further about 
the condition of division and misery that occurs in history. 
History as the slave form of being human is not given in the 
sheer fact of multiplicity, or even of human power in the 
world. The man in the garden " . . .  gave names to all cat­
tle, and to the birds of the air, and to every beast of the 
field . . ."18 But this man with the great power of naming 
is not the fallen, historical creature whom we behold a mo­
ment later, for even in the act of naming, he has not yet
modern leftism, and its understanding of the predicament of 
man in history makes explicit a truth which was not yet ap­
parent to Homer or the Yahwist, i.e., that the most patent 
source of historical misery is inequality itself. From in­
equality derives slavery, the absolute condition of power- 
lessness, an imposed non-being. In both Israel and Greece 
the connection of fallenness to inequality became understood 
sometime between the eighth and sixth centuries. Modern left­
ism is the heir to this discovery, and its understanding of 
freedom is thus a more nearly authentic understanding than is 
the conservative attitude which esteems tradition, even evil 
tradition, and couples freedom to the assertion of individual 
proclivity.
The quotation above is from "A Discourse on the Origin 
of Inequality," in The Social Contract and Discourses, tr.




discovered his own individuality and the claim of possesion 
which follows upon it. The man who names the animals is 
still the lesser partner who lives in unity with the God and 
the garden.^ Only with his comprehension of his otherness 
from the female does his individuation articulate itself, to 
self, through the act of possessing another. As historical 
materialism correctly understood, the possession of a woman 
in history amounts to a division of labor in which slavery
•^Buber's reflection on these concerns explains the 
radical distinction between Adam, the integrated namer, and 
Adam, the disintegrated possessor. He writes:
Man's will to profit and to be powerful have their 
natural and proper effect so long as they are linked 
with, and upheld by, his will to enter into relation. 
There is no evil impulse till the impulse has been 
separated from the being; the impulse which is bound 
up with, and defined by, the being is the living stuff 
of communal life, that which is detached is its dis­
integration. (Martin Buber, 1̂ and Thou, tr. Ronald 
Gregor Smith [New York: Charles Scribner1s Sons,
1958], p. 48.)
Buber's term "relation" means the same as this study's term 
"unity." That is, when one meets another as Thou (not as He 
or It), both exit from history. To relate with another is 
to enter into a supra-personal unity. Because in unity there 
is no severality, there can likewise be no causality, no fate.
To relate is thus to be free.
Beyond this thetic identity, our purpose in this study 
is different from that of Buber. In 1̂ and Thou, Buber called 
on twentieth century man to come out of history, out of his 
world of the finite It, whose several predicates amount to 
nothing. This study which seeks the origins of freedom in 
history is primarily a political study because freedom is 
primarily a political reality. A political study can never 
— even for an instant— exclude the rt world from its gaze.
Prom the political vantage point, the relational possibility 
in man's humanity is a possibility for the world of It.
Will the world in history be worse or better? The answer
depends on how fully political reality in history has come 
to embrace as its orient the presence of a Thou whose ulti­
mate being is before history.
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is incipient.
The second step, individuation as knowledge, follows 
upon the first. The text shows that possession is come by 
in innocence; the shattering of the world of pre-history ob­
tains as the individual discovers himself through the mode 
of possession. But the quest of knowledge is quite differ­
ent. It follows from the initial experience of individua­
tion. Like the unlimited drive of Achilles for conquest and 
vengeance, it is an assertion of the projected infinity of 
the individual. As such it is an enlarged form of possession 
by which the individual aspires to possess all that is 
through the power of cognition.
And the woman said to the serpent, "We may eat of the 
fruit of the trees of the garden; but God said, 'You 
shall not eat of the fruit of the tree which is in the
midst of the garden, neither shall you touch it, lest
you die.'" But the serpent said to the woman, "You will 
not die. For God knows that when you eat of it your 
eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing 
good and evil."21
For this passage to become intelligible, it is first neces­
sary to explain the usage "good and evil." It is a Hebrew
22idiom with the sense of "all things." The first couple has 
been promised an omniscience which will in turn bestow immor­
tality. But the serpent has lied to the woman, and his lie 
is the lie of historical humanity to itself, for as mankind
2®See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ide­
ology, Parts I and III (New York: International Publishers
Co., Inc., 1947), pp. 9 and 21.
^Genesis 3.2-5.
22Gerhard Von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary, tr. John H.
Marks (Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1961), p. 98.
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increases its exercise of cognition, the severality of exis­
tent things becomes increasingly apparent to consciousness. 
The consciousness which knows (in the Occidental sense of 
knowing finite things) is a consciousness which sensitized to 
the fact of its own impending terminus in defeat and death. 
This is hardly to be like God.
These accomplishments, the discovery of self in posses­
sion of persons and things and the amplification of individ­
ual selfhood in intellection are the material and ideal modes 
of historicization. Their consequence is the accursed burden 
of history.
To the woman he said,
"I will greatly multiply your pain in childbearing; 
in pain you shall bring forth children, 
yet your desire shall be for your husband, 
and he shall rule over you."
And to Adam he said,
"Because you have listened to the voice of your wife, 
and have eaten of the tree of which I commanded you,
'You shall not eat of it,'
cursed is the ground because of you;
in toil shall you eat of it all the days of your life; 
thorns and thistles it shall bring forth to you 
and you shall eat the plants of the field.
In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread 
till you return to the ground, 
for out of it you were taken; -
you are dust, and to dust you shall return." J
In both the Greek and Hebrew foundations of our European 
culture we witness a recognition of the same facts about his­
torical existence. That is, human existence in history is 
particular, and subject to a dominating misery which particu­
lar persons serve, as agents of cause, and encounter, as re­
cipients of effect. In the end there is death, at once the
23cenesis 3.16-19.
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cessation of historical man's project of particular finitude 
and the exposure of the false infinity to which this man pre­
tends. Historical man is unfree because he is ensnared within 
a series of causes which move him through a career of misery 
to his death. It is for this reason that the mediation of 
history in both Israel and Greece— and in the European cul­
ture which grew from their union— is the discovery of freedom.
The symbols which this study will examine make it plain 
that in its broadest possible meaning, freedom is the tri­
umph of life over death. If we speak of a free person or of 
a free polity, the ultimate meaning of our words is that the 
history of that person or polity has been so mediated that 
its intentions and actions enhance all life, and thus deny 
death its claim to a share in reality. Pre-history is life 
eternal, and freedom in history is the epiphany of life eter­
nal in time.
2. The Mediation of History
In seeking the origins of freedom in Mediterranean 
antiquity, the substance of this study will address the ques­
tion of mediation. In this introductory discussion, we iden­
tify the two types of approach to the problem of mediation. 
These are, in turn, the gnostic and the thymic or cardiac, 
the intellectual and the spiritual. The former attempt at 
mediation appears first in late antiquity and it is the prod­
uct of a burgeoning intellectualism combined with profound 
dissatisfaction over existential circumstance. The ideolo­
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gies of modern experience are heir to this combination. They 
share with it a scientism which promises release from the 
misery of historical existence. To illustrate this kind of 
thinking, we will examine Kant's essay on universal history. 
Of much higher antiquity is the mediative tendency which 
relies on the power of the heart to reach out for union with 
God and man. This tropism is pre-intellectual; it is the 
passion of passions. Its goal is no set of finite objects, 
but an embrace of life in its wholeness. To illustrate this 
truly archaic mode of mediation, we have chosen the paradigm 
of the Neighbor which appears in the Gospel according to 
Luke. The Neighbor is like the liberators to whose life- 
making activity our own history is the continuing witness.
The gnostic liberation from historical bondage is sci­
ence-dependent. It understands human misery to be the result 
of causality, and it imagines a private knowledge (gndsis) 
about the pattern of causes. This knowledge will facilitate 
the knower's deliverance from historical existence and its 
unhappiness. In its ancient form, gnosticism became associ­
ated with the Ptolemaic innovation in astronomy. Professor 
Burkitt wrote that before the Ptolemaic system became cur­
rent, Near Eastern peoples had conceived the universe as a 
tent with the earth as its floor. For the new astronomy the 
planets moved regularly around the earth in concentric 
spheres. Because of their regularity, they determined human 
life astrologically. The cosmos was thus a prison of sorts. 
The gnostic who knew the mysteries could pass through these
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life-determining spheres and reach the good God who dwelled 
beyond the spheres, and thus beyond all created existence in 
time. In this way he achieved a blissful freedom from experi­
ential reality.^
Modern ideology replicates in form and spirit the gnos­
ticism of late antiquity and it is no less troublesome than 
its ancestor. It appropriates both the general notion of 
science, causality, and also the specific understanding of 
whatever science is contemporaneously ascendant. Notions of 
mechanism and evolution are such specific ideas. Kant's
"Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose"
25is the initial effort in this genre. It applies the con-
^See F. C. Burkitt, Church and Gnosis: A Study of
Christian Thought and Speculation in the Second Century 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1932), pp. 30-33.
25That Kant's essay is the first of this type of pro­
gressive theory of history is the observation of R. G. 
Collingwood. The identification of the theory as ideology 
and as gnosis is our own. In this assessment, we follow the 
guideline which Voegelin established for judging political 
literature. That is, Kant's essay expects the eschatological 
event to occur in history. See R. G. Collingwood, The Idea 
of History (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1948), pp. 100-101,
and Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1952), chapter IV, sections 3 
and 4.
Since this study refers several times to Voegelin's 
theory of political gnosis, some comment is necessary.
Voegelin taught that modern ideological movements replicate 
the broad movement in late antiquity known as gnosticism.
They expect a qualitative change in the terms of historical 
existence, an essential modification of what Voegelin calls 
"the structure of reality." Accordingly, the eschaton of 
orthodox Christianity is moved within history by this gnosis, 
and given a secular, political coloration. From Puritanism 
to Maoism, this general pattern is evident.
Due to an interest in precision, we need to observe here 
that Voegelin's use of "gnosis" is based on an analogy. An­
cient gnosticism and modern ideology are analogous in that
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cept of mechanism to the problem of history. Ego derivative 
strife, like gravitation in nature, is conceived as the force 
which is leading history to its eventual perfection. This 
reliance on mechanism as the motor of human progress is cur­
ious, for it is the production of the author of the Second 
Critique, the most penetrating of the modern discussions of 
freedom.
Kant's essay understands by "history" the same range of 
evils which we have observed in the Iliad and in the fall of 
man from the perfection of the world-garden. Man's partial, 
historical qualities separate him from the life of concord 
which he would enjoy in their absence. But the evil of man's 
self-seeking activities is not complete unto itself. This 
evil has a beneficent underside in that it is the cause of 
all advances in both material and moral culture. Kant be­
lieved that the particularity of mankind in historical exis­
tence is in truth a subsidiary part of a greater process 
which is incrementally bringing universal peace, justice,
they expect and pursue a permanent end to the evil of exis­
tence in history; they attempt to re-enter the One of myth 
and womb. There are important differences, however. Ancient 
gnosticism was elitist and rigidly dualistic; modern ideology 
is democratic and monistic. Modern ideologues overcome the 
elitist-dualist tendency of the gnostic form by re-educating 
or killing those who are unable to participate in it. In 
this way, the lower level of the dual reality is eliminated. 
Because of this monistic transformation, modern ideology can 
be progressivist, unlike its ancestor. Finally, ancient 
gnosis was more spiritual than political. The politiciza­
tion of gnosticism is symptomatic of an even deeper trans­
formation which has taken place in modern symbolism and 
thought.
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lawfulness, and an international constitutional order.26 
Thus, like the gnostic cosmos, the Kantian world of histori­
cal existence is ostensibly a dungeon of torment. But Kant, 
like the gnostics, knows that all is not as it seems. In 
truth there is a secret staircase about whose location Kant—  
and those initiates who are privy to his syntactical myster­
ies— are knowledgable.
Proposition Eight is the crux of the essay.
The history of the human race as a whole can be 
regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature 
to bring about internally— and for this purpose also ex­
ternally— a perfect political constitution as the only 
possible state within which all natural capacities of 
mankind can be developed completely.
We can see that philosophy too may have its chiliastic 
expectations; but they are of such a kind that their 
fulfilment can be hastened, if only indirectly, by a 
knowledge of the idea they are based on, so that they are 
anything but over-fanciful. The real test is whether 
experience can discover anything to indicate a purpose­
ful natural process of this kind.
. . . [H]uman nature is such that it cannot be indif­
ferent even to the most remote epoch which may even­
tually affect our species, so long as this epoch can be 
expected with certainty. And in the present case, it is 
especially hard to be indifferent, for it appears that, 
we might by our own rational projects accelerate the 
coming of this period which will be so welcome to our 
descendants.27
^^See especially Proposition Four, "Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in Kant's Political 
Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970), p. 45. This appears to be a secularization of 
the Stoic-Augustinian theodicy which has it that the cosmos, 
or God, tolerates evil as a tributary force in the making of 
an ultimate good. The crucial difference between Kant and 
his predecessors is that Kant held that the ultimate beati­
tude would become manifest in history, through the "natural" 
workings of the historical process itself.
27Rant1s Political Writings, p. 50. Italics are from 
the text.
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The meaning is simple, even banal: Intellectuals should
learn to know the formula of the process so that they will be 
able to hasten its realization.
In his innocence, this gentle and erudite contemporary 
of Mozart bids his reader to put the theory to the test of 
experience. Experience has shown that the practitioners of 
this kind of gnosis were not patient men like Kant. They 
were indeed convinced chiliasts whose notions about the sci­
ence of racial types or of economic laws— analogous to Kant's 
mechanism— inspired their adherents to entirely un-Kantian 
behavior. Kant's "Universal History" is a very minor article 
within the philosopher's total effort. For those who took 
the progressive science of history so seriously as to make it 
the dominant theme of their lives, the effort to force his­
tory to display its latent perfection bore fruit which was 
quite different from Kant's imagined "perfect political con­
stitution." In pursuit of this vision of historical fulfil­
ment, the pursuers became less like Kant and more like 
Achilles. Rather than lead the world to beatitude, they made 
death more real than life. If experience is the test of the 
progressive theory, then the theory is false. The attempt 
to assist the historical process to its destined conclusion 
is diabolical. The consequence of chiliasm is not heaven in 
time, but an interminable last judgment of the damned.
The reason that the gnostic solution to the liberation 
of mankind from historical bondage has failed consistently 
is that there is no self-mediating process to be known— no
"hidden plan of nature"— in history. The most archaic docu­
ments of our culture inform us that history as history is a 
slave dominion wherein the particularity of mastery mandates 
a particularity of submission. The truth which obtains from 
a reflection on the origins of freedom in history is that 
this particularity causes mediation only inasmuch as wrong 
causes a perceived need for right. This is not to say that 
wrong is in some dialectical way a part of the right which 
responds against it, for wrong is— as the Anaximander frag­
ment implies— a part of nature proper, while right is divine. 
Bondage causes liberation in the same way that a burn causes 
therapy. If we are sane, we would never predicate "good" of 
a burn. We would predicate "good" of the healthy condition 
of the flesh before the burn, or of the healed condition of 
the flesh after the burn. If this is not understood, then 
it will seem that the mediation of history, liberation from 
bondage and abuse, is somehow automatic, and hence that human 
responsibility for the condition of the world is an option. 
Just as some burns are not treated and do not heal, but in­
volve the host in infection, pain, and death, so it is with 
the assertion of the particular self in history. If this 
particular assertion is not curbed by the power of a good 
will whose freedom is the condition of its determination by 
universal Reason, then the human project is left to history 
alone. Whenever this has happened, the generation of Lycaon 
is beckoned to Sheol in the flower of its youth.
The study of the origins of freedom show that history
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is mediated according to no inevitable process. Liberation 
occurs only when one appears who participates in the world- 
creative power which is the essence of divinity. This re­
sponsible creature opposes history without regard to personal 
safety or fortune, and in his opposition inheres the power to 
make free. Nowhere is this truth revealed with keener poign­
ancy than in the parable of the Samaritan, or more aptly, 
the parable of the Neighbor. This parable is the perfect 
vision of freedom for it shows its twofold nature. The 
Neighbor is free to turn outside of his own biography, and 
because of his turning, he is able to perform in history as
ooredeemer, as savior, as liberator.
O O^°The redeemer symbol xs from Israel, the savxor from 
Greece. Each reflects the experience of its culture with 
the threat of unfreedom and the event of liberation. Our 
European culture was constructed during the Roman period 
from the materials of these two Mediterranean cultures. Of 
the several documents which those cultures produced, none 
are more authoritative than the Synoptic gospels and the 
dialogues of Plato. The remarkable characteristic which 
these documents share is their nearly complete silence about 
freedom. Yet, when we read them, we recognize in them the 
trait which we identify at once as freedom. The parables of 
Jesus display this lesson consistently: negate the past,
begin anew. For our gestalt and its vocabulary, the newness 
of this commitment to the Kingdom is freedom itself, and 
indeed, Saint Paul taught us to understand it as such. Much 
the same is true of the Socratic understanding of the "Know 
thyself." To experience oneself as microcosmos is to become 
free of an ignorant and guilty past.
Why then the silence about freedom? Quite possibly it 
is because— as we will observe in the following chapter—  
"freedom" lends itself readily to a nominalization which sun­
ders connection with experienced reality. Moreover, the pop­
ular preoccupation with freedom tends to detract from the 
awesome weight of responsibility which freedom in its true 
meaning imposes. The identification of freedom with indi­
vidual whimsy is a consequence of popular fixation with indi­
viduation, the form of freedom, to the exclusion of the righ­
teousness which is freedom's empowering content. In view of
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This is the parable of the Neighbor:
"A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, 
and he fell among robbers, who stripped him and beat 
him, and departed, leaving him half dead. Now by 
chance a priest was going down that road; and when he 
saw him he passed by on the other side. So likewise a 
Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed 
by on the other side. But a Samaritan, as he journeyed, 
came to where he was; and when he saw him, he had com­
passion, and went to him and bound up his wounds, pour­
ing on oil and wine; then he set him on his own beast 
and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And 
the next day he took out two denarii and gave them to 
the innkeeper, saying, 'Take care of him; and whatever 
more you spend, I will repay you when I come back.'
Which of these three, do you think, proved neighbor to 
the man who fell among the robbers?" He said, "The one 
who showed mercy on him." And Jesus said to him, "Go 
and do likewise."29
The parable is a story about history and its mediation. 
Each of the characters in the story is a particular entity 
in his own history, going from one definite place to another, 
pursuing some finite goal. Inevitably, someone is injured 
as particular ambition is gratified. But there appears one 
who, upon beholding the injury, forgets in an eternal moment 
his own historicity. This forgetting of one's finite his­
torical past and its projected future in the blessed moment 
is the primary event of liberation, for it is the moment in
these hazards, our most authoritative texts decline to name 
the reality to whose presence they point.
In the Synoptics, the one important usage which our 
translations render as "liberty" is a quotation by Jesus from 
Trito Isaiah (Luke 4.8). It is significant that the Greek 
term here is an inflection of aphesis, not eleutheria, the 
standard term for "freedom" whose connotations in the Helle­
nistic vocabulary were as numerous as those of our own word. 
Aphesis is more restrictive; it has the sense of release 
from bondage following upon the forgiveness of debt or crime.
29Luke 10.30-37.
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which man remembers— in the Platonic sense of remembering—  
the wholeness which is his permanent being. This is the 
moment in which the liberator is himself created, and 
pursuant upon his own creation follows his recreation of the 
historical world. The Neighbor within history is the ana­
logue of God before history.
We recognize Moses and Solon as liberators because of 
the obviously liberative character of their accomplishments, 
but it is important to understand that beneath the practical­
ity of any liberation there dwells an empowering mass which 
is primarily ontic. The Samaritan is neither traveller nor 
rescuer nor healer, nor even "good." In a substantive sense 
the Samaritan i£ Neighbor. It is because of the amplitude 
of this symbol that we have chosen this parable to introduce 
the liberative mediation of history. A neighbor is no iso­
late particle in a fated progression; he is instead the 
cosmos in completion for his fellow men. He is the adversary 
of fate. Because he is Neighbor, the Samaritan obtains both 
inclination and power to act against the demonic current of 
history. Like Adam in the world-garden, the Samaritan as 
Neighbor is opaque to himself. His finite identity and am­
bition have fallen away; he interrupts his journey. Like 
Adam, the powerful namer, the Neighbor shows his power as 
restorer.
There remains one consideration about the symbolism of 
the parable of the Neighbor. In this story there is no pre­
tense to a false beatitude. There is no chiliasm. The en­
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tire narrative takes place within history. The Samaritan 
does not take the victim of the robbers to heaven; he takes 
him to a hotel. He does not place him in the charge of 
angels; he pays money to the innkeeper for services rendered. 
For an inquiry which is concerned with the origins of free­
dom and the archaic meaning of the concept of freedom, this 
imagery is extremely significant. The documents which in­
struct us about the origins of freedom make it plain that 
freedom is a reality which requires an improvement of the 
structures of the object world in time. The Marcionite wish 
to transport the meaning of life away from its concrete em­
bodiment in the structures of created existence is the most 
menacing of all heresies.30 To succumb to this wish is to 
leave the world to the mercy of tyrants and slave merchants. 
This study of the origins of freedom reveals that the concern 
from which all of our ideas about freedom would grow is a 
charitable concern about the miserable condition of man in 
history. The neighborly response to this concern was not to 
redefine meanings so as to conceal the inevitability of his­
30The revival of this attitude has been one achievement 
of the existential movement. Consider this passage from 
Berdyaev: "God is certainly not the constructor of the
world order, or an administrator of the whole world. God is 
the meaning of human existence." (See Nicolai Berdyaev, 
Slavery and Freedom, tr. R. M. French [New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1948], p. 87.) The ancients believed that 
God was the meaning of existence because of his involvement 
as constructor (Israel) or as administrator (Greece) of the 
world in time. Freedom came into history as a viable, pal­
pable consequence of this belief; it has no concrete mean­
ing apart from the belief that existence in time is in some 
sense a vessel for divine reality.
torical existence. It was instead to remember the whole 
meaning of life which historical man had forgotten. To 
remember is to enter into the truth which makes man free.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF FREEDOM
1. Two Articulations of Freedom
This study is an exercise in looking backward to a time 
of origins. For this reason, the materials which this chap­
ter examines are of passing interest. That is to say, we 
must pass them on the way to the origins of freedom, and we 
must cognize them as we pass them, for there is no way to get 
to the origins of freedom in history without passing through 
the Hellenistic period of late antiquity. The Hellenistic 
age is the great intersection which couples modern life and 
thought with its true and firm moorings in high antiquity.
The age effects this coupling, usually not with deep in­
sights of its own, but rather through the articulation of a 
conventional vocabulary which associates the later life and 
thought of Europe with the early, seminal insights of Israel 
and Greece. Terms such as "law of nature" and "right reason" 
become conventional in this period. The symbol "freedom," 
as a basic goal of life, is also conventionalized in this 
period.
As the Hellenistic age emptied itself into the new, Ro­
man age, two competing understandings of freedom were artic­
ulated. One of these is the Stoic position. The freedom 
teaching of the Stoa is properly Hellenistic; it is "indige­
nous" to its time, an ideology of sorts. As such, it afforded 
philosophic foundation for caesarism, and also, as we will
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show, a formula for the criticism of imperial tyranny.'*' The 
other understanding is that of the Christian New Testament.
It is basically anti-Hellenistic. Both survive in European 
thought.
The freedom which the Stoa advocates is "nominal" free­
dom. The Stoa reveres the term "freedom," but it has little 
interest in the affairs which common sense always identifies 
with freedom, i.e., affairs of real and daily human life. 
Beyond a strict personal regimen which is called freedom, the 
Stoa does not identify freedom with physical well being or 
with economic independence or with a permanent and powerful 
involvement in the life of one's civic community. The most 
immediate and pervasive explanation for the Stoa's subjec­
tivist understanding of freedom is its intense mentalism.
The Stoa did not embrace the Hellenistic dualism of mind (or
soul) and body until the teaching of Poseidonius appeared in
2the first century B.C. But it seems that such a develop­
ment was inevitable, given the emphasis on mental control of 
all life which is central to the Stoa. If we identify the 
truly beingful part of humanity as its mind, and if we imag­
ine concomitantly that the body is essentially a stranger to 
the mind, then freedom will seem to be an affair which has 
little to do with one's visible existence in the world. In-
^For the Stoic foundation of the Augustan design of em­
pire, see Moses Hadas, Hellenistic Civilization: Fusion and
Diffusion (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp.
251 ff. and 284 ff.
oJ. M. Hist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1969), pp. 211-218.
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s t e a d ,  f r e e d o m  w i l l  b e  i n t e r n a l  a n d  i n v i s i b l e ,  a  m e n t a l  d i s ­
p o s i t i o n  w h i c h  a s s e r t s  i t s e l f  i n  o b j e c t i v e  r e a l i t y  o n l y  o n  a  
s p o r a d i c  b a s i s .  P h i l o  t e l l s  u s  t h a t  Z e n o ,  t h e  f o u n d e r  o f  
t h e  S t o a ,  s h o w e d  h i s  f r e e d o m  w h e n  h e  c h e w e d  o f f  h i s  o w n  t o n g u e  
s o  a s  t o  a v o i d  g i v i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h o s e  w h o  w e r e  t o r t u r ­
i n g  him. E v e n  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a  d o c t r i n e  w h i c h  h o l d s  
t h a t  t h e  b o d y  i s  n e g l i g i b l e ,  o r  w o r s e ,  s u c h  a n  e x a m p l e  s p e a k s  
l o u d e r  t h a n  w o r d s .
The Stoa uses the word "freedom," but it departs grossly 
from the concrete and palpable meaning which this word held 
for the period in antiquity in which freedom emerged. From 
Stoic freedom to Gnostic bliss there is not too long a step, 
since both have ceased to respect the body as the objective 
and visible vessel of human life. In this chapter we exam­
ine the Stoic position on freedom as it appears in Philo (20 
B.C.-50 A.D.) and Epictetus (50 A.D.-135 A.D.).  ̂ The atti­
tude of these two writers regarding the meaning of freedom 
is much the same. They are especially pertinent in this 
chapter since they occupy the same period in which the New 
Testament "structure of freedom" was propounded.
S t o i c  f r e e d o m  i s  n o m i n a l ,  b u t  C h r i s t i a n  f r e e d o m  i s  r e a l .
^Philo Judaesus, Every Good Man Is Free, 108.
^Philo is not usually considered to be a Stoic. The 
great task of his life was to assimilate the Hebrew Scrip­
tures to the vocabulary and mentality of the Hellenistic 
world view. He belongs in this discussion however because 
his freedom treatise is essentially Stoic. F. H. Colson, 
the translator and editor of the complete Philo .collection, 
identifies the treatise as an argument in support of the 
Stoic paradox. See F. H. Colson, tr. Philo, IX (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1940),2.
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The freedom teaching of the New Testament is the authentic 
link which connects the modern appreciation of freedom with 
the origins of freedom in Greek and Israelite antiquity.
New Testament freedom is real because its freedom is a visi­
ble, daily affair; it is more than a venerable name, more 
even than a disposition of the mind. Freedom in the New Tes­
tament is real in the sense that it integrates mind and body 
in a program of action which seeks to accomplish the salva­
tion of person and world. The New Testament Christianity 
then is at base anti-Hellenistic. It begins in Palestine 
with the ministry of Jesus. Near the beginning of that min­
istry, the earliest of the Synoptic gospels establishes that
the forgiveness of sins— an internal rectification— is not
1
by itself a complete restoration of the person. The body is
5to be healed as well. The Apostles Creed's insistence on 
the resurrection of the body is anti-Hellenistic in the ex­
treme. Christian freedom, moreover, is not individual. Like 
the freedom which was first emergent in earlier antiquity it 
is freedom which obtains in an organized community, the 
church. The church is neither a nation in the Israelite 
sense, nor is it a Greek polis. But it is nonetheless a 
real community which imparts a substantive identity to the 
members who participate in it. Freedom is the modality by 
which this participation becomes possible.
The New Testament teaching of freedom is articulated 
in the writings of Paul and the Fourth Evangelist. Paul under-
5Mark 2.3-12.
42
s t a n d s  C h r i s t i a n  f r e e d o m  i n  t e r m s  o f  a  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  o t h e r  
p o s s i b l e  d i s p o s i t i o n s  t o w a r d  l i f e .  T h i s  c o n t r a s t  c a r r i e s  
w i t h  i t s e l f  a  n e w  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d  s t a t u s  d i s t i n c t i o n s  i n  t h e  
w o r l d ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t o w a r d  t h e  s o c i o - l e g a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  
f r e e m a n  a n d  s l a v e .  T h e  F o u r t h  E v a n g e l i s t ' s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  
f r e e d o m  i s  c o n c e p t u a l l y  o r g a n i z e d .  T h a t  w r i t e r ' s  a r t i c u l a ­
t i o n  i n s t r u c t s  t h e  c o r e  t h e s i s  o f  t h i s  s t u d y ,  w h i c h  i s  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  i n  h i s t o r i c a l  r e a l i t y  a  " s t r u c t u r e  o f  f r e e d o m "  w h i c h  
c a n  b e  f o u n d  i n  b o t h  t h e  a n c i e n t  a n d  m o d e r n  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  
f r e e d o m .  T h i s  s t r u c t u r e  o f  f r e e d o m  c o n s i s t s  i n  a n  i n c u r s i o n  
i n t o  h i s t o r i c a l  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  b e i n g f u l  r e a l i t y  w h i c h  we 
h a v e  u n d e r s t o o d  a s  t h e  p r e h i s t o r i c  e n d o w m e n t  o f  h u m a n i t y .
T h i s  b e i n g f u l  r e a l i t y  i s  d i v i n e ,  a n d  a s  m a n  b e c o m e s  o p e n  t o  
i t ,  h i s  o p e n n e s s  f r e e s  h i m  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e .  T h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  
f r e e d o m  p o s e s  t w o  g r e a t  m o m e n t s  w h i c h  m e e t  i n  a n  h i s t o r i c a l  
p r e s e n t .  T h e s e  a r e  t h e  m o m e n t s  o f  n e g a t i o n  a n d  p o s i t i o n .  
F r e e d o m  n e g a t e s  a n  o l d  p r e s e n t  a n d  m a k e s  i t  p a s t ,  w h i l e  i t  
p o s i t s  a  n e w ,  s u p r a - h i s t o r i c a l  p r e s e n t  a s  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  
a  h u m a n  f u t u r e  w h i c h  w i l l  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  d i v i n e  m e a s u r e .
^ n  o r d e r  t o  e l u c i d a t e  t h i s  s t r u c t u r e  o f  f r e e d o m ,  t h i s  
c h a p t e r  e x a m i n e s  i n  t u r n  t h e  S t o i c  p a r a d o x  o f  f r e e d o m  a s  i t  
o c c u r s  i n  P h i l o  a n d  E p i c t e t u s ,  a n d  t h e n  t h e  New T e s t a m e n t  
f o r m u l a t i o n .  T h e  S t o i c  p o s i t i o n  i s  l a r g e l y  a  d i s t o r t i o n  o f  
t h e  a n c i e n t  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  a n d  t h i s  d i s t o r t i o n  i s  w o r t h  i n ­
v e s t i g a t i n g  i n  o r d e r  t o  s h o w  w h a t  f r e e d o m  i s  n o t .  B u t  e v e n  
i n  t h i s  m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  f r e e d o m  t h e r e  i s  a  p a r t i a l  mem­
o r y  o f  w h a t  f r e e d o m  h a d  m e a n t  t o  t h e  o l d ,  p r e - i m p e r i a l  w o r l d  
o f  a n t i q u i t y .  T h e  C h r i s t i a n  f r e e d o m  t e a c h i n g  o f  P a u l  a n d
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the Fourth Evangelist remembers clearly the early meaning of 
freedom, and preserves this meaning for the European future.
2. Nominal Freedom in Philo and Epictetus 
In the following passage from his treatise on freedom, 
Philo describes an event which took place in his home city, 
Alexandria:
A short time ago, when some players were acting a trag­
edy, and reciting those lines of Euripides,
The name of freedom is worth all the world;
If one has little, let him think that much,
I saw the whole audience so carried away by enthusiasm 
that they stood upright to their full height, and rais­
ing their voices above the actors, burst into shout af­
ter shout of applause combining praise of the maxim 
with praise of the poet, who glorifies not only free­
dom for what it does, but even its name.®
It is clear from this description that by the time in which
Philo writes, the noun "freedom" has begun to command a kind
of totem power, not only with philosophers and poets, but
with the Hellenized audience as well.^ It is possible that
the power of the name increases in proportion to the loss of
real freedom that an historical community has suffered. If
this is the case, the emotive response to the name "freedom"
conveys a deep and largely unconscious feeling of opposition
to unfree circumstances.
This inflation of the name "freedom" is familiar to us,
^Philo Judaeus, Every Good Man Is Free, tr. F. H. Col­
son, Vol. IX (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 194 0),
141.
7Concerning the nominalization of "freedom" at the on­
set of the Hellenistic age, see Max Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek 
Life and Thought, tr. Carl Lofmark (Dordrecht, Holland: D.
Reidel Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 106-107.
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for modern symbolization parallels to some extent the Helle­
nistic increment in audibility of the term, "freedom." That 
is to say, real freedom is historically rooted in the life of 
an independent community. When great empires arise and de­
stroy the autonomy of communities, as in late antiquity, or 
when centralizing economic and political structures supplant 
the old, liberal pattern of human organization, as in moder­
nity, there is a concomitant loss of real freedom. But the 
loss of the material basis of the free life of a community 
does not entail that the symbol lose its power. In Helle­
nistic, as in modern times, the symbol retains and even in­
creases in power. If political reality is implacably obstrep­
erous in its resistance to the exercise of real freedom in 
the community, then the symbol lodges its power in the im­
material endowment of the human person. The mind or the soul 
becomes the dwelling place for freedom, and the bodily real­
ity is consigned to insignificance and disgrace. This ex­
plains why in Stoicism and Gnosticism in antiquity, and in 
existentialism in modernity, freedom takes an intensely per-
Osonal configuration. In certain times there is no alter­
native. The symbol can be kept warm and vital only if it is
^Thus, R. M. Grant speculates that Gnosticism does not 
originate simply from the Hellenistic world view with its 
dualism. Rather, he believes that its primary spring is from 
Jewish apocalyptic. In Roman Palestine during the early em­
pire, there were several insurrections against Rome which 
were inspired by the apocalyptic vision that God was about 
to restore autonomy to the Jewish nation. These insurrec­
tions were crushed with great carnage. When it became evi­
dent that the apocalyptic vision would not achieve material 
success, that vision was followed by a Gnostic retreat into 
the self. See R. M. Grant, Gnosticism and Early Christian­
ity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 27 ff.
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held close against the bosom. That the meaning of the sym­
bol is distorted is an unfortunate, but necessary, consequence 
of its subjectivization.
The Stoic paradox about freedom shows the extent of the 
personalist distortion of freedom. The paradox is stated in 
several ways. Philo's title conveys one formulation: "Every
Good Man is Free." Several centuries earlier, Zeno, who had 
been influenced by the paradigmatic lives of Socrates and 
the Cynics, Diogenes and Crates, had originally formulated 
the paradox in terms of wisdom; the wise man alone has both
Qvirtue and freedom. In either formulation, it is undeniable 
that there is an authentic historical thread, since the early 
records of freedom show that the men who are most free are 
indeed good and wise, and that they are conspicuously better 
and wiser than the common run of men. If we know nothing 
else of Solon, we know that he was good and wise, and that 
his goodness and wisdom influenced his work. But the Stoic 
formulations are nonetheless paradoxical because the Stoic 
doctrine insists that it is only those who are good and wise 
who are free. This idea is in conflict with experiential 
reality, for in that reality, there are some men who are 
wicked or stupid, or both, and who are likewise free and per­
haps even wealthy and powerful. Likewise, there are some 
men who are good and wise who are slaves, chattels of men 
who are quite possibly inferior to themselves in terms of
^Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Book 
VII, 121.
46
goodness and wisdom. The intention of the Stoa in asserting 
this paradox is to accuse men who are materially free, but 
who are wicked as well, and thus to convert them from wicked­
ness to goodness. Likewise, the paradox tends to encourage 
people of low station who are good to continue in their good­
ness, by assuring them that they are free despite their ma­
terial circumstances. The most manifest accomplishment of 
the Stoic paradox however is to make "freedom" a purely nom­
inal term which lacks existential relevance.
There are two main forces which prompt the Stoic nomi- 
nalization of freedom. One is the rise of cosmopolitan em­
pires and the consequent dwarfment of the old communities in 
which freedom took form. The other is closely related to 
this. It is that the immorality of slavery had become trans­
parent while slavery remained a necessity for the maintenance 
of an advanced, highly differentiated historical existence. 
With the reduction of old national and political boundaries 
to inconsequentiality before imperial authority, it became 
difficult to maintain a theory of natural slavery. If all 
are subject to Rome, then it is hard to convince oneself that 
one's own people are inherently superior to all other peoples 
and that they can be rightfully enslaved. Already in the 
writing of Aristotle, when the cosmopolitan age was dawning, 
natural slavery was an idea that could be asserted only with 
caution and much stipulation.11 The Stoa had to comprehend
l^See Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and Thought, pp. 
112-114.
11See Aristotle, Politics, 1253b-1255b. If Diogenes
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the historical fact that Diogenes, one of its early models, 
had in fact been enslaved.
When the evil of slavery has become transparent, three 
remedies present themselves. The first is abolition. In all 
of antiquity, only one group advocated this solution. This 
was the Jewish Essene sect in Palestine.1"* It is symptomatic 
that the Essenes lived a simple, pious, community life which 
showed a much lower degree of historical development and dif- 
ferentation than did the ambient world. Like more recent 
forms of egalitarian communalism, this group approximated 
the Unitarian pattern of the pre-historic Age of Cronos or 
world-garden, and was thus empowered to resist the slave in­
stitution which is consequent upon historical variegation.
A second remedy is that chosen by Christianity. For present 
purposes, it is enough to say that Christianity weakened 
slavery as an institution without demanding its abolition.
The third remedy was that of the Stoa. By defining reality 
in terms of paradox, it was possible to tolerate virtually 
any practise by establishing a mental distance which makes 
the world of daily conduct seem small and minor. This de-
Laertius' reproduction of Aristotle's will is authentic, It 
seems that Aristotle was ambivalent about the institution 
which his Politics defends as a natural, and mutually bene­
ficial relationship between master and slave. The will 
orders the manumission of Aristotle's slaves upon his death. 
See Diogenes Laertius, Lives, Book V, 15.
l^Epictetus, Discourses, IV, I.
13William L. Westermann, The Slave Systems of Greek and 
Roman Antiquity (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Soci-
ety, 1955), p. 117.
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tachment could even lead to a sort of establishmentarian cal­
lousness. Diogenes Laertius tells us that Chrysippus taught 
as follows about Zeno and his disciples in respect of their 
wisdom and freedom:
. . . the wise are infallible, not being.liable to er­
ror. They are also without offence; for they do no 
hurt to others or to themselves. At the same time they 
are not pitiful and make no allowance for anyone; they 
never relax the penalties fixed by the laws, since in­
dulgence and pity and even equitable consideration are 
marks of a weak mind, which affects kindness in place 
of chastizing. Nor do they deem punishments too se­
vere.
This is an example of the cultivated apathy of the Stoic.
The Stoic understood "pathos" not simply as suffering, but
as disease itself, and the disease is a condition inhering
in the sensory manifold which is at base an endowment of the 
15human body. To be without the disease of compassion is 
thus as desirable as to be without the disease of lust. This 
uncharitable mien becomes possible whenever the inner life 
becomes radically detached from the career of the body in 
the world. Even the slave who subscribes to this philosophy 
can view with detachment what happens to his body in the 
world, because he does not believe that what happens to that 
body is really happening to himself.
The Stoa's paradoxical use of the name "freedom" leads 
the Stoa to an absurdist travesty of commonly experienced 
reality. Within this absurdity however there is a genuine,
l ^ D i o g e n e s  Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, tr.
R. D. Hicks, Vol. II, Book VII (Cambridge: Harvard Univer- 
sity Press, 1965), 123.
1!*Rist, Stoic Philosophy, pp. 72-73.
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political opposition, a negation of present political evil, 
and thus, incipiently, an understanding of true freedom. 
Beneath both absurdity and opposition there dwells a memory 
of the real freedom of old. This memory is not even conver­
sant with the twisting of freedom which the paradox has 
accomplished. It is a pure memory. We must now examine in 
turn these three aspects of the Stoic freedom teaching: its
absurdity, its oppositional force, its memory.
In developing his main theme that to be good (or some­
times Philo says "wise") is to be free, Philo argues that to 
be sold does not make one a slave.1® If a member of a fam­
ily is kidnapped and is subsequently ransomed by the family, 
the fact of his having been ransomed does not make him a 
slave to the family. If a person kidnapped or taken captive 
in war is sold to a master, this does not make him a slave 
if he is really a free ( = good) person. Beautiful young 
girls in this situation are often able to turn the master 
into their own "slave." (It is hard to see how this con­
nects with the thesis that the good are inherently free. 
Furthermore, Philo withholds comment on what alternatives 
lie for those who are no longer young and beautiful; the way 
in which their goodness stays enslavement remains problem­
atic.) This argument concludes with the following passage:
If selling constitutes slavery we should have to assert 
that a person who had bought some lions is master of 
the lions, whereas if the beasts do but turn menacing 
eyes upon him, the poor man will learn at once by ex­
perience the cruel and ferocious lordship of those whom
iGphilo, Every Good Man Is Free, 37-40.
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he has purchased. Well then must we not suppose that 
if lions cannot, still less can the wise man be enslaved, 
who has in his free and unscathed soul a greater power 
of resistance to the yoke than any he could make with 
the naturally slavish body and all the vigour of its 
physical strength?17
If Philo had ever seen a lion pacing from wall to wall in a 
cage, the power of his convictions must have led him to sup­
pose that the cat had resolved, as an act of will, to take 
exercise. The image of the captive lion, and the implicit 
contrast of this animal with the same beast in its natural 
setting, show the extent of the Stoic paradox's deviation 
from the standards which are established in visible reality. 
The imputation of invisible qualities as compensation for 
visible imperfection is a symptom of powerlessness and decay. 
Visibly, the caged lion is not free. The caged lion can be 
free only if the term "lion" is understood as an exact syn­
onym for "free." In this event, verbal representation has 
ceased to admit any binding connection to visible reality.
Such absurdities are frequent in Epictetus, and in their 
political implications they approach satire.
In his long discourse, "On the Calling of the Cynic," 
Epictetus places the following words in the mouth of the 
Cynic whom he holds up as a model for all men:
Look at me, I have no house or city, property or slave:
I sleep on the ground, I have no wife or children, no 
miserable palace, but only earth and sky and one poor 
cloak. Yet what do I lack? Am I not quit of pain and 
fear, am I not free?1®
■^Philo, Every Good Man Is Free, 40.
18Epictetus, Discourses, in The Stoic and Epicurean 
Philosophers, ed. Whitney J. Oates, III, XXII (New York:
Random House, 1940), 380.
Now the early cynics of whom Epictetus was thinking as he.
spoke thus were rather like a Callicles who had been converted 
19to philosophy. They were fierce ascetics who despised the 
ordinary customs, pleasures, and status distinctions of set­
tled life. In this passage from Epictetus, however, we are 
not concerned about its historical model of early cynicism, 
but about its understanding of freedom. The speaker asks, 
rhetorically, about one who has ho house, city, property, 
family, wardrobe, "Am I not quit of pain and fear, am I not 
free?" Epictetus is entirely serious here; this is not sat­
ire. But from a common sense point of view, it is absurd.
The attributes which Epictetus has summed up as "free" are 
more commonly understood as the attributes of a slave. The 
Genesis story of Hagar and her son, which we will examine in 
the following chapter, shows a far more primitive and non­
intellectual approach to the visible life circumstance of 
one who has no property or tribal identity. She is not "quit 
of pain and fear" because of these attributes. On the con­
trary, pain and fear are the salient facts of experience for 
her. Finally, Hagar has incurred the attributes of homeless-
19In Plato's Gorgias, Callicles savagely advances the 
sophistic argument that nature is at odds with social con­
vention and law. He thus rejects Socrates and all that Plato 
understood the paradigmatic life of Socrates to imply. Cyn­
icism later embraced the paradigmatic life of Socrates, but 
maintained also the ascendancy of nature over convention. 
Cynicism's use of this sophistic concept resulted in a doc­
trine of human equality which rejects conventional distinc­
tions amongst men. One consequence of this must obviously 
be to cast suspicion upon slavery. See Plato, Gorgias, 482e- 
484c; Diogenes Laertius, Lives, Book VI, 38; Hadas, Hellen­
istic Culture, pp. 13-16.
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ness, etc., because she is a slave and is therefore powerless 
20to avoid them. The contrast of the Hagar who has been cast 
out of the household to the Cynic through whom Epictetus 
speaks shows in the most pronounced way the contrast between 
the old understanding of freedom and slavery and its late, 
subjectivist distortion. In Epictetus, there is a veritable 
"transvaluation of values" by which the visible marks of slav 
ery are transformed into badges of virtue and of freedom as 
well.
There is more than this, however, in the absurdities 
of Epictetus. We behold a real power and bravery in the way 
in which Epictetus reduces the common goals of life to absurd' 
ity. One suspects that in the philosopher's heart, it is 
not the common goals that are wrong, but rather that in his 
time and place, they become wrong because one must seek them 
within the world tyranny of Caesar. In his discourse "On 
Freedom," Epictetus details the career of the slave who is 
set f r e e . T h e  slave imagines that all will be well when he 
is set free, but his yearning for freedom is only the begin­
ning of his troubles. He will have to pay a tax on his manu­
mission. The slave believes that his status hampers him, and 
that freedom will mean equality, self mastery, freedom of 
movement. But actually he will get hungry after he is freed, 
and then he will have to enter prostitution or be reduced to 
a state of free labor even more menial than was his lot as a
^®See Genesis 21.14-16.
^Epictetus, Discourses, IV, I.
slave. Or he may become rich, and then he will fall in love
with a slave girl who will make him miserable. He will wish
to be a slave again. To make his freedom tolerable, he will
enter the military and work his way up in it. "Lastly, when
he gets the crown to his career and is made a senator, once
more he becomes a slave again as he goes to the senate; then
22he enjoys the noblest, and sleekest slavery of all."
This argument continues that the highest stage of slav­
ery is to be Caesar's friend, for to do this one must become 
a flatterer. A flatterer must speak and act against his own 
will, and thus he is in truth a slave. In the course of ad­
vocating the Stoic, personalist conception of the free will, 
the choice of materials which Epictetus uses to illustrate 
the thesis allows him to accuse the whole political system.
The conceptual absurdity that the slave is free and the free­
man slave is employed to expose an existential absurdity in 
which to be great amongst men entails the loss of honesty 
and self mastery.
The idea that the friend of the emperor is in truth a 
slave is a satire whose intensity can hardly be grasped within 
a world in which chattel slavery has been abandoned. This 
satire has become possible because the name "freedom" is sep­
arated from the historical circumstances in which freedom 
came to flourish. Freedom for the Stoa is not the commonly 
shared characteristic of the non-slave males of a community. 
Rather, it is a personal and subjective ability to will the
22Epictetus, Discourses, IV, I, 408.
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good and to prohibit the body from interfering with the will. 
For this reason, Stoic freedom enlarges the personal realm 
at the expense of the public, common realm. The Stoic idea 
of freedom maintains a connection to the political sphere, 
however, through its opposition to political evil. Opposition 
is articulated in characteristically Hellenistic terms. One 
opposes the tyrant by maintaining the integrity of the soul. 
The integrity of the soul is maintained by the forfeiture of 
the body.
Philo believes that many people who are free will pre­
fer death and dismemberment to enslavemeht. He recites a 
list of individuals and peoples) b6th mythical and histori­
cal, who went willingly to death rather than accept tyranny 
and e n s l a v e m e n t . ^  Epictetus engages the tyrant in a dia­
logue. (Is he thinking of Domitian?) The eloquence of his 
contempt eludes paraphrase. He speaks thus to the tyrant:
For who pays regard to you as a man? Show me. Who 
wishes to become like you? Who regards you as one like 
Socrates to admire and follow?
"But I can behead you."
Well said. I forgot, of course, one ought to pay 
you worship as if you were fever or cholera, and raise
an altar to you, like the altar to Fever in Rome.
What is it then which disturbs and confounds the 
multitude? Is it the tyrant and his guards? Nay, God 
forbid! It is impossible for that which is free by 
nature to be disturbed or hindered by anything but it­
self. It is a man's own judgments which disturb him.
For when the tyrant says to a man, "I will chain your 
leg," he that values his leg says, "Nay, have mercy," 
but he that values his will says, "If it seems more 
profitable to you, chain it."
"Do you pay no heed?"
No, I pay no heed.
"I will show you that I am master."
2 3 p h i l o ,  Every Good Man Is Free, 105-120.
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How can you? Zeus gave me my freedom. Or do you 
think that he was likely to let his own son be enslaved? 
You are master of my dead body, take it.
"Do you mean that when you approach me, you pay no 
respect to me?"
No, I only pay respect to myself; if you wish me to
say that I pay respect to you too, I tell you that I do
so, but only as I pay respect to my water pot.24
This impiety toward one who rules the world and is wor­
shipped as a deity is shocking. It bespeaks an opposition 
which approaches real negativity, for while neither Philo nor 
Epictetus promulgates a doctrine of negative freedom, the 
ingredients of the understanding are present here. The re­
spect of tyrants is a result of wrong opinions, and wrong 
opinions are the result of letting one's disposition toward 
life be influenced by forces other than one's own will.25 
The free will of the free person thus stands solid against
the material might of the tyrant, and inasmuch as it is given
to immaterial resolve to negate material force, Stoic free­
dom does negate tyranny. That it must negate the tyrant's 
venom by annihilating the body may seem to be foreign to any 
discussion in which "freedom" can be intelligible, but this 
is not the case. While the Stoa deprecated the body, Judaism 
and Christianity respected it, but all were required at this 
period in history to render up the body in order to avoid 
imperial contamination of the most sacred things.
Furthermore, one must consider the alternative to this 
Stoic forfeiture of the body. Stoic negativity remains polit-
24Epictetus, Discourses, I, XIX, 257.
25Epictetus, Discourses, I, XIX, 259.
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ical; it does not become cosmic. Although the Stoa rids the 
soul of its earlier, intimate ties to the material world, 
the separation is not absolute. The Stoa continues to show 
concern for right political order in the world, although the 
concrete means for making this concern effectual have van­
ished. The Stoa does not push the anthropological dualism 
of soul and body to its cosmic conclusion. It does not be­
come Gnosticism! Even in the transvalued world in which 
Stoic freedom takes form, the world itself is not damnable. 
Instead, the world is providential. The Stoa negates not 
the world, but the tyrant. Political evil occurs, as in old 
Greece, as a function of ignorance, misorientation to the 
true pattern. When the world is viewed thus, it is still 
important to show political concern. The new, personal free­
dom of the Stoa thus retains a limited connection to polit­
ical reality. This connection obtains as a personal nega­
tivity against tyranny.
The political gradient of Stoic freedom is negative.
It is problematical whether there is anything in this phi­
losophy that can be identified as positive freedom. The 
commitment of the Stoic "free" will to duty is well known,
9 £but this is a determined commitment. There is no "if" 
here; there is no dialogue within the soul over the question 
of openness or closure. Indeed, in the old Stoa, and again 
in Epictetus, there is a conscious refusal to accept the 
soul as a multi-tropic composite which may act reasonably or
2^See Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and Thought, 136-
137.
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unreasonably, freely or unfreely, according to the particular 
element which has come to dominance. Instead, the soul is a 
unitary structure which sometimes commands but always con­
sents to events; thus it is necessarily "free." For the 
Stoic then, the great lesson in life is to follow, lest one 
be dragged. In either case, nothing truly happens against 
the will. All is in some sense voluntary.^7 inasmuch as 
the unitary, subjective will is a subsidiary part of world 
reason, there can be no real freedom. The Stoa is quite 
right in its understanding that freedom consists in willing 
and doing good, but its assumption that the will is always 
inclined to the good is at odds with experience. Just as 
the Stoic paradox denies the physical reality of slavery, 
the doctrine of the free and good will denies the metaphys­
ical reality of slavery. That is to say, it minimizes the 
reality and power of evil in man and the world. The Stoic 
position then is not a doctrine of freedom which is won 
through struggle against physical bondage and base inclina­
tion. Instead, it is ideal determination. This ideal de­
terminism approximates to a theory of mechanism which be­
comes reminiscent of the gnostic ideologies of modernity. 
Epictetus tells us that the calling of the citizen is to be 
totally absorbed in the process, to be like a hand or foot 
which, if it had reason, would subordinate every impulse to 
the pattern of the whole body. This thought concludes:
That is why it is well said by philosophers that "if
^See Rist, Stoic Philosophy, pp. 42-44 and 127-132.
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the good man knew coming events beforehand he would help 
on nature, even if it meant working with disease, death 
and maiming," for he would realize that by the ordering 
of the universe this task is allotted him, and that the 
whole is more commanding than the part and the city 
than the citizen. "But seeing that we do not know be­
forehand, it is appropriate that we should hold fast to 
the things that are by nature more fit to be chosen; 
for indeed we are born for this."28
As in his negativity, Epictetus stops short of gnosis in his
positivity. We do not know the entire pattern, but if we
did . . . There can be no doubt that this statement and
others like it display a positive attunement to right reason,
the metaphysical core of reality. But they have nothing to
do with freedom, except perhaps in an undilutedly nominal
sense.29
^Epictetus, Discourses, II, X, 29.
29it is significant that when Paul uses this same meta­
phor of the church as a composite body in I Corinthians, 
chapters 12-14, the problem of the body's proper coordination 
is not viewed as a problem involving knowledge of a pattern. 
Knowledge is singled out for demotion in importance. In­
stead it is a problem of love. If one has love, then one 
will function in harmony with the other members of the body. 
If we reduce this Pauline treatment to Stoic language, the 
problem which Paul poses is: "Is your will free? Have you
been moved by love?" For the Stoa, the issue remains: "Your
will is free. Are you wise enough to manifest this freedom?" 
The Pauline treatment, rather than the Stoic, suggests the 
tension of freedom and unfreedom within the core of the self, 
i.e., the part that loves, the part out of which free posi­
tivity proceeds. True positive freedom comes then as a pos­
itive answer to the question: "Who are you?", not "What do
you know?" Professor Rist's remarks about the early Stoa 
shed light on this matter. He writes:
If the reason of the virtuous man is wholly "consis­
tent," then all his acts will be morally good, as the 
Stoics held, and he will not make any real choice be­
tween good and evil. It is probably not accidental 
that the early Stoics avoid the Aristotelian word for 
choice [proairesis], both when talking about external 
goods and when observing that virtue is to be chosen 
for its own sake. For in any ordinary sense of choice
The reason why this ethical positivity has nothing to 
do with freedom cannot be identified satisfactorily at the 
level of Stoic metaphysics or anthropology. Instead, a de­
scent to the political arena is necessary. In this quotation 
from Epictetus, it is ironic that Epictetus has seen fit to 
mention the relationship of the city and the citizen. This 
is an intrusion from an older, more primitive mentality that 
is not manifestly a concern of the Stoa. In this passage it 
amounts to little more than a figure of speech, for to the 
Stoa, man is a citizen of the cosmos. Now how should we 
translate this term? Should we say "world" or "universe"?
We must say both, for the Stoa intends both. What the Stoa 
explicitly does not mean by cosmos is "city" or "nation" or 
"people." Where positive freedom occurred in antiquity, it 
occurred as a liberation, followed by a positioning— or 
rather, a re-positioning— of life stations and experiences 
within a community. That community was a cosmion, a micro­
cosmos. It was not and could not be the cosmos itself, for 
such a reality would be too large and too dissociative to 
support action. Identity with the whole would not be real, 
but imaginary, and a re-positioning of life would likewise
the good man does not choose virtue; he simply is vir-
tuous.
Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p. 15. See also Pohlenz, Freedom in 
Greek Life and Thought, pp. 120-121 and 134. For a discus- 
sion which emphasizes human sinfulness as the salient dis­
tinction between Stoic and Pauline conceptions of personal­
ity, see Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in Its Con­
temporary Setting, tr. R. H. Fuller (New York: Meridian
Books, 1956), pp. 143-144.
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be imaginary. This is one way of understanding the Stoa's 
indifference to slavery. On the nominal level the Stoa does 
liberate slaves, but a real liberation and a new beginning 
for one's fellow cosmic "citizens" was not possible. Hence 
the lack of interest in the matter. Only with the establish­
ment of a community, the church, is the re-positioning of 
life able to recur. It is such a re-positioning that we will 
see articulated in Paul's letter to Philemon.
The negativity with which Philo and Epictetus assert 
real freedom against the tyrant is accompanied by sparse, but 
solid evidence that these thinkers who embraced the Stoic 
paradox did have a memory of what freedom had meant in the 
earlier period when it first emerged in history.
Philo's "memory" can be found in his profuse praise of
the Palestinian Essene community with which he was contempo-
30rary. Despite this contemporaneity, we are dealing here in 
the domain of memory because Philo chooses this community 
above all others in the world at his time to illustrate the 
concrete meaning of freedom. Such a selection must be in­
structed by a memory of an earlier pattern of human order 
which remained visible amongst the Essenes. Philo tells us 
that the Essenes are a devout, rural people; some farm and 
others practise crafts; they are not acquisitive beyond life's 
necessities and thus they are content; they have nothing to 
do with the making or use of armaments, nor will they become 
involved in commerce; they seriously study the divinely in-
30Philo, 75-87.
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s p i r e d  l a w s  o f  t h e i r  f a t h e r s ;  t h e y  a r e  l o v e r s  o f  G o d ,  v i r t u e ,
a n d  m a n ,  a n d  t h i s  l o v e  i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  p r a c t i s e ;  t h e y  h o l d  a l l
t h i n g s  i n  co m m o n ,  i n c l u d i n g  d w e l l i n g s ,  c l o t h i n g  a n d  w a g e s ,  a n d
t h e y  h a v e  p u b l i c  m e a l s ;  t h e y  c a r 6  f o r  t h e  s i c k  a n d  e l d e r l y .
N o t  a  s i n g l e  s l a v e  i s  t o  b e  f o u n d  a m o n g  t h e m ,  b u t  a l l  a r e  
f r e e ,  e x c h a n g i n g  s e r v i c e s  w i t h  e a c h  o t h e r ,  a n d  t h e y  d e ­
n o u n c e  t h e  o w n e r s  o f  s l a v e s ,  n o t  m e r e l y  f o r  t h e i r  i n j u s ­
t i c e  i n  o u t r a g i n g  t h e  l a w  o f  e q u a l i t y ,  b u t  a l s o  f o r  t h e i r  
i m p i e t y  i n  a n n u l l i n g  t h e  s t a t u t e  o f  N a t u r e ,  w h o  m o t h e r ­
l i k e  h a s  b o r n  a n d  r e a r e d  a l l  m e n  a l i k e ,  a n d  c r e a t e d  t h e m  
g e n u i n e  b r o t h e r s ,  n o t  i n  m e r e  n a m e ,  b u t  i n  v e r y  r e a l i t y ,  
t h o u g h  t h i s  k i n s h i p  h a s  b e e n  p u t  t o  c o n f u s i o n  b y  t h e  
t r i u m p h  o f  m a l i g n a n t  c o v e t o u s n e s s ,  w h i c h  h a s  w r o u g h t  
e s t r a n g e m e n t  i n s t e a d  o f  a f f i n i t y  a n d  e n m i t y  i n s t e a d  o f  
f r i e n d s h i p . 3 1
I t  w o u l d  b e  h a r d  t o  f i n d  a  m o r e  b l u n t  d e n u n c i a t i o n  o f  s l a v e r y
a t  a n y  t i m e .  P h i l o ' s  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  t h e  E s s e n e s 1 a n t i - s l a v e
p o s i t i o n  i s  i n f o r m e d  b y  b o t h  h i s  J e w i s h  a n d  h i s  G r e e k  m e m o r y .  
A s  a  J e w ,  h e  l o o k s  b a c k  t o  t h e  l i b e r a t i o n  a n d  E x o d u s  o f  I s ­
r a e l  f r o m  E g y p t ,  a n d  a s  a  r e c i p i e n t  o f  G r e e k  c u l t u r e ,  h e  c a n ­
n o t  b u t  r e m e m b e r  t h e  S o l o n i c  r e c t i f i c a t i o n  a n d  i t s  i n f l u e n c e  
b e y o n d  A t h e n s  i n  G r e e k  a n t i q u i t y .  We s h o u l d  n o t e  t h e  r e a s o n s  
w h i c h  P h i l o  g i v e s  f o r  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  t h i s  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  
f r e e d o m  b y  t h e  E s s e n e s .  H e s a y s ,  " S u c h  a r e  t h e  a t h l e t e s  o f  
v i r t u e  p r o d u c e d  b y  a  p h i l o s o p h y  f r e e  f r o m  t h e  p e d a n t r y  o f  
G r e e k  w o r d i n e s s ,  a  p h i l o s o p h y  w h i c h  s e t s  i t s  p u p i l s  t o  p r a c ­
t i s e  t h e m s e l v e s  i n  l a u d a b l e  a c t i o n s ,  b y  w h i c h  t h e  l i b e r t y  
w h i c h  c a n  n e v e r  b e  e n s l a v e d  i s  f i r m l y  e s t a b l i s h e d . " ^
T h e  m e m o ry  o f  f r e e  c o m m u n i t y  p r a c t i s e ,  a s  e x e m p l i f i e d  b y  
t h e  E s s e n e s ,  h a s  m a d e  i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  P h i l o  t o  p e r c e i v e ,  a t
3 1 p h i l o ,  E v e r y  G o o d  M an I s  F r e e , 7 9 .
3 2 p h i l o ,  E v e r y  G o o d  M an I s  F r e e , 8 8 .
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least for the moment, the disparity between words and reality. 
The Essenes are good and they are free, but not only because 
of an interior disposition; their freedom is concrete to the 
point that it has become absolutely opposed to the practise 
of slavery. They occupy a living space in which the name 
"freedom" has become real. This space is no cosmopolis; in­
stead,.^ is a God-community.
In one discourse, Epictetus also shows memory of the real 
and concrete integration of life in the time before. This
discourse is a spirited diatribe against sceptics and Epi- 
33cureans. Epictetus detects a nihilism at the base of these 
doctrines, and he is especially concerned about their effects 
upon the young. This is most interesting because the inten­
sity of Epictetus' desire to refute the sceptic leads him, 
for the duration of this discourse, completely away from the 
hard dualism of mind and body and into a concrete monism of 
self and community. Epictetus asserts nothing less than the 
reality of reality. In this, he forsakes all paradox, all 
convolution of meaning. He speaks like one who opposes the 
scepticism and nominalism of modern science because of its 
anomic implication to human life. Epictetus imagines that he 
is a slave to a sceptic. The master demands:
"Give me gruel here." I would fill a dish with 
vinegar sauce and bring it to him.
"Did I not ask for gruel?"
Yes, master, this is gruel.
"Is not this vinegar sauce?"
How is it more that than gruel?
"Take it and smell, take it and taste."
33Epictetus, Discourses, II, XX.
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How can you know if the senses play us false? If I 
had three or four fellow slaves who shared ray mind I 
should give him such a dressing that he would hang him­
self, or change his opinion. Such men trifle with us; 
they take advantage of all the gifts of nature, while in 
theory they do away with them.3*
In his mockery of Epicurus, the Stoic paradox about free­
dom disappears in a defense of the more common understanding 
of antiquity about freedom, slavery, the city.
Bravo, philosopher! Stick to your task, persuade 
our young men, that we may have more to agree with you 
and share your views. These, no doubt, are the arguments 
which have brought well-governed cities to greatness, 
these are the arguments which made Lacedaemon, these are 
the convictions which Lycurgus wrought into the Spartans 
by his laws and training: that slavery is no more shame­
ful than noble, and freedom no more noble than shameful! 
For these beliefs no doubt those who died at Thermopylae 
died!35
The arguments which are mentioned here are standard Epicurean 
fare: atheism, repudiation of the natural sociability of man­
kind, hedonism. What seems most revealing about Epictetus' 
response to these arguments is that he does not refute them 
philosophically. Instead, he echoes Herodotus in pointing out 
that the men of Greece would not have died to stop the Per­
sians had their lives held no more meaning for them than ori­
ental tyranny or Epicurean dogma is able to offer. The anomic 
vision of the world is always available, and with the accel­
eration of world historicity, as in imperial antiquity, it 
becomes proportionately more available. But this view, with 
its argumentative distortion of dommonly apprehended meanings, 
is unable to support an integrated human life.
•^Epictetus, Discourses, II, XX, 327-328.
O C Epictetus, Discourses, II, XX, 327.
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We can only wonder if Epictetus ever understood that 
the Stoic nominalization of freedom is similarly argumenta­
tive, similarly at odds with the real, archaic understanding 
of freedom. A part of the implication of the Stoic paradox 
must be that "slavery is no more shameful than noble, and 
freedom no more noble than shameful!"
In both Philo and Epictetus there is a basic confusion. 
There is a frail memory of what freedom had meant in the time 
of its emergence in history. There is an opposition to tyr­
anny. But concomitantly there is a detachment of the name 
"freedom" from free circumstance. This detachment distorts 
freedom. It elevates it as a symbol which no longer symbol­
izes a substantive power, and thus risks both idolatry and a 
consequent sublimation of opposition. The dissociation of 
the symbol from its referent life circumstance occurs in a 
historical world which has lost vital connection with its 
past. For the inhabitants of such a world, there is no firm, 
historical past with traditions and institutions which can 
anchor a present and assure a future by providing a positive 
orientation to the real affairs of life. Furthermore, there' 
is but a muted and intellectual memory of the pre-historic 
content and power which created and organized the world, the 
community, the human self. For the Stoa, "Zeus" is only a 
metaphor. The divine name means logos or world reason, of 
which the individual subjective will is a small part. When 
the pre-historic reality has been thus intellectualized, one 
participates in this transformed prehistory, not primarily by
acting in history, but by detaching the soul from history.
Such a detached soul does perform in history, but it does so 
from a somber concern for duty, and not from a free givenness 
in the goods of life. Dutiful behavior is not wholly free.
It is a calculated response to the manifest need for ethical 
conduct as the necessary condition for human survival. As 
such, it is pragmatic, dictated by an almost physical neces­
sity. Duty does not partake of the free, world-creative spon­
taneity which characterizes human practise in its most endur­
ing presentations.
The detached soul is able to do its duty because the 
Stoa has given it a "free will." It is this very dogmatic 
assertion that is the source of confusion for the Stoa and 
for later philosophy as well. The Stoic doctrine of free 
will plucks some imaginary, composite human out of his home, 
his community, his climate, and places him against the imme­
diate backdrop of the whole universe and asserts: This per­
son is free. In so doing, this doctrine forges a hard dis­
tinction between "man" and "economic man" or "political man." 
Whatever may be the "philosophic" merits of such abstract 
speculation about freedom understood as an independent will, 
history shows that freedom appeared and became meaningful in 
material and symbolic reality in the finite space of a living 
community. In Greece, the name "free" referred to concrete 
realities in the household and city. We infer thus that the 
primary meaning of the term is a political meaning. The Stoic 
memory of this older freedom shows us that the political mean­
ing of freedom has not been lost, but rather that its primacy
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has been lost. This memory, along with the dutiful commitment 
to ethical conduct, instructs the Stoa's opposition to tyr­
anny. But the ascendancy of freedom of will over political 
freedom in the Stoic hierarchy of interests makes the Stoa im­
potent to pose a real, political alternative to the prevail­
ing evil. In the Stoic treatment of freedom then there is no 
complete structure of freedom. Two rudiments of the structure 
are present, at least in a formal sense. There are the real 
negativity toward the tyrant, and the world reason which per­
forms as the pre-historic ordering principle for history.
The positive ingredient, the victory of the positive power 
within the soul over the forces of concupiscence and destruc­
tion, is absent. The free impetus to recreate, to re-position 
life, is absent. An ideally determined duty is advocated in 
place of freedom.
In the Christian New Testament we find a fuller appre­
ciation of freedom than the Stoa can show. The letters of 
Paul treat freedom in a way that is reminiscent of Herodotus; 
they contrast two opposed life patterns, the free and the un- 
free. The Fourth Evangelist articulates a structure of free­
dom which points the modern consciousness of freedom to its 
origins in Mediterranean antiquity.
3. The Structure of Freedom in the New Testament
Freedom is first an experience which occurs within his-
i
tory as the positioning, or placing, or making to stand of 
certain persons in a special way. Later, "freedom" occurs as 
a name which expresses in language the way in which those
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who have experienced freedom have come to stand in historical 
reality. As we have seen in the discussion of the Stoic par­
adox, the use of names is hazardous because names can become 
symbols which are dissociated from the primary experience out 
of which they grew. In the earliest understandings about 
freedom in both Israel and Greece there is in fact no noun in 
those languages which would translate as "freedom," or even 
as "freeman." At the early period, the experience which we 
comprehend by the name, "freedom," was articulated negatively 
by reference to the existential misfortune of the slave. Ho­
mer tells us that a slave has only half the powers and esteem 
of a m a n .-*6 Only later did the predicate "free" appear in 
reference to the man who is not a slave. By the time that 
the freedom vocabulary reaches the Stoa, it is no longer not 
being a slave that is the trait of,the free person, but rather 
being wise or good is the trait of the free person. Second­
ary aspects of the free person have replaced the primary as­
pect because of the erosive process of historical forgetting.
The primary experiential instance of freedom as a notable 
property of a people in history occurs in Egypt with the lib­
eration of the People of Yahweh from the power of Pharaoh. A 
similar event occurs in Greece with the Solonic rectification. 
Both involve a repositioning of life, a "positive freedom" as 
it were. These events in history are great events. They are 
great in the sense that they convey to us a feeling of large-
360dyssey, XVII, 322. For commentary on the relevant 
Homeric vocabulary see Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and 
Thought, pp. 4-5.
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ness and of power which accompanies something that is pri­
mary and enduring. The symbols of freedom which we find in 
the Christian New Testament give us access to these earlier 
events that have been so decisive for European history. The 
New Testament is able to do this, not because it is a divine 
book, and not mainly because it is a recipient of the cul­
tures of Moses and Solon. The N6w Testament symbols are 
able to make the primary experience of political freedom 
open to us for two other reasons. One is that the New Tes­
tament canon took form in a world in which the vocabulary of 
freedom was developed and conventional. But second, and of 
crucial importance, is that the New Testament was written in 
response to a great event. That event was the work of Jesus. 
The ministry of repentance, forgiveness and healing, of 
atonement, was a great event. Considered as a whole, it 
amounted to a repositioning of life. It was a primary event 
which Europe has understood as the beginning of a new time.
It can hardly be surprising that Paul and the author who is 
known to us as John would comprehend this great event in 
terms of freedom.
The New Testament symbolic structure of freedom is not 
important to this study in a "cultural" sense. That is to 
say, we do not imagine that New Testament freedom is nothing 
besides a concept whose meaning obtains from a mixing of Hel­
lenistic ideas and terms with a Hebraic-Christian heritage.
If it were only such a mixture, it could be reduced to its 
"cultural" ingredients, and in this way afford access to the 
earlier experiences of freedom. The New Testament is unable
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to do this. Bultmann has shown that the Pauline understand­
ing of freedom is very different from the mature Greek under­
standing, and also that Paul's understanding of the Old Tes­
tament itself is a theological interpretation rather than an
37historically faithful representation. This means that there 
is novelty in the New Testament's teaching about freedom, and 
thus, that from a "cultural" point of view, the New Testament 
compounds ingredients from East and West and makes of them 
something new. It is of such novelties that culture consists, 
for the term "culture" becomes meaningful when contrast be­
tween differing patterns of life is intended. The New Testa­
ment surpasses an old culture and begins a new one, and its 
teaching about freedom is a part of the new culture. We be­
hold the old culture of freedom, for example, when Antigone 
acts freely as she decides within herself to obey the higher
law. We see the new when Saul of Tarsus becomes free as he
38is changed to Paul on the road to Damascus. The difference 
between the two understandings about freedom is immense, and 
each typifies the attitude of its respective culture.
A study which seeks the origins of freedom in Mediterra­
nean antiquity will not be concerned with the New Testament 
position on freedom unless that teaching serves in some way
3 7'Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in Its Contem­
porary Setting, pp. 181-184. See also Irwin Edman, The Mind 
of Paul (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1935), pp. 72-74.
See also Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and Thought, pp. 172- 
173.
3®Sophocles, Antigone, 70-80, 440-470. Acts 9.1-9 and 
Galatians 1.13-20.
to make these origins intelligible to us. The New Testament 
does indeed serve this purpose, but not by giving us clues to 
the thought peculiarities of people who had lived earlier.
If all of the old Greek texts and the Old Testament had been 
lost, the information which the New Testament affords would 
not make a reliable historical reconstruction of Greek or Is­
raelite culture possible. The New Testament can shed some 
direct historical light on the earlier cultures, but this 
light is dim and it is focused with too great specificity.
The New Testament helps us to comprehend the origins of free­
dom, not in respect of attitudes, such as that of Antigone, 
which are culturally peculiar, but rather in respect of real­
ities which are general. Our interest in the New Testament 
freedom teaching is directed thus at a level which is before 
culture and below culture. When we ask, what i£ freedom?, 
this is a little like asking, what is a house? We do not re­
ply by saying that it is a building made of stones which are 
joined by mortar, but rather we say that it is a dwelling 
constructed from available materials which serves certain 
general purposes. To assay what it is, we look to its orig­
inal functions, and then to its later deviations which are 
contingent upon cultural peculiarity.
Although one would prefer a less pretentious word, it is 
an archetypal understanding of freedom that the New Testament 
is able to offer, because the New Testament shows freedom at 
a time of beginnings, just as do the earlier episodes which 
are the main interest of this study. By "archetype" we mean 
that a certain kind of event in history is productive of free-
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dom, much as a birth is productive of joy and a death of sor­
row. When, as in the ministry of Jesus, historical life is 
turned from its false direction to its true orient, the pres­
ence and will of the Father, the reality of freedom will be 
incipient in this turning. One who has turned is no longer 
a slave, no longer a half-person. One is that which his Cre­
ator has intended that he be, and his being thus makes him 
free within the community which shares the true orientation. 
This turning is a turning away from history, from one's slave 
past in which the world is divided and fallen. It is a turn­
ing toward one's true identity, the self who one would be, 
the self who dwells in concord before history with the Cre­
ator. Finally, it is a turning back to history, but to a new 
and heightened history which is more beingful than one's for­
mer history.
This process of turning evinces the structure of freedom 
which lies below culture. Antigone turns herself away from 
the false alternative of compliance with the king's decree. 
Saul of Tarsus is turned by God from a false ambition. But 
despite the agency by which the turning comes, both turn, and 
this is freedom. In both there is a before and an after, an 
old and a new, a negation and a position.
Along with Seneca and Epictetus* the Apostle Paul inhab­
ited the troubled, early period of the Roman Empire. But 
Paul differed from these Stoic luminaries in that he did not 
consider himself a citizen of the universe, or a philosopher
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for the universe, but rather as a minister to the Christian 
church. Paul's writings, a collection of letters to Chris­
tian congregations, became canonical as letters to the entire 
church. We are not directly concerned with the theology of 
these letters, or about the development of Paul's attitude 
as he began to anticipate a prolonged wait for the return of 
Christ. We are interested specifically in the freedom mes­
sage of these letters.
The letters of Paul address problems which had arisen 
in Christian congregations. These problems included both 
doctrinal and practical matters. As Paul advises about how 
. the congregations are to resolve these oftentimes schismatic 
problems, there appears a common motif of exhortation which 
runs throughout his letters. It can be digested as follows: 
"Remember always, you are no longer the persons who you once 
were; your old condition is a thing of the past. Through 
the work of the Spirit, you— both as individuals and as a 
corporate body— have been given a new life in Christ Jesus. 
Live not your old life but your new life." Paul understood 
his own biography in terms of such a contrast between old and 
new, past and present. In order to exemplify for his audi­
ence just what this contrast means, Paul uses a number of im­
ages. The image which is of concern to us is the contrast 
between the slave and the free person.39 One's former con­
dition, the condition before he came into the church of 
Christ, was that of a slave. His latter condition in the
3^See especially Galatians 4 and Romans 6.
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church is that of a free person. If one does not live freely 
by spontaneously practising the virtues of love and forbear­
ance, then he regresses to the old condition. He is re-en­
slaved .
There are five senses in which Paul uses the term,
"slave" (doulos). Four of these usages are closely related, 
and their meanings overlap; the fifth is independent. We 
need to dispense first with this fifth meaning. Paul says
that Christians are "slaves of righteousness" and "slaves of
40God." This use of "slave" is not related to the other uses 
of the term, and its implication is troublesome. The usage 
is troublesome not because it reduces the Christian to a con­
dition of servile bondage before a despot-god. This is not 
what Paul or the Old Testament means when they use the term 
thus. It is troublesome because it is an atavism in Paul's 
thought. This preacher who so zealously developed the dis­
tinction between law and gospel, and by consequence, between 
Old Testament and New, failed in this passage from Romans to 
advance beyond the Old Testament symbolization of the divine- 
human relationship. For this reason, the Fourth Evangelist 
explicitly repudiates this Old Testament and Pauline under­
standing of the believer's relationship to God.4^
The four other usages of "slave" deal with the life of 
the person before he has come to have righteousness through
4®Romans 6.18 and 22.
4^John 15.14.
faith. In our old selves, we were "enslaved to sin."42 The 
child of the household, as a person before maturity and mas-
A Otery, is "no better than a slave." Such children "were 
slaves to the elemental spirits of the universe" (stoi- 
cheia).44 Finally, those who persist in Jewish legalism, the 
covenant from Mount Sinai, are the children of Hagar, and
A C"she is in slavery with her children." J These four uses of 
"slave" can be comprehended within two categories. One of 
these is general, and the other cultural. That is, when Paul 
speaks of slavery to sin, and of the slave-like condition of 
the child, he is discussing a general human predicament. One 
who sins does other than he truly would do, had he the power 
to be the greater self whom his soul projects for him. Thus, 
he is like the child who awaits maturity, the age of power 
over one's own life. When Paul associates slavery with the 
elemental spirits and with the covenant from Sinai, he is 
dealing in materials drawn from the cultures of early Gnos­
ticism and Judaism. The elemental spirits are the Gnostic 
46archons. They enslave the self by impeding the advance of 
the self to reunion with God. In this statement then, Paul 
suggests that the congregation at Antioch had at some time 





4^Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, p. 190.
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influence. The association of the covenant of Sinai with the 
enslavement of Hagar is an irony, a deliberate blasphemy 
against the principles of first century Jewish legalism. It 
means that to seek salvation in law, which was given on Si­
nai, is to move away from freedom, into the domain of slavery.
Paul's statements about slavery begin to reveal, by a 
series of negations, what freedom is. Freedom is not wrong­
doing; it is not personal immaturity; it is not astral or 
chthonian superstition; it is not even persistent obedience 
to law. This last understanding is especially important, for 
it shows that Paul's grasp of the matter is truly primal. 
Paul's understanding is more basic than even the understand­
ing of Herodotus, who was the world's first great celebrant 
of freedom. Both Herodotus and Pericles after him believed 
freedom to occur in accordance with lawfulness, understood in 
terms of constitutionalism.^7 Paul, who is nearer to a great 
event than they, realizes that thi£ is not the case. Freedom
^Herodotus, Persian Wars, VII, 104. Thucydides, Pel­
oponnesian War, Book II, chapter 4.
The first extant uninflected usage of eleutheria occurs 
in conjunction with this "constitutional fallacy." It is 
found in Pindar, 1̂ Pythian, 61-62. There the poet associates 
freedom with the laws of a well founded city. As we will 
observe in chapter five, Solon avoided this fallacy some two 
generations before Pindar, identifying freedom as a conse­
quence of divine justice, not law.
It is not the task of this study to address in detail 
the complex question of freedom and law, for that question 
does not arise during the period of origins, or to an appre­
ciable extent, even in the classical period. The question 
becomes important in Roman times with the rise of a legalis­
tic political outlook. A historian of the natural law tra­
dition writes of Ulpian's view, "that the jus gentium falls 
short of natural law and that in its provisions regulating 
slavery it was contrary to. the law of nature, 'for by the 
law of nature all men were born free.'" (Paul E. Sigmund,
76
occurs as the consequence of an eruption of the divine into
history. Rules of law and lawful conduct are but a remote
echo of this divine epiphany. The immediate consequence is
free righteousness. "For freedom Christ has set us free;
stand fast therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of
slavery. Now I, Paul, say to you that if you receive circum-
48cision, Christ will be of no advantage to you." For the 
Judaism from which Paul has departed, circumcision is the 
sign of dedication to the law. For gentiles to be circum­
cised is to be re-enslaved; gentile Christians must "stand 
fast" in their freedom and avoid submission to law. The 
meaning of this standing fast does not proceed to the obser­
vance of established rules. Instead, it implies the conduct 
of life according to the ever-enduring inspiration of love.48
Paul's understanding of freedom shows us that in its 
primary presentation, freedom is antinomian. When the divine 
vision is still vivid, righteous conduct pours forth, not as 
calculated obedience— duty— but as spontaneous affection.
Natural Law in Political Thought [Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop
Publishers, Inc., 1971], p. 25.)
This distinction between two,kinds of jus successfully 
corrects the fallacy of deriving freedom from any particular 
set of laws. Unfortunately however its provision that men 
are "born free" is the seed of the equally erroneous liberal 
fallacy which came to prominence in modern Europe. Our in­
vestigation of the symbols of pre-history conduces to the 
judgment that men are born whole, not free. The quest for 
freedom in history is an effort to achieve a partial recovery 
of the initial wholeness. What is at stake here is the po­




To a consciousness so permeated by love, even heartfelt de­
votion to law— such as that of the Pharisees— is not per­
ceived as freedom, but as slavery. Only when the vision be­
comes remote and hardened does freedom become associated with 
obedience to hallowed rules and precepts.
Despite the vibrance of Paul's exultation in Christian 
freedom, there is a serious question about the relevance of 
his understanding of freedom in this discussion. If Christ 
has freed the faithful from slavery to sin, childish power­
lessness, Gnostic demons and sumptuary law, how does this 
understanding of slavery and freedom differ from the Stoic 
understanding? More specifically, is not this view of free­
dom nominal and personal in the same way that Stoic freedom 
is nominal? Does it not simply repeat the Hellenistic fal­
lacy of confusing personal goodness and some species of sub­
jective certitude with real freedom? Does it not therefore 
forget what freedom had meant at the time of its emergence 
in earlier antiquity? In truth, each of these questions must 
be answered affirmatively, but the affirmation is most highly 
conditional. Pauline freedom is metaphorical, just as is 
the freedom of the Stoic paradox, to the extent that it does 
not entail as a necessary condition the release of slaves 
from actual, legal slavery. But there are realizations pres­
ent in Paul's understanding which point in the direction of 
real freedom. These realizations concern Paul's view of the 
human personality and his teaching about the proper form of 
relationships within the Christian church.
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We recall that for the Stoa, the human personality is 
not a divided and dynamic melange of powers, but that in­
stead it is a solitary structure which consents to the events 
of life. It is thus definitionally free, since the will is 
a mechanism of consent. Paul's understanding of the person­
ality is completely different from this. It is suggestive 
of the older, Platonic view, in which the contending forces 
within the person compete for supremacy. Consider the fol­
lowing passages:
For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, 
in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do 
it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do 
not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, 
it is no longer I that do it, but the sin which dwells 
within me.
For those who live according to the flesh set their 
minds on the things of the flesh, but those who live 
according to the spirit set their minds on the things 
of the spirit.50
This personality is not definitionally free. Instead, it is 
susceptible of either freedom or bondage. That is to say, 
it can become free, different, more whole than it was before. 
Through the help of the Spirit, the Pauline personality 
negates a dead past and posits a living future. This Pau­
line future is not informed by Hellenic wisdom, which makes 
consent a process of higher consciousness, but by faith, 
hope, and love, which make a real repositioning of life pos­
sible. For Paul, this repositioning becomes visible in the 
Christian church. The church then is the vessel of real 
freedom in a world which is subject to Caesar.
5°Romans 7.18-20 and 8.5.
It is not within the power of the apostle to bring an 
end to slavery in the empire, nor his desire to do so. The 
empire is not of concern to Paul, for beside the church, an 
eschatological community of those who have come to share in 
God's redemptive act, the empire has only a utilitarian im­
portance. Within this church, however, the status arrange­
ments of the secular world are to be disregarded. Paul has 
advised the church that Christ has set its members free. 
Therefore he says: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there
is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female;
51for you are all one in Christ Jesus." Toward the end of
his ministry, the apostle again commands:
Here there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcised and un­
circumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free man, but 
Christ is all, and in all. Put on then, as God's 
chosen ones, holy and beloved, compassion, kindness, 
lowliness, meekness, and patience, forbearing one an­
other and, if one has a complaint against another, for­
giving each other; as the Lord has forgiven you, so you 
must also forgive. And above all these put on iove. 
which binds everything together in perfect harmony.52
It is this unifying love, emanating from Christ, which 
makes of the church a community of the free. As the subse­
quent chapters will explain, this unifying and liberating 
love has as its analogue the unifying sonship of Israel at 
the time of the Exodus and the unifying reverence for divine 
justice in the Aeschylean drama.
Paul's sincerity in this conviction that unity in 




is attested by the survival of a very personal letter of 
Paul to one Philemon, in whose house the church at Colossae 
met. Philemon's slave, Onesimus, had run away and had some­
how become acquainted with Paul in Rome. There he accepted 
Christianity, and for a time served the apostle during his 
imprisonment. The letter to Philemon concerns Paul's return 
of Onesimus to his master. Nowhere in the letter does Paul 
direct that Philemon should manumit the slave; legal title 
is insignificant to him. Instead of manumission, Paul speaks 
to Philemon of brotherhood.
Perhaps this is why he was parted from you for a 
while, that you might have him back forever, no longer 
as a slave but more than a slave, as a beloved brother, 
especially to me but how much more to you, both in the 
flesh and in the Lord. So if you consider me your 
partner, receive him as you would receive me. If he 
has wronged you at all, or owes you anything, charge 
that to my account. I, Paul, write this with my own 
hand, I will repay it— to say nothing of your owing me 
even your own self. Yes, brother, I want some benefit 
[onaimen]* from you in the Lord. Refresh my heart in 
Christ.53
The letter to Philemon is of central importance to us, 
for it indicates the reason why New Testament freedom may be 
called real, while the Stoic interest in freedom is nominal. 
Both Epictetus and Paul shrink from attacking slavery as a 
legal institution, but Paul goes much further than Epictetus 
in that he does nonetheless attack it at a more basic, pre- 
legal level. Within the household of Philemon, within the 
church at Colossae, Onesimus is no longer slave, but is in­
stead beloved brother. To infer from this that he is free
53Philemon, 15-20. *This is a play on the name "On- 
esimus," which means "useful" or "beneficial."
is almost a redundancy. This Onesimus is entirely different 
from a slave who, possessing wisdom and virtue, is mentally 
free. If such a slave really knows himself as a free person, 
this means that his self-knowledge has become solely an in­
ternally generated knowledge, and thus that he has ceased to 
experience communion with his fellow humans who know him not 
as free, but as slave. It means at last that he has cut away 
the primary trait which gives him humanity, the ability to 
enter into communion with his fellows. The Stoic defense of 
suicide bears implications beyond the physical domain; it 
reaches into the life of the soul as well. None of this is 
the case however with Paul's "child," Onesimus. In the 
church, the community which for him is salient, Onesimus 
will be known as beloved brother. His self-knowledge will 
be informed by his community's identification, and for this 
reason he will be no longer slave, but free. With this free­
dom in the community comes virtue, and perhaps wisdom as 
well. Moral improvement and moral freedom are consubstan- 
tial in the structure of freedom. This structure of freedom 
becomes intelligible for us as a conceptual schema in the 
Fourth Gospel of the New Testament.
The Fourth Evangelist, along with Paul, understands hu­
man freedom to be a consequence of the ministry of Jesus.
Paul's letters and the Acts of the Apostles provide a sum of 
of information about Paul which is adequate to the recon­
struction of a portrait of the man and his work. Unlike 
Paul, very little is known about the Fourth Evangelist. His
biography of Jesus establishes him as one of the most influ-
✓
ential masters of antiquity, but this same biography is the 
sole source of reliable information about its author. Be­
cause the Fourth Gospel is a biography of Jesus, and not of 
its own author, it suggests questions about its author and 
his purposes without providing certain answers to these ques­
tions. Here are some of the questions which the Fourth Gos­
pel suggests: Is the logos which is discussed in the pro­
logue related closely to the various forms of logos which 
appear in the narrative body of the gospel? Has the author 
of the gospel taken over a gospel about John the Baptist, 
converting it to a gospel about Jesus? Is the author a 
Christian Gnostic whose work has been subjected to Catholic 
redaction, or is he a Catholic whose work has been corrupted 
with a Gnostic overlay? Does the author anticipate a return 
of Jesus, or does he embrace the position known as "realized 
eschatology"? Is it possible that the Fourth Gospel could
have been written earlier than the letters of Paul and the
Synoptic gospels, or does the intense hostility toward Juda­
ism establish with certainty its place amongst the latest 
writings in the New Testament? Is the author of the Fourth
Gospel the author of the three epistles which church tradi­
tion ascribes to John?
These are serious questions, and the answers which are 
forthcoming in response to them determine our understanding
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of the intention of the Fourth Evangelist. And although the 
specific concern of this study is the Fourth Gospel's free­
dom message, it is necessary to have some general idea of 
the Fourth Evangelist's broader purpose in writing about 
Christ. The questions which have been posed about this book 
testify to its complexity and to its interior mystery. If 
anyone is to be able to get this book to speak to him in a 
cogent way, he must first venture some minimal set of assump­
tions about it.
This study will proceed on the basis of these assump­
tions: The Fourth Gospel is not fundamentally heretical.
That is to say, first, it is not preponderantly an allegory 
about a celestial figure whom its author calls logos-light- 
Son-Christ, who opposes the archon(s) who govern the world. 
Instead, it is primarily a response to the ministry in Pal­
estine of the same historical Jesus who is the main character 
of the Synoptic gospels. Second, the gospel is primarily 
orthodox and Biblical, and only secondarily Gnostic. This 
means that we would attach great weight to the following 
passage:
For God so loved the world that he gave his only 
Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but 
have eternal life. For God sent the Son into the world, 
not to condemn the world, but that the world might be 
saved through him.54
We would find less importance in the following:
The true light that enlightens every man was com­
ing into the world. He was in the world, and the world
54John 3.16-17.
was made through him# yet the world knew [egno] him not.55
The former passage reflects the orthodox position that Jesus 
was the Christ, the anointed Son of God who had been sent to 
save the world— i.e., created existence in time— from its 
own sins. The Iranian symbolism of the latter passage sug­
gests the Gnostic belief that created existence in time is 
inherently ignorant and thus, irredeemably evil.
That we perform such a ranking of themes is absolutely 
necessary. If the Fourth Gospel is primarily Gnostic, then 
it follows that its treatment of freedom will amount to an
55John 1.9-10. Why did the world not know the light? 
Possibly because the world, which this evangelist suggests 
(John 12.31) has had the devil for its ruler (archon), was 
incapable of seeing the light; possibly because the logos- 
light came from the Father in disguise so as to avoid inter­
ference from the archon(s) during his descent. This book 
does not answer such questions. Why then does it employ 
with such great frequency this indisputably Gnostic imagery 
and terminology? Bultmann's famous argument that post-Pau- 
line Christianity appropriated a full blown Gnostic redeemer 
myth to articulate the life of Jesus cannot be accepted 
here. The existence of such a developed myth, prior to the 
beginning of Christianity, remains speculative; moreover, 
Bultmann's own excellent explanation of the gross differ­
ences between Christianity and Gnosticism tends to weaken 
the plausibility of the Gnostic redeemer thesis. Professors 
Colwell and Titus suggest a more tenable answer. They point 
out that although there are inflections of gnosis scattered 
abundantly throughout the text, never is gnosis used in its 
uninflected form. This would seem to indicate a sort of 
homeopathy; i.e., the Fourth Evangelist couches a gospel 
whose main drift is Catholic within a Gnostic form. In this 
way it would be possible to combat the patent heresy of 
Christian Gnosticism by use of a Gnostic Christian instru­
ment which is essentially orthodox. This is manifestly the 
reason why the epistle known as I John employs Gnostic ter­
minology throughout. See Ernest Cadman Colwell and Eric 
Lane Titus, The Gospel of the Spirit; A Study of the Fourth 
Gospel (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 155-157. 
See also Grant, Gnosticism and Early Christianity, pp. 175- 
177, and Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, pp. 196 ff.
oriental escape from the damnable world, accomplished through 
knowledge of secrets which are available to a small, elect 
group. If, instead, it is Catholic, drawing its main inspi­
ration from the Old Testament whose God is the good Creator- 
Father, then its freedom will have to do with a life in this 
world which is animated by belief or faith in the Son whom 
God has sent into the world as an act of love. To say that 
we make these assumptions about the book is to say no more 
than that we understand this book to say what Christianity 
understood it to say from the defeat of Gnosticism, until the 
rise of the higher criticism. The orthodox understanding of 
the Fourth Gospel makes its freedom message illuminate the 
original occurrences of freedom in Mediterranean antiquity. 
The Gnostic interpretation leads not to freedom as an histor­
ical reality, but to an extra-historical bliss.
Our third assumption is that in the Fourth Gospel the 
dominant theme is participation in the life of God through 
belief in Jesus, the Son of God. Those who believe in the 
Son will come to know the Father, and to share in his time­
less glory. This theme is the Fourth Evangelist's analogue 
to the motif of the old and the new in the writing of Paul. 
Those who so participate are given "eternal life," and "eter­
nal life" in the Fourth Gospel means much the same thing as 
"Kingdom of God" in the Synoptic gospels.^ The following 
passage expresses this participatory concern:
When Jesus had spoken these words, he lifted up his
eyes to heaven and said, "Father, the hour has come;
56Colwell and Titus, Gospel of the Spirit, p. 172.
glorify thy Son that the Son may glorify thee, since 
thou hast given him power over all flesh, to give eter­
nal life to all whom thou hast given him. And this is 
eternal life, that they know thee the only true God, 
and Jesus Christ whom thou hast s e n t . 57
Although the Fourth Evangelist does not speak of the "church, 
it is clear that he understands this participation to happen 
in the church. This church is an organic entity in which 
human severality is submerged through consecration in truth. 
As a consecrate unity, the church is distinguishable from 
the world into which it is sent.5® To say that believers 
have eternal life is to say that human participation in the 
eternal life of God is a prehistoric participation since it 
does not have historic time as its limit. Instead, eternal 
life limits and transforms historical existence. Historic 
individuation is attenuated as human existence is subsumed 
within the timeless truth of God's being. As we have recog­
nized earlier, it is this subsumption of individuation and 
strife which puts an end to the selfish exploitativeness and 
cruelty which makes slavery the consequence of history. The 
Fourth Evangelist is less a preacher of ethics than even 
Paul. In his consciousness, the antinomian strain is pure. 
The Fourth Gospel does not even discuss the law.5® Those 
who believe in the Son have unity and life because they re­
ceive and reflect the love of G o d . 50 it £s within the con-
57John 17.1-3.
58John 17.18-21.
5^An understanding of the Pauline treatment of law is 
suggested in John 1.17; this does not however become a major 
topic in the Fourth Gospel.
SOjohn 15.4-17.
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text of this unifying, divine love that the symbol of the 
free disciple becomes intelligible for us.
Participation in the eternal life of the Father through 
knowledge of the Son is the main theme of the Fourth Gospel. 
Freedom is a minor consideration which contributes to the 
Fourth Evangelist's exposition of participation. The effort 
of this book would not be greatly impaired had the short 
pericope which discusses freedom not been transmitted to us.
But if that were the case, our knowledge of freedom would re­
main incomplete. The Fourth Evangelist uses the word "free” 
in such a way as to identify for us the place of freedom in 
human reality and in the being of all. Although this author 
writes after the possibility of political community has been 
lost for the world, his understanding of freedom and its 
participatory implication makes it possible for us to under­
stand the primary events which made freedom a concern for 
Europe. It is not too much to aver that beneath the Fourth 
Gospel's freedom pericope, there can be discerned a "struc­
ture of freedom" whose terms will be present wherever free­
dom is experienced in history.
The Fourth Gospel speaks as follows about freedom:
Jesus then said to the Jews who had believed in 
him, "If you continue in my word [logo], you are truly 
my disciples, and you will know the truth, and the 
truth will make you free." They answered him, "We are 
descendants of Abraham, and have never been in bondage 
to anyone. How is it that you say, 'You will be made 
free'?"
Jesus answered them, "Truly, truly, I say to you, 
everyone who commits [poiSn] sin is a slave to sin.
The slave does not contxnue in the house for ever; the
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son continues for ever. So if the Son makes you free,
you will be free indeed [ontos] .1161
Before we examine this passage with respect to its struc­
ture, it is necessary to comment on the vocabulary which con­
stitutes the structure. Three terms require attention. In 
English, these are "free," "indeed," and "word."
In the Fourth Gospel, "free" has the same quasi-meta- 
phorical sense that is has for Paul; it is a condition of 
not sinning. But beneath this meaning, the Fourth Evange­
list displays, through his own comment on the imagery, the 
basic understanding of antiquity about the matter. The slave 
is not free, and the free person is not slave. This is be­
cause the free person has a permanent tenure in the house­
hold. The slave can be separated from the household with no 
affront to law or convention. The implication is clearly 
that the slave is less a person than the free for this rea­
son. There is then no hint of the Stoic paradox in this 
text's use of "slave" and "free."
The word which both the King James and Revised Standard 
Version translators have curiously rendered, "indeed," is of 
vital importance in understanding this text. The term gives 
the whole passage its orient. The text says, "ontos free 
you will be." This ontSs has nothing to do with deeds, and 
it is not simply a random expletive. The Fourth Evangelist 
uses words consideredly, as is shown by the play on the word 
"son"; Jesus, the Son of the Father, is associated by impli­
61John 8.31-36.
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cation with Isaac, the son of Abraham, within the "household," 
i.e., Israel. Ontos is an adverb made from the participle 
on. An exact English equivalent would be "beingly," or more 
loosely, "really." The true sense of this passage is, "If 
then the son freed you, you will be free to partake of a gen­
uine reality." This one word then tells us what the entire 
passage is about. It is about being, and freedom relates to 
being. There is the true being of "my word." There is the 
false being of "making [goion] sin." Freedom attaches to the 
former. This is not to suggest that the Fourth Evangelist 
is a Platonist, for he is not. There is of course a parallel 
between the two, but it obtains only because two men who wrote 
in a language generally the same apprehended a higher reality 
which inevitably accuses of profanity and falsehood the lower 
reality of historical existence.
Participation in genuine reality involves that "you con­
tinue in my word [logo]." This usage necessarily suggests 
the broader question about the meaning of logos in the Fourth 
Gospel. In the passage considered here, is the logos in 
which one is to continue the same as the world-creative logos 
of the prologue? We do not know, for the author does not 
tell us. One thing seems certain; that is that if in this 
freedom discussion the author intended nothing more than the 
English noun "word" conveys, he probably would have used 
hrema instead of logos.62 Freedom is contingent upon one's
62This is the usage in John 3.34: "For he whom God has
sent utters the words [hremata] of god . . . "
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continuing in the logos, but the text does not explain this.
In order to understand the sense of this passage, we need to 
examine the several meanings of logos itself. Professor 
Goodenough, who objects to its translation as "word," iden­
tifies three meanings in the Hellenistic period.
Logos means primarily the formulation and expression of 
thought in speech, but from this it took on a variety 
of associated meanings. For example, it could mean the 
formula by which a thing is constituted, like a formula 
in chemistry; so Aristotle most commonly used it. It 
could mean a phrase or speech of almost any kind or 
length, even an oration, but never a single word. And 
it could be turned back upon the process by which utter­
ance was formulated in thought, and so come to mean rea­
son. In this sense study of logos as reason is logic, 
the science of formulation of thought.®3
In each of these meanings the function which logos performs 
is similar. The logos of speech is an instrument of ordering 
and unifying, and therefore it does have a creative aspect, 
since for the ancient consciousness creation was more an af­
fair of ordering substance than of making it from nothing.
By the time the Fourth Evangelist speaks of logos, it 
has been an important term for centuries. It was introduced 
in reflective thought by Heraclitus in the sixth century B.C., 
and the basic, Heraclitean understanding remained with the 
term despite its later appropriation by contending schools.
For Heraclitus, logos was the "unifying formula," the "pro­
portionate arrangement" of things within a world which ap­
pears to contain only polarity and flow; beyond that, it was 
also an "actual constituent of things," much like the primary
®3Erwin R. Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), p. 135.
(\Aelement, fire. * Heidegger's thoughtful language conveys 
amply the meaning of this actual constituency of the logos. 
The Heraclitean logos is "the original collecting collected­
ness which is in itself permanently dominant."®5 Heraclitus' 
interest in the logos is not that of a disinterested phys­
icist; his purpose in discovering the logos is to make his 
fellows aware of it, for it is relevant to the conduct of 
their lives. Its unifying work is instructive to mankind, 
and the fragments of Heraclitus convey a negative judgment of 
those who will not heed its instruction. For example: 
"Therefore it is necessary to follow the common; but although 
the Logos is common the many live as though they had a pri­
vate understanding."®® In this concern about the heedless-, 
ness of the many whom he has informed about the logos, Hera­
clitus is not essentially different from the Fourth Evange­
list five or six centuries later.
The purpose of this mention of the seminal, Heraclitean 
meaning of logos is to explain that the logos of the freedom 
pericope is not necessarily Platonic, Stoic, Philonic, or 
even Johannine (in the sense in which logos is used in the 
prologue of the gospel). Instead, it is simply the logos, 
about which the author believed that no more need be said,
64G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philoso­
phers : A Critical History with a Selection of Texts (Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 188.
65Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, tr. 
Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p.
128.
5®Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, Frag­
ment 198.
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except that it is of the Son. The great understandings are
always simple, and perhaps a little nebulous. At their best,
they are stated in the picture language of metaphor. "I am
6 7the vine, you are the branches." What is the vine to the
branches if not their logos? The participatory organicism
of this symbol of the grape, the fig, the olive plant shows
us what it means to "continue" in the logos. It is an affair
of life and being itself. Another figuration of the logos
is the door. "I am the door; if any one enters by me, he
68will be saved . . . "  The passage through the door is a 
passage from history to prehistory, from polarity to the 
unity which undergirds polarity, from individual moribundity 
to life eternal.®9 One who passes through the door is able 
to participate in the logos; he becomes one with the logos 
in the same sense that branches are one with the vine. The 
logos then is the realissimum; it imparts to life knowledge 
of truth and thus, being.
We need to observe finally that in this text there is 
a parallel between continuing in the logos and continuing in
®^John 15.5.
68John 10.9.
69The door, the gate, the narrow passage constitute an 
archetype which connotes transcendence of fallen, variegated, 
polar existence. One goes between the two sides so as to 
enter into that which is not two, and hence, many, but one. 
For example, in the proem of Parmenides' "Way of Truth," the 
poet is taken through gates and doors. After his passage, 
the goddess reveals to him the One. For an extensive dis­
cussion of this symbol which draws upon many literatures, 
see Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (New 
York: World Publishing Co., 1956), Chapter I, part 5, and
Chapter II, part 1.
the household. This is not simply a verbal happenstance.
As the subsequent chapter will explain, the Presence of Yah- 
weh is for Israel the salient reality which gives human ex­
istence its meaning and purpose. As such, this Presence is 
generally equivalent to the emergent experience of Being in 
Greece. The Heraclitean logos is one configuration of Being. 
In the Penteteuch, the Presence first became manifest in the 
household of Abram. There is then an intimate symbolic cor­
respondence between continuing in the logos and continuing 
in the household, for both symbols connote participation in 
a reality which is radically distinguishable from profane 
existence.
The great breakthrough of the Fourth Gospel is that it 
comprehends the logos of the Son not only as the realissimum, 
the core power of being, but as the power of liberation as 
well. It is because of this new insight that the Fourth Gos­
pel is able to instruct us about the structure of the reality 
in which freedom first appeared in Mediterranean antiquity.
In the history of the cultures which became constitutive of 
Europe, the deepening experience of being was accompanied by 
both a material and an affective increment in freedom. In 
the historical development of this freedom, there is a prac­
tical term which embodies the beingful reality and stands be­
tween it and freedom. That term is justice. The divine will 
is that justice be done, and freedom is a consequence. The 
Fourth Evangelist has by-passed the intervening practical 
term, and in so doing, shows freedom as the direct conse-
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quence of being. Justice is present here by implication 
only. Continuing in the logos by avoiding sin is the prac­
tical righteousness for which the truth which frees is the 
cognitive correspondent.
In eliciting the structure of freedom in the Fourth Gos­
pel, we employ the terminology which Kant used in his anal­
ysis of freedom. That is, the morally uninformed condition 
of mankind in which man acts from self-love in seeking pri­
vate happiness is a "pathological" condition, an affair of 
the "lower desires."7® This pathological condition corre­
sponds to the New Testament idea of sin. Human independence 
of the pathological condition is "freedom in the negative 
sense," or negative freedom, since it involves the negation 
of the lower desires. Conformity with "pure, practical rea­
son," the Kantian analogue of the logos, is "freedom in the
71positive sense," or positive freedom. We use this Kantian 
terminology because it is both familiar and meaningful.
This is not to imply however that the Fourth Evangelist was 
proto-Kantian. It is to say only that the formal rudiments 
of the modern understanding of freedom have come together 
for the first time in the freedom pericope of the Fourth 
Gospel.
The structure of freedom then has three distinguishable 
component elements. First is the affirmation of a present
7®Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Practical Reason, III, 
Theorem II, Remark I.
71Kant, VIII, Theorem IV.
in which the pathological condition of humanity is ascendant 
this is a condition of sickness and suffering, a condition 
of hopelessness and existential negativity. In both mate­
rial and metaphorical senses, it is the slave condition. In 
regard to both it is a slave condition because it is a con­
dition of powerlessness. The slave is powerless to obtain 
manumission, and thus he comprehends his own being as that 
of one who is blemished, who as a person is intrinsically 
inferior. Likewise the slave keeper is powerless to manumit 
and raise the slave to the mark of full humanity because he 
is himself the slave of a self-love which denies to him the 
power to regard the slave as neighbor, brother, friend. The 
Fourth Evangelist acknowledges this negative present with 
the symbol of sin which embraces slavery. "Truly, truly I 
say to you, everyone who commits [poion = making] sin is a 
slave to sin. The slave does not continue in the house for 
ever . . . "  The verb here conveys the implication of an 
erection, a creation, of an anti-reality in which slavery, 
not freedom, is the mode of participation. This false real­
ity of slavery is necessarily impermanent. It leads to de­
struction, to non-being. The slave cannot continue in the 
house (of Abram) because it is in that house that God has 
established his Presence. The slave cannot remain there be­
cause his presence is a false, pathological presence which 
threatens to subvert the divine Presence and to negate its 
purposes. To avoid this, in Genesis, the slave is cast out 
into the wilderness. But the true seed of the Fourth Evan­
96
gelist's message is not Genesis with its banishment of the 
slave; instead, it is the liberation of Exodus. In the sub­
sequent chapters we will see that the texts which deal with 
the liberation of the slave nation, Israel, and with the 
debt slaves of Athens begin with an acknowledgment of the 
pathology— the existential negativity of a society which is 
fallen into slavery.
The second element of the structure of freedom involves 
movement. The movement is away from slavery and its impetus 
is a real, divine power which has not been affected by the 
negativity of the slave present. In the texts which we will 
consider, it is clear that neither Moses nor Solon has been 
contaminated by the slave experience; they are thus suited 
to be agents for the divine mandate of liberation. In the 
Fourth Gospel, this divine agent is the Son. "So if the Son 
makes you free, you will be free indeed [ontos]." This 
movement of liberation is a negative freedom. The Son is a 
part of the household, and thus he holds the power of lib­
eration. He has the power to negate the negativity of slave 
existence. This negative movement of liberation is neces­
sarily an ascendant movement. It raises the freed to the 
high level of real being: "ont5s free you will be." The
liberation thus terminates an old, historical present, and 
broaches a new present in which history is mediated.
The ontos of the movement of negation points to the 
positive theme of discipleship in the logos with which the 
pericope began. This mediated present is the condition of
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discipleship with the collecting power which attenuates the 
selfish, destructive inclination which is constitutive of 
slavery. Discipleship in the creative, unifying power re-
i
i
positions life; discipleship responds with free affirmation 
to that which is divine, and thus, most real. Discipleship 
is positive freedom itself. The lives of those who are en­
meshed in slavery are finite, moribund. The new life of 
participation in the ordering power is an eternal life.
In the Fourth Gospel, those who have become positioned 
as disciples of the Son are called friends. "You are my 
friends if you do what I command you. No longer do I call 
you servants [doulous], for the servant [doulos] does not 
not know what his master is doing; but I have called you 
friends, for all that I have heard from my Father I have 
made known to you."7  ̂ If this symbol of friends of the Son 
resembles the Kantian symbol of the Kingdom of Ends, that 
should not be surprising. Such an understanding is implicit 
in the idea of positive freedom. Those who participate in 
the beingful reality are themselves more real than those 
whose lives are victim of the pathological condition.
The Fourth Evangelist shared with the later Stoa a 
caesar-ridden political reality which made a legal re-posi­
tioning of life impossible. Thus his freedom teaching shares 
with the Stoic teaching an intensely spiritual character.
But like the letters of Paul, the Fourth Gospel is a book to 
guide the church. In the church are the disciples and they
72John 15.14-15.
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are free in respect of their discipleship. Unlike the Stoic 
teaching, the themes that the Fourth Evangelist employs in 
his teaching about freedom make it possible to adduce a sym­
bolic structure of freedom whose components illumine the 
interpenetration of divine power and human need which are 
attendant upon the seminal instances of liberation. Finally, 
the historical content of the freedom pericope is instruc­
tive concerning the time and place into which one who seeks 
the origins of freedom in Europe must inquire. It is nec­
essary to look to the book of Genesis to learn the position 
of both the son and the slave in the household of Abram.
III. REDEMPTIVE LIBERATION IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
The Exodus of Israel from Egypt was more than a migra­
tion of a congeries of coreligionists from the Nile valley 
out to the desert. The Bible historians treat it as the lib­
eration of a people from the abuse and degradation of slav­
ery. Their understanding that Yahweh, the God of the Bible,
delivered his chosen people from slavery has made that event 
the symbolic foundation of the European concern for freedom. 
Human freedom first received divine sanction with the Exodus.
For that reason, the Exodus is the central interest of 
this chapter. We approach the Exodus symbolism through a 
retrograde movement. Our fitst area of focus is the late 
story of creation, with its picture of man as the most esti­
mable of the Creator's achievements. This man of the poet's
vision directs attention to history, with its real first 
man, Abram. That historical man suffers confusion and sad-
■̂ To say that the Exodus is the symbolic foundation of 
the European concern for freedom is not to suggest that it 
is the historical basis for the formal, philosophic state­
ments about freedom. The direct ancestors of Western philos­
ophy are the philosophic movements of Greek and Roman antiq­
uity, and the philosophy of freedom is their progeny. The 
phrase, "European concern for freedom" is deliberately am­
biguous; "concern" is more inclusive than "philosophy." 
Freedom is an enduring concern, not only for philosophers 
but for European peoples generally. This concern begins with 
the Exodus of Israel and is perpetuated wherever Bible cul­
ture persists. It is true, moreover, that the Exodus is re­
lated by both form and meaning to the historical events which 
made a formal philosophy of freedom possible. These events 
are the Solonic liberation and the defeat of Persia. Inas­
much as this is a real relationship, the Exodus is related 
even to the philosophy of freedom, not so much as grandpar­
ent, but more as great uncle.
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ness because of the slave presence within his household. The 
symbolism of slavery in the Abram saga opens then onto the 
sorrow of Israel when that people is enslaved in Egypt. The 
Exodus as formative event for both Israel and Europe occa­
sions three meditations. First involves the methodological 
problem suggested by the revelation of the divine name; sec­
ond is the property of world creation which is inherent in 
divine liberation; third is Moses as prototype of free human­
ity.
The chapter which follows discusses the prophets of the 
eighth century. It was not simply the Exodus which taught 
Europe about freedom, but more especially it was the proph­
ets' comprehension of the Exodus that has made the event per­
manently important. There are two opposed understandings 
about the prophets. One is that the prophets were radical 
innovators, and the other is that the prophets were radical 
rememberers. We follow the latter position. The differen­
tiated vocabulary of the prophets remembers the meaning of 
the early events and compact utterances. To say that Euro­
pean humanity is free is to say that it is recipient of the 
Exodus, and more, that it is participant in the prophetic 
memory of that beginning of freedom.
In the Old Testament, liberation obtains as redemption 
from bondage. Yahweh redeems his people because bondage is 
repugnant to two attributes which are proper to his divine 
presence. These are his justice and his faithful love.
Both of these interests are inchoate in the Exodus from 
Egypt, and the prophetic memory makes of the Exodus an ongo­
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ing affair which commands that each do the justice that will 
result in freedom for the oppressed.
1. The Image of God 
The most impressive confession of faith in the Old Tes­
tament is the chapter which stands at the beginning of that 
book. "In the beginning God created the heavens and the 
earth." In this account, with each successive step in the 
creation, the narrator relates that God saw that the creation 
was good. We understand this as a confession of faith be­
cause it is the creation narrative of the Priestly Code (P),
by far the latest of the documentary sources of the Penta- 
2teuch. This narrative did not take form during the exhil­
arating days of Israel's conquest of Canaan or the later dy­
nastic monarchies. It was given expression much later, af­
ter the great catastrophes had befallen the chosen people, 
after the two kingdoms had been eaten away by military con­
quest and the people of Yahweh had been humiliated before 
the nations. Thus the historical setting of the Priestly
2The Pentateuchal documentary sources in this chapter 
are taken from Walter Harrelson, Interpreting the Old Tes­
tament (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964),
pp. 487-492. The four Pentateuchal sources are dated as 
follows:
The Yahwist's historical epic (J), 1000-910 B.C.
The Elohist's historical epic (E) , 900-750 
The Deuteronomist writings (D) 750-586 
The Priestly code (P), 586-538 
See also Martin Noth, A History of Pentateuchal Traditions, 
tr. Bernard W. Anderson (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,
Inc., 1972), pp. 17-19, 28-32, 35-36, 262-276. Of special 
importance is Noth's imputation of a common source, G 
(Grundlage), for the materials which appear in both J and 
E narratives. See pp. 38-41.
creation is crucial to its meaning. This is not simply a 
Mediterranean cosmogony in which an anthropomorphic divinity 
subdues primal elements and so creates the world. Rather, 
the P creation is a statement of faith in the providential 
lordship of God in the world. To be sure, this is a cos­
mogony, but it is more than that alone; it is a creed as 
well. It confesses that in the ultimate reckoning of the 
totality of human experience, the world— and human life with 
it— is good by divine plan. Destruction, exile and captivity 
have served to deepen and to clarify the Priestly faith.
These misfortunes have made such an ultimate reckoning of 
purpose both necessary and possible. The P author announces 
that in the ultimate reckoning for Israel, the fundamental 
goodness of the divine work will not be negated by human de­
fection or historical calamity, for it is the work of the 
one God who has made the world, man, and history, in order 
to achieve his own good purpose.
It is appropriate that our Old Testament should begin 
as it does, for the Priestly account of the origin of things 
is given from the vantage point of maturity. The Priestly 
author is positioned so as to be able to survey events as 
they have unfolded in the past of the world, and thus to as­
say their meaning. Genesis 1 is in truth a prologue to the 
Bible. It is like a preface written for a late edition of a 
profound book; it compresses the content of the book so as 
to elicit its most permanently salient meaning. We are con­
cerned with what this prologue has to say about man and his 
status in creation.
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If we are to understand the Priestly creation narrative's 
message about man and his position in the world, it is first 
necessary to recognize that this narrative is not a myth. It 
is not simply that the discussion displays a more intense 
reflective and conceptual capability than that which would 
appear in a myth. The message itself is non-mythical. Myth­
ical materials appear briefly, i.e., the pre-existent matter, 
the chaotic earth which was without form, void. But this 
matter is without its characteristic demonic power; it is 
noted without comment. Von Rad explains,
It is amazing to see how sharply little Israel demar­
cated herself from an apparently overpowering environ­
ment of cosmological and theogonic myths. Here the sub­
ject is not a primeval mystery of procreation from which 
the divinity arose, nor of a 'creative' struggle of 
mythically personified powers from which the cosmos 
arose, but rather the one who is neither warrior nor 
procreator, who alone is worthy of the predicate, Cre­
ator.3
The P author is no theolpgian. He knows nothing of a doc­
trine of creation ex nihilo. But that later doctrine faith­
fully expresses the greater substance of the Priestly narra­
tive's intention. For P, the important event is the Cre­
ator’s work with the primal elements; to emphasize the old 
mythic materials would be to suggest competition between the 
Creator and his medium.
This understanding about the non-mythic quality of the 
P creation suggests that for P, and for the Bible to which 
the P creation is prologue, the temporal dimension which is
3Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary, p. 47.
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of concern to man and God is history. Indeed, the P creation 
is a narration of the events of the first week of world his­
tory. But for P, this history is not the domain of experi­
ential misery which is set in contrast to the dream-like in­
nocence of mythic prehistory. There is no flaming sword 
which separates mankind from Eden, no Pandora's box whose 
inhabitants become permanent evils in historical existence. 
Instead, P places the beatific and pacific content of life, 
which might in other accounts be reserved to pre-history, 
within the stream of history itself. God saw that the cre­
ation was good. This dictum, that the creation is presently 
and always a good creation, approaches the core reality to 
which the Old Testament is witness. This is not the whim of 
a chronic optimist; it is the profoundest expression of Is­
rael's total experience, national destruction notwithstand­
ing. Beyond disappointment and loss, historical existence 
is good because it is existence which takes place within the 
divine presence of the Creator. Historical existence is 
thus a hallowed existence. For this reason, Professor Irwin 
insisted that the modern theological conception of God as a 
being "wholly other" from man is foreign to the Old Testa­
ment.^ Only in historical circumstances which are wholly 
fallen, wholly profane, will God be wholly other from man.
For the Priestly author, God is not wholly other from man. 
Instead, he is the world creator who has imparted to man his
^William A. Irwin, "The Hebrews," The Intellectual Ad­
venture of Ancient Man, ed. Henri Frankfort (Chicago: UnT-
versity of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 263.
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own image. This is to say that in some sense, man is not 
other from, but same with, the Creator of all being.
The divine creation is depicted as an hierarchical un­
dertaking of creation and ordering which is accomplished 
during a period of six days. The seventh day is hallowed
by the Creator and set aside from the other days as a time
for rest. Buber understood the inner beauty and compassion 
of the ancient institution of Sabbath. Just as our concern 
is with man's character as image, Buber's was with the con­
verse interest, i.e., with God's character as leader. In 
respect of God's leadership and the institution of Sabbath, 
Buber wrote of the Sabbath passage,
. . . "for in six days YHVH made the heaven and the
earth, and on the seventh day He rested and drew breath."
The crass anthropomorphism binds together the deity and 
the tired, exhausted slave, and with words arousing the
soul calls the attention of the free man's indolent
heart to the slave; but at the same time it sets up be­
fore the community the loftiest sense of following the 
leader. Everyone that belongs to the essence of Israel 
— and the servants, the sojourners included, belong to 
it— shall be able to imitate YHVH without hindrance.5
This compassionate concern which produced the Sabbath is the
veritable heart of the Bible message, and its contemplation
would end speculation as to whether the Book of the Covenant 
is better or worse than other ancient legislative texts if 
reason prevailed in the world. Even Buber's treatment does 
not exhaust the matter. We recall Jesus' defense of heal­
ing on the Sabbath: "What man of you, if he has one sheep
and it falls into a pit on the sabbath, will not lay hold of
5Martin Buber, The Prophetic Faith, tr. Carlyle Witton-
Davies (New York: Harper and Row, I960), p. 54.
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it and lift it out?"*’ Ostensibly, the meaning is that one 
will rightfully protect his property on the Sabbath, but 
that interpretation is wrong. One must see the sheep, its 
wool matted with dirt, bleating and thrashing in terror.
That is why one will lift it out. The ancient code commands, 
"Six days shall you do your work, but on the seventh day you 
shall rest, that your ox and your ass may have rest, and 
the son of your bondmaid . . . Not only slaves (or the 
countless workers from whom the secular world has withdrawn 
this protection), but even brutes are the beneficiaries of 
this God's compassionate command. The Sabbath is truly the 
day of God, not only for its later pietistic associations, 
but more importantly because it raises life above the plane 
of human necessity. To transcend necessity is to broach the 
threshold of freedom.
If in the hierarchy of days the day of God is ultimate, 
then the day of man is penultimate, for man was created on 
the day before God's day. Man is the blossom of creation; 
he has been preceded by the inanimate and then the animate 
creation. Man is the final wonder of the word by which God 
has spoken his will, for unlike his predecessors in creation, 
man is cast in the "image of God." To be created in the im­
age of God is to be given a share in the being of God. The 
text of Genesis 1 understands God and man in a sort of part­




lesser partner. Their enterprise in creation is a joint en­
terprise; God instigates creation and man superintends the 
divine accomplishment.
An appreciation of man's sharing in the "image" of God 
is vital to an understanding of man as a character who is 
capable of freedom. If Genesis 1 were in fact a myth, then 
the "image of God" construction would lack value for an elu­
cidation of freedom or for any other concern, save for its 
testimonial to man's persistent ability to create gods.
That is to say, if the account under consideration'were a 
myth, then for man to be created in the image of God would 
mean that man recognized in himself the physical attributes 
of some concrete form, some idol, which had been shapen in 
an impenetrable antiquity, and which had from time immemorial 
been worshipped as a god. Under those circumstances we would 
be caught in a circular anthropomorphism. In truth there 
would be no God, or else the true God would indeed be wholly 
other from man. Man would be at last the image of man. But 
just as the Old Testament breaks from the myth, it likewise 
separates itself from the ambient world in which divinity 
appears as image graven by the hand of man.
The experience of human freedom to which Europe became 
heir occurs first as a human response to the command of the 
God whose self-revelation is attested in the Old Testament.
The symbol of man as the image of God is the most elevated 
strata of meaning which applies to understanding of man as a 
potentially free being. The Priestly narrator tells us what
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it means for man to be created in the image of God. As he 
looks back across the expanse of a millenium, the narrator 
captures the immensity of the Yahwist breakage of the old 
forms: Man, the image of God, is the accomplishment of the
command of God's word. God has made man like God, that is, 
with the power of command in the world. "Then God said, 'Let 
us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them 
have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds 
of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and 
over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth."'8
In that he has been created by God, man is given worth 
in the totality of things; in the bestowal of "dominion," 
man is given possession and power in the world. Possession, 
power and worth are the aspirations of man in historical ex­
istence. The philosopher Paul Ricoeur examines in depth 
historical man's quest for honor, possession and power. Al­
though his remarks are not intended as Biblical exegesis, 
they seem invaluable in cognizing the Priestly author's des­
ignation of man as a being made after God's image. Ricoeur 
writes thus of man's quest for commanding power in history:
. . . although we only know these fundamental quests 
empirically through their hideous and disfigured vis­
ages, in the form of greed and the passions of power 
and vanity, we understand these passions in their es­
sence only as a perversion of . . .  . We must say that 
what we understand at first are the primordial modali­
ties of human desire which are constitutive with re­
spect to man's humanity; and it is only later that we 
understand the 'passions' as departure, deviation, down­
fall, in relation to those primordial quests.8
8Genesis 1.26.
8Paul Ricoeur, Fallible Man, tr. Charles Kelbley (Chi-
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In light of this understanding about the constitutive modal­
ities of man's humanity, we repeat, the Priestly author is 
not a dogmatic optimist, nor is he one who is uninformed 
about the "fall of man" with its attendant condition of hu­
man-historical evil. Indeed, the creation of man in the im­
age of God not only bequeaths to man dominion, but it like­
wise imposes limits upon human action: "Whoever sheds the
blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made 
man in his own image."1®
This passage from the Priestly code, dear to those who 
find Biblical sanction for capital punishment, bears a latent 
implication which is far more important than the overt, ju­
ridical decree concerning the punishment of murders. That 
is to say, it tells us the nature of the dominion which man, 
the image of God, is to enjoy in the world. It is a domin­
ion over the earth and its non-human residents. But because 
man is the image of God, God is the sovereign of man. For 
one man to kill another is a trespass of the divine domain, 
and this requires not so much a simple retribution for mur­
der as an elimination from the community of man of the one 
who has committed the greatest sacrilege, the defilement and 
destruction of God's own image. The Priestly author writes 
after the end of the long monarchial spasm in which the sin­
gular dominion of God over man, his image, has been system-




atically and calculatedly subverted by men of worldly ambi­
tion. Yet this writer perceives clearly the inner sense of 
the old Yahwist confederacy of early Israel. There, man did 
not dominate man; instead, God claimed sole dominion over 
his own image.^ This great author then is a connecting fig­
ure. His symbol of the image of God comprehends amply both 
the early Israelite experience of direct rule by Yahweh and 
the new preaching of the Kingdom which was to come later.
Both the seminal utterance, "Israel is my first born son" 
and " . . .  the Kingdom of God is in the midst of you" are 
intelligible to the Priestly symbol of the image of God.-*-2
The symbol of man as God's image, responding directly 
to the divine command, explains then why the Priestly cre­
ation cannot be a theogony. Its purpose is not to provide 
cosmic support for a human king who acts as a divine ana­
logue. Rather, it is a confession of faith in the continu­
ing lordship of God for all the world. The Priestly creed
■^Professor Mendenhall argues that the true importance 
of the Bible for all of history can be understood only in 
the light of the formation of Israel at the beginning of the 
Iron Age from the ruins of the Late Bronze Age in the East­
ern Mediterranean region. In respect of this thesis, he con­
cludes that Yahwism (the direct rule of the one God and the 
primacy of ethics over power and economics) arose as a re­
sponse to the failure of divinized kingship in the Late 
Bronze Age to fulfil human need. This historical thesis is 
consistent with Mendenhall's philosophic view that the Bible 
of early Yahwism, the prophets, and Jesus, places an absolute 
priority on the thing known to moderns as "religion," and 
implies by consequence an absolute judgment against power 
politics. See George E. Mendenhall, The Tenth Generation:
The Origins of the Biblical Tradition (Baltimore: John Hop-
kings University Press, 1973), pp. 223-226.
■^Exodus 4.22 and Luke 17.21.
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is that beneath the gross and visible human propensity to 
evil which has brought Israel and the nations to destruction, 
there resides a real nucleus of human purpose and human ca­
pability which is a divine gift. The Priestly Code with its 
"and God saw that it was good" informs us that in the first 
and final figuration of the world, the dominion and honor 
which man seeks in history are available by divine command 
and that ultimately they are sanctid; they have a source and 
a purpose beyond the oftentimes squalid conditions in which 
they are sought and won. The Priestly anthropology thus 
casts a divine imprimature upon man as an active character 
in history. In this approval of man's dominion over the 
world of which God has predicated "good" inheres the nascent 
idea of human freedom.
The Priestly symbol of man as the image of God prefaces 
the Old Testament record with the assertion that in the ex­
perience which is recorded there, man shares in the creative 
stature of God. This study draws from this symbolization 
the inference that the Old Testament comprehends man as po­
tentially free. This inference however is not without dif­
ficulty. In his discussion of the Pauline treatment of free­
dom in the New Testament, Bultmann stresses that the Old Tes­
tament is completely lacking in a conception of freedom, and 
for this reason, that the New Testament takes the concept
from Greece, via the Hellenistic vocabulary that was current
13in the New Testament period. It is true that one of the
13Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, p. 186. See also
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puzzling problems of the Old Testament is the absence of re­
flection on the matter of human freedom. This is puzzling 
because the narrative imagery of the Old Testament shows 
with consistency a portrait of mankind whose existence has 
been lent direction and dignity by divine sanction. This is 
the case from the beginning with regard to the chosen people, 
and at a later time, the divine concern broadens to include 
the nations. That mankind is invested with practical dis­
cretion and with dignity is basic to our understanding of 
freedom. That the Old Testament is devoid of a single con­
cept to communicate this meaning does not entail therefore 
that freedom as a pattern of experience is missing from the 
Old Testament record. With the aid of the express concept 
which comes to us first from Greek reflection, we are able 
to identify a most ponderable body of materials in the Old 
Testament which involves human freedom in an integral manner.
The most elemental, and thus, the most memorable episode 
in the Old Testament which involves human freedom is the Ex­
odus of Israel from Egypt and the subsequent formation of 
the Covenant. This is the great event in the Old Testament, 
and it is the main interest of this chapter. It is a truly 
archetypal situation which is productive of freedom. But in 
order to clarify the difficulty which obtains as a result of 
the absence of a "freedom" concept in the Old Testament, it 
is desirable at this point to indicate how several Old Tes-
Rudolf Bultmann, History and Escatology: The Presence of
Eternity (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 97.
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tament understandings about human life and its correct order 
entail the reality which we know as freedom. These include 
the position of man and society in relation to the Law, and 
the "rights" of persons which place limitations upon polit­
ical authority.
When the Priestly author reflects on the experience of 
Israel and the purpose of the creation, he comprehends man's 
position in creation as that of the image of God. This sym­
bol means many things, but in the experience of Israel, it 
must mean primarily that man is the recipient of divine com­
mand. There are a number of commands in the Old Testament, 
beginning with Yahweh's command to Abram. For the nation, 
the most enduring form of the divine command is the Law of 
God. With reference to the Law of God, the experience of Is­
rael is not essentially different from the experience of 
Greece with the law of the city.14 In both instances, law 
is the defining link, the constitutive tie which compasses 
the aggregation and makes of it a unity. But in its unify­
ing purpose, the Law of God and the customary law of the city 
are not at all akin to primitive taboos which enclose life 
within an euroboric circle and so conceal consciousness within
14See Walter Eichrodt, Man in the Old Testament, tr. K. 
and R. Gregor Smith (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1951), pp. 9-
17. It is necessary to explain here that we do not mean by 
Law of God the same thing that "the law" meant in Hellenis- 
tic-Roman Judaism or the New Testament. We are speaking of 
the very ancient contents of the Book of the Covenant, Exo­
dus 20-23 E. This Law of God is not the handbook of a re­
ligion, but the constitution of a theopolitical community 
whose allegiance was to the God, its direct and constitu­
tional sovereign.
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a collective pattern of imagination and response to events. 
Rather, from the time of the Book of the Covenant, men are 
individually responsible before the Law for their behavior. 
Individual accountability for action rather than collective 
responsibility of family or clan is basic to an understand­
ing of man as capable of freedom. This Law of God moreover 
has an overtly liberating function. Professor Eichrodt 
writes of the Law's "Thou Shalt" that it is experienced "not 
as a heavy yoke, but as a necessary and blessed form of life, 
as liberation from chaotic self, destruction."^® For man to 
share in the image of God entails that his existence be cre­
ative in the profoundest way, that his life shun chaos for 
the greater sake of order.
For Israel, the command of God instructs man, the image 
of God. But the command which instructs man and so elevates 
him to participation in the life of God is a command which 
proceeds from a structure which has at once divine and human 
components. This structure is the Covenant. It binds man 
to allegiance and obedience to the nation's God, and like­
wise its God binds himself to faithfulness to his chosen peo­
ple. This experience of God as a sort of "heavenly consti­
tutional monarch" exerts a permanent influence on the whole 
life pattern of the Israelite nation and thus sets them apart
15por prophetic development of individual accountabil­
ity, see Jeremiah 31.29 and Ezekiel 18.2-4. Concerning the 
Aeschylean parallel to this Biblical attitude about respon­
sibility, see Hadas, Hellenistic Culture, p. 132.
■*-®Eichrodt, Man in the Old Testament, p. 17.
from neighboring peoples.17 Beginning with Moses, the com­
mands of God are delivered by the early and later prophets. 
The prophet is no surrogate deity; he is the medium by which 
the divine command is promulgated. For this reason the com­
manding relationship of God to the people is direct. Because 
of this direct connection of God and the nation, monarchy 
was always something of an alien institution in Israel.18 
Unlike surrounding oriental monarchies, the king is himself 
limited by both divine command and the constitutional con­
ventions of the Israelite nation. If Israel's God is limited 
by the Covenant, the structure of command, so also must the 
arbitrary puissance of kings be hemmed in. With the Deuter- 
onomist reform, these limitations are ultimately detailed in 
written form late in the monarchial period.18 From this de­
sign of direct relationship of the people to Yahweh, and the 
consequent reservations attaching to monarchial authority, 
it follows that the people enjoy in some degree a divinely 
countenanced "right" to "life, liberty and property." While 
this language, taken from British constitutional experience 
and natural rights theory can be misleading because of its 
blurring of historical contexts, it is not excessive insofar
17This divine constitutionalism contributes to a fur­
ther aspect of the uniqueness of Bible culture which embraces 
both the earlier Yahwism and the later Judaism, i.e., the 
orientation to history rather than nature. See Salo Witt- 
mayer Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, I 




as it indicates the intensity of popular feeling and pro­
phetic utterance.2® The plain historical fact is that in 
addition to individual accountability for conduct before the 
Law of God, it was commonly considered to be right that the 
chosen people be free from the arbitrary exercise of author­
ity. That this is the case is made certain by the intensity 
of prophetic reaction to the abusive use of authority. The 
case of Naboth's vineyard is the most memorable such contro­
versy .
Then the word of the Lord [YHWH] came to Elijah 
the Tishbite, saying, "Arise, go down to meet Ahab king 
of Israel, who is in Samaria; behold, he is in the vine­
yard of Naboth, where he has gone to take possession.
And you shall say to him, 'Thus says the Lord, "Have 
you killed, and also taken possession?"1 And you shall 
say to him, 'Thus says the Lord; "In the place where 
dogs licked up the blood of Naboth shall dogs lick your 
own blood.""'23.
In this limitation upon royal authority in deference to the
20In the strict sense, there are no "rights" in Israel; 
there are only obligations. There are however the obliga­
tions of an holy people, i.e., a people who have been sepa­
rated from others, and hallowed down to the last and least 
by a direct covenant with the holy God. This distributed 
holiness " . . .  meant that the value of a person was not a 
function of his particular role in society. It furnished 
everyone with a basis for self-respect, a self-valuation 
which seems to be necessary for personal freedom and integ­
rity." Mendenhall, The Tenth Generation, p. 207.
21I Kings 21.17-19. While there is a limited similar­
ity, it must be observed that the position of Elijah to the 
house of Omri is not fully analogous to that of John Locke 
to the Stuart monarchy. Lockean rights inhere in the "nat­
ural" endowment of the human person. The "rights" of Israel 
obtain between God, an overlord, and the several elements of 
the nation who hold property as fiefs from God. Thus, Ahab 
is not simply murderer and thief, culpable before human con­
vention for "crimes against humanity." More significantly 
he is the violator of a covenant between God and his chosen 
people, of whom Naboth is here the representative member.
"rights” of the people of God there inhere both the manifest 
experience of freedom and at least in a latent fashion, of 
human equality as well.
The Priestly author who symbolizes human life as being 
in the image of God writes at the end of Israel's existence 
as an independent political entity. His symbol comprehends 
a great range of experience enacted within the presence of 
the God of Israel. The writer who stands at the end looks 
back over the whole to the beginnings. In the beginning of 
Israel's experience the symbol of man as the image of God 
applies to that first man who became recipient of the divine 
command and promise, to Abram. We must examine the saga of 
Abram with respect to its symbols of freedom and slavery.
2. The Disgrace of Slavery
The slave histories contain passages like the following
A Neo-Babylonian document relates a characteristic and 
common occurrence. A man gave his pregnant slave as 
security for one-third of a shekel of silver. When he 
failed to redeem her, the creditor sold her with her 
baby for twenty shekels, making a profit of nineteen 
and two-thirds shekels of silver.22
The historian's report of this mortgage foreclosure employs 
the same verbal forms that our newspapers might use to de­
scribe something so ordinary as a modern corporation's pas­
sage into receivership. But this report does not affect us 
as an ordinary thing affects us; instead, we are affected 
with revulsion and sorrow— and rightly so— for we learn that
22Isaac Mendelsohn, Slavery in the Ancient Near East 
(New York; Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 52.
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a woman and an unborn child have been shuffled about over 
the earth with no regard for justice. And yet this trans­
action which strikes us as so extraordinary is a very ordi­
nary event in our human past, and for this reason it belongs 
to us in a remote but permanent way. It appears monstrous 
to us because we are separated from it by a definite series 
of events and utterances which define it for us as monstrous. 
It is defined as monstrous whenever the general connected­
ness of all humanity has become transparent through the in­
tervening haze of class, caste, and tribe.
The advent of this transparency can be dated with rel­
ative precision. In regard of its position concerning the 
absolute separation of the divine from the monstrous, the 
Bible message achieves total completion as early as the 
eighth century, "in the days of Uzziah king of Judah and in 
the days of Jeroboam the son of Joash, king of Israel . . .
The electric utterances of Amos, chapters one and two, are 
the great dividing line in the moral history of the world:
"The Lord roars from Zion." The God of Israel is no paro­
chial divinity, no merely national God. He is the lord of 
mankind who will punish all of the cruelties, all of the in­
justices which men heap upon men. The core issue of the 
Amos prophecy is not "man's inhumanity to man." That vul­
garism is a latterday dilution of the prophetic message, for 
the transparency of human connectedness is contingent upon 
the appreciation of the oneness of God. The prophet pro­
nounces a judgment rather upon man's indivinity to man. The
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Priestly symbol of man— all mankind, not only Israel— in the 
image of God is a positive development grounded upon this 
prophetic judgment against human monstrosity.
For an inquiry into the Mediterranean origins of the 
European concern for freedom, Amos is the end of the begin­
ning. His prophecy articulates the position toward which 
Yahwism had been moving from the first. Just as the pro­
phetic outcry against monstrosity in human conduct completes 
the Bible position, the Abram saga of Genesis begins it. In 
the Abram saga, we behold the initial attitude about the 
slave. It is not a disposition of sympathy or generosity to 
one who has suffered misfortune; instead, it is more a sen­
timent of fear and loathing toward that which is base. The 
Yahwist author who commits the Abram saga to writing under­
stands that in some futuristic sense "by you [Abram] all the 
families of the earth will bless themselves," but he cannot 
determine any way in which that blessing might apply to the 
slave figures within the immediate household of Abram.23 
They are not blessed but threatening figures, and both the J 
and E authors view them with a degree of hostility. Slavery 
in the house of Abram is a disgrace unto Israel. This dis­
grace in the biography of the patriarch is not suppressed, 
for J and E, the world's first historians, were honest his­
torians; they reported events as they were known to them.
It was their understanding that both freedom and slavery 
were resident in the household— nay, the person— of Abram,
2^Genesis 12.3.
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and that the God of the Bible cast his weight on the side of 
freedom.
If one reads the Bible with an interest in its teaching 
about the rightful ordering of human relationships, it will 
appear that after the patriarchal histories, much of the 
Bible message is concerned with the removal of the disgrace 
of the servile and the humble, and with their rehabilitation 
as persons worthy of divine and human esteem. With the be­
atitudes of the New Testament, this attitude becomes a per­
manent reproach to the exploiters and the power seekers of 
European civilization. For this magnanimity to become mani­
fest, however, it was first necessary to delineate clearly 
between the spheres of the great and the humble; only when 
that had been accomplished could the humble be raised up 
into the light. The Abram saga undertakes just this delin­
eation.
The Yahwist (J) narrator begins his biography of Abram 
in Genesis 12. According to the development of world events 
as given in the J text, Abram must be considered not only 
the ancestor of Israel, the people of Yahweh, but like Adam 
he is in a sense the universal first man. That is, Abram is 
the first "normal” man of the kind we know ourselves to be. 
Abram appears in the J document immediately after the dis­
persion of the postdiluvian mankind who had congregated at 
the tower of Babel. The dispersal of the Babel congregation 
marks the end of the heroic pre-peoples and their age. With 
Abram's appearance in the J document, a reasonably settled
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life is indicated; men pay attention to the mundane affairs 
of economy and survival while displaying concern also for 
the more ultimate purpose of life in a "normal" world which 
is characterized by the finitude of existence. The later 
Elohist (E) story of the life of Abram imputes "spiritual" 
meaning of majestic breadth to the encounters of Abram with 
his God; the most notable of these is the story of Abram's 
near sacrifice of Isaac at God's command.24 While the spir­
itually momentous encounters of Abram in E serve to deepen 
the God-consciousness of Yahwism, Judaism and Christianity, 
they tend initially to obscure the more commonplace existence 
of the J document's man, Abram, with the God who has extended 
his providence to the man. The following is characteristic 
of the relationship of Yahweh with Abram in J: "Now the
Lord [YHWH] said to Abram, Go . . ." "So Abram went as the 
Lord had told him . . . "
Like the P document the Deuteronomist source (D) is 
late. It dates from the period after Israel's end and the 
decline of Judah relative to the power of her neighbors. De­
24Genesis 22.15-18. The old tradition which the Elo­
hist has received is given a spiritual interpretation in 
this story. In its original form, the story is aetiologi- 
cal; i.e., it explains how the substitution of animal sac­
rifice for child sacrifice came about. Although this theme 
is identifiable in the present Biblical account, that is 
hardly the reason why the E document includes it. There it 
witnesses to the intensity of Abram's faith and the provi­
dential grace of Abram's God. In respect of the story's 
bearing on the man-God relationship, Buber treats the story 
as an explication of the early prophetic teaching about sac­
rifice. That is, the intention which underlies sacrifice is 
important, while the actual article of sacrifice is not.
See Noth, History of Pentateuchal Traditions, pp. 114-115. 
Buber, Prophetic Faith, pp. 91-92.
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spite this, it contains certain materials of high antiquity. 
Among these materials are several creedal statements which 
articulate the history of God's people and the meaning of 
that history in terms of the purpose of the theopolitical 
community. These creeds are of significance for us because 
they indicate in compact form the materials toward which our 
attention should be drawn in an effort to understand the im­
plications to freedom of the Abram saga. One of these 
creeds follows:
. . .  We were Pharaoh's slaves in Egypt, and the Lord 
brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand; and the 
Lord showed signs and wonders, great and grievous, 
against Egypt and against Pharaoh and all his household, 
before our eyes; and he brought us out from there, that 
he might bring us in and give us the land which he 
swore to give to our fathers. And the Lord commanded 
us to do all these statutes, to fear the Lord our God, 
for our good always, that he might preserve us alive, 
as at this day.25
"We were slaves." The creed begins with this admission 
of existential disgrace. The urgency of freedom in the New 
Testament, and in Europe, has as its impetus this experi­
ence of the chosen people of Yahweh. The importance of the 
slave experience of the chosen people cannot be understated 
in its bearing upon the theology and anthropology of the Old 
or the New Testament. It is by no means an accidental con­
catenation in the life of symbols that our emphasis upon 
freedom as the integral value in the Christian age has come 
to us primarily via the Bible, rather than through classical
25Deuteronomy 6.21-14. See Von Rad, Genesis, pp. 13-15 
for a discussion of the significance of the creeds. For 
creeds similar to the one above, see Deuteronomy 26.5-9 and 
Joshua 24.2-13.
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philosophy. Philosophy may explicate the idea of freedom 
with greater clarity than does the Old Testament, but the 
archaic experience which funded Greek thought was not ac­
quainted with national slavery as the basal condition of per­
sonal or civilizational identity. Rather, Aristotle could 
say, "Hellenes do not like to call Hellenes slaves, but con­
fine the term to barbarians.”2® To be sure, Pohlenz is cor­
rect when he explains that freedom in Greek thought is in­
structed by the presence of slavery in the community, but 
there is no common reservoir of experience which would prompt 
a Greek to confess, "We were slaves."2^ They were not. Zeus 
the Liberator prevented that. The liberation performed by 
Yahweh was not prophylactic as was that of Zeus at Marathon; 
it was remedial and redemptive. Because of the historical 
reality of slavery for Israel, the slave image occurs repeat­
edly as the symbol of negativity in being. "The slave does 
not continue in the house forever" of the Fourth Gospel is 
the best example of this employment of the slave symbol.
Beyond the recollection of the enslavement, the mention 
of the land promised to the fathers in the creed serves to 
introduce the figure of Abram. Our concern with Abram in­
volves the promise and its relationship to slavery and to 
freedom. The creedal confession, "and he brought us out 
from there, that he might bring us in and give us the land 
which he swore to give our fathers," refers back to the be-
2®Politics, 1255a24.
2^Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and Thought, pp. 3 ff.
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ginning of the J biography of Abram in Genesis 12. We have 
observed the primal character of Abram's manhood in respect 
of its existential dynamics; but Abram is a primal figure in 
a more important, a more essentially human and universal way. 
The first historians viewed Abram as the first normal man to 
hear and to heed the voice of the true God. J tells us that 
Abram had ancestors, but they are thoroughly insignificant; 
it was Abram who received the divine word.
Now the Lord [YHWH] said to Abram, "Go from your 
country and your kindred and your father's house to the 
land that I will show you. And I will make of you a 
great nation, and I will bless you, and make your name 
great, so that you will be a blessing. I will bless 
those who bless you, and him who curses you I will 
curse; and by you all the families of the earth will 
bless themselves."
So Abram went, as the Lord had told him . . .
The first notable consideration about this introductory 
speech of Yahweh is its futuristic inclination. There is 
nothing conspicuously wrong with Abram, yet his life is to 
be modified in a momentous way. Promises of greatness are 
given. If Abram is to enrich our knowledge of freedom, then 
we must attempt to reconstruct the character of this Abram 
who hears the command and the promise. The command and prom­
ise themselves can amount to little if we do not recognize 
the human situation in which they occurred as a radical in­
cision. Abram's existence is not wrong; the text suggests 
in no way that he is given in evil, nor does it suggest that 
he is in any need. Why then should Abram, a nomad, receive 
land, or why should this man become the father of a nation,
2®Genesis 12.1-4a.
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or what is there about him which would convey a universal 
blessing? There is nothing about the man Abram which would 
answer any of these questions, for he is quite ordinary. 
Indeed, the several texts recording his deceit over the mar­
ital status of his wife and travelling companion, Sarah, 
show him to be something of a "pragmatist." Clearly, Abram 
is not a slave, but he is nevertheless to be "liberated" 
from his present circumstances by the God who has spoken to 
him. He is not to be liberated from sin, and certainly not 
from "non-being," but from commonplace finite existence.
While Abram's erstwhile existence is hardly characterized by 
negativity in the volitional sense of sin which is present 
to the mature and robust moral consciousness, it is none the 
less negative. Abram's negativity is like the lazy and form­
less negativity of the cave dwellers in Republic VII. Abram 
is ordinary man who has not yet been awakened to his status 
as a being who dwells within the clear, bright luminescence 
of God's command and promise. So God's call to this Abram 
is in truth an act of divine liberation. Yahweh frees Abram 
from the delusion that this place, this family, this national 
grouping is definitive of anything which a person should 
value ultimately. The positivity of this liberation is given 
in its futuristic presentation? the things which will be made 
to happen are contingent upon the divine volition, and the 
passage to this completion consists in obedience to the di­
vine command; only the command is in the present: "Go." The
command is the connective link between that other Abram as
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he was in passive negativity— in unfreedom— and the Abram 
who becomes free to participate in God's promise of being. 
Abram's obedience makes him free; it re-positions his life. 
Although the word "freedom" is unfamiliar to the Yahwist, 
the formal pattern of the narrative in Genesis 12 is the 
earliest articulation of the structure of freedom.
It is necessary that we comprehend these parameters of 
Abram's erstwhile negative existence with his country, his 
kindred, his father's house, for the "old Abram" who can be 
found within and beneath the story of the J document is much 
like the "old man" of Pauline theology. He is not yet— only 
now— becoming a free man in the presence of the true God.
The old Abram's negative existence and his response to Yah- 
weh's positive command and promise serve moreover to associ­
ate the father of the chosen people in the paradigmatic 
plight of that people, i.e., in the negativity of slave ex­
istence, in divine liberation, in freedom before God. The 
divine command that God's people get up and leave the land 
of Egypt is adumbrated in Yahweh's command that their father 
Abram leave the negatively supporting environs of his youth.
Now Abram is a freeman in the conventional sense of be­
ing in bondage to none, and in the sense just explained, i.e., 
of having been positioned in the esteem of his God. Yet
i
Abram is a normal man, and his life does not go untouched by 
slavery. Slavery penetrates Abram's life in a most intricate 
way, a way which intertwines slavery in the material sense 
with slavery in its metaphysical dress as an influence which
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corrupts the soul. Abram's life will be finally saddened 
by its slave affection; he will lose his dear son Ishmael, 
for Ishmael is the child of a slave woman, and therefore he 
is unfit to remain in the house of Abram. But why had Ish­
mael to leave? To our ancestors the answer was obvious: 
slavery is disgrace. The J and E authors' mutual revulsion 
for the young Ishmael and for his mother is apparent in the 
text. The slave lineage of Abram's eldest son surely sug­
gests to them the slave existence of Israel in Egypt, and 
both narrators take care to demonstrate that the slave ex­
istence of Abram's issue in Egypt was not inherent in the 
nature of his people. The people's patriarchal heritage was 
not slave but free. Both texts (E less harshly than J) take 
satisfaction in the exit of Hagar and her son.
The slave condition is a disgrace— a defilement of the 
exterior person which convinces the beholder that the servile 
condition is inherent in character— that the slave is slav­
ish. The slave is not fully a person? he shares in the ap­
pearance of the freeman, but the circumstantial blemish is 
imputed to his soul. Thus he is’ by nature an inferior, half­
human type. Historical materialism expedites our apprecia­
tion of the negative evaluation which attaches to the slave 
with its understanding that the primal alienation of man 
from the world occurs— not in respect of a deficit of spiri­
tual autonomy— but in respect of man's world-building labor. 
The world which the slave erects is not a world for him; it 
is the world for others, a world in which the slave is at
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once an alien and yet a despised and embarrassing necessity.
The alien status of the slave is the source of the disgrace
and the evidence of the impediment within the soul of the
slave. Concerning the blemished condition of the slave as
person, it matters none whether we have reference to gang
slavery with its cruelty or to household slavery with its
29genteel condescension. In the language of Arendt, the
slave embodies the "privation" of life— its confinement away
30from the sphere of public objectification in durable works.
In the language which the study has employed, the slave is 
the visible incarnation of negativity in being. He is a 
creature evocative of both our pity and our hatred, for in 
the slave we witness that half-person who we might have been 
in less fortunate circumstances, and indeed that soiled and
2^This is not to suggest that there are no important 
differences between these two forms of slavery. Indeed, 
Mendelsohn has explained that the distinction between house­
hold slavery which employs only a few slaves and the massive 
use of slaves in latifundia and mining is a distinction be­
tween class and caste. In the ancient Near East, slavery 
tended to follow the pattern of household service, and thence, 
status assignation on the basis of class. (See Mendelsohn, 
Slavery in the Ancient Near East, pp. 42 and 121 f.) The 
slave themes in the Genesis saga of Abram seem entirely con­
sistent with this Near Eastern model. Thus there is no sug­
gestion that Ishmael, the son of a slave woman and a free­
man, is viewed as a slave. In keeping with typical class 
stratification practices, he accedes to a higher social rung 
than that occupied by his slave parent. By way of contrast, 
the Exodus narrative of the employment of Hebrew slaves in 
public works seems to indicate a caste arrangement reminis­
cent of European employment of Negroes in the Americas. With 
either the class or the caste pattern of slavery, the slave 
is inferior, a blemished type. In the former, there are de­
vices for removing the blemish in exceptional circumstances.
■^Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City: 
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1959), pp. 53 ff.
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servile creature who in part we be. The symbolism of slav­
ery as a moral failure of the internal character has as its 
experiential root the privation, the visible baseness, of 
the one whose external person is the property of another.
In the Abram saga the bi-level theme of slavery as an 
external condition, threatening to taint the internal accord 
of God and his chosen man occurs first in the J text.
But Abram said, "0 Lord God [YHWH Elohim], what wilt 
thou give me, for I continue childless, and the heir of 
my house is Eliezer of Damascus?" And Abram said, "Be­
hold, thou hast given me no offspring; and a slave born 
in my house will be my heir." And behold, the word of 
the Lord came, to him, "This man shall not be your heir; 
your own son shall be your heir."3i
Von Rad remarks that the sagas of the Hexateuch differ from 
those of all other religious traditions in that they make 
no effort to cloak the human failings of the principal char­
acters.^2 This short splice of J within the E narrative of 
Genesis 15 is a parade instance of this trait of the Bible 
histories. The "old Abram" surfaces shamelessly in this 
passage; in recession is Yahweh's free man, trusting his God 
to make good the promise of nationhood. Abram reduces him­
self to the slavishness of negativity; he despairs of Yah- 
weh's ability or willingness to fulfil his promise. The 
slavishness of his behavior is given substance in the possi­
bility that a real slave will become heir to his household.
Had the God of Abram— El Shaddai, or whomever— been a God 
without mercy, forbearance and ambition, he could have per-
•^Genesis 15.2-5.
■*2Von Rad, Genesis, p. 34.
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mitted Abram's fears to be realized ,with complete justice.33 
Abram's slavish deportment, his blasphemous mistrust, mer­
ited an equally slavish denouement which would accord with 
the established legal custom; Abram's manservant would have 
become his heir, and that would be the end of the matter.3  ̂
But God will not have it that way; he has called Abram to be 
his, and he will use Abram to achieve his purpose in history. 
Thus God answers that a slave will not be the heir, and that 
the heir will be Abram's own son. To affirm the solemnity 
with which God's promise is given, the E text of Genesis 
15.7-11 describes a primitive covenant ritual which God per­
formed in the presence of Abram. Abram's positivity unto 
his God is restored; J says, ". . .he believed the Lord 
[YHWH], and he reckoned it to him as righteousness."3  ̂ Again 
Abram is a free man in the esteem of his God; his household 
is spared the disgrace of slave receivership.
33Although the J text uses the name Yahweh [YHWH = LORD) 
from its beginning in Genesis, chapter two, as the name of 
the God of Adam, Noah, and the patriarchs, this usage is 
probably inaccurate historically. Both E (Exodus 3.15) and 
P (Exodus 6.2-3) indicate that the name "YHWH" was not known 
before the sojourn of Israel in Egypt, and that the God of 
the patriarchs was known by another name(s). "El Shaddai" 
is the name by which the P text designates the God of the 
fathers.
3^Von Rad explains the legal situation of the time which 
has prompted Abram's fears. He writes, " . . .  in the so- 
called Nuzi texts (fifteenth century B.C., east of the Ti­
gris) there are several contracts, according to which in the 
event of childlessness slaves were- adopted; their duty was 
to give the testator a proper burial." Genesis, p. 178.
See also Mendelsohn's discussion of adoption practices, Slav­
ery in the Ancient Near East, pp. 20-22 and 58.
35Genesis 15.6.
131
The dialectic of freedom and slavery in the Abram saga 
is only begun in this descent and restoration of Abram in 
Genesis 15. True to the fashion which will become charac­
teristic of the chosen people in the history which is to be, 
Abram and his household will descend even deeper into the 
disgrace and defilement of slave existence; the entire fu­
ture will be jeopardized, and the cleansing of the household 
will be a painful and ugly affair. J and E give separate 
accounts of Hagar and her son, and we shall observe both.
In the blasphemous doubt of his utterance in Genesis 15, 
Abram has adumbrated his later complete descent into the 
slavish behavior which gives the lie to his existence before 
God as a free creature and partner; the form and content of 
Abram's misgivings— slavishness and slavery— likewise fore­
shadow the post-patriarchal enslavement of the chosen people 
in Egypt. The J text tells the story of this descent and 
misfortune.3® In this text, no sooner has Abram's belief 
been reckoned as righteousness than the following episode 
occurs.
Now Sarai, Abram's wife, bore him no children. She 
had an Egyptian maid whose name was Hagar; and Sarai 
said to Abram, "Behold now, the Lord [YHWH] has pre­
vented me from bearing children; go in to my maid; it 
may be that I shall obtain children by her." And Abram 
hearkened to the voice of Sarai. (So after Abram had 
dwelt ten years in the land of Canaan, Sarai, Abram's 
wife, took Hagar the Egyptian her maid, and gave her to 
Abram her husband as a wife.) And he went in to Hagar, 
and she conceived; and when she saw that she had con­
ceived, she looked with contempt upon her mistress. And 
Sarai said to Abram, "May the wrong done to me be on
J Genesis 16.1-2 and 4-14. Genesis 16.3 is an insertion 
from the P document.
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you! I gave my maid to your embrace, and when she saw 
that she had conceived, she looked on me with contempt. 
May the Lord judge between you and me!" But Abram said 
to Sarai, "Behold, your maid is in your power; do to 
her as you please." Then Sarai dealt harshly with her, 
and she fled from her.
In the ancient Near East, legal custom provided that a
barren wife could provide a legitimate heir to the household
if she would bring to her husband her personal maidservant.
The maidservant would bear the child of the husband upon the
wife's knees, and the child could thus be considered the 
37wife's own. It was in this way that Sarah contrived to
provide her unhappy husband with an heir. The story is
brief, but it is not difficult to imagine the details which
are missing. The aging Abram appears here, not as his God's
free man displaying mastery over household and world, but
rather as a pawn caught up in the intrigues of the women in
his household. Sarah is considerably less impressed with
the God and his promises than is Abram, and this episode
shows her as a more complete "pragmatist" than ever her hus- 
38band has been.JO she is a temptress; her husband has re­
cently been restored to righteousness, and she now rekindles 
his doubts, reinforces his latent negativity toward the God 
and his command and promise. In Sarah's design, Abram, who 
has previously feared that a slave unrelated to himself will 
be his heir, is now to enter into carnal relations with a 
slave, and of this slave, to beget a son who will become
•*̂ Von Rad, Genesis, p. 186.
•*®See Genesis 18 J.
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heir to him. Abram, God's chosen man, appears in this story 
as the most slavish of all the lot; like the mute Adam of 
Genesis 3, Abram stupidly does as the woman has told him.
Like a slave, Abram has permitted hegemony over his life and 
his household to pass to another, to the conniving Sarah.
As this other dominates, Abram is reduced to moral and polit­
ical vacancy. When he goes in to the slave woman, to Hagar, 
he has become as thoroughly slavish as she, and Ishmael, the 
child of their union— the "son according to the flesh"— is 
ironically not even made of an act which bears the savor of 
lustful delight. The boy's parents behave simply as brood 
animals who fulfil the projections of their keeper.
But the plan redounds on the schemer who has minted it. 
The slave woman Hagar is not one to neglect the main chance; 
it is she after all who carries the master's child, and not 
the mistress of the household. She makes known to Sarah 
her intention to keep the master's child as her own, and 
quite possibly, to usurp the aging female's favored position
O Qas wife. A sordid family row follows— more appropriate in 
39This potential difficulty is inherent in a servant- 
concubine situation, and social stability requires that it be 
forbidden. Thus the Hammurabi Code requires branding as the 
punishment for a presumptuous servant-concubine:
When a seignior married a hierodule and she gave a fe­
male slave to her husband and she has then borne child­
ren, if later that female slave has claimed equality 
with her mistress because she bore children, her mis­
tress may not sell her; she may mark her with the slave- 
mark and count her among the slaves.
Hammurabi Code, paragraph 146, tr. Theophile J. Meek, in 
James B. Pritchard, The Ancient Near East; An Anthology of 
Texts and Pictures (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1958).
Zola than in the patriarchal history of Israel— and the be­
fuddled Abram, bereft of divine guidance, can find counsel 
in none other than the perfidious wife who is herself the 
cause of the trouble. Sarah hastens to dismiss her rival, 
and the hapless slave woman departs into the wilderness car 
rying Abram's unborn child.
It seems as if the blemish upon the soul of this slave 
woman has.spread like a germ throughout Abram's household, 
infecting all of the principals, draining them of the capac 
ity for free action. Sarah is tempted by the presence of 
one within her home whose labor— whose body— whose progeny 
cannot be her own because she is in bondage. In the se­
quence which derives, almost by design, from this initial 
perception on the part of Sarah, we behold the truth of the 
understanding that slavery enslaves the slaver as well as 
the slave. Sarah's temptation to employ the body of her 
maidservant for a function of which her own is incapable 
leads her to tempt her husband to improve upon the promise 
of his God, to get an heir by a slave woman rather than his 
wife. In his complicity in this scheme, Abram renounces 
the free righteousness which was his in belief, and he de­
liberately sullies the projected lineage of his household, 
his nation and the God's, by getting it through concourse 
with a slave. Had Abram succeeded in this rebellious plan, 
his nation would have been suited aetiologically to the 
slavery in Egypt; there would have been no grounds for God 
to rescue a blemished people; their enslavement would have
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occurred as fulfilment of an inherent propensity rather 
than as the wicked reversal of a preordained destiny.
The episode concludes in the J text with Hagar's escape 
into the wilderness, her encounter with Yahweh, who advises 
her to return and submit to her mistress, and Yahweh's proph­
ecy regarding the child who has yet to be born. Of this 
forecast we will have more to say.
The E account of this same affair is given as follows:
And the child grew, and was weaned: and Abraham
made a great feast on the day that Isaac was weaned.
But Sarah saw the son of Hagar the Egyptian whom she 
had borne to Abraham, playing with her son Isaac. So 
she said to Abraham, "Cast out this slave woman with 
her son; for the son of this slave woman shall not be 
heir with my son Isaac." And the thing was very dis­
pleasing to Abraham on account of his son. But God 
[Elohim] said to Abraham, "Be not displeased because of 
the lad and because of your slave woman; whatever Sarah 
says to you, do as she tells you, for through Isaac 
shall your descendants be named. And I will make a 
nation of the son of the slave woman also, because he 
is your offspring." So Abraham rose early in the morn­
ing, and took bread and a skin of water, and gave it to 
Hagar, putting it on her shoulder, along with the child, 
and sent her away. And she departed, and wandered in 
the wilderness of Beersheba.^0
The E story is quite different from that in J, a fact which 
explains its preservation in a book which favors the J his­
tory. Here Ishmael is a lad— his age is uncertain— and 
Isaac the son of Sarah a toddler. In the E document the 
trouble in the household occurs not because of conflict 
amongst the women, but directly because of Ishmael's pres­
ence. One must infer from the account that Ishmael has been 
legitimized according to the custom, and that he is consid-
^Genesis 21.8-14.
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ered the elder son of Abram, the established heir of the 
household.
As in the J story the peripetia is forced by Sarah's 
jealous outrage. The old female looks upon the son of the 
slave, a son whom her husband loves dearly, and she per­
ceives that the presence of this son jeopardizes the future 
of her own child within the household. In this account, 
however, Abram is prepared to resist the shrewish meddling 
of his wife. Suddenly Sarah gains a powerful ally whose 
weight in the matter is decisive; God instructs Abram to 
follow the counsel of his wife. The E account of the expul­
sion of Ishmael thus suggests a problem which is missing in 
J. That is, when E casts God as the ally of the faithless 
Sarah, he necessarily implicates the God of Abram as accom­
plice in the selfish scheming of the woman. There are two 
possible explanations for this ostensibly un-divine coalition 
of interests. One is the theological explanation that the 
divine plan employs human baseness to achieve its ends. This 
explanation is plausible for this episode, since the Penta­
teuch is not unfamiliar with instances in which human chica­
nery and straying figure as lesser moments within a divine 
project. But such a theological explanation cannot be ex­
haustive. On a more elemental level it must be acknowledged 
that the alliance of Sarah and the God of Abram against the 
pitiable son of the slave woman bespeaks a period in the Yah- 
wist faith before the time when "the great in height will be
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41brought low." There is an inexpiable disgrace which clings 
to the son of the slave woman. Thus, both Sarah and the 
God of Abram fear the presence of Ishmael, and both are 
concerned for the future of the young Isaac. The free child 
in this story is not merely the son of Sarah; in truth,
Isaac is the God's child, given through Sarah in her senes­
cence to be a blessing unto all the earth. In this story 
from E, Sarah fears that a child other than her own may be­
come heir in the household of her husband, but God is con­
cerned to shelter the future which he has begun in Abram 
from the blemish of slave corruption. It seems certain that 
this is how the Elohist understood the matter; the enslave­
ment of Israel in Egypt came as perversion rather than ful­
filment, and God reversed that perversion in his act of de­
liverance. The elevation of Isaac over Ishmael in the Abram 
saga establishes that freedom before God is the destined 
condition of Abram and his nation.
With regard to the divine promise in both J and E to 
make a nation of Ishmael, there is no symbolic substance.
This promise is simply an aetiological statement which ex­
plains the origin of the Ishmaelite people.
The future of the free son Isaac is well known. He 
became the father of Israel, whom the historians identify 
as the father of the tribes of Yahweh's chosen nation.
Through the free son Isaac, the God of Abram carried out his 
saving history. But with Ishmael, the son of the slave,
41lsaiah 10.33.
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there is not the most meager hint of future positivity; in­
stead this son is destined to wrath. J tells his fate: "He 
shall be a wild ass of a man, his hand against every man and 
every man's hand against him; and he shall dwell over against 
all his k i n s m e n . T h e  mother a slave, the son a brigand.
With the narrative of Isaac and Ishmael, we observe a 
separation of the divine from the demonic as discernible 
provinces of human reality. In respect of this separation, 
it is important that the demonic, the unjust, the profane, 
proceed from that which is unfree. Contrariwise, the divine, 
the just, the redemptive follow from the free. This connec­
tion which appears symbolically in the Isaac-Ishmael narra­
tive becomes developed for Israel and for Christianity 
through prophecy. In Greece the same mature understanding 
will appear with drama and philosophy. In both cultures, 
there is a discrete, historical event which facilitates the 
reflective development of the early, compact symbolism. For 
Israel, this event is the Exodus.
3. The Exodus
As is the case with almost every concern in ancient his­
tory, the Exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt has occasioned 
profuse scholarly attention and debate. Its cause, its time,
A Oits size, indeed its actual occurrence, are controversial.
^Genesis 16.22.
4^For a moderating treatment of the events of the Exodus 
which does justice to the several reasonable possibilities, 
see Adolphe Lods, Israel from Its Beginnings to the Middle
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Such questions of historical facticity are of marginal im­
portance to this study. Of greater moment is the record as 
it stands, for the record shows us how the Bible historians 
understood the Exodus, and it is their understanding of this 
event which has proved decisive for the accumulated history 
to which our own generation is heir. Professor Snaith cau­
tions against a too keen interest in origins because of that 
interest's detriment to a complete understanding of the Bi­
ble and its unique contents. He writes:
We ought never to have permitted our evolutionary zeal 
to make us forget that lesson which Aristotle himself 
taught— namely, that the subsequent stages of growth 
are at least as important for the understanding of the 
nature of an organism as are its beginnings. It is the 
oak that shall be which makes the acorn what it is, and 
not the acorn the oak.44
This spirit of attending to ends instructs our examination 
of the freedom content of the Exodus. The Exodus as we read 
of it is such an end; it is the finished work of the histo­
rians and the Redactor, all of whom understood the Exodus to 
have been an event of divine liberation. In the text as it 
stands there are three themes which must be examined in turn 
in order to elicit this episode's character as the most fun­
damental pylon of European freedom. These themes are (1) re­
vealed divinity, (2) world creation, and (3) the person of 
Moses. The first of these themes suggests the problem of
of the Eighth Century, tr. S. H. Hooke (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1932), pp. 151-190.
44Norman H. Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas of the Old 
Testament (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), p. 14.
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m e t h o d ,  w h i l e  t h e  t w o  l a t t e r  a d d r e s s  t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  t h e  E x o ­
d u s  a s  a  c o n g e r i e s  o f  s y m b o l s  a n d  e v e n t s  w h i c h  a m o u n t  t o  a n  
e n d u r i n g  s t r u c t u r e  o f  f r e e d o m .
Revealed Divinity
In the E text of Exodus 3.14-15, the divine name is
revealed in two statements from the burning bush. The RSV
translates this passage as follows:
God [Elohim] said to Moses, "I AM WHO I AM [Ehyeh Aser 
Ehyeh]." And he said, "Say this to the people of Is­
rael, 'I AM [Ehyeh] has sent me to you."' God said 
also to Moses, "Say this to the people of Israel, 'The 
Lord [YHWH], the God of your fathers, the God of Abra­
ham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has sent 
me to you': this is my name for ever, and thus I am
to be remembered throughout all generations."
The second of these names of God is the tetragrammaton 
(YHWH), the standard usage of the Yahwist for the deity who 
is the central power within his narrative. This is the tet­
ragrammaton ' s first appearance in E. The first rendition 
of the divine name is peculiar to the Elohist. It is a 
dense and mysterious utterance, Ehyeh Aser Ehyeh. There are 
several translations of the name, and all of them are sup­
ported by evidence and argumentation. This study adopts 
Buber's rendition: I AM PRESENT.45
45Various translations of the divine name are given in 
Harrelson, Interpreting the Old Testament, pp. 78-79. In 
addition to the sense of "being there" or "being present" 
which we have employed, other translations include: "I am
who I am," "I will be what I will be," "I cause to be what I 
cause to be," "I cause to be what is, what occurs," and "I 
am who it am." The last is preferred by Harrelson.
Noth advocates the standard "I am who I am." The phi­
lological speculation which underlies his preference is 
worth considering. Noth writes, "The giving of the name
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The revelation of the divine name, and with this name, 
of divinity itself, poses a problem for the serious reader 
of the Exodus narrative. The birth of human freedom follows 
upon this self-revelation of the God, but we are hardly pre­
pared by experience to embrace the reality from which free-
follows in w .  14 f., first and foremost through the myster- 
ious sentence ehyeh aser ehveh, 'I am who I am' from which 
the catchword ehyeh 'I am' is taken as the name of the God 
who appeared to .Moses. This name unmistakably hints at the 
divine name Yahweh in so far as the Israelite ear could im­
mediately understand the transition from ehyeh to yahweh 
merely as a transition from the first to the third person, 
so that the name Yahweh would be understood to mean 'he is.' 
Verse 15 explicitly puts forward this connection by insert­
ing the name Yahweh for the ehyeh of v. 14." (Martin Noth, 
Exodus: A Commentary [Philadelphia: The Westminister Press,
1962], p. 43.) Noth1s translation and its philological 
foundation is significant because of its latent ontologizing 
tendency. Buber's emphasis on divine presence as the form 
of relationship between God and Israel rejects this ontolo­
gizing possibility of the name. This study follows Buber—  
not for philological reasons, for they are beyond its com­
petence— but because Buber's translation best elicits the 
historical character of the divine reality in the Old Testa­
ment. (See Exodus 3.12 E in support of Buber's position.)
This is not to say that this project's orientation is 
to reject ontology as a creditable figuration of the divine; 
certainly this project has had recourse to ontology in its 
effort to discern a "structure of freedom" in the Bible. It 
is necessary to affirm however that ontology is a thought 
dimension which we bring from philosophy to revelation. In 
the Old Testament revelation, there is no "being" in the 
pure, ontic sense. The Old Testament is simply too down to 
earth for such a construction to occur. It is we who ontolo- 
gize the Old Testament revelation when we recognize in it 
symbolic structures which parallel those of philosophy.
Such recognition is synthetic; that it goes beyond simple 
elucidation of the text must be acknowledged. Buber's ren­
dition of the name has no interest in such synthesis; Bu­
ber's concern was to uncover as much truth as possible about 
the historical Moses and his experience. For this reason, 
we accept the historical and theological reliability of 
Buber's rendition of the divine name. When, in 1̂ and Thou, 
Buber explicates his relational category of the Present in 
terms of "being," it is clear that this "being" which is cen­
tral to Buber's philosophy has nothing in common with being
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dom follows. The problem then is one involving reality it­
self; the erotic human center strains to apprehend the great 
and primary reality whose force makes life intelligible, but 
our own degenerate reality interposes itself— a genuine, 
historical veil of Maya— making the true reality dim and for 
the most part unreal. Thus, if we put the question, What's 
in a name?, this I AM PRESENT can open little of its content 
to us, perhaps none at all. The Presence into which Moses 
and Israel were drawn is of a wholly different sort from the 
presence of our own experience.
When we attempt to assay the presence which gives tex­
ture to modern experience, we can hardly distinguish its 
component parts as discrete and individual counters; instead 
there is the blur. All around are even surfaces machined to
as to on, or with such terms as physis, ousia, phaino, 
histemi, which express the Greek experience of being. Of 
these latter, Heidegger has written, "Limit and end are that 
wherewith the essent [das Seierid] begins to be." (Introduc­
tion to Metaphysics, p. 60.) Contrast the following verse 
from Buber: "So long as the heaven of Thou is spread out
over me the winds of causality cower at my heels, and the 
whirlpool of fate stays its course." Greek ontology— which 
grew from natural philosophy— emphasizes the sanctity of 
causality and of fate in the sense of achieved ends, i.e., 
stasis. The Hebrew sense of Yahweh's dynamic being there as 
person is actually a supra-ontic comprehension of reality. 
See 1̂ and Thou, pp. 9-13 and 51.
Buber's translation moreover is not without critical 
evidence on its side. The only similar usage of the ehyeh 
in the Old Testament is Hosea 1.9: "And the Lord said,
'Call his name Not my people, for you are not my people and
I am not ehyeh for you.'" (The RSV translates this ehyeh 
as "your God.") In this usage, Buber's "being present" 
makes sense, whereas Noth's usage, "I am," is less than sat­
isfactory. See Martin Buber, Moses: The Revelation and the
Covenant (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), pp. 52-53. See
also Buber, Prophetic Faith, pp. 26-29.
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standard tolerances, Euclidean abstractions become firm and 
animate and, in one sense, real. If one were to hold still 
for a time so as to stop the blur and make it static, the 
blur would be a collage made up of these even surfaces, im­
posed one upon the other in infinite regress. Our homes, 
offices, factories, roads, even our clothing, all share in 
this quality of forced evenness. This collage is itself the 
cumulative presence which is the setting for modern exis­
tence. It is a totalitarian presence, for within this blur 
of even surfaces there is no power which can truly stand 
forth as an entity wholly distinct from the geometric blur 
which is the ubiquitous presence for human existence from 
birth to death. Were we to utter a parallel formulation 
from our own experience to the name which is revealed in the 
E document, we could say only, "It is present." The "it" 
character of the setting which is present for the modern 
imagination obscures, almost hopelessly, our apperception of 
the world as it is.
For Moses there were no geometric abstractions forced 
to be real, but there was the craggy surface of Horeb, the 
firmament, the sky, the sun, the white clump bunchings of 
the sheep which he tended. When Moses approached the burn­
ing bush he was prepared to hear and to see.
There are no theophanies in the world of lines and cor­
ners, for this world blocks out the great and true realities 
which have bestowed meaning on existence. This world con­
duces to an apperception at once limited and misleading.
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Rather than the great and true, this world apprehends the 
banal and false, for when historical process becomes greatly 
accelerated, true origins are deprecated and ideology sup­
plants reality as the ground for thought and action. In an­
tiquity, such movements as sophism and gnosticism anticipate 
in turn the banality and the falsehood of modern ideology.
For modern man, the banal form of ideology is scientism 
which "corrects" apperception in Protagorean fashion by trun- 
catinig the range of reality to which the human eros may fas­
ten i t s e l f . T h e  patently false form of ideology is the 
gradient taken by post-Puritan chiliasm in both its liber­
tine and despotic arrangements. These two forms of ideology, 
the banal and the false, converge most obviously in the 
teaching of Auguste Comte. That teaching has become the 
logos of our world, the world of collage and blur. Our rec­
ognition of its tenets will help to identify the difficulty 
which the burning bush and the revelation of the name pose 
for us.
Comte interpreted history according to the well known 
law of the three stages. Humanity has progressed from the 
theological to the metaphysical to the positive stage, in 
which empiricism and mechanism couple so as to end the pa­
thetic character of human existence in history.47 The the-
4®See Theatetus, 166-168, for the first recorded artic­
ulation of the "enlightened" world view.
^See Harald Hoffding, A History of Modern Philosophy, 
tr. B. E. Meyer (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955),
II, 320-360.
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o r y  o f  t h e  p o s i t i v e  s t a g e  e n t a i l s  a  p r o g r a m  f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  
a s  w e l l  a s  a  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  p a s t  m o v e m e n t .  I n  t h e  p o s i t i v e  
s t a g e  t h e  e x t i r p a t i o n  o f  m e a n i n g  b y  t h o u g h t  l e a d e r s  i s  a  
b e n e v o l e n c e  w h i c h  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  h u m a n  h a p p i n e s s .  T h e  p o s ­
i t i v i s t  m o v e m e n t ' s  o n g o i n g  e x c i s i b n  o f  t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  t h e  
s u b s t a n t i v e  v e r b  t h u s  a p p r o a c h e s  t h e  i n t e n t  a n d  a c h i e v e m e n t  
w h i c h  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  t h e  f r o n t a l  l o b o t o m y  i n  i t s  h e y d a y :  h a p ­
p i n e s s  n e e d  n o  l o n g e r  c o m e  b y  t h e  h a r d  A r i s t o t e l i a n  m e t h o d  
o f  r e f l e c t i n g ,  b u i l d i n g  a n d  b a l a n c i n g .  I n s t e a d ,  h a p p i n e s s  
c a n  b e  h a d  b y  l i g h t e n i n g  t h e  l o a d  w i t h  w h i c h  a  c u l t u r e  r i c h  
i n  s y m b o l s  o f  m e a n i n g  h a s  b u r d e n e d  a n d  s o  a n i m a t e d  e r o t i c  
h u m a n i t y  i n  f o r m e r  g e n e r a t i o n s .  T h a t  t h i s  d i s b u r d e n m e n t  
q u i e t s  h u m a n  e r o t i c i s m ,  t h a t  i t  s u b j e c t s  c u l t u r e  t o  e u t h a ­
n a s i a ,  t h a t  i t  c o n c e a l s  h i s t o r y  f r o m  s i g h t  a n d  f e e l i n g ,  a r e  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  n o  c o n s e q u e n c e  t o  t h o s e  w h o  a r e  a t  p e a c e  
w i t h  t h e  f a l s e  a n d  b a n a l  w o r l d  o f  e v e n  s u r f a c e s .
I t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  w e  a c k n o w l e d g e  t h e  d a n g e r  o f  s u c h  
a  p e a c e ,  f o r  a l l  o f  u s  w h o  p e o p l e  t h i s  w o r l d  m u s t  p a r t i c i ­
p a t e  t o  s o m e  d e g r e e  i n  i t s  m i s l e a d i n g  p e a c e .  I f  we a r e  u n ­
a b l e  t o  s e t  a  c r i t i c a l  d i s t a n c e  b e t w e e n  o u r  ow n c o n s c i o u s ­
n e s s  a n d  t h e  s y m b o l i c  v a c a n c y  w h i c h  f a c i l i t a t e s  t h e  p r e v a i l ­
i n g  p e a c e ,  t h e n  t h e  r e a l  t h i n g s  c a n  n e v e r  b e c o m e  e v e n  p a r ­
t i a l l y  i n t e l l i g i b l e  a n d  p r e s e n t  t o  u s .  O ne  o f  t h e  s u s t a i n ­
i n g  o b j e c t s  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  e r o s  h a s  b e e n  t h e  g o a l  o f  f r e e ­
d o m  w i t h  j u s t i c e .  M any  g e n e r a t i o n s  h a v e  u n d e r s t o o d  t h i s  t o  
b e  a  r e a l  g o a l .  B u t  we c a n n o t  u n d e r s t a n d  i t  a s  r e a l  u n l e s s  
w e  w i l l  a c c e p t  t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  r e c o r d .  H i s -
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tory as it is recorded teaches that God revealed his name to 
Moses from the burning bush and that history's first great 
liberation followed in consequence upon this revelation.
Our own historical identities begin with this liberation.
But the positivist method dictates that the theophany must 
be an exercise in the fantasy life of the child-like first 
stage, or that it is only an heuristic event in the progres­
sive maturation of the human intellect.
This study has adopted as its most basic attitude that 
history is the fallen domain where human severality engen­
ders strife, injustice, slavery. The free act punctuates 
history and elevates it by revealing the wholeness which is 
the underlying, eternal reality of all. By this standard, 
ideology constitutes the most thoroughgoing servitude possi­
ble because it separates itself in principle from the inner 
unity— the true logos— which frees. The ideologue thus is 
lost in history like a man in the heavy shadows who cannot 
see the sun's movement from east to west. The self--revela­
tion of Yahweh at the burning bush is an act of divine free­
dom which in turn made a free human response possible. This 
theophany then coupled to historical existence a new dimen­
sion, the dimension of the sacred. Israel is the mother of 
freedom in the world because its experience as the chosen 
people established that historical existence would be recon­
ciled with sacred being. Thus for Israel, there could be 
sacred history. No longer were the sacred and the histori­
cal antinomous dominions. Elsewhere in Near East, these
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spheres had been kept apart, with sacred places, times and 
events separated from the historical conduct of life. For 
Israel, however, Yahweh was an unrelenting Presence who
A Qprompted the response of free righteousness.
In the modern world where abstractions are made con­
crete, this Presence is not within the range of customary 
experience, especially the experience of the intellect. In- 
tellectualism is consumed by history for it lacks any abid­
ing sense of the beginning and of the ultimate finitude and 
falsehood of history. If men, caught deep in the passage­
ways of history, are to know, they must first believe. The 
Anselmian motto is the only formula which can assure under­
standing. It is not so much that one should believe in God, 
or in burning bushes and the like. Before an acquaintance 
with those is possible, one must believe in reality, unseen 
but residually present in all culture. From this belief in 
reality follows the apperception of the unreal as other from 
the real, the transcient as other from the permanent, the 
many as other from the one, the servile as other from the 
free. If belief cannot heal the inherent malady of histor­
ical mankind's divided apperception, it can at the least cor­
rect its focus by heightening its selectivity. With the pos­
itivist rubric which continues to be the world-dominant pat-
^8This, of course, was the prophetic notion of life in 
pre-monarchial Israel, whose historical validity modern 
scholarship has tended to discount as an idyllic vision of 
the golden age. The great value of Professor Mendenhall's 
book, The Tenth Generation, is that he argues on the basis 
of the most recent evidence that the prophetic view was cor­
rect .
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tern for the interpretation of experience, there is no felt 
need for rescue from the blurred and spiritless presence of 
the "it." The I AM PRESENT revealed to Moses becomes at 
best a poem, at worst a fraud. If the Presence is false, so 
also is freedom and all knowledge about it. In that event, 
our attachment to freedom is sentimental and thus, uncertain.
The ensuing discussion of the Exodus from Egypt will 
examine certain materials from the text of Exodus, chapters 
1-14. This passage contains an account of the enslavement 
of Israel in Egypt, God’s call to Moses, Moses1 directive 
to the Pharaoh, the plagues, the Passover, the Exodus from 
Egypt, and finally, the destruction of the army of Egypt in 
the sea. In order to elicit the paradigmatic value of the 
liberation performed in the Exodus, it might seem desirable 
to terminate the discussion with a consideration of the giv­
ing of the Law at Sinai, the holy mountain of God. This 
study has decided against this course for two reasons. The 
first is that the connection of the giving of the Law and 
the Exodus of Israel from Egypt is more probably the result 
of later redaction than of actual historical events. The 
two episodes are initially unconnected, being happenings
which affected different constituent groups in the Israelite 
4 9confederacy. The second is that while the Sinai pericope
49The initial separation of these events is indicated 
by the absence of any mention of the Law in the early creeds 
of Deuteronomy 6.21-24, 25.5-9, and Joshua 24.2-13. See
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furnishes a pleasing denouement to the events of the Exodus, 
it is not integral to the paradigmatic meaning of that af­
fair. The narrative of Exodus 1-14 is sufficient to estab­
lish the significance of the events which occurred, without 
requiring further reference to any later developments. In 
that narrative, the removal of Israel from Egypt is sought 
in order that the people of Yahweh may serve their God away 
from the Pharaonic domain. There is no suggestion that the 
purpose involves a dispensation of law. When we recall the 
pure Pauline consciousness of freedom, we are reminded that 
in its initial, exuberant moment, the free vision is wholly 
antinomian. Only when the vision of spontaneous beinghood 
begins to grow dim does a set of rules become necessary in 
order to preserve in tact as much of the great epiphany as 
is possible. Hence the persistent symbolism of the divine 
origin of the laws, both in Israel and in Greece. In truth, 
the laws are divine only as means to the participation in a 
reality which is intrinsically foreign to law. The Bible 
has more to teach us about the origin of freedom than does 
Greece, for in both the Old and New Testaments, we find epi­
sodes in which the holy, antinomian moment of freedom is ar­
rested and preserved for us. The divine liberation text of 
Exodus is the first and greatest of these.
In this text two themes will illumine the divine lib-
Martin Noth, The History of Israel (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1958), pp. 131 ff. See also Noth, History of the 
Pentateuchal Traditions, pp. 59-62.
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eration. These themes may be designated as follows: (1) the
spectacle of world creation, and (2) Moses the liberator.
By way of introduction to these themes, it will be necessary 
to recognize the centrality of the structure of freedom 
within the paradigmatic narrative of Exodus 1-14.
Liberation as World Creation
The tripartite structure of freedom achieves maximum 
clarity in the teaching of John 8. This structure includes 
the avowal of the negativity of slave existence, the negation 
of negativity through divine liberation, the repositioning 
of existence as participation in the life of God. Such a 
repositioning elevates existence to the high level of being. 
This is to say then that a liberation is nothing less than 
a creation. Presence supplants vacancy; being supplants 
non-being. When the liberation involves a whole city, a 
whole nation, it achieves the force of world creation. The 
world is new and good for those who have become free.
Although the Exodus does not display the conceptual re­
finement of John 8, the several elements of the structure of 
freedom occur unmistakably throughout the passage which we 
have indicated as our field of reference. Yahweh acknowl­
edges the misery of the slaves; he frees the slaves; he re­
positions Israelite life as an enduring directedness toward 
the divine Presence. Half a millenium later a rather simi­
lar pattern emerges in the thought and work of Solon. The 
Exodus text is rich in its symbolization of the experience 
of slavery and liberation, for the Redactor has included
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substantial portions of J, E, and P so as to present the 
fullest possible account of the events and their meaning.
Chapter three of Exodus contains both the J and E state­
ments of God's recognition of the disgrace and suffering of 
the people in Egyptian enslavement. In J, Yahweh says,
I have seen the affliction of my people who are in 
Egypt, and have heard their cry because of their task­
masters; I know their sufferings, and I have come down 
to deliver them out of the hand of the Egyptians, and 
to bring them up out of that land to a good and broad 
land, a land flowing with milk and honey . . .50
In E, God says to Moses:
And now, behold, the cry of the people of Israel has 
come to me, and I have seen the oppression with which 
the Egyptians oppress them. Come, I will send you to 
Pharaoh that you may bring forth my people, the sons of 
Israel, out of Egypt.51
Both of these dicta convey divine awareness of the negativ­
ity of slave existence. The divine word is then a vocation 
of the first element of the structure of freedom. This God 
has revealed himself to Moses as the God of the patriarchs, 
and as such, he is concerned that the promise to the fathers 
of Israel has reached a terminus— not in fulfilment of free 
nationhood— but in the enslavement of the people whom he has 
promised to exalt. Thus, both of the texts reveal Yahweh's 
intention to liberate his people through a concrete histor­
ical act; he will negate the negativity of his people's 
slave existence. In this obtains the second, dynamic moment 




For a political science which attempts to comprehend 
the witness of archaic experience to the meaning of slavery 
and freedom, it is vitally important that the expression of 
concern over the enslavement of the people Israel occurs 
not in the mouth of man but of God. One ought not read the 
Exodus without bearing in mind the callousness which moder­
nity has brought to the issue of human exploitation through 
the writing of Nietzsche, Calhoun, and the capitalist and 
fascist ideologues. For man to lament his own condition as 
slave is an exercise in egoism, and it is easy to see how 
this can be construed as a function of the human meanness 
which writing of that genre imputes to the majority of man­
kind. But for God to decry the enslavement of a people is 
a fundamentally different proposition; before God, the en­
slavement appears as a political deviation from the plan of 
creation, and therefore it ultimately becomes a divine pro­
ject to reverse the negativity of existence, first for the 
chosen people Israel, and then for all mankind through a 
positive act of liberation and redemption. The image of God 
will not be a slave. Upon this stipulation, human freedom 
can no longer be understood as one of several alternative 
types of political organization. Freedom is not merely the 
ascendant trait of life in "free" countries where the owner­
ship of people is forbidden and random behavior is tolerated. 
Freedom before God becomes anthropocosmic in its implication. 
The Exodus liberation links human freedom to the divine pur­
pose underlying all creation. It follows then that in poli-
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ties where freedom is obstructed by the ruling directorate, 
or in polities where freedom is misused by the populace, 
there obtains a visible lacuna between existence and being. 
Such polities are turned toward destruction rather than cre­
ation, toward death instead of life. Egypt was such a pol­
ity.
The third element of the structure of freedom, the step 
of positive participation in the truth of divine being, is 
the purpose, the final cause, of God's act of liberation.
It is this purpose which brings the God of Israel into con­
flict with the very constitution of the Egyptian regime.
The conflict involves the rupture of the old constitution 
and the establishment of a new Order. This epic subjugation 
of the old and unjust before the new and righteous likens 
the Exodus to a world creation.52 in the amalgamative JE 
text of Exodus 5, the positive purpose of the liberation is 
figured in the intended feast to Yahweh in the wilderness; 
the world creation conflict is adumbrated in Pharaoh's reply 
to the proposal of Israel's retreat and worship.
Afterward Moses and Aaron went to the Pharaoh and said, 
"Thus says the Lord [YHWH], the God [Elohim] of Israel, 
'Let my people go, that they may hold a feast to me in 
the wilderness.'" But Pharaoh said, "Who is the Lord, 
that I should heed his voice and let Israel go? I do 
not know the Lord, and moreover I will not let Israel go."53
^concerning the similarities between the Exodus and 
various articles of creation literature, see Harrelson, In­
terpreting the Old Testament, pp. 80 ff.
S^Exodus 5.1-2.
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The projected feast in the wilderness in this passage paral­
lels in both form and content the Johannine "continuance in 
the logos" and "true discipleship." That is to say, liber­
ation, the act which makes free, is teleological in a divine 
sense; it does not occur on mere humanitarian grounds. There 
would be no reason in Yahweh's plan to liberate this people 
from Pharaonic service if there were no higher service in­
tended for the people. The worship festival in the wilder­
ness symbolizes the alternate course which lies in the fu­
ture for the people Israel; as such, it adumbrates the sal­
vation in the desert and the fulfilment of the promise first 
given to Abram, i.e., the promise of nationhood and land.
On a paradigmatic level, the formation of the Covenant and 
the giving of the Law is wholly consistent with the worship 
festival, and it is for exactly that reason that the sources 
maintain that the giving of the Law was the historical de­
nouement of the whole liberation. It was their understand­
ing that the new constitution supplanted the old. The lib­
eration thus has a transcendent bearing; it involves the 
restoration of divine sonship for the people of Yahweh 
through popular obedience to divine command.
It is possible to infer from the passages dealing with 
the feast in the wilderness a trick to deceive the Pharaoh 
into letting the people slip away from their stations and 
tasks. This explanation is not satisfying. The feast to 
Yahweh must be held out of the boundaries of Egypt because 
Egypt is contaminated with the presence of a counter deity,
155
the Pharaoh himself. The depth of this conflict begins to 
emerge with Pharaoh's own reply to the command of Yahweh 
which Moses has conveyed. The Pharaoh responds— loosely—  
"Who is this Yahweh that I should obey him . . . ?" Appar­
ently this reply displays the same sneering cynicism which 
Stalin exhibited in his famous query as to how many divisions 
are at the disposal of the pope, and inasmuch as both were 
slave masters of renown, it is kindred with that later ques­
tion. But the Pharaoh's response is more straightforward 
than that of Stalin for he is not only the king of Egypt but 
its god as well. He knows of no other deity whose authority 
should countermand his own. Nor is he— a god— likely to be 
convinced otherwise by entreaties and threats. It is for 
this reason that the last of the Biblical exercises in world 
creation ensues. The sequence of events which begins in Exo­
dus 5.2 with the Pharaoh's refusal to heed the command of 
Yahweh includes the several plagues and achieves completion 
with the destruction of the army of Egypt in the sea.
The "world creation" of Exodus 5-14 is generically dif­
ferent from the P creation account of Genesis 1, and the J 
creation account of Genesis 2. It has greater similarity to 
the "creation" stories of the flood and of the appearance of 
Abram after the dispersal of the Babel community, but it is 
different from these also. The two statements of creation 
in the first two chapters of Genesis deal primarily in the 
creation of the world and man in time; moreover, the manifest 
theme in these accounts is God's creation of world reality
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out of a pre-existent emptiness, an emptiness which parallels 
the primal chaos of other literatures. The "creations" fol­
lowing upon the flood and upon the Babel dispersion have 
nothing to do with the establishment of time. In these, time 
is given and constant; novelty occurs pursuant to God’s de­
structive acts because these world-destructive acts serve to 
introduce new epochs within time and hence, recreations of 
the world. Pre-historic time is thus divided epochally 
through great destructions and recreations amongst the heroic 
pre-peoples. But the Exodus account of world creation is 
fundamentally different from these epochal destruction-cre- 
ation events in that it does not consist of but another "oc­
casion" by which time can be divided. Rather, it is world 
creation by which the saving history of Yahweh begins with 
the assembling of Israel as a free people, responsible before 
its God. In the great upheavals of the Exodus, history be­
comes differentiated from time, reckoned in terms of cre- 
ation-destruction cycles.
There may be objection to the employment of the term 
"world creation" in description of the events of the Exodus. 
This objection can be maintained only if it is held that 
"world" means physical reality. The "world," as the symbol 
occurs in philosophy in reference to the ambient reality 
which is synthesized for consciousness by a subjective, his­
torical humanity, is a world erected upon the suppressed 
ruins of an archaic, unfree, pre-individuated, unconscious 
world. Inasmuch as the Exodus destroyed that world, to in­
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troduce in its place a world of new celestial, political and 
psychic configurations, the Exodus amounts to a world cre­
ation. The Old Testament documentary sources (all of whom 
labored without the instruction of Hegel and Jung), are su­
perlatively cognizant of the division which the Exodus im­
posed in the existence of man upon the earth. For them, the 
Exodus created a world in which man lived in free service to 
the God who had sanctified history with his saving Presence. 
Godliness in history is pre-figured in Abram's removal from 
the existence of his land, his kindred, his father's house; 
in the Exodus, patriarchal history is reenacted as national 
history through the escape of Israel from the encompassing 
greyness of its slave existence in Egypt. The Exodus drama 
must thus be understood as world creation, for there could 
be no world which serves as object for consciousness had the 
liberation of Israel from Egyptian slavery not occurred. In 
the old world, men and gods are jointly integral with the 
natural world as pattern; hence the impossibility of subjec­
tivity; hence magic in place of action. The preternatural 
God of the new world is free; he is not the exponent of pat­
tern, but the creator of a c t i o n . ^4 Mankind which enters
54Snaith explains that in the Hebrew language there is 
no verb which conveys "being" in the static sense that is 
possible in the Greek language. Instead, there is only "be­
coming" (hayah). (Hence Buber's rendition of ehyeh as "be­
ing there"— i.e., as a continually self^-manifesting presence. 
The consonantal pattern of the words is the same, vowels be­
ing at the linguist's option.) Frpm this understanding 
Snaith develops one of the distinctive ideas with which his 
study is concerned. The God of Israel (or later, the Holy 
One of Israel) couples in his character the Semitic traits 
of an EL (the greatest of gods) who is holy (qodosh) in the
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into partnership with this God is mankind which is recreated 
for action i. The new mankind which is emergent from the Exo­
dus is mankind become capable of subjectivity, of conscious­
ness, of freedom within the Presence of the author of free 
action. The Exodus of Israel from Egypt is nothing less 
than the creation of the free world of history.
The Exodus is world creation in the symbolic and mythi­
cal sense also. That is to say, the character of the events 
by which the liberation of the chosen people was won is 
clearly suggestive of the ancient Near Eastern mythical en­
counters by which the primordial chaos is subdued and world 
order is installed. We must hasten to add, again, that the 
Exodus is different from these in that it creates the world 
as history, in contrast to the myths in which the world is 
created as a repetitive cycle of decay and renewal. Despite 
this basic difference, the Exodus displays a motif which is 
common to the theogonic myth. Like Marduk in the East and
sense of R. Otto^s "the Numinous," with the relentless sense 
of action which is conveyed in the Hebrew version of the 
verb substantive, hayah. (See Snaith, Distinctive Ideas of 
the Old Testament, pp. 47-48.) It is this peculiar juxta­
position in the character of Yahweh of an awful holiness with 
a worldview in which stasis is incomprehensible that has 
given to Europe history as we know it, i.e., as real movement 
in which action is never merely efficient, but is itself an 
expression of, or deviation from, the real content which un­
dergirds all. When history expresses this real content, we 
say that it is free. It is for this reason that the intense 
political monism of both the historians and prophets is ab­
solutely at odds with the monism of recent totalitarianism. 
Totalitarianism seeks rest in a return to the unconscious 
world of magic and bull sacrifice. The Bible quite literally 
has no understanding of rest. In action there is freedom, 
while in stasis there is the spurious perfection of universal 
bondage.
Zeus in the West, Yahweh accomplishes an incremental defeat 
of the older generation of deity which has lost the power of 
order and has become itself the agent of chaos. In the Exo­
dus struggle, Yahweh becomes the new ordering deity and Pha­
raoh the dragon, the monster-god who dominates the world of 
the dead. The triumph of Yahweh over Egypt is the triumph 
of history over death. Egypt left great tombs, while Israel 
and its daughter faiths live on as sacred history into the 
modern age. The Exodus creation directed Egypt and the an­
cient Near East to death and Israel to life.
Life is the end of creation, and creation involves the 
replacement of nothing with something, of disorder with or­
der, of injustice with justice. The nothing, the disorderly, 
the unjust, are symbolic expressions of the residual, life 
destroying evil which is pushed into abeyance by the world- 
creative act. In the later Bible consciousness, this evil 
reality is personified by the devil, a personage who is ab­
solutely other from Yahweh, the one true God. In the pre- 
Biblical symbolizations of the world-creative struggle 
against the demonic reality, the monotheistic principle is 
partially or wholly absent. In this situation, the struggle 
occurs between older gods who have exchanged their divinity 
for demonism and new gods who have taken up the task of in­
stituting and policing divine order. The Exodus struggle is 
of this sort, for it is a combat to the death between Yahweh, 
the righteous God of Israel, and Pharaoh, the slave-master 
god of Egypt. The theopolitical boundary of the Exodus then
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is not monotheism but h e n o t h e i s m . ^5 It is important that 
the god character of the Pharaoh be recognized, for if it is 
not, the larger significance of the Exodus will evade our 
understanding. We will be unable to perceive the Exodus as 
the creation of a veritably new world of justice and free­
dom.
The challenge of the new deity to the old is given in 
the declaration: "Thus says the Lord [YHWH] . . . "  and it
C C Henotheism is the worship of one god without denial 
of the existence of others, and there are suggestions in the 
Old Testament that until quite late, henotheism was the form 
of godliness amongst the chosen people. Irwin argued that 
Amos was the first monotheist, and the internal evidence of 
the Amos prophecy supports the claim that Amos was very 
near to that position, even though he does not say so di­
rectly. (See Irwin, "The Hebrews," p. 227.) Professor 
Albright believed that the historical Moses was a monotheist, 
but he went on to stipulate that there was no need for Is­
rael to deny the existence of gods other than Yahweh; it was 
necessary only to deny their power. (See William Foxwell 
Albright, From Stone Age to Christianity: Monotheism and
the Historical Process, 2nd ed. [Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1957], pp. 271 and 327-328.) Lods offers 
the most complete overview of the matter in his argument 
that monotheism becomes doctrinal only with the climactic 
prophecy of Deutero-Isaiah. This doctrinization of Yahweh's 
sole hegemony, Lods explains, is anticipated in the express 
teaching of Amos, and is implicit in compact form in the 
early documents from the Mosaic age. (See Adolphe Lods, The 
Prophets and the Rise of Judaism, tr. S. H. Hooke [London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1937], p. 60.) In any event, 
if consistent monotheism is imputed to the earlier Bible 
text, the greater contest of the prophet Elijah with the 
priests of the Canaanite Baal (I Kings 18) cannot make much 
sense. The issue here is not the existence of the Baal, but 
of his power.
In connection with this question of henotheism and mono­
theism, it should be recognized that gnosticism in both its 
authentic historical form and in the modernist analogue which 
Voegelin identified embraces a retreat from monotheism back 
to henotheism. Thus the gnostic supercession of Yahweh (or 
Ialdabaoth) by Christ, and analogously, the supercession of 
the metaphysician by the sociologist, of the bourgeoisie by 
the proletariat, and so on. In no instance is the reality
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is accepted by the Pharaoh in his reply, "Who is the Lord 
that I should heed his voice . . . ?" Upon the rejoinder, 
there ensues a series of divinely initiated natural catas­
trophes which are of world-destructive proportions. By the 
plagues, Yahweh destroys the Egyptian order step by step, 
rendering life within the Pharaonic theopolity so hateful 
that at last the god-king, driven by desperation at the death 
of the first-born of all Egypt, acquiesces in the will of 
Yahweh and releases Israel to serve its God. For his part, 
the Pharaoh has attempted to retain his sovereignty, agree­
ing to release Israel in order to obtain relief from the 
plagues, and with the cessation of each plague, reneging on 
his word. In the P document, Pharaoh's duplicity is indeed 
part of the divine plan of Yahweh; Yahweh will "multiply" 
his signs and wonders through hardening the heart of the 
king, thereby heightening the effect of the demonstration of 
his superiority to the god-ki ng. Alt hou gh JE does not go 
so far in rationalizing this theme, the same implication is 
present in the text.
. . . Thus says the Lord [YHWH], the God of the Hebrews, 
"Let my people go, that they may serve me. For this 
time I will send all my plagues upon your heart, and 
upon your servants and your people, that you may know 
that there is none like me in all the earth. For by 
now I could have put forth my hand and struck you and 
your people with pestilence, and you would have been 
cut off from the earth; but for this purpose have I let 
you live, to show you my power, so that my name may be




declared throughout all the earth. You are still 
exalting yourself against my people and will not let them go . . ."57
In creating Israel as the new People of the world, Yahweh 
has proceeded slowly in humbling the moribund world of di­
vinized monarchs, astral deities, magic, and human enslave­
ment before chthonian spirits. There is one final encounter 
with the Pharaoh after the Exodus from Egypt; the king again 
attempts to assert hegemony over God's people, and he is 
destroyed along with the Egyptian army, which the Bible his­
torians understood to be the primary symbol of the negative 
power of political domination. With the destruction of the 
god-king and his armed might the divine liberation of Israel 
is complete. Israel is no longer to serve the Pharaoh in 
bondage; Israel is to serve Yahweh in freedom, for before 
Yahweh Israel is not a subject people; instead, Israel is 
the son of God.
The sonship relation between the people and their God 
is the cardinal achievement of the world creation accom­
plished in the Exodus. The theme of divine sonship for Is­
rael illumines both the future history of Yahweh and his 
people and the past of the now decadent Egyptian theopolity. 
From the vantage point of divine command, the purpose of the 
Exodus has been for Israel to serve its God away from the 
Egyptian Pharaonic contamination, but from the vantage point 
of divine dispensation of grace unto that people who is to 
serve, sonship is the gift which is to be bestowed upon the
^Exodus 9.13-17.
issue of God's first man, Abram. The positivity of Yahweh's 
approach to Israel in bondage is formally the same as the 
positivity of Yahweh's approach to Abram in the environment 
of his youth. It consists of a command and a promise. The 
command is given in the "serve me" and God's promise concern­
ing the future history is adumbrated in the "Israel is my 
son." Even before Moses had approached the king demanding 
release of Israel, Yahweh has said, "And you shall say to 
Pharaoh, 'Thus says the Lord, Israel is my first-born son, 
and I say to you, "Let my son go that he may serve me"; if 
you refuse to let him go, behold, I will slay your first­
born son.'"58 The symbol of divine sonship for Israel thus 
has a double ramification. It is the Exodus equivalent of 
the blessed nationhood promised to Abram upon his departure 
from the land of his youth. Within the setting of Pharaonic 
Egypt, the symbol suggests a spiritual treason against the 
established order. Voegelin was the first to recognize the 
extent and the depth of this treason within the decadent 
world which antedated the world of sacred history. He writes
The conflict between the Yahwist experience and the 
pharaonic order is brought on a formula as simple as it 
is perfect. We remember the Pyramid Text in which the 
Pharaoh is greeted by the gods:
This is my son, my first born;
and we find now opposed to it in [Exodus] 4.22 the new 
formula:
My son, my first-born, is Israel.59
S^Exodus 4.22^-23. See also Hosea 11.1.
S^Eric Voegelin, Order and History, I (Baton Rouge:
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The great events which we have recognized as being world- 
destructive and world-creative are here developed in the 
fullest degree. A massive substitution has occurred; no 
longer is only one amongst men the son of the gods; with 
Yahweh's liberating action in history, an entire people has 
been elected to sonship.
It is commonly understood that the European interest 
in constitutionalism was instructed by the republican ex­
periences of classical antiquity. But the Exodus creation- 
liberation event was no less important to constitutionalism 
than classical republicanism, for the demotion of an arbi­
trary king from divine to mortal status, coupled with the 
elevation of an entire people from the status of slaves to 
sons of God is a distributed bestowal of esteem which cul­
minates in uniform rules, duties, and rights. This is the 
conclusion which the historian E transmitted to Europe 
through the inclusion of the Book of the Covenant within his 
Exodus narrative.
Sonship for Israel is the teleological aspect of the 
Exodus drama of world creation; that is to say, election of 
the people Israel to sonship is the purpose of the projected 
service to God in the wilderness; the command has substance 
only in relation to the promise. The connection of service 
with sonship establishes the second sense in which the elec-
Louisiana State University Press, 1956), 390. For the later 
royalist heresy which seeks a complete reversal of the na­
tional sonship symbolism, see Psalm 2.6-7. Propaganda is an 
ancient art.
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tion has cast light upon the liberation; the people has ex­
changed masters. Yahweh has become suzerain and Israel has 
become vassal.®^ The relationship of suzerain to vassal is 
hardly akin to the relationship of owner to slave, for the 
former is a constitutional arrangement and the latter is 
not. But Israel's service to its creator-liberator is con­
stitutional in a more profound sense than the language of
feudal organization can show. The provision of divine son-
!
ship qualifies the nature of the service; a life in service 
to the father-God is essentially different from a life worn 
fine in service to the Pharaoh, or even to a good human 
overlord. Service of son to father is service rendered in 
an atmosphere of mutual love and duty; it is a morally de­
velopmental service, a service which is propadeutic unto 
free selfhood for the person and independent nationhood for 
the collective. The service of a chattel to its keeper is 
exploitative and morally destructive; it is service which 
finally wearies the soul, drying to nothing the latent seed 
from which the free, legislative self might otherwise grow. 
Sonship in service to God is the core anthropological sym­
bolism of the Bible; more certainly than any other of that 
book's contents,1it establishes freedom as the destined con­
dition of man before God. The God of Israel is the true God
6®See Mendenhall, The Tenth Generation, pp. 14-15. 
Mendenhall explains that suzerainty agreements of this re­
gion and period frequently use the father-son terminology. 
Mendenhall points out also that the father-son relationship 
continues to be the dominant theme of divine-human relation­
ship in the Bible until the writing of the Fourth Evangelist 
in John 15.14-15: "You are my friends . . . "
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for just that reason: Within his Presence, mankind partic­
ipated more consciously in the truth of being than had been 
the case before the election of Israel to sonship. The 
Fourth Evangelist later synthesized these participatory sym­
bols of son and servant in the New Testament symbol of pos- 
itivity in being: the free disciple. A community of these
persons is the end of creation.
It is possible now to contemplate the several symbols 
which we have considered of man in free positivity before 
God. In the order of their appearance in the Bible sources 
they include the portrait symbol of Abram who in the J nar­
rative quits his surroundings in response to the command and 
promise of his God; nex.t is the free son, Isaac; then comes 
the plural son of God who in the Exodus is freed from Phar­
aonic slavery to serve the true God in the wilderness; after 
this is the image of God in the P creation whose properties 
in the esteem of God are possession, power and worth; last 
is the disciple of the Fourth Gospel whose freedom is deriv­
ative from participation in the truth of the mediatory logos. 
In the New Testament disciple symbol, the overt identifi­
cation of freedom as the condition of positivity before God 
has led our analysis to develop freedom as the latent inten­
tion of positivity in the earlier symbols. In so doing we 
have not imputed to the text a construction which it will 
not support. In the slave difficulty of Abram, in the Is-
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raelite liberation from slavery, in the divine commission to 
man, the image of God, the meaning is unmistakable: the
slave condition is fraught with existential negativity, while 
freedom within God's Presence is a condition charged with 
ontic positivity. The underside of each of these symbols 
of free humanity is the slave condition. Both are possibil­
ities, and either may be manifested in the person and in the 
greater affiliation which is the extension of personhood.
In respect of these opposing gradients of the human 
character, several observations follow. First is that the 
capacities which reside within the human character are like­
wise the projectible capacities for order in the world ex­
ternal to self. In Republic VIII Plato has shown that the 
order of the soul is constitutive of public order. By this 
understanding, the conclusion follows that an aggregation 
comprised of free and positive characters will be a commu­
nity which is pledged to live its collective existence in 
free service to positive ends. An inspection of the symbols 
of the prophetic critique and of free political life in 
Athens will illustrate this public aspect of freedom as pos­
itivity in being.
The second consideration pertains more directly to the 
Biblical symbols which have been examined. We should recog­
nize that from the portrait symbol of Abram to the concept 
symbol of the disciple, we are dealing in pre-Augustinian 
materials. None of our narrators is acquainted with a doc­
trine of original sin. While original sin, Augustine's
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"blemished nature," gathers in summary form so much of the 
truth of archaic symbolism, it does so in such a fashion as 
to harden that experience and to empty it of the dynamic 
tension in which it is natively couched. After Augustine, 
the primary propensity of man is to slavery, to negativity, 
to sin. This conceptual turn occurred mainly because 
Augustine wedded sin to pride. To Augustine, the inherent 
negativity of man lies in that man conceives himself to be 
a source of being and order, and in so conceiving himself, 
man erects himself as a power in competition with the God 
who has created him. Except for the Adam story, there is 
little in the historical portion of the Old Testament to 
support the anthropology which makes original sin the pri­
mary fact of life for m a n . ^ l  The Abram saga is more repre­
sentative of the Bible portrait of man than is the Adam
®^It is important that in City of God, Book XXXI, chap­
ter 3, Augustine bases the argument of original sin on the 
historicity of Adam and his transgression. Once the mythi­
cal character of this episode has become transparent, it be­
comes impossible to maintain the doctrine in its traditional 
form. No longer can all be held to be guilty because of de­
scent from corrupted ancestors. On the paradigmatic level, 
however, Augustine's reading cannot be gainsaid. Eve's re­
ceptivity to the serpent's invitation to know all things 
does indicate pride, human over-stepping of boundaries and 
competition with divinity. If pride is the generic type of 
negativity within which all other negativity may be gathered, 
then the advocates of original sin as a trait of human nature 
are correct. The preponderant teaching of the Bible will not 
support such an anthropology though. There is an irreconcil­
able variance between the fallen mankind of Genesis 3 and the 
"image of God" in Genesis 1, and to imagine that with Adam's 
fall, man has lost the divine image is simply to apply a 
cosmetic screen which cannot be effective in the post- 
Wellhausean world. P is much later than J, and it is clear 
that he did not agree with J about the salient property of 
human nature. J has preserved for us a Biblicized version
story. In the character of Abram there dwells a range of 
possibilities which extends from the slavishness of despair 
to free trust in God's promise and free obedience to God's 
command. Negativity in the Abram story does not grow from 
a prideful design; it grows rather from mistrust, from 
straying, from forgetting. It is the behavior of a wayward 
son, not the conspiracy of a would-be god. Only by means 
of the most assiduous intellectualization of the facts can 
it become possible to impute pride to Abram. It may be true 
that prideful hubris against God and man becomes an audible 
dissonance in later times, after the beginning of the mon­
archies and the vertically stratified societies which were 
their adjunct. But in the early historical period the char­
acters are too naive, too insufficient in depth, for them 
to be capable of a genuinely Pelagian pride. Even of the 
Pharaoh, the hated god-king, P finds it necessary to tell us 
that God hardened his heart. Apparently there would have 
been a more muted conflict had he been left to his own re­
sources .
While it is true that the most patent negativity of 
which man is capable is pride, it is important to recognize 
that the Biblical symbols which this study has examined do 
not exhibit that dress. It is likewise necessary to observe 
that in respect of these various symbols— negativity, slav-
of a tale whose heathen provenance is scarcely concealed.
The occurrence of this atavism in the Yahwist canon is quite 
possibly the most fateful accident in the entire history of 
Western civilization.
ishness, sin— are not the sole, or even the primary gradients 
of the human character. The case is quite the contrary; free 
positivity before God is the condition of desire and destiny. 
The descent to slavery occurs as a function of human impo­
tence, but not as the design of a maliced nature. To be 
sure, free positivity is not realized in a world-immanent 
frame of activity; in each instance it is God the Savior who 
makes free and thus draws nearer to completion the nature 
which God the Creator has intended for man. In an objective 
assessment, liberation from slavery is a divine action by 
which man is saved from a negative condition for which he 
is not ultimately responsible. In the Bible, slavery to 
Egypt or slavery to sin is a happening which ensnares man 
from without, and so corrupts the essentially free and pos­
itive character that man is. The inherency of negativity 
in the human character as radical evil is the consequence 
of man's own affective avowal of responsibility for his 
slave condition; "I have sinned." In that confession the 
person claims volitional involvement in the circumstances 
of his negativity and thus involves his own volitional cen­
ter in the restoration of positivity. Inasmuch as the "I" 
partakes of a more generalized human nature and condition, 
the "I" who confesses sin imputes the slave condition not 
only to the particular self, but to the broader humanity of 
which the "I" is one particular instance. It is at this 
affective point of the avowal of personal culpability for 
sin that the Augustian claim of inherency becomes viable,
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and not before.®^
Mankind, according to the symbolic configurations which 
we have beheld, can follow one of two opposing paths. Man 
is destined for free partnership in the venture of divine 
creation; his nature as person is open to the universe as 
being. But this same nature is vulnerable to closure and 
to impotence. In this dual proclivity can be found both 
man as he is and the fallen character who he has become.
This fallen character, the slave,' is the person to- whose 
hapless condition God bears witness, who is liberated by 
God, and who is elevated to a new creaturehood which par­
ticipates in the world-creative process itself. In order 
of ascending antiquity, this liberated character is the dis­
ciple, the image, the son of God.
From Voegelin we have learned that "To establish a 
government is an essay in world creation." But the Exodus
62The following excerpts from Paul Ricoeur explain this 
more fully:
. . . even if evil came to man from another source 
which contaminates him, this other source would still 
be accessible to us only through its relation to us, 
only through the state of temptation, aberration, or 
blindness whereby we would be affected. In all hypoth­
eses, evil manifests itself in man's humanity.
The choice of the center of perspective is already the 
declaration of a freedom which admits its responsibil­
ity, which vows to look upon evil as evil committed, 
and avows its responsibility to see that it is not com­
mitted. It is this avowal that links evil to man, not 
merely as its place of manifestation, but as its author.
Fallible Man, pp. xxiv-xxv.
^Voegelin, Order and History, I, 16.
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of Israel from Egypt teaches something more than this. That 
is, a creation is likewise a liberation, for it frees man to 
be the self who he really is. In its initial impulse, every 
revolution is such a creation, for the revolutionary inten­
tion is to rectify and to free. This intention is given in 
the very attempt to reposition life on a new and higher level 
than that which went before.
Moses
The transferral of divine sonship from the Pharaoh to 
Israel through Yahweh's act of liberation suggests Hegel's 
consideration that while in imperial China, only one was 
free, in modern Europe, all are free. Hegel was unprepared 
to admit that long before his age the freedom of a whole 
people had been accomplished in completion, for such an ad­
mission would have upset the developmental thesis which 
Hegel advanced. Hence the rather unfriendly treatment of
C.AIsrael in The Philosophy of History.° It is true that the 
freedom of Israel pursuant to the Exodus was not character-
^^Consider the following accusation against Israel:
We observe among this people a severe religious 
ceremonial, expressing a relation to pure Thought. The 
individual as concrete does not become free, because 
the Absolute itself is not comprehended as concrete 
Spirit; since Spirit still appears posited as non­
spiritual— destitute of its proper characteristics. It 
is true that subjective feeling is manifest— the pure 
heart, repentance, devotion; but the particular con­
crete individuality has not become objective to itself 
in the Absolute.
G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, tr. J. Sibree 
(New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956), pp. 196-197.
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ized by highly differentiated individuality; that develop­
ment would occur first in Greece. Freedom for Israel within 
the divine Presence bestowed both moral and ontic power upon 
the chosen people, as a whole, in a way unprecedented in 
history. Israelite freedom did not encourage the sort of 
resplendent individuality which culminated in athletic prow­
ess, aesthetic virtuosity, and in science. But if these 
achievements of Greece are considered to constitute the 
greater virtue, they must be taken along with the terrible 
underside of Greek humanism, i.e., the preordained verdict 
of form and fate which propels the human project to gory de­
struction.^^ There is nothing like this in Israel, for 
within the Presence, redemption is the enduring response to 
repentance for both the individual and the nation. This 
abiding belief in the possibility of a real turning away 
from death toward life is the most concrete showing of the 
reality of freedom in Israel. The forum for redemption, for 
change which makes life abundant, is the nation. This pat­
tern holds from the Exodus to the return of the Remnant. 
Unlike the more extreme manifestations of freedom in Greece, 
the Israelite hope began and remained as group freedom, real-
What this means is that the Israelites were not Greeks, 
and especially that they were not Greek humanists. Hegel is 
complaining that the God of Israel remained transcendent.
The difficulty with this criticism is that the same charge 
must lie against the best of the Greeks.
G^Thus Collingwood identifies not Herodotus, but 
Thucydides with his "substantialism" as the historian who 
most faithfully follows the anti-historical bias of Greek 
culture. See R. G. Collingwood, Idea of History, pp. 29 ff.
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ized in response to, or reaction against, the affairs of the 
nation. Only in the vision of Aeschylus would Greece ap­
proach this high mark of Israelite freedom.
To say that the freedom of the Israelite nation is 
group freedom is to say that the God who gives the nation 
identity is the force who supports action. Thus, when great 
individuals appear— and by great individuals we do not mean 
kings— it is not because ambition has driven them into prom­
inence . From Abram through the later prophets, great men 
become great in obedience— sometimes reluctant obedience— to 
divine command. According to our text, Moses, the liberator 
and legislator, was such a man.
Moses and Pharaoh— and to a much lesser extent Aaron—  
are the only significant human characters in the portion of 
the Exodus narrative which we have discussed. Our concern 
here is not to explore in detail the historical person and 
doings of Moses. The so-called "fossil text" of Exodus 5.3 
and 5.5-19 J suggests the possibility that the most basic 
strata of the Exodus tradition is pre-Mosaic, and that the 
centrality of Moses in the received text is the result of 
later synthesis with other Moses traditions. Whatever the 
case may be with the history of the Exodus narrative, in a 
paradigmatic sense the Moses of the Exodus text develops our 
understanding of divine liberation and human freedom as a 
condition of positivity before God and the world. Like Abram
6^See Noth, History of Pentateuchal Traditions, pp. 70- 
71 and 156 ff.
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in Genesis, Moses is God's man. Like Abram, Moses is of the 
type, first man; he resembles those figures whom the Greeks 
would call archon. That is to say, Moses is the first 
clearly discernible human who is emergent in the world cre­
ation of Exodus. As first man, Moses is suited to partner­
ship with the Creator and to leadership of the chosen people. 
Moses is prototypical of free humanity, and if we are to 
comprehend the meaning of freedom in its original- showing, 
we must attend to this model figure.
The concern for Moses as both product and agent of lib­
eration is necessitated by this project's interest in the 
modernist misunderstanding and frequent deprecation of cul­
tural origins. This is serious, especially where the inter­
ests of a whole order of life are concerned. A man who be­
lieves that he began in Naples, when in fact he began in 
Rome, will believe that he has come to Rome when he arrives 
in Venice. That man will drown. In the Genealogy of Morals, 
Nietzsche contrived a colorful explanation for the origin of 
morality, uniformly binding on all men. In brief, morality 
is held to be the product of a mean and sinister conspiracy 
by which conniving slaves infect masters with their own con­
genital weakness and thereby subvert the innocent, pre-moral
6 7hegemony of masters over the world. By and large, it is 
as if geese should persuade swans that it is evil for the 
latter to be masters of the pond, and so reduce swans to the
fi 7 See especially Genealogy of Morals, aphorism 7, and 
Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 195.
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ignominious stature of geese. In Nietzsche's view, the con­
tagion of moral conscience was such that the world was per­
verted and its former grandeur was lost. On a factual level, 
the historicity of Nietzsche's thesis is dubious, and an 
inspection of the character of Moses, the liberator, shows 
that on a paradigmatic level it is completely false.
Nietzsche could not come to the truth of transcendence, and 
thus he rendered himself incapable of understanding the real 
truth which attaches to the liberation of the slaves. The 
Exodus text depicts a Moses who, after his ordination as 
liberator, displayed none of the meanness, the hatefulness, 
the duplicitousness which Nietzsche imputed to the slave 
mentality. Instead, our text shows Moses as a fairly simple 
man, not entirely unlike Nietzsche imagined the primeval 
masters to have been. He obeyed the God who had spoken to 
him from the burning bush, going before the king (the first 
prophet to do so), bearing the authority of God's word, dis­
playing no regard for personal safety or worldly fortune.
His only fear was that people would not listen to him.
The origins of Moses in the JE text of Exodus 2 are 
legendary: Moses was born into the priestly tribe of Levi;
he was placed in a basket by the river's shore, where the 
daughter of the Pharaoh discovered him and took him to be 
her son. Exodus 2.10 gives a Hebrew etymology of the name 
"Moses," but the Old Testament scholars agree that the ety­
mology is mistaken. The name "Moses" is an Egyptian name, 
and it is possible that the historical Moses was born an
Egyptian.^® Why then the legendary account of the nativity
and upbringing of Moses? Buber explains the legend in terms
69of Moses' function as liberator. The legend of Moses' 
Levite parenthood provides an organic connection of Moses 
with the slave people Israel, but the account of his expo­
sure and royal adoption spares Moses the experience of en­
slavement. This is important, for one who had been a slave 
would have been unsuited by origin to become the human agent 
of divine liberation. The Exodus treatment of the origin 
of Moses in the Old Testament is formally similar to the 
virgin birth of Christ in the New Testament. The Exodus 
legend of the nativity of Moses thus attests to the blemish 
of slavery in much the same way as the Genesis account of 
the expulsion of Ishmael. That is to say, Ishmael— born of 
a slave— was unfit to become the ancestor of Yahweh's holy 
nation; Moses, spared enslavement and rehabilitated from his 
slave nativity by a royal adoption, was by nature suited to 
become God's agent in the liberation. In all of this the 
text seems actually to anticipate the charge that a petty 
self-interest was clandestinely at work in the freeing of 
the slaves and the consequent formation of a morality bind­
ing on all. In both history and legend, Moses, the human by 
whose agency the freedom of the slaves was won, was never a 
slave; he was by experience a member of the master caste; he 
could not be the exponent of a "slave mentality." Exactly
68see Noth, History of Pentateuchal Traditions, p. 159.
^Buber, Moses, p. 35.
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the same is true of Solon in Greece.
Despite the text's depiction of Moses as one who has 
been spared the blemish of slavery, the slave mentality is 
suggested in the didactic story about the young Moses' mur­
der and flight.
One day, when Moses had grown up, he went out to 
his people and looked on their burdens; and he saw an 
Egyptian beating a Hebrew, one of his people. He 
looked this way and that, and seeing no one he killed 
the Egyptian and hid him in the sand. When he went out 
the next day, behold, two Hebrews were struggling to­
gether; and he said to the man that did the wrong, "Why 
do you strike your fellow?" He answered, "Who made you 
a prince and a judge over us? Do you mean to kill me 
as you killed the Egyptian?" Then Moses was afraid, 
and thought, "Surely the thing is known." When Pharaoh 
heard of it, he sought to kill M o s e s . 70
In the European imagination, good government entails
the coupling of constitutionalism with popular freedom.
t
Europe learned to value this union from its discoverers, Is­
rael and Greece. Good teachers are first students, and the 
episode narrated above is from the period of the teacher's 
own student passage. Moses, the teacher of Israel, learns 
the futility of ego-derivative solutions to the problem of 
injustice amongst men. It is altogether possible that this 
tale with a rather "Kantian" lesson is historically accurate. 
Moses murdered the Egyptian because the latter was abusing 
"one of his people." But the rectification of human injus­
tice by an act of human injustice is not productive of jus­
tice. Instead, it marks Moses as a murderer in the esteem 
of the slave people and renders him impotent to become a
70Exodus 2.11-15.
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moral force amongst them. Moses becomes a common fugitive 
from the established justice of the land.
The account of Moses' crime, his failure as a judge 
amongst men, his flight from prosecution, has much to teach 
about the slave mentality and the morality attendant upon 
it. If the aspiration to end injustice amongst men consists 
in nothing more than a design to elevate one's own status in 
the world— or the status of one's kindred— through devices 
such as crime, deceit, connivance, the project is necessar­
ily aborted in its beginning, fbr it serves only to compound 
the extant injustice, working a net increment in the suffer­
ing and guilt of mankind. The author of this text under­
stands the reality known to us as transcendence, and he pro­
ceeds to illustrate its centrality in Yahweh's saving act of 
justice, the liberation of his people from slavery. The 
great historian J displays no sympathy for Moses and for his 
crime done in stealth. J will not acquiesce in slave moral­
ity— a morality borne of mere resentment of even "humanist" 
altruism; he will have nothing to do with the overturning of 
the master caste by means of demonic descent. It is signif­
icant moreover that the criminal figure in this account is 
Moses himself; the failure and disgrace which accrue to 
Moses in this murder are vital to the education of God's 
chosen liberator. If a slave mentality of the sort de­
scribed by Nietzsche had been operative here, the text would 
certainly suppress Moses' loss of influence amongst his kin­
dred. It might even lionize Moses for his bravura pose in
180
this episode. That it shrinks from doing so conveys the 
condemnatory attitude of Yahwism toward slavish solutions to 
the misfortunes of the slave.
From one point of view, the murder which Moses commit­
ted is a function of the slave morality for it bespeaks self­
ish rebellion against those who exercise mastery. But from 
another perspective, it is the expression of an incipient 
will to mastery, rather similar to the murderous acts of 
those who articulate themselves as the Folk or the People.
The Yahwist will acquiesce in neither of these opposed de­
signs, for both lead to murder. At the very base of the 
Bible, before the Decalogue with its statutory "Thou shalt 
not kill," stands the principle that human life— Egyptian or
otherwise— must be inviolate, and that the homicide es-
71tranges himself from the human community. The existence 
of one human community is thus axiomatic in the Bible, and 
the ultimate implication of this axiom is egalitarian. Nei­
ther service nor mastery can be countenanced if their inten­
sity is such as to deny the common humanity of all. It is 
for this reason that the caste society which Solomon created 
evoked the curse of the prophets. A society which is so 
structured as to deny the common humanity of its inhabitants 
must likewise repudiate divine authority, for in such a so­
ciety the dominant element will itself exercise uncondi­
tional authority over the lesser. The Biblical insistence 
upon the ultimate equality of mankind before God has nothing
7^See Genesis 4.8-16, 34.25-31, 49.5-7.
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to do then with a slave morality; it has rather to do with 
the prevention of apostasy, and consequentially, of murder.
The Bible is opposed to a morality skewed to the interests 
of masters or of slaves; right is prior, and material con­
siderations are posterior. The Moses whom we see in this 
text is a man who is forced to reckon with this priority of 
right. He learns that even a reformer cannot kill with im­
punity. The murder and its consequences for Moses of dis­
grace, fear, and flight, serve to extricate Moses from the 
slave morality, and thus to prepare him for the task of lib­
eration to which he will be appointed.
Finally we must reckon with the portrait of Moses that 
appears in the text of Exodus 4 J. Here are the key pas­
sages:
Then Moses answered, "But behold, they will not 
believe me or listen to my voice, for they will say 
’The Lord [YHWH] did not appear to you.'"
But Moses said to the Lord, "Oh my Lord, I am not 
eloquent, either heretofore or since thou hast spoken 
to thy servant; but I am slow of speech and of tongue."
But he said, "Oh, my Lord, send, I pray, some 
other person."
So Moses took his wife and his sons and set them on an 
ass, and went back to the land of Egypt; and in his 
hand Moses took the rod of G o d . 7 2
This Moses after the escape from Egypt is no enthusi­
ast, no abolitionist. For him the sweetness of family life 
in Midian is satisfying, and he prefers to remain dormant 
rather than enter into struggle with the god-king of Egypt.
^Exodus 4.1, 10, 13, 20.
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In the understanding of J, the Exodus is not the work of man 
but of God. It could not be the work of man because for man 
existential negativity is at once the source of satisfaction 
and paralysis. For Moses the retirement in Midian, and for 
Israel the security of Pharaonic servitude with its flesh- 
pots appear to be life as it truly is and as it was intended 
to be. The dim satisfaction of this life is suggestive of 
the settled and vacant negativity of Abram in the land of 
his kindred. Unlike Abram, Moses is loath to go, and Yahweh 
must command, cajole, and finally offer concessions before 
Moses will obey. Does this seem undivine of Yahweh? It 
seems so only if we think of divinity as being somehow 
vainly royal. Before Yahweh is king he is creator. Before 
he creates Israel, he creates its liberator. He takes this 
backward Moses, and in the language of Buber, makes of him 
a "person."73
None of this accords with the Nietzschean format by
which slaves initiate the thoughts and deeds which weaken
their masters' rule. In the Exodus, it is man who is pas­
sive and recalcitrant, and God who is the motor of activity.
It could hardly be otherwise, for right order within the 
world is the function of creation and creation is divine.
With Moses, with the Pharaoh, with Israel itself, the events
73Buber explains the dialogue between Yahweh and
Jeremiah in respect to personhood. (Prophetic Faith, pp. 
164-165.) In the dialogue, God becomes person and so makes 
man person also. This person has .the power to carry the 
word. This formation of a person takes place also in the J 
story of Moses.
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of the Exodus detail the liberating redemption of the cre­
ator God in establishing this people as the center of the 
new history of man. The divine liberation and re-creation 
of man is accomplished in spite of man himself.
The understanding that man must be overcome was no 
stranger to the Exodus historians. Their biography of Moses, 
the leader of the people, shows just how the overcoming of 
man takes place. Its residual feature is not power but ser­
vice; Moses serves Yahweh as he serves the people. The sev­
eral terms which imply freedom— servant, disciple, friend of 
God— bespeak a disposition of the person which is not coiled 
up and bound within its own purposes. When human life be­
comes so isolated, freedom ends. With the end of freedom 
through selfish isolation came the beginning of the pro­
phetic critique.
IV. PROPHETIC FREEDOM
This study has undertaken the almost embarassing task 
of arguing that the root origins of European freedom are to 
be found in the formative event of a culture which had no 
clearly articulated concept of freedom. For this reason, 
awareness of the history of freedom tends to stop short in 
Greece, where eleutheria translates into Latin as libertas, 
and into the North European languages as a series of nouns 
built upon the stem frei. That freedom in some fashion as­
sociates man with divinity we know from Greece. Zeus is 
Liberator; Zeus is also Savior. The connection of the two 
figurations is insunderable. The agent who saves from dom­
ination by enemies is likewise the agent who makes free.^
In the testament of Israel, it is true, there is no 
clear symbolization of Yahweh as Liberator. There is how­
ever a moving symbolism which has as its heart the convic­
tion that Yahweh is Redeemer and thus, Savior. This symbol­
ization appears in its consummate form in the prophecy of 
the nameless author who is known to us as Deutero Isaiah. 
Like the Priestly author, Deutero Isaiah has beheld the ful­
ness of human catastrophe and despair. For this writer, the 
time of threat and vengeance is past. His message of repair 
comes suddenly in the Isaiah text, like rain which ends the 
long drought.
•̂ See Martin P. Nilsson, A History of Greek Religion, 




Comfort, comfort my people, says your God.
Speak tenderly to Jerusalem, and cry to her 
that her warfare is ended, that her iniquity is par­
doned, that she has received from the Lord's hand 
double for all her s i n s .2
This passage establishes the tenor of the whole text which 
taught Israel to recognize Yahweh as Redeemer. The message 
of Deutero Isaiah is unmistakably a message of freedom. It 
is this because the term gaol ("redeemer"— "avenger") is not 
an heavenly concept which Deutero Isaiah has minted to con­
vey a "religious" notion. Instead, it is a noun which is 
vital in the culture of its origin. The gaol is a senior 
member of the family whose function is to keep mortgaged 
property from leaving the family and, above all, to redeem 
family members who have fallen into b o n d s e r v i t u d e .^ it 
seems obvious then that the symbolization of Yahweh as Re­
deemer in Deutero Isaiah brings us near in thought not only 
to the Exodus, but also to the historical reality of Athens 
in the time of Solon. That is to say, in Deutero Isaiah, we 
comprehend yet another moment in the origin of freedom. It 
is the moment when received history has become transparent.
Deutero Isaiah wrote in the late sixth century, after 
the end of his nation's history as an independent political 
entity; his message is synthetic in the same sense as is the 
writing of those who became prominent in Athens after its 
defeat. Deutero Isaiah is the high spire of the prophetic 
church; all below moves determinedly to the high message of
^Isaiah 40.1-2.
3Buber, Prophetic Faith, p. 207.
redemption, of comfort out of bondage. The four corners of 
his foundation are those eighth century ecstatics who are 
the first "writing" prophets: Amos, Hosea, Micah, Isaiah.
These are utterly unshakable men for they are totally taken 
in the cause of their God. They are simple men, and direct; 
even in the seizure of vision their discourse employs the 
images of daily human experience. Of the four, three have 
the dirt of the field beneath their nails. More even than 
Parmenides and Heraclitus, these prophets are the hewers of 
European mankind. They make European humanity capable of 
freedom because they impart to Europe an accusatory con­
science. These prophets direct man to an awful depth in 
their attack upon cult and ritual, for concomitant with this 
attack is an unconditional demand for rectitude of intention. 
Thus, while the act is not insignificant, it is subordinate 
to intent. In the pure prophetic understanding there is no 
set of sutras which, by inculcating right habit, can somehow
work right mindedness. There is instead what amounts to a
4demand for pure freedom— freedom to decide rightly.
With the prophets, the Bible's freedom content has be­
come overtly political, for the prophets cross at will the 
line which delineates the authoritative allocation of values 
from the society which is at once the matrix and recipient 
of authority. The prophetic perception of the disparity be-
^Thus, Buber sees the prophetic mentality at work even 
in the Adam narrative. Adam has the power to decide; this 
is a given, beyond question. The sole question is: How
will he decide? (See Prophetic Faith, p. 103.)
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tween act and intention is indeed awakened by political af­
fairs. Buber sagaciously calls attention to the dedicatory 
address of Solomon. The king's fulsome claims of reverence 
for Yahweh are a screen of piety which conceals the infinite 
concupiscence of the tyrant, a lust whose consequence in 
history is always heartbreak, famine, death— non-being. The 
king's hypocritical speech is symptomatic of the general 
state of affairs which will prevail in the monarchial cen­
turies and against which Yahweh will direct his prophets to 
rise and speak truly. Monarchial misfeasance, alliances of 
questionable value, social and economic imbalance, the im­
propriety and cruelty of the agricultural cults, these are 
wrong actions which the popular mentality believes can be 
compensatorily balanced and cancelled by a certain kind of 
right action, i.e., by sacrifice to the Yahweh whom Solomon 
has promulgated as a heavenly deity. This is the delusion 
of high antiquity which the prophets strip away.6 Action, 
whether correct or incorrect, is the derivative concern.
The disposition of the heart is of commanding importance.
If the heart is open to Yahweh, then no question about action 
will remain. It is for this reason that these prophets, 
most notably Isaiah, opposed alliance politics. The pro­
phetic conviction is not hostility to foreign alliances per 
se. It is rather that the king attempts to do the impossi-
5I Kings 8.12 f. Buber, Prophetic Faith, p. 83 f.
Concerning the radical uniqueness of the prophetic re­
jection of sacrifice, see Lods, Prophets and the Rise of 
Judaism, p. 68.
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ble, i.e., to find a middle ground that will embrace with 
satisfaction both the sacred and the profane. In any such 
effort, profane actions are bound to prevail over wistfully 
sacred sentiments.
1. The Prophetic Memory of Unity
In our attempt to comprehend.the greatest possible do­
main in which freedom can have meaning, we have adopted the 
Platonic understanding that the slippage of man into slavery 
occurs through a process of historical forgetting. If the 
initial, pre-historic figuration of reality consists in a 
perfect unity of God, man and the world, then the secondary, 
historical reality obtains in a forgetful shattering of this 
real unity. From the New Testament paradigm of the Neighbor, 
we have adduced that freedom happens as a restorative incur­
sion into the brokenness of history of the divine unity 
which undergirds history. It is just this latent— sometimes 
manifest— possibility that has made Europe the arena of free­
dom.
The prophetic struggle lends figure and substance to 
this mental schematization, for the pattern of events in the 
post-Solomonic centuries amounts to a deliberate forgetting 
of the initial oneness of Yahweh with his chosen people. 
Consequent upon this forgetting come the specific maladies 
against which the prophets complain: the chasm between rich
and poor, the oppression of the poor, the cult of the baals, 
the baalization of Yahwism, the reduction of "orthodox" 
Yahwism to a religion, power politics and its apologetic ac-
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complice, court prophecy. Above all else then, the pro­
phetic preaching of the disparity between act and intention 
is a call to end forgetfulness, a call to remember: "Did
you bring to me sacrifices and offerings the forty years in 
the wilderness, 0 house of Israel?"7 Couched within this 
rhetorical question is an injunction that Israel remember
who it has been and so discover who it truly is. It is a
call to remember a time when divine intention instructed hu­
man intention and thus shaped the course of human practise. 
The prophets are able to arouse memory because they claim to 
be spokesmen for Yahweh, and thus to be the real authorities 
within the human culture of which Yahweh is author. Veri­
tably, they are the nation's memory. Buber wrote:
The exposition of the prophets is not a basic action
but a reaction to the fact that the people and kings
did not in their lives and deeds realize the goal im­
plicit in the nature of the kingdom. The prophecy of 
the early writing prophets, of Amos and Hosea, marks 
the maturity of the protest. It is not a beginning, it 
remembers the beginning and pleads with the generation 
concerning what was intended there.8
If we are to understand the prophetic contribution to
freedom, their claim must be taken at face value. To deny
7Amos 5.25.
8Prophetic Faith, p. 67. Of the literature which this 
study has consulted, Buber's work on prophecy is entirely 
the most perspicacious in its grasp of the subject. There 
is a simple reason for this. The faith of the prophets was 
likewise Buber's faith; both accepted uncritically the real­
ity of culture. Thus both were able to apply critical tal­
ent in the area of true need, i.e., to declare where, in a 
world suffused with pretense, the real, living pulse of cul­
ture is to be found. From Buber then we have learned to 
hear the prophets as the authentic spokesmen of a real mem­
ory, the memory of divine liberation. To lack faith in this
190
the cultural authenticity of the writing prophets and to 
imagine that they are an entirely novel phenomenon is not 
only to repudiate their own self-understanding, it is also 
to reject the contiguity of culture itself. Doubtlessly the 
writing prophets temper and sharpen the nouns and narratives 
which constitute the Israelite memory, but in this their 
work is more clarification than innovation. What the proph­
ets must clarify is the true nature of the relationship of 
Yahweh to his people. It is for this reason that they find 
instruction in a special kind of "pre-history," i.e., in 
their own national past before the fall into monarchial de­
viation.
The prophets are the guardians of the true Bible cul­
ture, the culture of Yahweh in union with his people. They 
are the enemies of received history, for that history has 
fragmented life. Under the monarchy life has been cleft in 
a number of ways. Divinity is divided, with Yahweh becoming 
a Near Eastern cosmic deity and the king a reigning deity, 
not unlike the Pharaoh. The nation itself is divided into 
separate kingdoms with antagonistic monarchies. Society is 
stratified according to the conventional arrangement of a 
court-centered elite which preys upon the hard working poor. 
Worst of all, there is a pronounced separation of secular 
life from institutionalized religion. The loss of the sa-
matter is to treat the prophets as "basic action," as "be- 
ginning." Such an historical empiricism is incapable of 
synthesizing a cogent vision of history.
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cred character which attaches to all endeavor is to be seen 
most prominently in the conduct of politics. There, expedi-
gency supplants inspiration. Into this pathetic situation 
the prophets inject, in differing ways, the principle of 
unity. The writing prophets no less than Heraclitus under­
stood the first principle of order: that unity must be as­
cendant within diversity for the preservation of life in the 
world.
Probably the most directly comprehensible teaching of 
this unity can be found in the symbol which Hosea employs. 
Yahweh is husband; Israel is wife.'*-® This is a symbol of 
peculiarly wide ramification, for it comprehends both hea­
then and Biblical experience, and for that reason, it was
perfectly suited to the purpose of Hosea's ministry. Snaith
11detects a missionary cleverness in this symbol of Hosea.
What better way was there to subvert the old time religion 
of fertility rites and cult prostitution than to substitute 
Yahweh for the Canaanite deities as the sower of semen and 
guarantor of harvest? An apt symbol means many things at 
once, and this no doubt is one use of the Hoseanic symbol. 
Beyond this specific meaning which obtains from the immediate 
conditions of the symbol's employment, there are implications 
of more permanent importance. Below the agricultural pas-
qSee especially Isaiah 7.1-12.
10Hosea 2.16-23.
•^Snaith, Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament, pp. 
111-113.
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sage of human concern, the enduring significance of the hus- 
band-wife symbolism is the implication of unity. In con­
jugal union the partners overcome the division and polarity 
of temporal existence and approach in some sense the time­
less unity of being, whole unto itself. Above the level of 
fertility interests the husband-wife symbolism suggests the 
permanent loving-faithfulness (chesed) of the marriage part­
ners for one another. This love surpasses sexual interests 
and at last transcends them entirely. Only this burning and 
pure love would prompt a husband to buy a wife from the 
brothel and take her to his home. Hosea teaches that it is 
through such divine love that Yahweh seeks reunion with Is­
rael. Is redemption from service in the brothel essentially 
different from redemption from bondservitude? Both forms 
are disgraceful and demeaning, and from both, release can 
only be edifying. In the symbolism of Hosea, we behold al­
ready in the eighth century the complete pattern of pro­
phetic freedom: unity of man achieved through reunion with
God. The return from Egypt, from the brothel, from Babylon, 
all are events of divine liberation.
Liberation is divine, intrinsically and emphatically. 
This understanding is basic in both Israel and Greece, the 
cultures which have made freedom a possibility for us. When­
ever anyone, anywhere achieves the release of the unfortu­
nate and so opens to the unfortunate the possibility of 
fuller participation in the real goods of life, a divine ac­
tion has been accomplished. The liberator partakes of the
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world-creative intent and power of God himself. Because of 
this circumstance which attaches to liberation it is under­
standable that those who are its exponents are permitted a 
more complete vision of divinity and its purposes than are 
the general run of mankind. Thus, the ecstatic vision of 
the prophet corresponds to the revelation of the name at the 
burning bush. With the revelation of the name, Yahweh's 
singular Presence as God of Israel is promulgated. In the 
cosmopolitan environment of the writing prophets, a related 
development is necessary. In Amos.there is a burgeoning
monotheism of rebuke and command which terminates in the
1 2doctrinal monotheism of Deutero Isaiah. The introduction 
of monotheism is the most radical of the changes performed 
by the writing prophets, and is perhaps the only prophetic 
effort which could qualify as an absolute innovation. Even 
here though the path is made straight for monotheism by the 
peculiar terms of Israel's henotheistic past; the God who 
has been Present for Israel is not like the other gods.
When the diplomatic exigencies of two small nations and 
eventual foreign exile present overwhelming danger to the 
special relationship of Israel to the God who has been Pres­
ent with Israel, then it is necessary for prophecy to draw 
upon the fund of meaning which has been implicit in the spe­
cial terms of Israel's henotheistic heritage. There is one 
God, Yahweh, the maker and mover of all, to whom all peoples 
are accountable. Israel is his instrument in the world, his
1 2See Amos, chapters 1, 2, and 9. Isaiah, chapter 45.
194
special servant.
Our interest here is no more with the development of 
theology than with the social psychology of Hebrew marriage. 
Monotheism is introduced in the prophetic message for one 
reason. It is a term which commands an end to the fragmen­
tation of existential endeavor and of ultimate allegiances. 
The oneness of God, even when it is rudimentarily understood, 
imposes at least a tendentious unity upon mankind, for it 
clarifies the legitimate province of human intention and 
thus proscribes the most blatantly destructive kinds of ac­
tion. One who has internalized the oneness of God would 
suffer bad conscience if he carried into exile a whole peo­
ple (one should recall Himmler's plans for the Dutch and the 
sort of Wagnerian national theology which encouraged such 
planning); if he ripped open pregnant women so as to in­
crease his territory; if he sold poor people so as to buy 
new shoes.13 He would suffer bad conscience if he conspired 
at night to take another's land in the morning; if he were a
judge who took a bribe; if he attempted to placate God by
14sacrificing his first-born child to him. With those who 
protest that bad conscience is not enough, one can agree.
Bad conscience is the primal positive force however, and in 
the twentieth century we have lost monotheism, and seemingly, 
bad conscience with it. The prophetic arrival at monotheism 
is in a sense a metaphysical breakthrough, but as such, it
13Amos 1.6, 1.13, 2.6.
■^Micah 2.2, 3.11, 6.6-8.
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is hardly a heavenly affair, for metaphysics— theistic or 
otherwise— is the science of putting into order even the 
least particle of the universe. When all has been so or­
dered, no longer can it be said that there are particles; 
all things belong to some more cogent whole. To belong is 
to be obligated, and from obligation springs conscience.
The metaphysical understanding that God is one is a 
formal understanding, not peculiar to Israel. Of itself, 
this understanding implies a formal imperative which tends 
to proscribe the most destructive kinds of practise, and 
thus, it constitutes a beginning of freedom in both person 
and polity. Proscriptive conscience is the impetus to neg­
ative freedom, for it decrees that we must not abuse and en­
slave others at will, for all are the people of the one God. 
This much is given in the form of monotheism itself. Mono­
theism, however, is but the barest scaffold for the pro­
phetic vision of God. The Yahweh who is revealed in the 
prophets is no mere Stoic deity. He is a personality with 
a real content which bears directly on the issue of freedom.
2. The Holy Righteousness of Yahweh
The initial figure amongst the eighth century prophets 
is Amos of Tekoa. Amos teaches that justice is integral to 
the nature of God. But there is something incomplete about 
the vision of Amos, a missing term which one feels is some­
how present, but remains unarticulated. There is something 
which the prophet has experienced which has made him fear­
less and absolutely certain of his task. If formal prophecy
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had stopped with Amos, readers would be forced to puzzle
over the hidden, half-spoken character of Amos' God who
roars like a fearsome lion. If this had been the case, then
it would be hard for scholarship to establish in just what
sense the justice of Yahweh differs from the Dike of Zeus.
It would be clear that there is a profound difference, for
the Olympian pantheon was inadequate to the strains imposed
by Greek culture; hence the beginnings of natural science,
not in Israel, but in Greece. Yahweh remained ample to the
needs of Israel, but the Tekoan peasant with his vision of
Yahweh's righteous justice does not tell us why.
Isaiah of Jerusalem reveals to his audience the term
which oriented the prophetic experience from its beginning
in Moses to its resumption in Amos. God is holy.
In the year that King Uzziah died I saw the Lord 
[adonai] sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up; 
and his train filled the temple. Above him stood the 
seraphim; each had six wings: with two he covered his
face, and with two he covered his feet, and with two 
he flew. And one called to another and said:
"Holy, holy, holy is the Lord [YHWH] of hosts; 
the whole earth is full of his glory."
And the foundations of the thresholds shook at the 
voice of him who called, and the house was filled with 
smoke. And I said: "Woe is me! For I am lost; for I
am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of 
a people of unclean lips; for my eyes have seen the 
King, the Lord of hosts!"
Then flew one of the seraphim to me, having in his 
hand a burning coal which he had taken with tongs from 
the altar. And he touched my mouth, and said: "Be­
hold, this has touched your lips; your guilt is taken 
away, and your sin forgiven." And I heard the voice of 
the Lord saying, "Whom shall I send, and who will go 
for us?" Then I said, "Here I am! Send me."l5
Monotheism is but the hull of this prophetic vision of God.
•^Isaiah 6.1-8.
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The overpowering holiness of Yahweh is such that there can 
be none other like him.
Early in the twentieth century, Professor Rudolf Otto 
published a revolutionary work in the study of religion.
Its English title is The Idea of the Holy. The methodology 
which Otto employed was Kantian. The holy thing-in-itself, 
which Otto called the numen, is "wholly other" from man, 
ultimately unknowable, as itself. Otto proceeded in Kantian 
fashion to categorize the typical modes of human response to 
the holy. This response to the holy thing outside the self 
ranges, argued Otto, from a kind of frenetic terror, such as 
the terror evoked by Pan, to the sacred, ethically charged 
vision of Isaiah. Thus, the experience of holiness under­
goes development. Otto wrote:
The venerable religion of Moses marks the beginning of 
a process which from that point onward proceeds with 
ever increasing momentum, by which "the numinous" is 
throughout rationalized and moralized, i.e., charged 
with ethical import, until it becomes "the holy" in the 
fullest sense of the word. The culmination of the pro­
cess is found in the Prophets and the Gospels. And it 
is in this that the special nobility of the religion 
revealed to us by the Bible is to be found, which, when 
the stage represented by the deutero-Isaiah is reached, 
justifies its claim to be a universal world-religion. 
Here is to be found its manifest superiority over, e.g., 
Islam, in which Allah is mere "numen", and is in fact 
precisely Yahweh in his pre-Mosaic form and upon a 
larger scale.16
One hopes not to disparage the genius of a great and cre­
ative scholar in speculating that Otto's Kantian methodology 
contributed to a fundamental error. Not the Bible, but the
*^Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, tr. John W.
Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 77-78.
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enlightened, empiricist critique of knowledge provoked Kant's 
agnosticism concerning exterior reality as it is in itself.
In the Old Testament, it is given to some at least to have 
knowledge of God, and Isaiah of Jerusalem is one of this 
number. To be sure, this knowledge is communicated symbol­
ically, but the symbols connect (not separate) those who be­
hold them to the reality of deity in itself. We digress 
upon this matter so as to offer the consideration that the 
presence of the holy ought not be imputed to all experiences 
in which the presentiment of an incorporeal substance— a 
numen— causes a "creature feeling" of quaking and apprehen-
17sion in the subject. Most certainly, holiness is much 
besides ethics, is greater than ethics, but is not infi­
nitely beyond or before ethics. The predicates "good" and 
"just" stick with the true God, along with the more substan­
tive predicate "holy." Such local demons as Pan are indeed 
numinous, but they are not holy. It is impossible to affirm 
this however on the strength of a set of Kantian assumptions. 
Faith in God is the real bridge between subjectivity and the 
intelligibles, just as is "animal faith" between subjectiv­
ity and nature.
Professor N. H. Snaith's careful linguistic study of 
the major terms of the prophetic vocabulary corrects Otto's 
position. Snaith is not a philosopher, as was Otto, but an
1 7Without mentioning Otto by name, Buber wrote thus 
about Otto's methodological assumption and its consequences: 
" . . .  the absolute relation (which gathers up into reality 
all those that are relative, and is no more a part, as these 
are, but is the whole that completes and unifies them all),
historian. Snaith does not deny that the holy (qodesh) un­
derwent development, for indeed, the term's development 
within the eighth century alone was momentous. "Holy” means 
more in Isaiah than in Amos. Snaith insists however that 
Otto was misled in his supposition that the holy could ever 
be pre-ethical, since even in its pre-Israelite, Semitic 
formation, a thing which is qodesh had danger and taboo as­
sociated with it. Coexistent with these was the embryonic
18experience of sin. As Otto understood, the full ethical 
implication of holiness was articulated for the first time 
in Isaiah's account of his vision in the temple. When Isaiah 
apprehends the awful holiness of God, he experiences a kind 
of dizzying revulsion for himself and for his people. At 
the instant in which this bottomless lacuna between divinity 
and humanity becomes apparent, God's justice becomes subsumed 
within his greater holiness. We are not yet ready however 
to inquire about this justice, for the symbolic contents of 
Isaiah's vision of Yahweh's holiness have direct implications 
to our interest in prophetic freedom.
If freedom is a human concern, then we must attend to 
the dominant human symbol in the vision of Isaiah. This is 
the figure of the unclean lips. Again, it is important that 
a symbol carries multiple implications. Biblical symbols
xn being reduced to the status of an isolated and limited 
feeling, is made into a relative psychological matter." U  
and Thou, p. 81.)
■̂8Snaith, Distinctive Ideas, pp. 31-32.
200
often have both historical provenance and poetic ramifica­
tion. Hosea*s personal experience with a wayward wife en­
larges symbolically as the experience of Yahweh with Israel. 
On the level of poetic representation, the unclean lips 
amounts to a truly primitive fear of defilement which is 
revenant in the disorder called Lady Macbeth trauma, in 
which feelings of guilt are expressed as concern about im­
purity. Ricoeur has in mind the call of Isaiah when he 
writes of this symbolism,
The representation of defilement dwells in the half- 
light of a quasi-physical infection that points toward 
a quasi-moral unworthiness. This ambiguity is not ex­
pressed conceptually, but is experienced intentionally 
in the very quality of the half-physical, half-ethical 
fear that clings to the representation of the impure. ^
Stripped of its historical implication then, Isaiah employs 
this primitive symbolism so as to contrast the grotesquely 
physical— and thus most visibly corruptible— property of man 
against the pristine holiness of God. Isaiah and his soci­
ety are the bearers of "infection," and in this infection 
lies the conviction of guiltiness before the holy. The pu­
rification by burning is a decidedly moral and political 
event of liberation. In the woeful avowal of negativity, in 
the liberatory cleansing, in the repositioning of Isaiah as 
prophet, the entire structure of freedom is evident. After 
this cleansing, Isaiah is free to be a prophet. The vision 
has emptied all confusion from the domain of intention; of 
one mind with his God, Isaiah is himself a participant in
19Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, tr. Emerson 
Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 19"^) , p. 35.
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holiness. Thus he is able to act. It is this same freedom 
to act which Isaiah attempts to impart to Ahaz at the res­
ervoir. The king resists. He has not experienced himself 
as the receptacle of infection. Thus he is satisfied with 
his own entirely pragmatic decision.2®
From Samuel through Jeremiah, the monarchy is the pre­
cipitating fixture within the prophetic milieu. The king is 
the focal point of the society, its incarnate representation. 
Because he is both mirror and mover of society, the prophet 
addresses himself to the problem of the king. Because the 
prophet is himself representative, not of society in its syn­
chronous fixity, but of its God and its history, the prophet 
finds himself placed in opposition to the king. This is no 
less the case with Isaiah than with his predecessors. Yet, 
Isaiah is no republican; his is a loyal opposition. His vi­
sion of the divine regime is monarchial: ". . .my eyes
have seen the King, Yahweh of hosts." The vision of Isaiah's 
call suggests a picture of total reality which in its didac­
tic intent is similar to that adduced by Plato in the dis­
cussion of the divided line; true reality stands against its
O ' !spurxous analogue. Isaiah's comprehension of the great 
division is expressed not in mathematical but in political 
terms. This is made clear by Buber's brilliant insight into 
the structure of the narrative and of the specific histori-
20lsaiah 7.12.
^ Republic 510 passim.
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cal derivation of the symbol, unclean lips.22 Isaiah's ac­
count of his call is the product of reflection, written many 
years after its occurrence. It begins not with the vision 
of Yahweh's awful holiness, but with the mention of King 
Uz z iah's death.
Uzziah died a leper123
Here then we behold the prophetic division of the world. 
On the one side of the canvas we see the king, representative 
of profane human endeavor, disfigured, dying. The flesh 
rots upon his frame as still he draws breath. Above all 
else we witness the corruption of his lips, the human part 
with which he vocalizes allegiance and desire. The repre­
sentative of society is the symbol of moribundity itself, 
the end consequence of all confusion and false directedness. 
Opposed to the putrescent king is Yahweh, God of the nation, 
holy. The structure of the account itself amounts then to a 
compact expression of the prophetic alternative: Unclean­
ness or holiness? Death or life? Bondage or freedom? The 
presence of the leprous king in Isaiah's own account of his 
initiatory vision implicates not just one, but all of soci­
ety— and eventually, all the world— in the profanity which 
is infinitely offensive to the one God. The infinite of-; 
fense of itself awakens consciousness to the infinite de­
mand, a demand which subjects both personal conduct and po­
litical authority to an exhaustive ethical critique.
77Prophetic Faith, p. 126-128.
23II Kings 15. II Chronicles 26.
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For Israel, the infinite holiness of Yahweh is the 
source of ethics. This understanding leaves open however 
the question of the weight which should be assigned to pro­
phetic ethics. Ricoeur explains ethics as . . the slack­
ening of an impulse that is fundamentally hyperethical."24 
The vision of Isaiah shows that the hyperethical moment is 
the moment in which consciousness is seized with the holi­
ness of God. When Ricoeur speaks of ethics as a "slacken­
ing" he has in mind especially the onset of Judaism as a re­
ligion which reverences the "finite command" of the ethical 
codes as the embodiment of the prophetic "infinite demand." 
Ricoeur comprehends Bible ethics pursuant to the early pro­
phetic message as "slackening," as "finite command" for rea­
sons that are only remotely acquainted with the initial pro­
phetic revelation of the ethical demands. That is to say, 
Ricoeur is a philosophical exponent of the Pauline anthro­
pology which puts "the law" along with the psyche and the
25flesh on the side of death. Justification presumably 
draws up the "slackness" which has been the consequence of 
legal ethics; it makes one wholly righteous before God.
We enter this thicket of Christian paradox reluctantly, 
for it introduces a note of complication amidst meanings 
that are simple. Ricoeur's claim that ethics is the slack­
ening of a hyperethical impulse is a half truth, but a very 
important one, for it is the quintessential expression of
2^Symbolism of Evil, p. 55.
25Symbolism of Evil, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 4.
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the Christian understanding of the Old Testament. In terms 
of that view, the appearance of the Christ is the new moment 
of holy tension before which "the law" must be consigned in 
disgrace to the stature of a propadeutic means.26 This 
Christian understanding of "the law" is correct. "The law" 
of the Judaism to which Paul had belonged is a slackening 
of the prophetic infinite demand. But considerations which 
equate prophetic ethics with "the law" embrace only the pos­
terior half of the truth about prophetic ethics.
The slackening of the vision of holiness which issues 
in codified ordinances ("the law") about conduct is clearly 
a descendant movement. The chronology of eighth century 
prophetic declaration reveals something quite different 
which likewise involves ethics. That is that the ethical 
concern is also present as the prophetic consciousness as­
cends to the vision of God's holiness. In the clear, high 
air of the eighth century, the central ethical-political 
term arrives not in a moment of slackening, but in the mo­
ment that the prophetic awareness tensions itself in prep­
aration for the vision of God as holy. Isaiah makes both 
Amos and Hosea intelligible for us; God's righteousness and 
his loving-faithfulness are aspects of his being that are 
inherent in his holiness. But no less do Amos and Hosea 
make Isaiah possible. The terms "righteousness" and "lov­
ing-faithfulness" intervene on both the ascendant and the 
descendant sides of holiness. The holiness of Yahweh. has a
26Galatians 3.24.
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content that is known before its own articulation as holi­
ness!
The episode at the burning bush is the formative event 
in which the divine righteousness and faithfulness appear 
unseparated in union with the spectral holiness of the jeal­
ous God. The prophets of the eighth century sort out the 
ingredient qualities of this divinity and they first iden­
tify not holiness, but the intervening terms righteous jus­
tice and loving-faithfulness. These are ethical terms, and 
they are not the product of a slackening; only the codes 
represent slackening. These terms are real, resident qual­
ities of the divine nature which commend it to human nature 
as guide. In both their ascendant and descendant movements, 
these intervening terms make ethics a possibility, for they 
translate holiness into the human vocabulary, and thus make 
its practical realization possible in some limited measure.
That the prophets themselves provided this translation
is sufficient evidence that they sought not only a total
commitment to Yahweh, but also an incremental improvement in
the conduct of life. The finite command was related to the
infinite demand, not as antithesis, but as consequent. To
imagine that the infinity of demand in the prophets and the
Sermon on the Mount has only a soteriological value is an
intellectualist reduction to which protestantism is espe-
27cially inclined. One can go to eschatological salvation
2^0nly in a world in which each person had the in­
tensely spiritual inclination of St. Paul would it be safe 
to admit the efficacy of the Pauline relegation of ethics to
directly from creature-guilt borne of one's own existential 
profanity without ever stopping on the way to repent of 
one's specific injustice or deficit of mercy toward one's 
fellows. This approach can and does serve the needs of in­
dividual religiosity. The eighth century prophets however 
care neither for eschatological salvation nor for religion 
nor for individuals as such. Theirs is a global critique of 
the intent— the whole disposition toward worldly existence—  
of two national societies. It is because of this socio­
political concern that the prophetic message is rife with 
specific charges about actions which have shown imperfect 
intent. Even Amos, the fiercest of the eighth century 
prophets and the most bleakly condemnatory, "operational­
izes" the grounds of his complaint. He recites the prevail­
ing injustices and condemns the society which perpetuates 
them. Implicit in this condemnation is an exhortation to 
repent and to change, to replace human injustice with divine
the spontaneous response of those who are saved. In the 
world of experience, it is necessary to maintain directly 
the divine decree of righteousness without intervening mys­
teries which becloud the pragmatic domain. Thus it was nec­
essary for Bonhoeffer to address his fellow German protes- 
tants in terms more prophetic than "Christian" in order to 
help them decide (in 1937!) what to do about Nazism. Expe­
rience in the United States is similarly instructive. The 
Joe McCarthy aberration (not to mention the Watergate or­
deal) was viewed less critically by Biblicist protestants 
than others. The conclusion is warranted that persons who 
have a firm grasp on the doctrine of salvation by grace of­
ten view justice in the world as more an option than obli­
gation. In terms of the eighth century "Bible," that as­
sumption, not "the law," is the way to bondage and death. 
(See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, tr. R.
H. Fuller [New York: Macmillan Co., 1963], especially chap­
ter 1, "Costly Grace.")
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justice. The demand is ethical to be sure, but taken wholly
ooor specifically, it is not the result of slackening. To 
treat it in that fashion is to make of Amos a Pharisee, sub­
ject not to his God, but to "the law." Paul's entirely cor­
rect rejection of "the law" has nothing to do with the eth­
ical demand to which Amos gave utterance.
In truth Paul was somewhat more like the prophets than 
like himself! Beyond the theology of "the law" and its in­
adequacy to justification are Paul's frequent and plain pas­
toral communications to his congregations. These communi­
cations are the same as the directives of the writing proph­
ets. Their source is the vision of God and their form is 
the infinite demand made human as finite command. Most prom­
inent is the repeated exhortation that Christians practise 
agape; this is no different from Hosea's teaching of the di­
vine chesed which is binding on man. Just as the monotheism
2®Von Rad, whose prosaic inquiry into these matters 
knows nothing of an "infinite demand," sheds some light on 
the prophets' ethical accusations. He writes of Amos' re­
monstrances: "This is . . . the first occasion when 'law' 
in the proper sense of the term was preached." Von Rad goes 
on to stipulate that he does not mean that Amos was a legal­
ist; rather, he was the first person to take the Book of the 
Covenant at face value. While there are many (including 
Amos) who will disagree with this statement's tacit argument 
about the life of early Israel, the statement helps to clar­
ify our immediate problem. Each of the prophets believed 
that his utterances were consonant with national tradition. 
Central to that tradition was the belief that ethics was an 
ineluctable element in the nature of the nation's God, as 
that nature had been revealed in the great days of the na­
tion's formative past. This is why (except for Isaiah who 
works from the David-Zion tradition) the eighth century 
prophets point to the Exodus, sojourn, and conquest of Canaan 
as the ground for their own visions of God and world. See 
Gerhard Von Rad, The Message of the Prophets, tr. D. M. G. 
Stalker (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 148 ff.
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of the writing prophets, the Pauline dialectic of law and 
grace is the formal structure which supports the real, liv­
ing content of the pastoral decree.
Tsedagah is the prophetic term which is translated as 
God's righteousness. Tsedagah is used in close connection 
with mishpat, an intimately related, but more juridical con­
cept. English translations render the former as "righ­
teousness" and the latter as "justice." It should be borne 
in mind that this is justice with a view to the settlement 
of a specific controversy. For this reason, the King James 
Version's occasional translation of mishpat as "judgement" 
is more nearly adequate than the RSV's consistent "justice."
A bribed judge would render a faulty judgement, and so trans­
gress God's broader demand for tsedagah— righteousness or 
justice— in the world. The Septuagint, a production from 
the Hellenistic period, translated tsedagah as dikaiosyne♦ 
Hence, the intimate association in the European mind of the 
Biblical and Greek concerns for righteousness. Hence also 
the confusion and controversy in the early Christian church 
as to whether its teaching should favor the forms of the Old 
Testament or of classical Greece.2® We must speculate here 
that a more authentic translation would have used simply 
dike, for dikaiosyne connotes the reflective exploration of
29See Snaith, Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament, 
p. 74 f.
20See Snaith, Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament, 
Chapter 3, section 3, and Chapter 8, section 1. See also 
Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 28 ff.
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the initial symbol, and its systematization as a virtue.
The dik5 of Hesiod and Solon is nearer in usage to the 
tsedagah of the eighth century than is the dikaiosynS of 
Plato or Aristotle. Whatever the merits of this thought, 
the passion for Yahweh's tsedagah which pervades the proph­
ecy of Amos brings us nigh to one of the cardinal points 
which this study must repeat in each separate context about 
the origins of freedom in Mediterranean antiguity.
Justice is inevitably divine, and freedom is inevitably 
contingent upon j u s t i c e . p ut differently, in the original 
comprehension of the formative truth of Europe, justice- 
righteousness is a divine impulse which touches mankind.
Its by-product is freedom. We are able to verify this claim 
as regards both Israel and Greece, the true and permanent 
homelands. In neither of these homelands is there a liberal 
imagination at work during the period of origins. In re­
spect of both, the mentality expressed in "liberty and jus-
J It may be objected that in John 8, our paradigmatic 
teaching about the structure of freedom, freedom is contin­
gent upon logos, not justice. For the most part, the dif­
ference is specious. Logos is a term from the metaphysical 
sphere, while justice comes from the language of political 
and personal ethics. In their respective domains, their 
purpose is similar; both are principles of harmonious order­
ing. That is why the statesman, whose immediate concern is 
justice, must have orthos logos, upright reason, a sort of 
epistemic hold upon the true metaphysical realities.
In respect of the syncretistic sense in which it is 
used here, "divine" also reguires explanation. "Divine" may 
be predicated of Yahweh or of Zeus, as a generic property 
common to both. There is of course a profound difference 
between the two. The divinity of Zeus exhausts itself in 
ethics, while for Yahweh, ethics is part of a greater holi­
ness. The absence of such an holiness in Greek divinity is 
the cause of the poignant search of Aeschylus for founda­
tions of order.
tice for all" is wrong. It reverses priorities, suggesting 
that the liberated individual somehow finds within his own 
self a reservoir of justice. The record of the ancients, a 
testament compiled before the onset of intellectualism, 
teaches that man learns justice from the divine paradigm, and 
that one consequence of his learning is freedom. In both 
Amos and Hesiod, there is a consuming concern for justice. 
Neither speaks of freedom. When we "discover" freedom in 
their utterances, it is because we have learned the word from 
later teachers. The imputation of freedom to their meanings 
is no falsification, but it is useful only to the extent that 
it clarifies for us the full effect of justice and of the im­
portance of the divinity whose being warrants justice. The 
testimony of the ancients cuts freedom to its proper size and 
in so doing enhances its value for us. Upon hearing the an­
cient witness, we are able to recognize freedom as a lesser, 
but nonetheless real, character in the drama of the divine 
ministry to man. A small thing which is real is worth more 
than a large thing which is unreal. We will examine Amos 
with a view to such recognition.
This consideration of the eighth century prophets fol­
lows the discussion of the Exodus because the implications 
of the Exodus to the European freedom consciousness are not 
complete without reflection upon the prophetic understanding 
of the formative event. In the prophets, the righteous jus­
tice of Yahweh becomes the dominant principle of correct or­
der in society. Its complement is Yahweh's loving-faithful-
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ness, which he expects his chosen people to exhibit in their 
dealings with one another. Together or separately, there 
are clearly unifying and ordering configurations of the One 
which must be ascendant over the severality of persons and 
things in history if life is to continue. Their presence 
attentuates the ravage of history? when they are practised, 
life becomes good.  ̂ This metaphysical insight into the un­
derlying terms of worldly existence is discernible in the 
prophets no less certainly than in Heraclitus and Parmenides. 
Symbolism is in phrt the property of culture, but truth is 
transcendant of culture.
The most basic form of the prophetic alternative is
33the injunction: Choose life or death. Beyond this, the
entire prophetic effort can be seen as an attempt to influ­
ence the hearer to choose life. In service to this end, both 
revelation and history are used in support of the prophetic 
argument. Amos draws upon his revelation and his knowledge 
of history when he utters the prescription which expresses 
his central interest:
I hate, I despise your feasts, and I take no de­
light in your solemn assemblies.
Even though you offer me your burnt offerings and 
cereal offerings, I will not accept them, and the peace 
offerings of your fatted beasts I will not look upon.
Take away from me the noise of your songs; to the 
melody of your harps I will not listen.
But let justice [mishpat] roll down like waters, . 
and righteousness [tsedeq] like an ever-flowing stream.
•*2See especially Micah 6.8.
33see Amos, chapter 5.
•^Amos 5.21-24.
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We must note how the content of Amos' revelation, Yahweh's 
righteous justice, coalesces with the prophet's understand­
ing of national history. The question which follows immedi­
ately upon the passage above makes this plain: "Did you
bring to me sacrifices and offerings the forty years in the 
wilderness, 0 house of Israel?"33 The rhetorical question 
about the sojourn in the wilderness must be associated with 
the beginning of the prophet's address to the people of Is­
rael :
Hear this word that the Lord [YHWH] has spoken 
against you, 0 people of Israel, against the whole fam­
ily which I brought up out of the land of Egypt:
"You only have I known of all the families of the 
earth; therefore I will punish you for all your iniq­
uities. "36
By now the essentials of Amos' view are in place. Let 
us put it in simple prose: "You people have turned me,
Yahweh, into an oriental, astral god with your cultic ritu­
als. You even confuse me with other gods. I oppose this be­
cause it causes you to forget my true nature. I am the God 
of righteousness who demands that you, my people, deal justly 
with one another. Your ancestors, whom I led from Egypt and 
governed in the wilderness, knew that I was the God of righ­
teousness, but you have gone away from me and have forgotten 
this. Your forgetfulness will bring punishment and death 
upon you." In this account, we have added only one conclu­
sion that is not already given in the texts, i.e., that the
33Amos 5.15.
3 Âjnos 3.1-2. See also 2.10.
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God of the Exodus and wilderness sojourn was also the God of 
righteous justice. Why does Amos not say this for us? This 
study concludes that the association was axiomatic for Amos; 
as the bearer of the national memory, the prophet remembers 
that Yahweh led Israel from Egypt because he was righteous.37 
To conclude differently would be to imagine that Yahweh had 
been an itinerant god who was roving in search of a people, 
a house, a fragrant and noisy cult, all the things which be­
stow status upon a god. Amos* contrary understanding expands 
the basic thesis of this study: The Exodus, which made Is­
rael free, was an exercise in divine righteousness which had 
existential justice as its goal. The "Serve me as my son" 
which constituted the positive moment in the Exodus narrative 
is now seen to have meant, "Serve me in righteousness by do­
ing justice amongst yourselves."
The intricate questions of Bible criticism are beyond 
this study's competence. It does seem however that there is 
little intricacy involved in this matter. The J document was 
written before the onset of formal prophecy, and unlike the 
E, is without appreciable prophetic influence. It says,
Then the Lord [YHWH] said, "I have seen the afflic­
tion of my people who are in Egypt, and have heard
their cry because of their taskmasters; I know their 
sufferings, and I have come down to deliver them out of 
the hand of the Egyptians, and to bring them up out of 
that land to a good and broad land, a land flowing with
milk and honey . . ."38
3 7 i s a i a h  m a k e s  t h i s  e x p l i c i t  i n  t h e  Song of t h e  V i n e ­
y a r d ,  5.1-7.
S^Exodus 3.7-8a.
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To be sure, neither the words for righteousness nor loving- 
faithfulness are to be found in this text, but the intent 
which the prophets will later verbalize is wholly and abun­
dantly here. Amos builds weightily upon received founda­
tions and proves their strength to support the increased 
strain. Above all others, it is Amos who first shows us the 
complete meaning of liberation in service to Yahweh. Its 
intent is justice in the world.
There can be no mistake about this, for the range of 
concerns to which Amos applies the righteous justice of God 
corresponds exactly to the concern expressed by Yahweh in 
the passage from the J document:
Seek the Lord and live, lest he break out like 
fire in the house of Joseph, and devour it, with none 
to quench it for Bethel,
0 you who turn justice to wormwood, and cast down 
righteousness to the earth!39
How does one go about turning justice bitter and casting 
down righteousness? The answer comes shortly in the proph­
et's commentary on his own imprudence. We recall the "af­
fliction" and the "suffering" in the J account of life in 
Egypt.
They hate him who reproves in the gate, and they 
abhor him who speaks the truth.
Therefore because you trample upon the poor and 
take from him exactions of wheat, you have built houses 
of hewn stone, but you shall not dwell in them; you 
have planted pleasant vineyards, but you shall not 
drink their wine.
For I know how many are your transgressions, and 
how great are your sins— you who afflict the righteous, 
who take a bribe, and turn aside the needy in the gate.
•^Amos 5.6-7.
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Therefore he who is prudent will keep silent insuch a time; for it is an evil t i m e .4 0
The verbs which animate this prophet's metaphors have a pe­
culiar impact in the picture of the negativity they convey. 
The diseased lips of the human king and his society have 
their parallel in the picture of the trampling upon (not 
setting upright/ in place)/ in taking away (not creating 
something which was not there before)/ in afflicting (not 
healing), in turning aside (not bringing within). These are 
verbs which capture the damnable hurt of history which has 
lost its way in a process of shattering and profanation. To 
the shattered history of Israel, Amos opposes as restorative 
his knowledge that the very nature of Yahweh is his righ­
teousness. Implicit in the prophet's discourse is the un­
derstanding that this righteousness is an ethical property 
which is funded by the divine power of world creativity. It 
is this source which makes justice the one effective foe 
against the destructive inclination of human history.
On the practical level of interest, freedom is the up­
shot of the Amos prophecy as surely as it is the consequence 
of the Exodus. This conclusion holds not only concerning 
the loftier view of freedom as the repositioning of life to­
ward true and enduring ends, but even more prominently in 
the negative, common-sense understanding of the term. Shep­
herds and peasants, the indentured, men and women defense­
less against military conquest, beggars, recipients of un-
40Amos 5.10-13.
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fair justice— in one word, the oppressed— these are the pop­
ulation of the prophet's vision. We must see them in their 
setting. The land is seldom fertile; rain is seldom suffi­
cient; mineral wealth is negligible. Despite these circum­
stances, the powerless ones who toil and sweat in the mid­
day heat are used to support not only a fat native elite, 
but to provide the materials for the tributes which flow to 
the surrounding great powers as the price of protection. It 
is not surprising that their Yahwism is corrupted.
The dictum, "Israel is my son" cannot have meaning in 
these circumstances. The injustice of the prevailing allo­
cation of values amounts to a design of unfreedom as well.
For the many who are its victims, life is no better in the 
prophetic present than for the Israelite slave in the Egyp­
tian past. The prophecy of God's righteousness which demands 
human justice is inevitably a prophecy of freedom against 
servitude.
In the modern world, first laissez faire liberalism, 
and then with greater emphasis, socialism, have asserted the 
primacy of economic freedom over other species of free en­
deavor. The reasoning which underlies this economic primacy 
is quite simple. A person can be touched and eventually
^ I t  was no accident that Martin Luther King, Jr., drew 
the basic symbolism for his 1963 speech at the Washington 
Monument from the prophecy of Amos. The speech advocated 
the replacement of injustice with justice, and ended with 
the lines from the spiritual: "Free at last! Free at last!
Thank God Almighty, we are free at last!" Freedom follows 
justice as corollary. See Annals of America, volume 18, se­
lection 30.
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dominated through external influence over the nutritive means 
of existence more easily and more completely than through 
influence of any other sort. The righteousness teaching of 
the prophets confirms this understanding about economic pri­
macy. The unfree poor, ground into the earth by the expo­
nents of an evil allocation of wealth and power, are the 
prophets' continual concern. The freedom of free political 
participation is a luxury to which Israel does not aspire, 
and to which Athens attains only at long last, after passing 
through a state of economic rectification. Prophetic free­
dom is not arrested at the economic plane, however, for the 
free individual conscience— a pre-requisite to political 
freedom— is one accomplishment of the prophetic ministry.
We will discuss this later. Where the prophetic demand for 
righteous judgment is rendered in the eighth century, how­
ever, the hardship— the unfreedom— of the oppressed is the 
critical issue which provokes the prophet to fling Yahweh's 
righteousness against man's injustice.
The full implication of this prophetic teaching is then 
that justice makes freedom, and for this reason, justice is 
of special importance to the downtrodden. But how are we to 
understand this association? Should we suppose, with 
Nietzsche, that the likes of the shepherd Amos and the farmer 
Hesiod have conspired to establish an exalted principle whose 
true purpose is to legitimize the hatred of slave for master? 
There is no absolute proof against this supposition, although 
a careful inspection of the historical events and symbols in
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the actual genealogy of morals does tend to weaken the the­
sis. The Nietzschean claim, along with the corresponding 
Marxian analysis which makes of symbols of authority an ideo­
logical production, must be rejected because both reduce to 
gibberish the whole vocabulary of human order. If we begin 
with the basic alternative, life or death, it is certain 
that the option for life necessitates the rejection of posi­
tions which impute an ultimate meaninglessness to the endur­
ing concerns of life. Understanding of the liberation con­
tent of justice is enlarged more by attention to the real 
and lively meanings of history and language than to the in­
tellectual facility of the nineteenth century.
Professor Eichrodt is thinking not only of righteous­
ness but of the whole prophetic message when he explains the 
prophetic concern for the poor and downtrodden in historical 
terms. Those who have grown rich and powerful under the 
monarchy through the employment of violent and unscrupulous 
means have set themselves apart from the covenant. The poor 
have not done so. For that reason, the latter are partici­
pants in the nation's real history. Eichrodt is speaking of 
these persons in this passage.
It is they who are exalted as the real core of the di­
vine community, above those who live in thoughtless 
riches and enjoyment of every kind, and are made the 
heirs of the promised divine glory. It is therefore 
with these that the higher spiritual and moral life of 
community with God reaches its full reality, while 
those who are richly blessed with all life's goods have 
in reality lost their life.42
42Eichrodt, Man in the Old Testament, p. 48.
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What seems most notable about this analysis is that its au­
thor employs the prophetic symbol, life. The rich have lost 
their life, but the poor have retained theirs. This pro­
phetic symbol of life is more than a metaphor, since it draws 
together the covenant and the farming and herding heritage 
of the nation in the egalitarian days of the confederacy.
The rural folk are the direct supporters of life. Of the 
four eighth century prophets, three are recruited from the 
rural poor. It is amongst these groups that both the nutri­
tive life and the spiritual life of the nation have been pre­
served. Appropriately, Isaiah, the synthesizer, is a Jeru­
salemite man of affairs. But his contribution in no way de­
tracts from the teaching of the poor men from the country­
side. Instead, he uses their symbols as a reproach from 
within against the moribund pragmatism of the metropolis 
elite. Isaiah the urbanite, naked and barefoot for three
years, cannot be unacquainted with the nakedness of the
43poor. For him as for the others, the poor are the vessels
44of God's special concern.
Professor Snaith's assiduous linguistic inquiry illu­
mines even further the association between God's righteous­
ness and the servile. Snaith found that etymologically, 
tsedaqah is not associated with words that mean strict jus­
tice. Rather, the Aramaic and Urdu equivalents of the term
43See Isaiah 20.2-3.
44See Isaiah 3.13-15; 10.1-3.
convey benevolence and mercy.45 Upon this understanding, 
the prophetic application of God's righteousness to the 
plight of the helpless is kindred to the teaching of the 
loving-faithfulness of God whose overt consequence is divine 
mercy. The overlapping of these prophetic concepts brings 
into the light a quality which is implicit in the greater 
righteousness which is the tutor of human justice. This un­
derstanding of justice— derived from the classical period—  
is an intellectualized fixture which sets justice over 
against mercy. Perhaps this is a result of Plato's paradig­
matic depiction of justice (dikaiosyne) through the model of 
a human society which is so organized as to be in no need of 
mercy. This analysis was not mistaken, but it was mislead­
ing. Justice, excerpted from its historical ramifications, 
is not unlike the "pure" tones produced by modern electronic 
musical instruments, tones made without the accompanying vi- 
brances which mechanical production always generates. There 
is error in this way of comprehending either the infinite 
righteousness or the finite justice, for in the societies of 
human experience, the concern for justice and the need for 
mercy are coemergent from the actuality of historical evil. 
The symbolism of justice is ascendant over that of mercy be­
cause the just act is inherently also the merciful act; the 
former subsumes the latter. This is so because the victims 
of injustice are powerless to rectify the situation in which
45Snaith, Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament, pp.
71 ff.
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they are victim. When authority acts with a view toward 
justice, mercy obtains as well as freedom. This understand­
ing is given in the historical criticism of the prophets and 
it achieves historical concretion in the Solonic reform in 
Athens. Jaeger's discussion of the linguistic properties
A Cof dike lead to a similar observation. ° while the etymol­
ogy of dike is unclear, its early usage came to have the im­
plication of rectification of the condition of the poor who 
are oppressed by the rich. It would be hard not to find 
mercy along with this understanding of justice. One must 
remember that in Israel and in Greece we are considering the 
course of action which will be right according to the divine 
will. Divinity wills justice, and that is to say, it op­
poses the injustice of divided, exploitative human history.
In this opposition to injustice obtains the merciful concern 
of the prophets for the poor, as well as their teaching of 
liberation.
None of this is to imply that all the terms of the pro­
phetic vocabulary mean the same. They do not. It is simply 
to explain that when we enter the early, pre-intellectual 
domain of human awareness, there is a fluidity of meanings 
which will not permit precise edging and cornering. In the 
prophets, holiness became the governing symbol for righteous­
ness, with mercy unto freedom as a practical consequence for 
those who have been wronged by the corrupt rulers of society.
46Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture,
tr. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford University Press,
1939), I, 99-100.
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Below the strata of these interpenetrating concept symbols 
of immanent holiness, righteous justice, loving-faithfulness, 
lies the great, undifferentiated picture of history and fu­
turity.
The utterances of Micah are the most conceptually naive 
of the prophetic statements from the eighth century. Their 
picturesque compactness conveys the essence of the prophetic 
complaint and of the vision of divine completion which is 
anticipated as restorative. The following is the orienting 
vision of Micah; it appears in the text following a recita­
tion of grievances which amount to charges of injustice and 
apostasy which merit the punishment of Yahweh. Opposed to 
human evil and the divine wrath which it has earned are the 
prospects of Yahweh's gathering and leadership.
I will surely gather all of you, 0 Jacob,
I will gather the remnant of Israel; I will set them 
together like a sheep in a fold, like a flock in its 
pasture, a noisy multitude of men.
He who opens the breach will go up before them; 
they will break through and pass the gate, going out 
by it. Their king will pass on before them, 
the Lord [YHWH] at their h e a d . 47
This imagery of Yahweh as pastor to the robust, active, mov­
ing flock is the pure and perfect expression of prophetic 
organicism. It is in no need of the great concept symbols 
of the eighth century, for the picture of divine leadership 
obviates the need for mention of Yahweh's specific excellen­
ces. The picture shows these along with the human response.
In place of brigandage paved over with the rubric of estab-
47Micah 2.12-13.
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lishment justice, in place of the mortal falsehood of human 
religiosity is the gathering of mankind, its re-creation as 
a "flock" which follows the leadership of Yahweh.
3. Freedom and Individuation
Our modern idea of freedom entails the understanding 
that where freedom is present, the individual will be dis­
tinguishable from society. In its British form, this abso­
lute distinction of the individual is viewed as one of the 
major goals of political endeavor. Like whole justice or 
teleological happiness in a time before, individual liberty 
is the end of human existence in the double sense of being 
the result of historical progression and the cause of future 
progress. This doctrine was put forward most emphatically 
in John Stuart Mill1s essay On Liberty. The continental ap­
proach has been more moderate. Rousseau, Kant and Hegel be­
lieved that the individual should be liberated from igno- • 
ranee, poverty, and the caprice of the tyrant. This ambition 
is accompanied however by the sure knowledge that the indi­
vidual— as such— has only a relative value. This is why the 
term "positive freedom" comes from the continent. For lib­
eration of the individual from servility of any sort to have 
lasting importance, individual life must be reintegrated on 
a higher plane with the Reason which is conversant with the 
wholeness of being.
The implication of the prophets to freedom is more con­
sonant with the continental understanding than with the
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British.48 This is so because freedom, the unspoken term, 
is dependant upon and subordinate to the spoken terms, righ­
teousness, loving-faithfulness, holiness. In each of these, 
the configuration of wholeness is ascendant over individual­
ity. Individual freedom is part and parcel of the prophetic 
experience, but it is a freedom which always looks toward 
the moment of its own overcoming. The hope of the prophets 
is for that absolute, unconditional freedom which annuls the 
individuality of human isolation.
As we have observed, individual liberty is almost to­
tally absent in the liberation narrative of the Exodus. One 
could explain this absence in one of two ways. The most ob­
vious explanation would be the one which is most frequently 
employed in modern intellection to explain the several con­
ditions of mankind as they occur at various times, i.e., the 
theory of development. According to notions about develop­
ment, the absence of individual freedom in the Exodus would 
obtain as the result of a traditional pattern of life in 
which the norms of the community are of sufficient power to 
prevent the full articulation of the. individual. In keeping 
with this view then, the social arid political variegation of 
the later monarchial societies would represent an advance to 
a higher level of development, as would the appearance of
48There is no possibility of accomodating prophetic 
freedom to empirical liberalism, even on the grounds that 
liberalism, like prophecy, is desirous to supervise action 
so as to guarantee good social order. Intent, not action, 
is basic to both. Liberalism advocates absolute freedom of 
thought. Prophecy teaches that only certain "thoughts," not 
others, are admissible.
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49the prophetic "ideology." Such an application might in­
deed suffice to explain the actual development— the increas­
ing complexity— of Israelite society, considered in terms of 
sheer mechanics. To adopt this view with respect to our 
concern, freedom, would lead to a fascinating conclusion, 
i.e., that the prophets were a function of a developmental 
situation, much as Franklin Roosevelt's innovative presi­
dency was the function of a developing economic and social 
situation. Indeed, that conclusion has a certain specious 
truthfulness to it, for it is the development of material 
conditions which has provoked the prophetic outburst. Ac­
cording to this schematization, we would be able to recog­
nize the prophets as the first of a type— harbingers of a 
great tradition of individualism.
Such an explanation of prophetic freedom is not without 
its own elegance, but it is wrong for it misses the point of 
the entire history of which the prophets are spokesmen. It 
refuses to consider the meaning of the Exodus as that mean­
ing is recorded in J, E, and P, and it likewise refuses to 
grant the authenticity of the prophets' own self-understand­
ing. It is possible that the prophets were themselves the 
world's first developmental theorists, but they differed 
from the developmental theorists of the Christian age in one
49If the Little Brown Series in Comparative Politics 
were to prepare a volume dealing with pre-exilic Israel and 
Judah, the above would constitute a precis of the approach 
used. See Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Com­
parative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1966), chapter 3.
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central respect. They did not imagine that their own place 
and time had the character of an accomplished end. Their 
understanding was entirely contrary to such an assumption, 
for the development to which the prophets were witness was 
a degenerative development. The high point of culture had 
been the Exodus and sojourn, and their own time was a time, 
not of fulfillment, but of perversion. This prophetic un­
derstanding of historical development thus explains the ab­
sence of individual .freedom in the Exodus episode. "I am 
Present." "Israel is my son." These are the dominant sym­
bols of the Exodus, and they are symbols of liberation.
They are symbols which overcome the severalness— the indi­
vidual partition— of the human aggregation, and so make of 
it a purposive community. In the Exodus then we behold the 
consummate symbolism of human organization. As the consum­
mate form, the Exodus paradigm corresponds to the real, abid­
ing, unifying freedom that is the ethos of such concepts as 
"general will" and "kingdom of ends." The prophets under­
stand it as a time when divine will and human impulse are 
coupled in harmony.
In our contemporary English language, compound nouns 
like "personal liberty" and "individual freedom" are common. 
These are words of camouflage in that they hide from critical 
inspection a truth about existence that is deeper than the 
superficial truth which they reveal. "Individual freedom" 
is the expression of a culture which tends to equate indi­
viduality with freedom. It is a misleading expression be-
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cause it diverts attention from the fact that in the total 
of human experience, individuality and freedom do not often 
come together. This is apparent in the most mundane circum­
stances: Should we say of the contemporary peasant who is
separated from the village to find himself of a sudden in 
Stuttgart or Bogata that he is a free individual? There can
be no doubt that he has become an individual, but if we are
\
willing to predicate "free" of this lost character, then we 
are likewise willing to throw the entire content of the word 
out upon the swirling waters of historical directionless­
ness. If a history of individuality is ever undertaken, it 
will doubtlessly devote more space to the uprooted people 
than to "individual freedom."
This problem of forced individuality and its implica-r 
tions to the realm of moral concern was an immediate inter­
est of the prophets. Isaiah threatens: "Woe to those who
join house to house, who add field to field, until there is 
no more room, and you are made to dwell alone in the midst 
of the land."^® He is talking about the expropriation of 
the peasantry. Not freedom, but aloneness, is the conse­
quence of this species of individuality. The eighth century 
prophets make it clear that they are inhabitants of an age 
of individualism. The individuated appetites of the elite 
are fulfilled at the expense of the many. This causes a dis­
ruption of national life which severs people from the organ­
ic ism of family and community, reducing them to the indi­
^Isaiah 5.8.
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viduality of the debt slave or the loneliness of the beggar. 
Bible history is no different from "secular" history in this 
regard. Slavery to appetite is the most prominent fact 
about the individuation of humanity. Before the machine age, 
this servitude of the powerful to desire issued inevitably 
into a physical servitude for the powerless.
Despite its too frequent use, "individual freedom" is 
not meaningless; the prophets are the first of its limited 
number of practitioners. The prophets show us just how in­
dividual freedom is distinguishable from the individuality 
of domination, or its symbiotic companion, the individuality 
of bondage. There is a transcript of the first encounter in 
which this true individual freedom showed itself in the 
eighth century. Amaziah is the chief priest at Bethel, the 
central shrine of the northern kingdom's cult.
And Amaziah said to Amos, "0 seer, go, flee away 
to the land of Judah, and eat bread there, and proph­
esy there; but never again prophesy at Bethel, for it
is the king's sanctuary and it is a temple of the king­
dom. "
Then Amos answered Amaziah, "I am no prophet, nor 
a prophet's son; but I am a herdsman, and a dresser of 
sycamore trees, and the Lord [YHWH] took me from fol­
lowing the flock, and the Lord said to me, 'Go, proph­
esy to my people Israel.'"51
The speech of Amaziah has the following meaning: "Be a sen­
sible man, Amos, like the rest of us. Go back home to Judah 
and put your obvious ecstatic gifts on the marketplace where 
they will bring you a material reward." To this suggestion
Amos replies, "I am no prophet." With this denial, Amos
S^Amos 7.12-15.
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sets himself apart from the ambitious individuality of the 
age. His denial means that he is not a court prophet who 
will lend a veneer of religious legitimacy to power politics 
and social injustice. Instead, he is the agent of Yahweh, 
who is implacably opposed to the whole set of institutions 
with which the priest has bidden Amos to associate himself.
In this exchange we behold two essentially opposed patterns 
of individuality. The one is the individuality which has as 
its purpose the eating of b r e a d . T h e  other is that which 
has as its guiding impulse the knowledge that its practition­
er has been taken by a power that is greater and nobler 
than himself. It is to the latter and rarer of these kinds 
of individuality that we may without hesitation attach the 
name "freedom," for along with its audible negativity against 
the injustice of present conduct there dwells in silence the 
seed of positivity toward the future. This seed is the de­
cision against death, for life.
Have we drawn the lines between the individuality of 
servitude and the individuality of freedom so sharply as to 
exclude that middle range within person and polity where 
these propensities come together in contest and accomodation? 
Quite possibly we have overstated the case, denying to the 
conventional "individual freedom" a worth which is its due.
It is important though that if we have been wrong, it is be­
cause the prophets have made us wrong. There can be no doubt
52Cf. Hosea 2.5, where the eating of bread is a reward 
for harlotry.
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that the prophets are the authors of a great tradition of 
free individuality which places allegiance to higher author­
ity above concerns about material reward or even material 
danger. To some degree, this prophetic allegiance is mani­
fest in the daily life of countries which permit free indi­
viduality. But in the instant that we recognize this pio­
neering aspect of the prophetic movement, we must acknowledge 
that from the perspective of prophetic intention, this is the 
unintended— the almost shameful— consequence of prophetic 
endeavor. Sociology would call it a "latent function" of 
the prophetic ministry. On prophetic terms, the establish­
ment of a line of individuals who must go on through history, 
opposing right against wrong, is evidence of failure. The 
prophets failed to restore human life to the condition of 
wholeness that had been its property in the season of plant­
ing.53 From this failure of the total project grew individ­
ual freedom as the realization of partial success. Wherever 
the truly free person is to be found, there is also found 
the prophetic memory along with the prophetic projection of 
the future with its imperative verb: "Turn!" "Turn around
and find your destiny in your own beginnings of oneness with
53This is not to suggest that the extreme vision of 
pastoral happiness which is especially prominent in Micah is 
the only form of eighth century prophetic hope and expecta­
tion. We believe however that this is its definitive form.
We do not understand this vision as an eschaton. That noun 
comes from a culture which reckoned time in terms of the 
world cycle. These prophets had no acquaintance with an 




This ultimate failure of the prophetic quest was inher­
ent in the form of the movement itself. The ascendancy of 
individuality over the sought organicism can be identified 
in three separate regards. The first and most obvious of 
these has to do with the personal prominence of the prophets 
themselves. Like Abram, they are called out of the commu­
nity, away from familiar circumstances, called to be indi­
viduals in witness against society. In this latter respect 
they are essentially different from Abram, for he is called 
with a view to formation, while the prophets are called for 
the purpose of reformation. Abram is before the Yahwist 
community, its benign (and harmless) ancestor, while the 
prophets are against the established norms of the post-Yah- 
wist society, and thus in one regard its enemy. The writing 
prophets are in fact more like Moses than Abram. They stand 
out as individuals against the corruption of divinized mon­
archy and against the human society which is passively ac­
quiescent in its error. This is possibly the reason for the
55silence about Moses in the eighth century prophets. In
54we have argued in chapter one that this is the univer­
sal form of the ethical inclination in history, i.e., a lib- 
erative recovery of the divine-human unity which precedes all 
severality and strife. What is unique about the prophetic 
employment of this form is that the prophets could cite a 
real, historical past as the sacred ground for future his­
tory. They did not, as did Plato, find it necessary to res­
cue fallen history through the "remembrance” of a mythical 
pre-history as the sacred ground for history.
S^Micah 6.3, whose authorship is uncertain, is the only 
direct reference to Moses in the eighth century prophets.
Hosea 12.13 seems to refer to Moses.
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terms of the ultimate intent of the prophetic endeavor— the 
restoration of the nation to the leadership of Yahweh— the 
individual prominence of Moses ih the liberation event is no 
less an embarrassment than the individual prominence of the 
prophets in the reformation. The visibility of the men who 
are its bearers detracts from the content of the message and 
the God who is its author. It is also possible that the 
Exodus tradition with which these prophets were familiar 
knew nothing about M o s e s . ^6 In either case, the same conclu­
sion is warranted. The prophets wanted to direct attention 
to the authority of Yahweh, for they saw that authority as 
the cause of the liberative-formative event. Their own in­
dividual prominence as representatives of authority became 
enduringly important in a way that they neither foresaw nor 
desired.
There is a second sense in which the prophets encouraged 
a burgeoning individuality. The individual freedom of the 
prophets was necessarily contagious. Eichrodt writes that 
the prophet "asks of the individual a conscious decision 
against the constraint of the collective will and against 
the pressure of a cultural development encouraged by the 
whole external situation."57 Here again the writer's choice
^Concerning the problem of the Moses tradition, see 
Noth, History of Pentateuchal Traditions, pp. 156-174.
S^Eichrodt, Man in the Old Testament, p. 21. We should 
report that Eichrodt tends to understand the general direc­
tion of the Old Testament as a movement toward morally re­
sponsible individualism, not entirely different in intent 
and result from the similar developments in Greece. For this
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of words is revealing. The prophetic preaching cannot but 
sensitize its audience to a new and deepened apperception. 
The new consciousness is required to synthesize an "external 
situation," and with it no doubt to become awakened to one's 
own personal disposition as a critical, internal power set 
against all externality. Here we behold the same hiatus 
which we have identified as the dichotomy of act and inten­
tion. Whenever the owl of Minerva takes flight, the hour of 
dusk is at hand, if not for a whole culture, then at least 
for the individuals within it to whom life has become re­
flective. The flight causes the dusk no less than the dusk 
the flight. This awakening of the individual consciousness 
cannot but lessen the possibility of achieving the righteous 
and free community which the prophets hoped to revitalize.
There is an insoluble antinomy at the bottom of freedom 
in history. The individual form and the global content are
reason, the nearly Jungian sound of his language is no acci­
dent; he is interested in a kind of psychic individuation 
which liberates from the collective unconscious. (See espe­
cially pp. 9-10.) While it is certain that the Bible is at 
odds with the collective unconscious because of its heathen 
contents, we cannot share in Eichrodt's thesis, especially 
as concerns the prophets of the eighth century. Eichrodt 
believes that the result of prophetic ministry— a personal 
responsibility of Antigonian proportions— is consonant with 
the intent. This conclusion ignores the express political 
hope of the prophets, i.e., the restoration of an organic 
community of equals responsible both individually and sever­
ally before the commanding Presence of Yahweh. In seeking 
an end to individualism, the prophets succeed only in edu­
cating it, a partial success. Von Rad also comments on the 
novelty of the prophets' display of free, individual person- 
hood, but his commentary likewise fails to consider the an­
tagonism between this personhood and the prophetic idea of 
salvation, Von Rad's special interest. See Message of the 
Prophets, pp. 56-57, and 146-147.
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locked in mutual opposition. This would not be the case 
were it possible for human society to become Amos or Hosea 
or Micah writ large. If this were a possibility, then in 
the same socio-political vessel the total individual arousal 
in response to the divine Presence could coexist with the 
subsumption of the individual within the wholeness of the 
God community. If this were possible, then the individual 
articulation of each, though entirely real, would matter as 
little to each as it mattered to these prophets. None of 
this was the case, however, for unlike the prophets, the 
bulk of the community were not ecstatics, nor could they be.
To the prophet, whose individual distinction to us per- 
ceivers is his most immediate mark, this individuality is 
opaque, for he is taken by his God. (One must contemplate 
Isaiah's nakedness, month after month, on the streets of 
Jerusalem, or Hosea the cuckold, redeeming his wife, obliv­
ious to the gaze of the village folk.) The hearer of proph­
ecy is different from the prophet. The message stirs him, 
not first in his affective depth, but in his cognitive 
height. He synthesizes an "external situation."
For this bewildering array of prophetic accusations 
against the familiar present to be taken seriously, it must 
first be understood; reflection must learn to separate in­
tention from the act in which it is couched, and then to 
weigh each against the prophetic precept of righteousness.
Only upon this accomplishment can the affective powers of 
accusation and repentance become productive unto a turning.
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One of the sadnesses of existence is that the free individ­
ual must also be in some measure an intellectual individual, 
standing at some critical remove from the spontaneous pulse 
of life's events. This is not what the prophets hoped for, 
but this is the better kind of creature whom the prophets 
gave to Europe. It is this harmonization of mind and heart 
that has made history tolerable.^®
The third event in the unfolding of free individuality 
as part of the prophetic effort has to do specifically with 
the character and work of Isaiah. With the other prophets 
of the eighth century, the ecstatic seizure has a sudden, 
volcanic quality. It is to be assumed, for example, that 
when his message had been delivered, Amos crossed back over 
the border and resumed herding at Tekoa. With Isaiah, how­
ever, free, canonical prophecy became a lifetime career no 
less than false, court prophecy. As the ecstatic moment be­
came elongated, the prophet's presence became almost an in­
stitution, resented, but also feared by the established au­
thorities. It is a "loyal opposition" of a curious sort, 
for it remains loyal and non-violent despite its disagree­
ment with the authorities over the very terms of the consti­
tution. In this respect, Isaianic prophecy is like a gov­
ernment in exile; it is loyal to homeland and people while
C O It is universally recognized (excepting fundamental­
ism) that the Deuteronomist movement is the first attempt at 
political implementation of a program inspired by prophetic 
protest. This is prototypical of the limited, intellectual 
appropriation of an initially ecstatic and infinite project.
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it looks upon the present leadership as a corrupting, lep­
rous influence.
The institutional nature of Isaiah's tenure as prophet
was finalized when Isaiah assembled around himself a group 
59of disciples. Lods regarded Isaiah's formation of a school 
as one of the great events of Old Testament history. He be­
lieved that this event "marks the religious emancipation of 
the individual, whose destiny no longer coincided entirely 
with that of the group."®® Again we must complain that this 
statement, although entirely true in the descriptive sense, 
is insensitive to the tragedy which underlies Isaiah's per­
ceived need to gather disciples. The establishment of a 
group of individuals in on-going opposition to monarchial 
authority is the foremost emblem of the prophet's reckoning 
of his own failure. The constitution would not be amended 
in Isaiah's lifetime, and thus he must not permit his true 
inspiration to be darkened in a world shot through with fol­
ly. He must "emancipate" a certain number of individuals 
who will comprise a permanent opposition. This group will 
carry the true past into the uncertain future: "Bind up the
testimony, seal the teaching among my disciples."
This communication of the teaching to an intimate group 
did indeed amount to an emancipation of individuals. Lods 
spoke of this as a "religious" emancipation, and so it be-
®®See Isaiah 8.2 and 8.16.
6®Lods, Prophets and the Rise of Judaism, p. 102.
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came. If one believes that the rise of Judaism is a great 
event in history, then such a religious emancipation was an 
event of positive value. It is certain that the rise of 
Judaism— or any other religion— could stir no enthusiasm in 
the early prophetic consciousness. These prophets were op^ 
posed to religion, for when the rise of religion occurs (the 
dedicatory speech of Solomon marks such an event) life has 
admitted the separability of the sacred from the secular. 
Then piety, the propitiatory act, is offered in faulty com­
pensation for the absence of divine influence in all the af­
fairs of human life.®'5' That the prophets, God's represen­
tatives, should deprecate religion may seem strange in a 
world whose highest self-articulation occurs in the disci­
plinary fragmentation of theology, economics, politics, his­
tory, and so on. This schematization of the world in 
thought is the consequence of social pluralism, and it is 
the advent of such a pluralism which admits the working of 
the detached conscience whose appearance Lods heralds. But
6XThe prophetic opposition to religion is the source of 
Jesus' disagreement with the established Judaism of his 
time. One of the misfortunes of history is that the Phar­
isees were not insensitive to the hazards of cleaving life 
into divine and secular domains which have no connection. 
Jesus and his followers believed however that they had 
failed to accomplish their own intended goal of integration 
because their means to its accomplishment were essentially 
formal and thus bereft of real, divine content. These means 
amounted to a religion. Paul's letter to Philemon is in­
structive concerning the tension between religion and whole 
godliness in Christianity. His expectation that Philemon 
would heed his counsel concerning Onesimus is evidence that 
in the church at Colossae, religion had been extensively 
overcome. This overcoming was the hope of the prophets be­
fore Paul.
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pluralism was not the goal of the prophetic guest; the pro­
phetic imagination is "totalitarian." For the writing 
prophets human life ought to unfold as an undivided totality 
within the total vessel of Yahweh's holy, righteous, faith­
ful Presence.
The individual freedom of Isaiah and his followers is 
an accomodation of form— a pragmatic concession to the world 
of power politics— accepted so as to preserve the content of 
a vision whose full realization would accomplish the trans­
figuration of the form itself. Indeed, such a transfigura­
tion was the consequence of the young Isaiah's vision of 
Yahweh in the temple. To say that Isaiah became transfig­
ured does not mean that he became a "holy man" in the sense 
of one who is able to suppress sensible reality or bodily 
function and thus attenuate the illusion of temporal exis­
tence. It means instead that Isaiah the son of Amoz was 
lost to him; when he left the temple he could no longer com­
municate with that former particular self, a personal entity 
with habits and tropisms which in sum constituted a singular 
human identity. To understand the prophet then as a tower­
ing individual opposed to the king, another individual, is 
utterly wrong. The real format for such encounters is the 
being of God in ministry against the non-being of man. The 
wholeness of divinity, not conspicuous human particularity, 
is the unseen content of the prophet's visible freedom. 
Wherever in history the free individual has appeared, the 
ultimate intention of his quest is the dissolution of his
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own formal identity, and that of all the world, into the 
wholeness that is being itself.
We end where we began. Deutero Isaiah is the product 
of the Isaianic movement. His prophecy of redemptive lib­
eration is given at the time of the great Persian expansion 
in the Eastern Mediterranean which swept away the decentral­
ized parochialism of mid-antiquity. At the time of the 
Persian conquest, the remnant of Israel, and the second 
Isaiah with them, were captive in Babylon. The Persian tri­
umph over Babylon will end the unrighteous rule of the idol­
aters, and thus Deutero Isaiah perceives Cyrus as the in­
strument of Yahweh's lordship over history. The prophet's 
glad shout of redemption is equally a liberative declaration 
with the "Let my people go, that they may serve me" of the 
Exodus. The Yahweh of this tiny, exiled people is revealed 
in his fulness as the holy creator of the universe and the
commanding lord of all history. All gods beside him are
6 2idols, enformate fantasies of the human unconscious.
There is a strain of decadence in this great prophet's 
writing, for the high spire is the emblem of completion, the 
end of the dirty peasant toil which builds. There is a
62Buber says that Deutero Isaiah's God is transcendent 
in the sense that his being becomes manifest beyond the lim­
its of the human psyche; he is not a psychological produc­
tion like the idols. Thus, human apprehension of his being 
is essentially different from acquaintance with the great 
idols. See Prophetic Faith, pp. 209 passim.
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spiritualization of meanings, common to the later, reflect- 
tive passage of antiquity, in which the immediate and con­
crete sources of joy or sorrow are poured into a synthetic 
term which dissolves the immediate circumstance within the
i
mediate condition of its occurrence. No longer is bondage, 
exile, servitude the prominent configuration of existential 
negativity; instead it is the sin which has worked bondage.
The identification of sin as the condition of bondage neces­
sitates that redemption must first come as relief from sin.
In this understanding, Deutero Isaiah anticipates the Fourth 
Evangelist's teaching that "liberation" is primarily the 
surcease of sin, a defective condition of being before God 
upon which existential misfortune is consequent. In context 
then, the terms "redemption" and "liberation" mean essen­
tially the same. Both ascent and decay are present in equal 
measure in the discovery of this kind of association wherein 
the spiritual subsumes the practical. Decay because man has 
lost his direct and simplistic association with the world; 
ascent because man has come to have knowledge about the in­
terior side of things.
Deutero Isaiah's subsumption of the material unfreedom 
of his people within their sin is no mere mental fabrication 
put forward in service to a religious end. Instead, it is 
an induction about the nature of historical process itself, 
an induction valid for all history: Calamity, disgrace,
bondage are the inevitable consequences of sin, for sin is 
nothing besides the refusal to be free. It is the personal
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and political refusal to will and to do the righteousness 
which is the sufficient condition of freedom and its abso­
lute content. The very mundane consequence of this refusal 
is national catastrophe, exile and bondage. Corollary to 
this induction about the cause of unfreedom in history is
the foundation principle of historical theism, i.e., that
\
liberation and rectification are divine. In respect of this 
basic understanding, there is absolutely no "development" 
from J and E to Deutero Isaiah.
The moment of impetus in the structure of freedom is 
the divine avowal of existential misfortune, an avowal which 
is uttered with an intent toward the negation of misfortune. 
Passages which are built upon the structure of freedom are 
rife in Deutero Isaiah. The following is exemplary because 
it incorporates the major symbols which are prominent in 
this prophet's representation of reality. We recall that 
the prophecy begins with divine recognition of sorrow and a 
promise of comfort out of sorrow. The concrete meaning of
this comfort is redemption and return, negation and posi­
tion.
Remember these things, 0 Jacob, and Israel, for 
you are my servant;
I formed you, you are my servant;
0 Israel, you will not be forgotten by me.
I have swept away your transgressions like a cloud, 
and your sins like mist; return to me, for I have 
redeemed y o u . 63
The call to return is no longer an injunction; it is an in­
vitation, the acceptance of which has been made possible by
63Isaiah 44.21-22.
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the clearing away of the impediments of a guilty past.
We need finally to inquire concerning the conditions of 
the return. The prophecy of Deutero Isaiah is eschatolog- 
ical, and it displays the variety which is proper to that 
genre. The symbolism of the following passage places the 
expected event in the context of the recent historical mem­
ory of Israel.
Get you up to a high mountain, 0 Zion, herald of 
good tidings; lift up your voice with strength,
0 Jerusalem, herald of good tidings, lift it up 
and fear not; say to the cities of Judah,"Behold your G o d ! "64
But suddenly in the next verse, the urban imagery disap­
pears, revealing the old strata of memory, the fundamental 
form of the prophetic vision of life in completion.
Behold, the Lord God comes with might, and his arm 
rules for him; behold his reward is with him, and his 
recompense before him.
He will feed his flock like a shepherd, he will 
gather the lambs in his arms, he will carry them in 
his bosom and gently lead those that are with y o u n g . ^5
It is the symbolism of Exodus and sojourn, might and gentle­




V. GREECE: THE BIRTH OF FREEDOM FROM
THE SPIRIT OF JUSTICE
1. The Freedom of Human Intermediacy 
"Freedom" is a word which does not easily lend itself 
to precise definition because of the emotive value which 
clings to it. Freedom is a sourde of exultation for those 
who have it, and an object of desire for those who live 
without it. For children, "Ambrica is a free country" is 
often the earliest proposition about the political order of 
their native land, and to the extent that that order influ­
ences their lives, it is the most salient of all their un­
derstandings about their country. Athens is the ancestor of 
the free European peoples of the modern age, the world's 
first conscious claimant of freedom. The awareness of free­
dom as the definitive trait of Athens is articulated in a 
series of contrasts. Relative to Persia, Greece generally 
and Athens particularly is free; later, Athens is free rel­
ative to Sparta. But the claim that one's country is free 
does nothing to illumine the character of the freedom which 
is claimed.
We must break freedom down and render it in its sepa­
rate moments if we are to understand the meaning of the 
Athenian claim to freedom. The task of definition was not 
incumbent upon this project as it dealt with the Exodus of 
Israel, for the Bible's own analytical standard, the struc-
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ture of freedom in the Fourth Gospel undertook this concep­
tualization for us. It will become clear that this struc­
ture of freedom is likewise relevant to the Athenian exper­
ience of freedom, but by itself it is not sufficient to ex­
plain that experience. In Athenian experience, the concep­
tual schematics of the free life are seldom symbolized in 
any manner abstract from that life experience. Therefore 
the task of schematization falls the lot of this project. 
From the variety of freedoms which we behold in Greece, we 
infer the presence of typical patterns— moments— which make 
experiential freedom intelligible to us.
Athens enlarges and complicates the experience of free­
dom which has its origin in Israel. The structure of free­
dom which articulates the inner meaning of the Israelite ex­
perience of divine liberation establishes the outer bound­
aries of freedom. Athenian experience and self-articulation 
are likewise conversant with these outer boundaries, but in 
a sense the freedom of Athens improves upon the Biblical de­
velopment of the issue, for Athens fills in the mid spaces 
which in the Exodus and the prophets are left blank. The 
life of Israel within the immediate Presence of the supra- 
worldly deity is a life lived in the realm of ultimacy; in 
such a life there is little or no middle ground, no reserva­
tion set apart for the random development of the strictly 
human impulses and abilities. With early Israel it is the 
divine element within man— as an aggregate universal— that 
is called into the Presence of Yahweh, and the lesser ele-
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ments of the human constitution, the forces which work to­
ward individuation, are consigned to inconsequentiality. 
Athens is quite different, for in that country it was man 
who was immediate. Man is immediate in the symbolic record 
of Greece because the Homeric pantheon is at once plural and 
thoroughly anthropomorphic.1 The basal layer of the Greek 
religious consciousness recognized and celebrated in the 
gods the same virtues and weaknesses which are frequent 
amongst mortals. To infer from this that the Greeks were 
irreligious is mistaken. It is true however that the impu­
tation of ethics to the Olympian pantheon is a secondary, 
"subversive" development in Greek religion whose end result
for Greece was the destruction of the Homeric pantheon in
2the period of enlightenment. But in the archaic period, 
for every Hesiod, steeped in devotion to righteous Zeus,
10f this phenomenon which explains the essential dif­
ference between Israel and Greece, Voegelin writes, "The 
universal validity of transcendent truth, the universality 
of the one God over the one mankind, could be more easily 
disengaged from an individual's discovery of the existence 
of his psyche under the gods than from the Sinaitic revela­
tion of a people's existence under God." (Order and His­
tory, II, 169.) The human psyche, as a power detached from 
the greater cosmos, is the proper arena of Greek freedom. 
Because of this detachment it was necessary for Solon the 
liberator to puzzle out the ways of Zeus. In Israel the 
case was opposite: Yahweh sought out Moses and made him
liberator.
^The major thesis of Nilsson's study of Greek religion 
is that the anthropomorphism of the popular Homeric reli­
gion destined that religion to destruction once the urgen­
cies of urban civilization made it necessary for the gods to 
become supporters of ethics. The later Greeks were asked to 
believe that the same gods who had practised deceitfulness, 
partisanship, and sexual promiscuity in the Homeric liter­
ature were now the upholders of rdctitude and order. The
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there must have been thousands like his brother Perses who 
could live quite successfully on an exclusively human plane, 
participating in cultic celebrations of the protective an- 
cestor-gods, unconcerned about truly divine norms or sanc­
tions. It is in this middle space occupied by Hesiod's 
brother Perses that freedom as a human way of life could 
first develop. Because of Athenian freedom's development in 
this middling, unsteady human zone, the thought leaders who 
articulated the life of Athens found it necessary to point 
beyond the merely human realm of existence toward a vision 
in which human life became endowed with an ennobled freedom, 
a freedom imbued with the divine.spirit of Dike, of Justice.
In Athens, four moments can be discerned in the life of 
freedom as a moral and political constellation. These are 
hierarchical, ascending from freedom of a lower type to 
freedom of the highest order. These are: 1. freedom from
slavery, 2. freedom to live as one desires, 3. freedom of 
the self to decide amongst alternatives of varying moral 
magnitudes, 4. freedom to live in righteousness. The first 
and the last of these conform to the polarity within the 
Biblical structure of freedom. The two intermediate mo-
contrary strains could not bear examination when rationality 
was applied to religion. See Martin P. Nilsson, A History 
of Greek Religion, tr. F. J. Fielden (New York: W. W.
Norton and Co., 1964), pp. 130 f., 152-157.
•̂ The following models show the difference between the 
schematization of freedom for Israel and that for Greece:
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ments of freedom are the specifically human contribution of 
Greek experience, for they partake of neither the mute, less 
than human existence of the slave, nor of the divine, 
greater than human life of the wholly righteous. They are 
truly intermediate, for the middle range of freedom, in both 
its individual and political manifestations, constitutes a 
platform from which human existence may move toward the 
lower inclinations of tyranny and slavery or toward the 
higher destiny of divine completion.
Freedom from slavery is negative freedom, for it is 
freedom which negates a negative condition of existence in 
which life is sealed off from public objectification in 
speeches and works. Similar to freedom from slavery is 
freedom from tyranny, for the former consists in an economic 
relationship and the latter in a political relationship.
The consequences of enslavement and tyranny are much the
Israel
positive 4. whole righteousness 3.
negative 2.1. freedom from slavery 
Greece
positive 4. whole righteousness 3. freedom of moral decision
negative 2. freedom to gratify desire 1. freedom from slavery
As the text will explain, the fourth moment is present in 
Greek awareness, but there is no expectation that it will 
be fully manifested in history.
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same, moreover, since both of these conditions deny the 
autonomy of those who occupy the subordinate position. Lib­
eration from slave bondage or tyrannical bondage inevitably 
establishes— within politically defined limits— the "right” 
of the principal to his life and its produce. It is for 
this reason that in concrete history and in the conceptual 
schematization which obtains from that history, freedom from 
slavery is the primary moment in the experience of freedom. 
If freedom is to happen, then somehow the understanding must 
occur that it is "right" for some persons to exist in a con­
dition of non-bondage. The negation of the negative circum­
stances of the slave people Israel was the efficient circum­
stance of the formation of Israel as a theopolity. The same 
is true of Athens. The foundation of Athens as the mother 
of political communities was coincidental with the negation 
of the slave condition of the Athenians. Pursuant upon 
this negation, Athens became the city which Europe remembers 
as the ancestor of constitutional government and popular 
liberty.
In historical and conceptual terms the moment of free­
dom which follows upon the existential fact of not living in 
bondage is freedom to live as one pleases. It is natural 
that this broad condition of randomness should follow upon 
the initial moment of freedom from slavery or tyranny. This 
is the freedom of societies which are resident in the lib­
eral zone of moral accomplishment, and if the "freedom" of 
this moment is for the better part specious, it is nonethe­
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less exuberant. Herodotus wrote:
Thus did the Athenians increase in strength. And 
it is plain enough, not from this instance only, but 
from many everywhere, that freedom is an excellent 
thing; since even the Athenians, who, while they con­
tinued under the rule of tyrants, were not a whit more 
valiant than any of their neighbors, no sooner shook 
off the yoke than they became decidedly the first of 
all. These things show that, while undergoing oppres­
sion, they let themselves be beaten, since then they 
worked for a master; but so soon as they got their 
freedom, each man was eager to do the best he could for 
himself. So it fared now with the Athenians.4
This random freedom is intermediate; it occurs as man recog­
nizes that he— not some other whom he serves— is himself 
fully human. This moment of freedom is preponderantly neg­
ative, for it springs from the circumstance of lacking ex­
ternal restraint; that is why so often it finds its terminus 
in a re-enslavement of human life. It was of a society im­
bued with the practise of this second moment in the career 
of freedom that Plato was thinking when he discussed the 
constitutional form, democracy:
All sorts and conditions,of men, then, would arise 
in this polity more than in any other?
Of course.
Possibly, said I, this is the most beautiful of 
polities; as a garment of many colors, embroidered with 
all kinds of hues, so this, decked and diversified with 
every type of character, would appear the most beauti­
ful, like boys and women when they see bright-colored 
things.5
Specifically, Plato is describing Athens. As is well known, 
his prognosis for the liberal society is gloomy. Liberty
^Persian Wars, V, 78, tr. George Rawlinson (New York: 
The Modern Library, 1942) .
^Republic, 557c, tr. Paul Shorey.
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leads to license, and eventually the licentious society 
opens onto tyranny, for Plato the rule of the devil upon the 
earth. It was this pessimistic faith, compounded by per­
sonal experience, that led Plato to look upon the random 
life as a cancer to be excised at a high cost. In his writ­
ing, Plato seems to have deliberately suppressed the obvious 
circumstance which coupled his life and work with that of 
Solon, Aeschylus and Socrates: all of them were free men of
Athens. If random freedom for the many amounted to gratifi­
cation of appetite at the expense of public order, it was no 
less an historical truth that for a portion of the community 
that same human freedom became teleological.
The random freedom of the second moment is mainly an 
affair of desire, of channelling the simpler inclinations 
and appetites in a manner which is pleasant to the self, 
without regard for measure and consequence amongst the be­
haviors which implement desire. The freedom of the second 
moment then exhibits no permanent contact with that fixture 
in man which is most divine, with the mind. It is for this 
reason that life in free countries tends to fixate at the 
generally negative second moment of freedom; the great bulk 
of mankind is not such that mind looms large as the dominant 
influence in behavior. All this is simply to say that left 
to its own devices, humanity will do as it pleases more usu­
ally than it will do what is right. The institutions of 
free countries encourage people to do as they please; they 
accomodate "interest" and facilitate "interest articulation."
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Thus, as Aristotle understood, in a bi-polar society it is 
the interest of the rich to exploit the poor and the inter­
est of the poor to expropriate the rich. Hence the alter­
native evils of oligarchy and democracy become tyranny. The 
random freedom of the second moment,; as it occurs in both 
the individual and society, can be fully justified only on 
an hedonic basis. There is yet a further possibility for 
its justification, albeit a partial one. This is that a 
society which tolerates unimpeded exercise of preference 
amongst pre-rational, pre-moral desires is also a society 
which will countenance the deployment of the human person­
ality as a moral arbiter. It is as if the former were an 
unimposing platform upon which the latter edifice may be 
built. To permit a discretionary range for nutritive im­
pulse is likewise to give free play to the exertion of up­
right reason as a guiding light for the person, and in times 
of good fortune, for the polity as well.
This then is the third moment in the occurrence of 
freedom within Athens, and within later history as well. It 
grows from the second. The self which takes up the burden 
of true freedom is the self which orients its life in a di­
rection of ontic positivity. This self is a minority fig­
ure amongst men, for it is the self in which the noetic 
mind is more fully awakened than in the general run of man­
kind. The self which is a moral arbiter is not untroubled, 
as is the primarily appetitive self, for it dwells in in­
cessant awareness of the reality that right is, and to be a
252
recipient of this understanding entails a condition of in­
ternal warfare. For when the reality of the moral imper­
ative has become apparent, then the ongoingness of the pre­
moral, desiderative self becomes problematic to the self 
which strives to present itself as an integrated moral unity. 
The self-knowledge of the self as a power having free choice 
becomes fully manifest only at that instant when it has 
been grasped that the will is extensively a slave character, 
bent to its path by factors which lie beyond the powers of 
the volitional self. Curiously, it is Paul who conveys most 
lucidly this ultimate paradox of Greek knowledge of self and 
world. We return to this central passage from the Romans
which we first considered in contrast to the Stoic view.
Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is 
good. So then it is no longer I that do it, but sin 
which dwells within me. For I know that nothing good 
dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will 
what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the 
good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do.
Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that
do it, but sin which dwells within me.
So I find it to be a law that when I want to do
right, evil lies close at hand. For I delight in the
law of God, in my inmost self, but I see in my members
another law at war with the law of my mind [noos] and 
making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my 
members.6
Paul's statement of the issue was intelligible to the Helle- 
nized Jews whom this epistle addresses, for there are two 
"Greek" themes in this passage, in addition to the Jewish 
concern for the law with which they are synthesized. First 
is the avowal that the inmost self, the "I" of the "mind" is
^Romans 7.16-23.
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free, that its volition is to rectitude. Second is the in­
escapable reality of existence, that the total person is un- 
free, unrighteous, a doer of evil, despite contrary voli­
tion. This is the counter "self" of the sin which dwells in 
bodily members, the passions of appetite. It is important 
though that Paul does not quit the issue at this vulgar, 
Orphic stage of analysis. The epistle continues:
For those who live according to the flesh set their 
minds on the things of the flesh, but those who live 
according to the Spirit set their minds on the things 
of the Spirit. To set the mind on the flesh is death, 
but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace.'
The slave existence of the self is not, in the final analy­
sis of the matter, an affair which derives from man's con­
dition of having body. Body is but the matrix from which 
the slave self may make its presence known. The unfreedom 
of man— like his freedom— has its final locus in the core of 
the self— in the set of the mind, in the disposition of the 
heart. The anthropology of man as free/man as slave in 
Romans 7 and 8 repeats in direct prose the same meaning of 
Plato whose picture stories of the composition of the soul 
first overcame the simplistic Orphic presentation of the 
matter.®
In this third moment then the random freedom of the 
second is brought low, for its speciousness is unmasked. It
7Romans 8.5-6.
®This seemingly arcane problem is of great importance 
to a consideration of freedom, for if the Orphic-Gnostic un­
derstanding of evil is tolerated, then human freedom must be 
understood as escape from life as we know it in historical
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is a free existence only in the most physical sense; its 
practitioners are not the chattels of another. But in the 
ontic range which has become transparent for reason, the 
freedom of the second moment is a bitter sham; its freedom 
is external and corrupt. Men who imagine themselves to be 
free are in fact driven by taskmasters whose influence they 
do not even perceive. The political consequences of the 
eruption of the third moment in freedom are momentous, for 
they extend the warfare within the self beyond the self. It 
is enlarged as conflict within the polity. The self which 
has become privy to the moral range of possibility can no 
longer live in peace amongst those who, though imagining
existence. This, briefly, is the Orphic myth: Dionysos,
the son of Zeus, was slain by the Titan monsters who de­
voured his limbs. Zeus managed to retrieve his heart, and 
then struck the Titans with lightning, burning them to pow­
der. From their ashes mankind was formed. The material 
(bodily) part of man was evil because of its Titan content, 
yet because the Titans had eaten Dionysos, the soul was 
good. This contrived myth which lacks true archaic stand­
ing is the Greek source of the soul-body dualism which has 
plagued the Western imagination. The early Plato of the 
Phaedo period was heavily influenced by Orphism, and hence 
the optimism of Socrates as he drinks the hemlock which will 
separate soul from body and speed the former to its blessed 
afterlife. The orthodox tradition in Western letters— be­
ginning with the mature Plato— has spurned this understand­
ing of man and his experience of evil. In Republic, 439c- 
440a, and Phaedrus, 253c-254e, Plato moves the propensity to 
evil within the soul proper, along with the propensity to 
good. This has the advantage of making man, as man (not as 
animal), responsible for evil. Likewise it rescues the 
body, and with it material existence in history, from dis­
grace and desuetude. The implications to freedom are ob­
vious .
Cf. Augustine, City of God, XI, 23, and Kant, On the 
Radical Evil in Human Nature, III. Concerning Orphism, see 
Nilsson, History of Greek Religion, pp. 215-222, and 
Ricoeur, Symbolism of Evil, part II, chapter IV.
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themselves to be free, are in fact the victims of a bondage 
too subtle for them to detect. Once this realization occurs, 
the free self must act, and it must act politically. The 
free person must attempt through persuasion to heighten the 
vision of his fellow men, and, that failing, he may employ 
harsher means to save them from their own slavishness. The 
former alternative was the course of Solon and Aeschylus, 
and the latter was the hard portion of Plato who attempted 
to annul freedom as a fixture of life and thought.
The freedom of the third moment is resident in a dynamic 
tension, a conscious suspension between slavery and righ­
teousness in which the self strives to manifest itself as a 
positive and worthy being. This freedom then exhibits the 
higher intermediacy through which man's humanity attempts to 
bridge the baser aspect of humanity itself, and so to termi­
nate this very intermediacy which is the most salient fact of 
human life. It is this aspiration unto the terminus of the 
intermediate suspension that was known to the Greeks and to 
the New Testament as Hope. Hope is open to the ultimate, 
open to life as wholeness in being, and that hoped for con­
dition of beatific completion is the fourth and final moment 
in freedom.
In the Bible, wh^n Yahweh declares, "Israel is my son," 
when the Son declares, "You are my disciples," the predicate 
indicates that for at least some of the human characters in 
the Bible, the consummate moment of freedom has been attained 
through a dispensation of divine grace. In the symbolic ex­
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perience of Athens, the fourth moment of human aspiration is 
seldom if ever realized in temporal existence, for there is 
nothing in the experience of Greece which is fully parallel 
to the grace of God as it occurs in the Bible. Rather, for 
Athens, the completion of freedom in a total positivity of 
living in the divine presence remains a goal of life which 
is apprehended and experienced across a paradigmatic dis­
tance. This is to say that freedom in the ultimate and pos­
itive sense is a characteristic which is fully developed 
only in the gods; man remains intermediate. Asechylus ex-
Qpressed this perfectly: "For only Zeus is free." It is
for this reason that the ways of the gods are objects of 
hope and concern among those men who partake of the higher 
intermediacy and so aspire to a freedom by agency of which 
human will is drawn nearer to the divine will. If the hu­
manity of the human will were to collapse utterly, then the 
intermediacy of man would end and the residual volition 
would be either wholly demonic or wholly divine. It is the 
divine gradient of this possibility which is the fourth and
^Prometheus Bound, 50. To employ this passage in this 
fashion may appear to be facile, since in its context the 
passage is obviously ironic. In the Prometheus Bound an im­
portant theme is that Zeus is governed in some degree by ne­
cessity, so even his freedom is incomplete. But beyond its 
immediate, ironic application, the passage does express the 
true and direct thinking of Aeschylus, since the final play 
of the trilogy (it is almost universally believed) contains 
not only the liberation of Prometheus from his torment but 
also of Zeus from that fate which would produce his over­
throw. Concomitant with this end to the threat to his rule 
is the accession of Zeus to the realm of pure divinity which 
wills that whole righteousness whose consequence is freedom.
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final moment of freedom.
In its ultimate character then, freedom is transfigured 
so as to forfeit the arbitrary aspect of intent and struggle 
which has marked its earlier moments. In the fourth moment, 
there is no further need for arbitration in the selection of 
alternative courses, for there are no longer alternatives.
The pastoral vision of Micah has shown us this much. The 
leadership of Yahweh is perceived to be sufficient; a human 
decision is no longer required. This resembles the condi­
tion known to modern understanding as "absolute uncondi­
tional freedom," i.e., a freedom in which self and world are 
so integrated that the struggle within the soul or within 
the polity occurs no longer. Greece did not share the ide­
alist opinion that the absolute moment of freedom lay within 
the range of mortal experience. Indeed— save for the clue 
given by Aeschylus— this ultimate freedom was not known by 
the name "freedom." In the symbolic vocabulary of Greece, 
the condition of moral completion.is understood to fall 
within the range of Dike. Dike is the perfect and unequiv­
ocal Justice of Zeus, and as such it is the supra-human 
freedom to do that which is right. Thus it is the divine 
characteristic which men behold across the distance which 
separates their imperfect order from the perfect order of 
the gods. Dike, the ultimate and divine freedom, is a model 
for mortal men; it is a guide which enriches the intermedi­
ate condition of man, advising and warning the arbiter who 
dwells within the free, intermediate soul.
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In Athens then, "freedom," as the noun is commonly em­
ployed, is not the consummate value. Dike, the complete 
righteousness of Zeus, is the foundation upon which the im­
perishable values of humanity rest. Dike is the tutor of 
man with his freedom. We need now to examine the utterances 
which articulate the experience of freedom and justice, and 
shape the dialectic of the two.
2. The Dike of Hesiod
Hesiod is one of that very small number of men who gave 
to Europe its historical identity. Hesiod was a free Boetian 
peasant of the eighth century who wrote not much more than a 
generation after Homer. The world of Hesiod however is not 
really the same world as that of Homer, for while Homer 
wrote of the heroic, Mycennaean past as it was known to him, 
Hesiod addresses himself to the affairs of the present. The 
present for Hesiod is the end of the so-called Dark Age, the 
time before which the Dorian invaders had destroyed the old 
Mycennaean civilization and supplanted its order with a more 
primitive, northern pattern of organization. Thus Hesiod's 
present is as different from that of Achilles and Odysseus 
as is the present of Abram from that of Adam, Seth, and Noah. 
It is a real present whose concerns are intelligible to us 
as creatures of history. It is not a happy present, for 
overpopulation has made life a struggle against starvation.
One can infer much from the change in diet. The Homeric pop­
ulation is accustomed to a diet of roast meat, while the
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Hesiodian diet consists of vegetable products.10 This is a 
world then of dissatisfaction and unrest. Hesiod's own fa-
t
ther had been an immigrant to Boetia, who, after failing at 
a maritime enterprise, had taken up farming on the stony 
soil of the mainland peninsula. It is in this world of ex­
istential precariousness that the light of divine justice 
begins to beam as the guiding beacon for human conduct.
To say that Hesiod is the father of justice is not to 
overstate the case, for the view of the world as an order 
which is in some way productive of right or just relation­
ships is derivative from the inspiration of Hesiod. This is 
not to suggest that the theme of justice appears first in 
Hesiod; rather, Hesiod gives it its moral urgency. Jaeger 
explains of the Homeric justice relative to that of Hesiod,
. . .  a vast distance separates these occasional traces 
of an ethical conception of the gods, and even the 
faith which governs the Odyssey, from the religious 
passion of Hesiod, the herald of justice. . . He bor­
rows from Homer the content of his ideal of justice, 
and even some characteristic phrases to describe it.
But the reformer1s zeal with which he experiences its 
compelling force, and its predominant position in his 
conception of the rule of heaven and the meaning of 
man's life, these mark him out as the prophet of a new 
age, in which men are to build a better society, 
founded upon justice.11
^Concerning the widespread misery at the end of the 
Dark Age and the early archaic period see the following: 
Andrew Robert Burn, The World of Hesiod: A Study of the
Greek Middle Ages, c. 900-700 B.C. (New York: Benjamin
Blom, 1966), chapter II. Gustave Glotz, Ancient Greece at 
Work: An Economic History of Greece from the Homeric Period
to the Roman Conquest (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc.,
1965), part II, chapters 1 and 2. C. E. Van Sickle, A Poli­
tical and Cultural History of the Ancient World (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970), I, chapters 11 and 12.
11Jaeger, Paideia, I, 67.
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Jaeger's comment that Hesiod "borrows from Homer the 
content of his ideal of justice" requires some examination, 
for the Homeric understanding of all normative affairs is 
adapted to the heroic, aristocratic societies of which he 
writes. Certain aspects of the Homeric view are tributaries 
to the new synthesis of Hesiod. Zeus is at the apex of the 
pantheon, and while he does not save the world from self- 
destruction in the Iliad, he alone amongst the gods remains 
neutral. It is this Zeus who becomes capable of true, im­
partial justice in the vision of Hesiod. Similarly in 
Homer, justice is understood to involve the correct treat­
ment of others? above all else it is the opposite of out­
rageous and savage behavior.12 Thus the Cyclops, who are 
violent, lawless, inhospitable to strangers, and utterly 
without political institutions, are absolutely offensive to
Homer, and Odysseus' blinding of the Cyclops is understood
13to be an act consistent with the vengeance of Zeus. Per­
haps the easiest way to express the qualitative difference 
which lies between Homer and Hesiod is to state that in 
Hesiod, unlike Homer, the fantastic does not command atten­
tion in and of itself. If monstrous beings, monstrous oc­
currences appear in Hesiod, the purpose is either proto-sci- 
entific or else to amplify some meaning which pertains di­
rectly to the moral sphere. Homer loves adventure and thus
12See especially Odyssey, VI, 120.
13Odyssey, IX, 478.
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he finds the Cyclops intrinsically interesting; that a di­
dactic lesson obtains from the episode is of secondary im­
portance. For Hesiod, justice is a divine concern which 
applies directly to mankind in its historical existence.
Thus, Homer can be exercised about the outrage of suitors 
who roost for twenty years in the house of Telemachos, 
courting a queen who may or may hot be a widow, while 
Hesiod, like Amos and Micah, is fearful of the outrage of 
the bribed judge who will deprive an honest man of his prop­
erty. To say then, as Jaeger did, that the content of the 
Hesiodian justice is borrowed from Homer, is not entirely 
satisfactory. The content is the same inasmuch as in both 
just action is correct, but there is a kind of correctness 
which is proper to each. Professor Forrest does much to 
clarify this. He writes that the adjective dikaios has an 
earlier and a later meaning. The opposite of the earlier 
use of the term is "wild" or "uncivilised," while the oppo­
site of the later meaning is "unjust" or "impious."'1'4 In 
this distinction drawn according to opposites can be seen 
the great advance of Hesiod over Homer. The misbehavior of 
the suitors is at bottom an aesthetic impropriety; they have 
unpardonably bad manners. The misbehavior of a bribed judge 
however is a moral offense against God himself. This real­
ization, not the former, is the source of historical order 
as we know it.
14W. G. Forrest, The Emergence of Greek Democracy, 800- 
400 B.C. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1946), p. 111.
Hesiod's vision is set forth in two great poems, the 
Theogony and the Works and Days. The Theogony offers 
Hesiod's account of the generations of the gods. It is not 
an "impartial history" however, for Hesiod writes from a 
biased point of view. He is a partisan who celebrates the 
triumph of the late, Olympian deities— Zeus and his genera­
tion— gods who are not culpable for the doing of "shameful 
things." The Theogony thus accounts for the separation of 
the demonic and the divine aspects of reality. Hesiod is 
the first Greek to whom Zeus is revealed as a fully moral 
god, and his ascendancy amongst the gods establishes for 
Hesiod the tenor of life as it ought to be conducted by men. 
The Theogony is Hesiod's statement on the reality of the di­
vine, and the Works and Days extends Hesiod's analysis and 
exhortation into the province of mortal existence. It is 
with this domain that we are primarily concerned.
Scholarly study of the Works and Days is of course pre­
eminently interested in understanding Hesiod's thought cate­
gories and their ramifications in later writing. To follow 
this approach at first however is to miss the symbolic rich­
ness of the existential situation which prompts the utter­
ance of this peasant rhapsode. The first reality of the 
Works and Days— its instigator— is a base fellow with the 
name Perses. Perses is Hesiod's brother and the poem is ad­
dressed to him. Hesiod's address tells us a good deal about 
Perses early in the poem.
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Perses, lay up these things in your heart [thumos], 
and do not let that Strife who delights in mischief 
hold your heart back from work, while you peep and peer 
and listen to the wrangles of the court-house. Little 
concern has he with quarrels and courts who has not a 
year's victuals laid up betimes, even that which the 
earth bears, Demeter's grain. When you have got plenty 
of that, you can raise disputes and strive to get an­
other's goods. But you shall have no second chance to 
deal so again; nay, let us settle our dispute here with 
true judgment which is of Zeus and is perfect. For we 
had already divided our inheritance, but you seized the 
greater share and carried if off, greatly swelling the 
glory of our bribe-swallowing lords [basileas] who love 
to judge such a cause as this. Fools! They know not 
how much more the half is than the whole, nor what 
great advantage there is in mallow and asphodel.15
Hesiod addresses himself to a defect in Perses' heart,
and in so doing, he identifies the heart as the arbiter of
the self. Centuries later Plato will clarify this mediatory
capacity of the Hesiodian heart (thumos) when he casts it as
the third, spirited power within the soul which decides be-
*1 £tween the competing inclinations of reason and desire.
The difficulty which stems from the disposition of Perses' 
heart is this: Rather than do honest work to ensure his
livelihood, Perses has intrigued with the local barons so as 
to defraud Hesiod of his fair share of their father's estate. 
Now, after a period of profligate living, Perses is in need, 
and he threatens to go to court again so as to take that 
portion which had earlier gone to Hesiod. This aspect of 
the difficulty introduces the political motif in the Works
15The Works and Days, 27-41, in Hesiod: The Homeric
Hymns and Homerica, tr. Hugh C. Evelyn-White (London:
William Heinemann, 1914) .
Re public, 439e.
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and Days, a theme that will undergo continual development in 
the political philosophy of Athens. "For we had already di­
vided our inheritance, but you seized the greater share and 
carried it off, greatly swelling the glory of our bribe- 
swallowing lords . . . "  The picture is familiar.
While it is easy to recognize that Hesiod, as the fa­
ther of justice, is the first of a type of man— the just
man— it should not escape our attention that Perses is like­
wise the first of a type. To be sure, Perses can hardly be
the first unjust man, but it is rather likely that he is the
first of one type of "free man." The picture that Hesiod 
draws with Perses at its center is familiar to us. But in 
the annals of mankind, Perses is proto-typical. Here, after 
all, is "ancient man"; or should one say, here at last is 
ancient man? In order to elucidate this novel aspect of
Perses1 character, let us observe what Perses is not.
Perses desires fortune, but in order to get it, he does not 
appear before us as a hero or a demigod at war with others
of this same sort. Nor is he a mortal who enjoys the spe­
cial tutelage of some deity who uses tricks and charms to 
outwit some counter deity who has established a protectorate 
over his brother Hesiod. Nor does Perses seek out sorcerers 
who might by spell and incantation silence Hesiod, and so 
despoil him of his inheritance. Instead, Perses does what 
we would do if we were avariciously inclined; he schemes 
with corrupt officials. In a sense then, Perses is like 
Abram, and thus like us as well. He is an ordinary man in
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historical existence. The prehistoric blessedness of human­
ity in union with divinity is opaque to him. To say that 
Perses is the instigator of the Works and Days is to say 
that Hesiod's great work was produced in response to the ap­
pearance of man in history. It cannot be put more simply. 
Perses knows that he is a man, only a man. He has come to 
terms with the fact of his human mediocrity, and in accept­
ing this, he has put away all which appears to him to be 
pretense; for Perses there are no beautiful speeches, no 
weighty deeds, but only a graceless covetousness which if 
successful will assure comfort until the time of his death. 
This same Perses would be a coward in battle, and quite prob­
ably he is conventionally religious, making due propitiation 
to the gods to ensure their neutrality. But of the divine 
realm, he cares for nothing more than to avoid its disfavor.
To Hesiod, the appearance of man in the world is a 
source of emergency. If man is here to stay, then he must 
be educated. The disposition of his heart must have direc­
tion, else calamity impends. The appearance of Perses as 
the representative type of man in history prompts Hesiod to 
articulate the etiology of the evil condition of man which 
he beholds about him in the world. Thus, in the text of the 
Works and Days, the exhortation to Perses is followed imme­
diately by two myths of the fall of man. The first of these 
is the story of Prometheus' theft of fire, his gift of it to 
man, and of Zeus's retaliation through the creation of Pan­
dora and her jar. The second is the account of the five
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consecutive races of men. In respect of our interest in 
Perses, we shall examine only the last two of the five ages 
in the anthropogony. The first three races of men, in or­
der, are the gold, silver and bronze. The fifth and present 
race is of iron. The race of iron is preceded immediately 
by the fourth, the heroic race. The heroic race encompasses 
the mankind of the Homeric epics. Of this epoch, Hesiod 
says that the heroes are "noble, righteous, god-like, un­
touched by sorrow, h a p p y . W h a t  is most significant about 
this list is that it is not offset by any counter-inventory 
of negative traits or circumstances. Clearly the heroic 
mankind bears only a remote connection to the mankind with 
which Hesiod is familiar. Its value to Hesiod obtains 
solely in that it affords a standard of contrast for his 
analysis of life in the world of familiar experience.
The existence with which Hesiod is familiar is the of­
tentimes hateful existence of the Iron Age. Of this age he 
reports:
Thereafter, would that I were not among the men of 
the fifth generation, but either had died before or
been born afterwards. For now truly is a race of iron,
and men never rest from labor and sorrow by day, and 
from perishing by night; and the gods shall lay sore 
trouble upon them. But, notwithstanding, even these 
shall have some good mingled with their evils. And 
Zeus will destroy this race of mortal men also when
they come to have grey hair on the temples at their
birth.18
A list of specific evils of both a private and a public na-
17Works and Days, 156-169b.
18works and Days, 174-182.
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ture follows here. Then Hesiod concludes:
And then Aidos and Nemesis, with their sweet forms 
wrapped in white robes, will go from the wide-pathed 
earth and forsake mankind to join the company of the 
deathless gods: and bitter sorrows will be left for
mortal men, and there will be no help against evil.19
This description and prognosis for the humanity of 
Hesiod's acquaintance is probably the most notable instance 
of the Hesiodian pessimism; one must add though that it is a 
moderate pessimism. The evidence that Hesiod's pessimism is 
not total consists in two aspects of his writing. The first 
is that with the triumph of Zeus in the Theogony the affairs 
of the gods are at last set aright. Surely this must sug­
gest some possibility for improvement within the condition 
of mortals. The second is that the Works and Days is itself 
an exhortatory address. The parallel with the prophets of 
Israel is obvious: Children will be born aged; Aidos (Shame)
and Nemesis (Indignation) will depart; Zeus will destroy this 
race, unless it changes the disposition of its heart! Like 
the fiber-thin thread of promise which runs through the en­
venomed words of Amos, this latter condition is the barely 
stated premise of the Works and Days. Its deliverance is 
the purpose of the whole address.
In his assessment of the generation to which he belongs, 
Hesiod posits a range of negative attributes which contrast 
with those of the earlier race of heroes. Labor is as nec­
essary as it is onerous; domestic strife abounds; worthy men
^ Works and Days, 195-201.
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are victimized by perjurers and violent usurpers; at last 
men are defenseless against evil. Again, however, Hesiod's 
view is moderated when he allows that "even these shall have 
some good mingled with their evils." The negative aspect, 
to be sure, is preponderant, but life is not completely be­
reft of positive content. In brief, Hesiod's picture of hu­
man existence in his world (and ours) is accurate. If we 
are to appreciate the authenticity of the Hesiodian iron 
race as a typical vision of historical existence, it is nec­
essary that we refrain from imagining that we are not in the 
broadest sense participants in the same historical world as 
the inhabitants of eighth century Boetia. Amongst us, abuse, 
injustice, perjury, toilsome and unrewarding labor, though 
recessive, are enduring conditions of existence. Hesiod 
tells the truth of historical existence and ventilates the 
distress of the righteous soul in a timeless utterance.
Hesiod's expression of the negativity of present exis­
tence exhibits a formal correspondence to a similar attesta­
tion in the ExoduS: "Then the Lord [YHWH] said, 'I have
seen the affliction of my people who are in Egypt, and have 
heard their cry because of their taskmasters; I know their 
sufferings . . .'"20 The case is not fully the same however, 
for the miserable lot of Israel is the result of an external 
hegemony which has ensnared the people from without. Hesiod 
is grappling with an internal malady which has external con-
20Exodus 3.7 J.
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sequences— with the intermediacy of a man whose heart turns 
to wickedness more readily than to righteousness. Greece is 
not Israel, nor is Zeus Yahweh. The old Yahwist creed un­
derstood that Yahweh saved Israel through the performance of 
"signs and wonders," but it seems clear in Hesiod's writing 
that the salvation of Zeus occurs only inasmuch as mortals 
will to regard him as paradigm. That the heart come to feel 
the paradigmatic immediacy of the Olympians is the intent of 
Hesiod's address. The primary audience of the poem is the 
unjust Perses, the intermediate figure for whose conversion 
Hesiod is concerned. Inasmuch as the poem exhibits the be­
lief that man can be converted to the divine path, the Works 
and Days is an appeal to man in his freedom.
As was the case with Israel, we are looking at Greek 
culture at a time before the idea of freedom had been spoken 
aloud. Symbolic expression of values is tied to experience 
which in itself is valued, and is derivative from that ex­
perience. For this reason it is important that Jaeger con­
cludes that the Boetia which Hesiod describes to us can be 
called a free society. The nobles monopolize political 
power, but the peasants have a life of their own, with ex­
tensive latitude in matters of personal conduct and economy. 
There is extensive freedom of speech, and there is nothing 
akin to serfdom or to helotry of the Laconian pattern.21 In 
addition to these considerations, it is most important that
Jaeger, Paideia, I, 56.
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in Hesiod's Boetia— in sharp contrast to Attica— land could 
be bought and sold easily.22 This means that there was 
real, commonplace individual freedom of a quite modern sort, 
for from this right to transfer property, the historian in­
fers that the extended family has little power over the in­
dividual. Where the extended family is strong, land is not 
permitted to leave the family.2  ̂ By and large then, the 
pattern of Hesiod's existence is one which is recognizable 
as a free one to us whose vocabulary is familiar with the 
concept of freedom.
In Hesiod's portrait of Perses, we behold the first 
free man of whom there is record in Greece, and in that one 
sense at least, the first Greek. But does not freedom come 
to more than the biography of this empty Perses? Perhaps, 
but not necessarily. One meaning of the claim to be a free 
man in a free country must always be that one can undertake 
to do outrageous things without certainty of being appre­
hended and punished. Perses is a choice specimen, for he 
embodies no more of freedom than that which we have desig­
nated as the second moment of freedom; he is free from ex­
ternal restraint, free to live a life of utter randomness. 
The arbiter within has arrested his selective range at the 
quantitative level of appetite; Perses is a man who wants 
more. Hesiod's picture of Perses cannot be far from Plato's
22E.g., see the advice in Works and Days, 335-340.
2^See Burn, The World of Hesiod, pp. 111-114. Not all 
scholars accept the idea that land could be sold anywhere in
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mind when in Republic IV he models the tripartite composi­
tion of the soul with desire (epithumia) as its lowest struc­
ture. In Plato— as in Hesiod before him— the spectre of de­
sire as the basal leaning of the human self issues into a 
comment on the political order as a potential curb to the 
rampant satisfaction of the guests of the quantitative self. 
For Hesiod though, the political aspect is less clearly pro­
nounced than in Plato, for Hesiod has no concrete program 
for reform. His primary avenue of approach to the problem 
of human baseness is his appeal to the human heart, for in 
that central mediator of the self, he hopes to awaken a dor­
mant receptivity to his "true words." Hesiod's approach 
then presupposes freedom as elemental to the human self and 
to the greater political community. Otherwise the exhorta­
tion would be without purpose.
The vital question concerns which kind of freedom that 
the self will display. Will it continue as the specious and 
deceptive freedom of quantitative inclination, or can it be 
heightened and broadened? Professor Solmsen, whose study 
looks ahead to Aeschylus, understandably comprehends the 
problem which Perses poses for thought in Aeschylean terms, 
i.e., in terms of freedom. Most significantly Solmsen con­
nects the issue of human freedom in Hesiod to the beatific
eighth century Greece. The fact is however that virtually 
the only evidence about life in the eighth century is that 
contained in the Works and Days. It assumes that land can 
be sold, and in numerous respects suggests a weak family 
structure.
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vision of the Golden Age:
Man has a choice. Perses is free to choose between one 
course and the opposite. So are the judges who may ei­
ther accept bribes from Perses or bring the lawsuit 
which is pending between him and Hesiod to a satisfac­
tory end by handing down a just verdict. The road of 
hybris is open to man, but so is that of dike and if he 
chooses the honest course he will experience a happi­
ness not quite identical with, but not much inferior 
to, that enjoyed by the men of the Golden Age.24
Solmsen wisely couples freedom and justice to happiness in 
his reading of Hesiod; eudaemonism is never missing from the 
Greek political consciousness, and Hesiod more than Homer is 
author of the principle. In Hesiod, the prediction that 
righteous conduct in the individual self and in the public 
domain will lead to happiness is a proposition that has 
freedom as its animus. But as we have seen, there are 
greater and lesser species of freedom. In his exhortation 
and prediction, Hesiod is in effect beseeching Perses and 
the judges to become free as he is free. And the freedom of 
Hesiod is of an elevated sort; it is truly the freedom of 
choice, the third moment in freedom. Basic to the Hesiodian 
faith is the belief that the freedom of the higher interme­
diacy is common to all mankind; within the hearts of some, 
it is a latent capacity, a potential being whose presence is 
not yet visible. In Hesiod though that which in others is 
latent is fully manifest. It is this maturity of the abil­
ity for free choice which qualifies Hesiod to speak while 
the others are qualified only to listen.
24Friederich Solmsen, Hesiod and Aeschylus (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1949), pp. 86-87.
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Like Perses, Hesiod also is in a sense the first Greek, 
albeit in a firmer and more permanent respect. For Hesiod 
is the first of his type of man of whom we have record.
Both brothers share in the human primacy which occurs for 
Israel in the account of Abram. While Perses corresponds to 
Abram in his doubt, Hesiod represents that trusting Abram 
who dwells obediently in the command and promise of his God. 
Both are human— both exhibit the human property of interme­
diacy. The man Perses is more nearly animal, Hesiod more 
nearly divine. Hesiod is a man who wills to live righ­
teously, knowing full well that he could do otherwise if 
only he chose. The historical dichotomy of Perses and 
Hesiod, and the types whom they represent, passes through 
the centuries of Greek experience and reflection. Aristotle 
explains most concisely the possibilities inherent in this 
dichotomy.
For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but 
when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of 
all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and 
he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by 
intelligence and virtue, he is the most unholy and the 
most savage of animals, and the most full of lust andgluttony.25
Hesiod's own decision to live by justice is the content of 
his freedom. Above all others in Greece, Athens is the re­
cipient of Hesiodian culture, and in that state it is men 
who exhibit the moral freedom of this third moment whom Eu­




To say that Hesiod, in respect of his power to choose
righteousness, is free is to suggest that his character has
become individuated and that he has thus made claim to an
ethical detachment which enables him to speak to others from
a superior stance. In following this inference, we meet
difficulty in Voegelin's interpretation of Hesiod, for
Voegelin advances a developmental thesis which denies Hesiod
individuation, and by consequence, freedom as well. The
difficulty derives from the following desperate utterance:
"now, therefore, may neither I myself be righteous among
men, nor my son— for then it is a bad thing to be righteous
— if indeed the unrighteous shall have the greater right.
But I think that all-wise Zeus will not yet bring that to
p a s s . "26 Voegelin comments:
This fear cannot yet be met by the resistance of a soul 
that has become conscious of its own life. The soul 
still is inextricably interwoven with the fabric of 
social and cosmic order; when the order becomes unrigh­
teous, the soul must become unrighteous too, because 
life has no meaning beyond life within the order. 
Strictly speaking, the soul does not yet exist. The 
self-conscious resistance of a Xenophanes or Heraclitus 
was out of the question; and it took several centuries 
before the soul was sufficiently formed to become a 
source of order in opposition to society, as it did in 
the life and work of Plato.27
In our effort to resolve this difficulty, we are with­
out certain final information which would be decisive. We 
do not know if Hesiod's exhortations were successful; and if 
they were unsuccessful, we do not know if Hesiod and his son
26works and Days, 270-273. 
270rder and History, II, 157.
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became unrighteous. Thus we have only to draw on the text 
as it stands. In a technical sense, Voegelin cannot be 
gainsaid, for in Hesiod, there is no independent soul (psy­
che) as a discrete structure uniting man's intellectual and 
moral powers. But our study has shown that the reality of 
freedom is manifest before the symbol, eleutheria, comes 
forth to give the reality a name. Much the same seems to be 
the case with the "soul" of Hesiod. On another matter 
Voegelin overstates the case, for it is not until late that 
the living soul becomes completely extricated from the fab­
ric of cosmic order. To speak of the fabric of social and 
cosmic order in the same breath is misleading, for Plato's 
claim to legitimacy rests on the understanding that his own 
soul bears the imprint of the cosmos, and that it is thereby 
funded with the power of resistance to unsatisfactory social 
circumstances. In this respect then, Plato is not fundamen­
tally different from Hesiod; the centuries do not alter— or 
even "develop"— the most vital content of the self under­
standing. As the soul of Plato is inextricable from the 
mathematical cosmos, so the heart of Hesiod is inextricable 
from the order of the Olympians. The developmental question 
then is not one of the "growth" of independent resistance to 
social injustice? rather it is one of rationalization and 
clarification of the nature of a resistance which is robust 
in its youth. That which is great begins great. The affec­
tive rebellion of the heart in Hesiod opens ultimately into 
the articulation of the fully matured soul as the bearer of
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rational resistance borne of the vision of true order. A 
Plato was impossible before the sophistic exploration of 
the possibilities of intellection and discourse. But Hesiod, 
unlike Plato, was dependent on none before him. The true 
giants of culture are the peasants who, with handmade wooden 
plow, cut the first furrow straight and deep. No less than 
the eighth century prophets in their struggle against the 
compromised monarchy, the vision of Hesiod in his reproof of 
a predatory aristocracy is the cause of the first instance 
of moral freedom for which there is record in Europe.
Can we believe that Hesiod really intends to abandon 
righteousness if his exhortation goes unheeded? Is integra­
tion within the social fabric of irresistible importance to 
one who alone has discovered the true nature of Zeus, and 
who through his discovery has become free? This seems un­
likely. The mandarin has difficulty in feeling with the 
peasant. The true sense of Hesiod's utterance is only this: 
"For all my righteousness I am but a man, and I can be 
crushed by abuse." There is no developmental problem here; 
instead there is an existential dilemma. Hesiod is a peas­
ant, and if the courts deprive him of his property he will 
be without a livelihood. Hesiod tells us of no disciples 
whose aid might relieve him in penury. Nor is he an Elijah; 
though he knows the ways of Zeus, he has no direct contact 
with the god so as to receive comfort from the source of his 
allegiance. Hesiod indeed is free, but as we recognized 
in the discussion of those contemporaries of Hesiod, the
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prophets of Israel, economic freedom is the primary freedom, 
itself supportive of the more spiritually laden freedom to 
choose righteousness. If Hesiod loses his farm, will he 
remain free to follow the way of justice, or will the exi­
gencies of survival necessitate that he become a brigand?
This is the question whose answer Hesiod cannot know. Though 
free, Hesiod is but a man, not an immortal deity, and his 
candor is such that he admits the fear that his righteousness 
might be destroyed, and with it, the person who he knows 
himself to be. Hesiod concludes the desperate utterance with 
a vocation of faith: "But I think that all-wise Zeus will
not yet bring that to pass." This exalted Zeus, infinitely 
more divine than the Zeus of Homer, is the guardian of 
Hesiod's remaining the kind of man who he is, a kind whom 
we know as free man.
As consciousness of freedom grew in Greece, personal and 
social freedom could not be maintained without a regulative 
ideal which lent measure and substance to free life, and so 
made its continuance possible. This ideal is the fourth 
moment of freedom, the divine measure itself. For Hesiod, 
it is the complete dike of Zeus. His hold on dike enabled 
Hesiod to become a teacher of men. The implicit exhortation 
within all teaching is the invitation: "Heed my words, for
I am better than you." And the source of this betterness is 
the content of teaching, the benefaction bestowed upon those 
whose business it is to learn. In Hesiod this content is 
Dike, daughter of Zeus, and the influence of divine Dike
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upon the freedom of Athens is so decisive that we need to 
examine the major provisions of Hesiod's articulation of the 
term.28
With regard to the Hesiodian understanding of "just" or 
"right," it is necessary to distinguish three characteris­
tics. First is its place in the world, second is its place 
in the universe, and third is the nature of its consequences. 
By way of approach to these characteristics, we should con­
sider that although Hesiod is the major progenitor of 
Athenian political philosophy, there is not yet in Hesiod's 
own writing a sharp delineation between the personal and 
political spheres; there is no "ethics," nor is there a 
"politics." The reason for this non-distribution is that in 
the time and place of Hesiod, the realm of the political has 
not yet become clearly visible. In the absence of open and 
public deliberation, the authoritative allocation of values 
is performed by a ruling nobility. Hence the plea for gov­
ernmental justice is generically identical with the plea that 
Perses become just, for it is a plea to the person of the
28In the Works and Days and also in the Theogony, Hesiod 
personifies a number of important forces in the world, both 
normative and physical, which were not personified in Homer, 
and which never achieved the anthropomorphic development of 
the Homeric, Olympian pantheon. One of these forces is dike. 
When the term appears in this study as Dike, the reference is 
to Hesiod's specific understanding about this common Greek 
word. Hesiod's audience was at best unsophisticated. (Two 
and a half centuries later, in Attica, Peisistratus dressed 
up a country girl as Athena, and when he brought her into 
Athens, the people knelt in worship.) For such an audience 
the representation of Dik§ as a living deity must have helped 
Hesiod to communicate the enlarged meaning which he had dis­
covered for this word.
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ruler. To say that there is little suggestion of a "politi­
cal philosophy" in Hesiod is to say then that Hesiod does 
not call into question the structure of government or the 
constitution of the community as more or less suitable ves­
sels for the performance of right. His interest is only that 
the established order behave as it should, by right, behave. 
This simplistic approach is consistent with Hesiod's address 
to the heart.
Political philosophy is unmistakably incipient in 
Hesiod however, for while the Works and Days shrinks from 
any suggestion of constitutional reform, the Theogony deals 
with that very topic as it pertains to the divine realm. The 
Theogony details at length the proper structure of relation­
ships amongst the gods, with righteous Zeus in clear command 
of the divine realm. With this accomplishment of Hesiod, it 
is but a short step to Athenian political philosophy, which, 
beginning with Solon, assays the proper structure for human 
relationships. In addition to the reform and purification 
of the pantheon, there is a further clue in Hesiod that a 
political philosophy is nigh. Burn calls attention to the 
uniqueness of the following in eighth century thought:
Alike with him who does wrong to a suppliant or a guest, 
or who goes up to his brother's bed and commits unnat­
ural sin in lying with his wife, or who infatuately 
offends against fatherless children, or who abuses his 
old father at the cheerless threshold of old age and 
attacks him with harsh words, truly Zeus himself is 
angry, and at the last lays on him a heavy requittal for 
his evil d o i n g . 2 9
29Works and Days, 327-334. See Burn, World of Hesiod, 
p. 77.
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As Burn explains, what is arrestirig about this thought is 
that is places wrongs done to suppliants and orphans on a 
plane equal to wrongs against members of one's family. The 
significance of this claim is that the universal justice of 
Zeus has overtaken the pre-moral piety of the family to its 
particular gods. Zeus will punish both types of wrong, with­
out greater interest in either. In a peculiar Greek fashion, 
this understanding of Hesiod runs parallel to the universal- 
ism of the prophets. Zeus, like Yahweh, is the judge of all, 
and his justice is non-partisan. While this is not in itself 
political philosophy, it is a realization which was necessary 
for the beginning of overt political reflection. Most cer­
tainly Cleisthenes' radical reform of the family structure 
in Attica in the late sixth century would have been impos­
sible had this awareness not taken hold at some earlier time. 
The place of right in the world is in man's humanity.
But you, Perses, lay up these things within your 
heart and listen now to right, ceasing altogether to 
think of violence. For the son of Cronos has ordained 
this law for men, that fishes and beasts and winged 
fowls should devour one another, for right is not in 
them; but to mankind he gave right which proves far 
the best. For whoever knows the right and is ready to 
speak it, far-seeing Zeus gives him prosperity; but 
whoever deliberately lies in his witness and forswears 
himself, is left obscure thereafter. But the generation 
of man who swears truly is better thenceforward.30
The contents of this passage upon which we will concentrate
•^Works and Days, 274-285. Cf. Politics, 1253a, 10, 
Aristotle*s identification of speech as the specifically 
human power to assay the expedient and the just. Boetian 
poetry instructs Athenian philosophy.
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are the listening, the thinking, the two opposed uses of 
speech, and the relation of all these to justice. In the 
evil times in which Hesiod lived, it became necessary to 
explain that which to later generations has been obvious,
i.e., that there is at the least a latent qualitative dif­
ference between men and beasts. Men differ from the latter 
in that they are able in thought to mold the world as it 
ought to be, and then to communicate their knowledge of the 
world as it ought to be in speech so that their fellows may 
know right as well. Hesiod is the first to articulate the 
anthropology of man as a being who can discover right in 
thought and then make it understood in speech. It had become 
necessary to point up the obvious— that there is a difference 
in kind between men and predatory beasts— because the pre­
vailing conditions of existence worked so as to conceal that 
difference in being. We are able to understand this circum­
stance as the meonic misuse of freedom. Free men, Perses 
and the magistrates, attempt to get the goods of life by 
behaving as predators.
In these circumstances the assertion of the obvious—  
that justice, and knowledge and speech of it, is the core 
power of human life— is itself a demonstration of the verac­
ity of the claim, for the claim would not be rendered if 
circumstances did not contradict it. To inject this truth 
into the unjust circumstances which were Hesiod's lot is to 
set the divine vection of humanity against the bestial. One 
who does this brings danger upon himself by attacking the
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legitimacy of the established unjust deployment of powers. 
This is the position of Hesiod; while it might be more pru­
dent for him to remain silent, or at any rate to confine his 
reprimand to Perses and leave the princes alone, Hesiod risks 
himself in defense of the obvious. The princes are like a 
savage beast.
And now I will tell a fable for princes who themselves 
understand. Thus said the hawk to the nightingale with 
speckled neck, while he carried her high up among the 
clouds, gripped fast in his talons, and she, pierced by 
his crooked talons, cried pitifully. To her he spoke 
disdainfully: "Miserable thing, why do you cry out?
One far stronger than you now holds you fast, and you 
must go wherever I take you, songstress as you are.
And if I please I will make my meal of you, or let you 
go. He is a fool who tries to withstand the stronger, 
for he does not get the mastery and suffers pain besides 
his shame." So said the swiftly flying hawk, the long­
winged bird.31
Surely the princes were unhappy with this revealing compar­
ison; surely its utterance brought danger to Hesiod and his 
family. For Hesiod the risk of himself is worth the hazard, 
for as we have seen, he considers himself lost at any rate 
if right does not prevail. In these comments on the powers 
of humanity to know and speak justice, this great maker of 
culture appears with a nobility which surpasses even that of 
the prophets, for the prophets respond to the direct commis­
sion of Yahweh; for this, they are not alone. Hesiod is the 
free Greek person par excellence. He has not, like Amos, 
been "taken." Instead, it is his own tropism to the divine 
which instructs his allegiance to the justice of Zeus and 
his brave rebuke to the unjust rulers.
33-works and Days, 201-212.
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The place of right in the world is in man's humanity, 
and the content of right appears in the correct discharge of 
inter-human relationships and in work. But in Hesiod, there 
is little of the much celebrated "Greek humanism," for right 
in the life of mankind obtains only by virtue of the per­
manent residence of Right in a supra-human domain. "And 
there is virgin Justice [Dike], the daughter of Zeus, who is 
honoured and reverenced among the gods who dwell on
O OOlympus . . Hesiod's location of Justice near the
summit of the Olympian pantheon is possibly the earliest 
exercise in the realist ontology of morals, for Right, the 
beloved daughter of Zeus, is herself the permanent and uni­
versal ground who by her cosmic stature as Right lends sub­
stantiality to all particular instances of right among men 
in historical existence. Only if men were themselves gods 
would the situation be otherwise. Only if men were immortal, 
never prone to error, would they be entities capable of gen­
erating within themselves the universal power which lends 
being to existence. Since man is not this character, since 
instead his character is particular and intermediate, ontol- 
ogically suspended between the polarity of justice and in­
justice, and anthropologically enmeshed within both, he 
cannot be for himself the author of that most exalted human 
content which lies within him. Man is not author but par­
ticipant. The Fourth Evangelist does not bid men to be the
3^Works and Days, 256-257.
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logos, but to continue in it; nor does Hesiod expect Perses 
and the nobles to be Right, but to open their hearts to her 
and so become capable to do right. The substantive capacity 
of divinity to be Right is the ultimate, the ontic condition 
of freedom, and the participatory capacity of man to appre­
hend this right and to act accordingly is the penultimate 
moment in freedom— human intermediacy at its highest plane.
The complete Right of the gods serves to instruct man in his 
freedom, making it a freedom which approaches ontic comple­
tion, rather than a freedom whose movement is pointless and 
bestial.
It is necessary to recite these elementary consider­
ations because they are elemental in the writing of Hesiod. 
They make their first appearance in the world with his 
vision. In the experience of Athens as a free country, and 
as a model to later mankind, Hesiod's poetry is the anchor 
of the idea of human freedom which is instructed by divine 
righteousness. That idea is the crux of Solon and Aeschylus. 
The Hesiodian foundation of freedom with justice entails 
that human life is finite and intermediate. For this reason, 
Hesiod does not demand of Perses and the nobles that they 
become what they cannot be, to wit, the ontic structure for 
their own lives. More than any other period, the eighth 
century of Hesiod and Amos is the time of truth. The time 
of truth is the hypostatic moment in the definition of his­
torical humanity, for it is the moment in which man begins 
as man, distinct from chthonian spirits, heroes, demigods.
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At the time of truth, man understands himself simply as man; 
he is conscious of himself as a character undergoing birth, 
career, death. When this consciousness appears, then with 
it comes the truth of man as intermediate between heaven and 
earth, bearing the seed for justice and injustice, discover­
ing the template for both within the self and the ultimate 
being of both in realms beyond the self. The "beyondness" 
of these capacities is the necessary condition which under­
lies the freedom of man, for he must exercise discretion as 
he attempts to objectify himself according to these patterns 
which are ultimately beyond him. This is the substance of 
Hesiod's understanding of self and world. Hesiod's true 
words attempt to obtain for man the best settlement possible, 
given the limits inherent in human historical existence. To 
attempt more, to make of man the source of his own justice, 
is to seek after a suspension of humanity itself. Hesiod's 
true words do not attempt to overcome man, but to guide him 
by grounding human justice within the perfect fabric of di­
vine Justice.
The most comprehensively symbolic of Hesiod's several 
visions is the apocalypse of the two cities, the one devoted 
to justice and the other given in injustice. This is 
Hesiod's own version of the prophetic understanding that man 
must consciously choose between life and death. Of the 
former city we learn, " . . .  they who give straight judg­
ments to strangers and to the men of the land, and go not 
aside from what is just, their city flourishes and the
286
people prosper in it.” This city has peace instead of war, 
food instead of famine, fecundity instead of barrenness. Of 
the unjust city, " . . .  for those who practise violence and 
cruel deeds far-seeing Zeus, the son of Cronos, ordains a
punishment. Often even a whole city suffers for a bad man
33who sins and devises presumptuous deeds." In order that 
this vision be understood for what it is, it is necessary to 
explain first that Hesiod is not— as may seem to be the case 
— promulgating a doctrine of Zeus as a god who intervenes in 
history on behalf of the righteous. In this passage, it is 
Zeus who brings good fortune, or ill, for the simple reason 
that the Greeks before the age of *enlightenment attributed 
all important happenings to the gods. In accepting this 
customary view, Hesiod is not essentially different from 
Homer, except inasmuch as Zeus is the only god about whom 
Hesiod cares. It is important that this be understood, for 
the meaning which Hesiod intends here is almost mechanistic, 
not greatly different from Deutero Isaiah's understanding of 
sin as the comprehensive term which explains self-destruc­
tion in history. Hesiod's meaning here presages the prin­
ciple of historical causality which will appear in Solon in 
wholly secular form: The city which lives righteously, ser­
iously trying to do justice to all, makes its own happiness. 
The city which has no scruple about violence (hybris, the 
human outrage which accepts no moderating curbs) poisons its
33Works and Days, 225 ff.
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own future and goes to destruction by its own hand.
The apocalypse of the two cities is the opportune point 
for this study to move from Hesiod to Solon. The vision of 
the two cities is prophetic, for it predicts the nature of 
the "Greek complaint" in the ensuing centuries. The horribly 
murderous class struggles of the poleis in the historical 
period came as a consequence of the organization of cities 
according to the second, unjust pattern. This did not hap­
pen in Athens because there arose in that city a statesman 
who gave "straight judgments to strangers and to the men of 
the land."
3. The Solonic Liberation
In the invocation to the Theogony, Hesiod establishes
in the symbolic imagination of Greece the transcultural
analogue of the good prince to the good god.
Whomsoever of heaven-nourished princes the daughters of 
great Zeus honor, and behold him at his birth, they 
pour sweet dew upon his tongue, and from his lips flow 
gracious words. All the people look towards him while 
he settles causes with true judgments; and he, speaking 
surely, would soon make wise end even of a great quar­
rel; for therefore are there princes wise in heart, be­
cause when the people are being misguided in their 
assembly, they set right the matter again with ease, 
persuading them with gentle words.
For it is through the Muses and far-shooting Apollo 
that there are singers and harpers upon the earth; but 
princes are of Zeus.34
The prince who is the mortal analogue of Zeus is given the
capacity for "gracious words," "true judgments," with which
34Theogony, 81-90, 94-95.
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to settle causes; this prince is "wise in heart," "persuad­
ing them with gentle words."
In this imagery of the good prince, we behold the seed 
of a concept which would flower some four centuries later in 
Plato's construction of the philosopher-ruler. But the late 
Platonic figure who has become a paradigm for the ruler 
would have been impossible had not the divinely endowed 
prince of Hesiod's vision become flesh at some point in his­
tory. Plato was an Athenian, and to be an Athenian involved 
the understanding that one's identity as an Athenian was 
derivative in the first instance from the life and work of 
Theseus in legend and of Solon in history. For all intents 
and purposes, Solon was the first Athenian, and he was like­
wise the sort of ruler whom Hesiod described in the invoca­
tion to the Theogony.
In the strictest sense, Solon was not a prince 
(basileus); rather, he was an archon, or first citizen, thus 
indicating a selective rather than hereditary basis for 
rulership. But the incipient difference between monarchial 
and republican forms in the Athenian sixth century makes 
little difference where the content of Solon's person and 
action is concerned. In all respects he conforms to Hesiod's 
picture of the divinely blessed prince. Indeed, it is 
through the statesmanship of Solon that Hesiod's "true words" 
receive their political induction, and so become the spir­
itual constitution of Athens. Our direct knowledge of Solon 
is through fragments of his poems that have been preserved
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as quotations in various later Greek texts. Solmsen com­
ments on the relationship of these fragments of Solon to the
writing of Hesiod: "The relationship which Hesiod had estab-
»
lished between hybris, wealth, the punishment of Zeus, and
35Ate had become canonical." To say that the Hesiodian 
ethos had become canonical is to say that it was a living 
corpus of ideas which could be put to use as a guide for 
action. That, indeed, was the character of Solon's work.
The history of Athens as a moral entity in history has 
its beginning in circumstances similar to those under which 
Israel began. That is, Athens before Solon was an unhappy 
country, ridden by social strife, beset with the enslavement 
of its own people. The history of Attica before Solon is 
extremely dim, for relative to Corinth or the Ionic Greek 
poleis it was an "underdeveloped country" which left little 
record. Less even is known about this country and its people 
than is known about Israel in Goshen. The absence of infor­
mation serves only to goad on the historian's detective 
lust, and to sharpen his artistry. Of the historical recon­
structions of the Attican situation at the time of Solon, 
the most ambitious and most complete is Woodhouse's study.
For the purposes of our own interest in the symbols of lib­
eration, we need go no farther with Woodhouse than to agree 
that the accounts of both Aristotle and Plutarch are con­
fused due to inadequate information, and to learn that
35Solmsen, Hesiod and Aeschylus, p. 109.
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Aristotle's account safely warrants the following conclu­
sions:
1. There was a dependent agricultural class called 
Hektemores.
2. The name had something to do with the conditions of 
service.
3. They were extremely bitter toward the rich, on whom 
they were dependent.
4. The primitive law of debt was operative, with de­
fault causing distraint of the person, his family 
and his possessions.
We will suppose also that Aristotle was wrong in identifying
the Hektemores with the debtors sold into slavery, since the
former were giving a share of their produce to the landlord,
and thus would not have been sold by him to someone else.
Whether the Hektemore gave one sixth or five sixths of his
produce to the landlord, we do not know; the extremity of
the bitterness to which all sources are witness commends the
latter figure. We suppose that the Horoi, or ward stones,
were emblematic of the erstwhile free family holdings which
were at last under perpetual lien to a noble, and that the
families which occupied these holdings were the Hektemore
serfs. Whatever the exact truth may be about the Hektemores
and the debtors, Glotz's inference about the general pattern
36See W. J. Woodhouse, Solon the Liberator: A Study of
the Agrarian Problem in Attika in the Seventh Century (New 
York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1965), p. 23. See also Glotz,
Ancient Greece at Work, part II, chapter 2, Victor Ehrenberg, 
From Solon to Socrates: Greek History and Civilization Dur­
ing the Sixth and Fifth Centuries B.C. (London: Methuen and
Co., Ltd., 1968), chapter 3, Forrest, The Emergence of Greek 
Democracy, chapter 6, Kathleen Freeman, The Work and Life of 
Solon (London: Oxford University Press, 1926) , part I.
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of events is certain. The time in which Solon appeared was 
a time which demanded a decision; would Athens be another 
Sparta, with the productive element in society a permanently 
servile caste, or would Athens be different?3  ̂ Solon decided 
for his country, against helotry, for freedom.
The history of Athens begins with Solon's accession to 
the archonship. After that, the need for supposition van­
ishes. We know that Solon abolished Hektemorage for all 
time, and that this was executed with such thoroughness that 
archaeology has never retrieved so much as one of the hated 
Horoi. It is possible that they were punished by burial at 
sea, just as a stone which falls upon a man and kills him 
would be punished under the primitive law of homicide. We 
know that Solon cancelled all debts that were outstanding 
when he took the archonship, thus sundering the usurious web 
through which the aristocrats held the people in fear and 
hunger. We know that Solon's law broke with custom and for-
3^Glotz, Ancient Greece at Work, p. 84. See also 
Woodhouse, Solon the Liberator, pp. 56-57 and 160-161. Al­
though in a general sense the association of hektemorage 
with helotry is legitimate, it should be qualified. While 
Sparta is one of the permanent scandals of Europe because of 
its inhuman institutions, it is also Europe's first consti­
tutional state. Thus, no Spartan would agree with this 
association because in Laconia, the inferior caste was (be­
lieved to be) non-Dorian, and thus, non-Greek. No such dis­
tinction existed in Attica. The Spartiates were themselves 
Equals, and had become such through the constitutional pro­
gram of a ruler whom they called Lycurgus. The Lycurgan re­
form in the seventh century paralleled the Solonic reform of 
the sixth century in that both attenuated the voraciousness 
of a ruling aristocracy. But, characteristically, the 
Spartan reform resulted from a military innovation, the ad­
vent of Hoplite infantry, while the Athenian reform was in 
equal proportions pragmatic and moral. See Forrest, Emer­
gence of Greek Democracy, pp. 138. ff.
292
bade the making of loans secured upon the person. Unlike
many other of the reforms, this was copied throughout 
38Greece. We know also that Solon's liberation went beyond 
the range of economic freedom, for his popular court of ap­
peals is the earliest of the famous Athenian participatory 
political bodies. Solon's performance as archon is one of 
the great miracles of history, for Solon understood what 
Greeks all the way to the Hellenistic period often failed to 
understand, i.e., that there must be unity within plurality 
for life to continue. The guiding term of Solonic unity is 
divine justice, and its consequence for Athens was freedom. 
Several centuries later we hear the familiar boast of 
Pericles, "In this land of ours there have always been the 
same people living from generation to generation up till 
now, and they, by their courage and their virtues, have 
handed it on to us, a free c o u n t r y . T h e  claim that 
Athens is a free country was made good at a definite place 
and time. The setting was one in which civil war impended 
as* a certainty. The early skirmishes had already been 
fought.
No one tells the story of Solon's career in Athens 
better than Solon himself. Thus, we have frequent recourse 
to the fragments. Here Solon tells of the negativity of 
existence in the polis for which he has become archon.
88Westerman, Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiq­
uity, pp. 4-5.
88Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, II, 4, tr. Rex Warner 
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954).
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Lo, even now there cometh upon the whole city a plague 
which none may escape. The people have come quickly 
into degrading bondage; bondage rouseth from their 
sleep war and civil strife; and war destroyeth many in 
the beauty of their youth. As if she were the prey of 
foreign foes, our beloved city is rapidly wasted and 
consumed in those secret conspiracies which are the 
delight of dishonest men.
These are the evils which stalk at home. Mean­
while the poor and needy in great numbers are loaded 
with shameful bonds and sold into slavery in foreign 
lands . . . Thus public calamity cometh to the house
of every individual, and a man is no longer safe within
the gates of his own court, which refuse him their pro­
tection. It leapeth over the garden-wall, however high 
it be, and surely findeth him out, though he run and 
hide himself in the inmost corner of his chamber.4®
The negativity of existence to which Solon bears witness 
here is a more complex matter than the slavery of Israel in 
Egypt. Israel is simply a subject people— an inferior caste 
— in a foreign land. Complexity enters the Israelite liber­
ation drama only through the struggle of the transcendent 
God, Yahweh, against the god-king, the Pharaoh. The Athenian 
situation which Solon laments is the classic malady of the 
polis. The country has become bi-polar, the rich oppressing 
the poor, the poor resentful of the rich. Solon consis­
tently blames the unhappy condition on the rich, and so dis­
sociates himself from the aristocratic ethos of his own 
origin, for it is aristocratic greed which has led the 
country to the brink of civil war. In Solon's description 
of Athens, it seems as if the type of man whom Hesiod had
40Pragment XII, 17-29, in Ivan M. Linforth, Solon the 
Athenian (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1919).
Unfortunately there is no consistent international notation 
for the fragments of Solon. This study follows the notation 
of the Linforth text and translation.
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recognized in his brother Perses had finally become ascendant 
in all affairs, making injustice the norm for all life. The 
aristocrats had practised a systematic form of theft, and 
now the poor were prepared to repay theft with murder.
The negative circumstances which Solon describes are at 
once a function of inequitable economic organization and 
human callousness. This set of conditions is not unfamiliar 
to the twentieth century. In parts of the world the peasant 
lives from one generation to the next, in the shadow of the 
money lender. Work as he will, he never gets out of debt, 
and his life is not really his own. The lesson which 
Herodotus drew so starkly is not hopelessly overdrawn; Greece 
was not Asia, and the institution of debt slavery came to be 
viewed in Athens as a perversion of right order. Slavery 
and starvation-level serfdom in Athens then were not the 
simple matter that slavery for Israel had been in Egypt, for 
in Athens enslavement of the people came as the last step in 
a series of movements that were considered to be intrinsi­
cally u n j u s t . S o l o n  was the veritable mind of Athens, and
41If Homer is the spokesman for the most basic layer of 
Greek imagination, then there was something decidedly un- 
Greek afoot in both Hesiod's Boetia and in pre-Solonic 
Athens. Odysseus, a chieftain, exerts a rule which is hardly 
constitutional, nor can his subjects be called free in an 
exact sense. Yet his rule is wholly paternalistic, and the 
swineherd Eumaios is bound to the master by a bond of true 
love. Odysseus would never wilfully despoil a subject for 
any act short of disloyalty. Thus, while dike in Homer 
would not apply to a relationship so banal as that between 
lord and tenant, there is an unspoken understanding that the 
great man will deal fairly with inferiors, and further, that 
he will protect and sustain them in time of trouble.
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to him the free condition of man— even if that condition 
were as yet unarticulated— is the normal condition of man, 
and any design which served to undo it is seen as malady, as 
"public calamity." Solon's symbol of an ill which leaps 
over the wall of one's courtyard and finds even the one who 
hides from it likens the moral condition of Athens to the 
physical condition of a city which is beset by the plague. 
This symbol is particularly telling, for only the rich cred­
itor will have a high courtyard wall; the plague of injus­
tice for which the oppressor is responsible will consume him 
as surely as it will the oppressed. The movement as Solon
describes it is from greed to servitude to public ruin.
This is the pattern of negativity in Athens.
In Athens as in Israel, the movement from slavery to 
freedom has its beginning in the articulation of the nega­
tivity of present existence. The present condition— the 
slave condition— is a fallen estate, a domain of misery 
which has been wrought by injustice. The opposite condition 
then will be a condition of positivity, of happiness, of
freedom, and it will be the accomplishment of a righteous
disposition. Liberation from slavery, according to the prin 
ciple of right, is thus the beginning of Athens as a free 
moral order in history, just as was the case in Israel. In 
Athens the human bearer of this right is Solon, who was 
called to the leadership in an effort to avoid civil war. 
Solon is for Athens the same character as Moses for Israel. 
He is liberator, law giver, savior, and ancestor.
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The comprehensive name for Solon's program is
Seisachtheia, the shaking-off-of-burdens. Below is Solon's
description of the several achievements of this program.
I removed the stones of her bondage which had been 
planted everywhere, and she who was slave before is now 
free. I brought back to their own divinely founded 
home many Athenians who justly or unjustly had been 
sold into slavery in foreign lands, and I brought back 
those whom destitution had driven into exile, and who, 
through wandering long abroad, no longer spoke the 
Attic tongue; and I restored to liberty those who had 
been degraded to slavery here in their own land and 
trembled at their masters' whims. These things I ac­
complished through arbitrary action, bringing force to 
the support of the dictates of justice, and I followed 
through to the end the course which I promised. On the 
other hand, I drafted laws, which show equal consider­
ation for the upper and lower classes, and provide a 
fair administration of justice for every individual.42
Before the full significance of this statement can be clear, 
it is necessary to pause and consider the avenues of histor­
ical inquiry which have led us to this statement.
42IX, 5-20. Two phrases here require explanation.
(1) " . . .  she who was slave before is now free" refers to 
the land. The antecedent of "she" is Ge melaina, Black 
Earth. Since Attic law forbade that land leave the family, 
the aristocrats had "enslaved" the land of the demos through 
the legal ruse of Hektemorage. Thus they had its perpetual 
use without legal title to it. This liberation of the land 
is no less important than the liberation of the people be­
cause— as we have urged elsewhere— economic freedom is the 
primary, concrete freedom that the archaic witness identi­
fies. (2) In the passage, " . . .  many Athenians who justly 
or unjustly had been sold into slavery . . .", the meaning 
is legal, not moral. That is, some had been sold according 
to the provisions of the old customary law, or perhaps ac­
cording to the code of Dracon. Others had been sold ille­
gally, possibly through kidnap or piracy. The distinction 
between legal or illegal passage into slavery is somewhat 
ambiguous, since the laws— until the time of Dracon in the 
generation before Solon— had been unwritten, and the magis­
trates were always aristocrats. Thus Solon's reform of the 
system of justice was intended to replace the aristocratic 
monopoly with a system which involved both classes in the 
administration of moderate written laws.
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We began our historical search for symbols on the sug­
gestion of the Fourth Evangelist that the abidance of the 
free son in the house complements the meaning of participa­
tory continuance in the unifying logos. Thus, in chronolog­
ical progression we have moved forward from the Yahwist's 
narrative of Abram and Exodus which incorporates materials 
from the second millenium. In the Abram narrative the dis­
tinction between the two sons showed that the son of the 
free mother is nearer to the positive range than is the son 
of the slave; in the Exodus narrative, we recognized a bur­
geoning spirit of divine righteousness in creative and lib- 
erative opposition to pharaonic oppression. In the eighth 
century, with the writing prophets and with Hesiod, we have 
seen that the human apprehension of divine righteousness is 
given explicit articulation in the Hebrew term tsedaqah and 
the Greek term dik§. In both, the righteousness of God has 
a liberative character through its opposition to all manner 
of human exploitation. Now, in the early sixth century with 
Solon's description of the Disburdenment, we behold at last 
the fire which has been making the smoke. In this passage 
is the earliest articulation of the connection of freedom 
with justice, and it confirms the thesis which we have ad­
vanced. Freedom is derivative from justice. 11. . . 1  re­
stored to liberty those who had been degraded to slav­
ery . . . bringing force to the support of the dictates of 
ju s t i c e . " 4 ** indeed, when one draws near to the pulse of
43In the Greek text the association of freedom with
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this issue as it throbs in the symbols of antiquity, it is 
almost too much to say that freedom is "derivative," for 
that construction assigns some independent importance to 
freedom. It is more true to say that in the primal litera­
ture of freedom, freedom is a modality of justice, never be­
coming fully separate from its parent force. That is why we 
wait so many centuries to hear the connection spoken aloud. 
When at last we do hear it, it is a practical administrator, 
not a poet or prophet, who makes explicit the implications 
of the justice which binds the community in peace as one, by 
freeing each to make a decent living and to enjoy the esteem 
which is the property of the free man. The beginning of 
Athenian history with Solon is also the beginning of freedom 
as an explicit concern of political order.
The Solonic liberation is the Greek parallel to the 
much earlier liberation of the Hebrews from the grasp of the 
Pharaoh. The former event, the Exodus, is like the acorn, 
the latter like the oak. The Exodus narrative bears com­
pactly the imprint for justice and its consequence, freedom, 
while the Solonic reform displays visibly the inner inten­
tion of the earlier movement. While it is necessary to rec­
ognize the parallelism of occurrences at the beginning of 
both Athens and Israel, it is likewise necessary to point up 
the broad differences in the formative experiences of both
justice is verbally closer than in our translation, with 
"freedom" in line fifteen and "justice" in line sixteen.
societies. Both are societies arrested in a condition of 
negativity; both are blemished because of slavery. For 
both, the liberation— the negation of negativity— is the 
beginning of a historical movement toward moral and politi­
cal completion. The crucial difference concerns the nature 
of the impetus toward liberation and the manner of its com­
pletion. Voegelin has identified the generic difference be­
tween revelation and philosophy. At base, this means that 
for Israel, liberation, redemption, salvation obtains as the 
transcendent God reveals himself and becomes a powerful 
presence in the life of man. The historical stature of 
Moses derives from the fact of his being a vessel for the 
command of Yahweh. It is this underlying condition of the 
life of Israel which, as we have explained, tends to eclipse 
the mediatory aspect of man's humanity; for Israel, God is 
the mediator for man. This is seen best in the pastoral 
vision of Micah; Yahweh will lead Israel as a shepherd leads 
the flock. In Athens there was no such understanding, and 
thus the humanity of men could and did develop. Although 
Hesiod, in the invocation to the Theogony, claims inspira­
tion by the Muses, and so exhibits a formal resemblance to 
Moses in Midian, the development of man as a mediatory self 
is apparent in the Works and Days. In the fragments of 
Solon, it is the dominant theme which shows through the text 
repeatedly. Solon is neither oracle nor bard; he is a phi­
losopher— a loving friend of wisdom.44 And that is to say
44Plato calls Solon philosopher in Phaedrus, 278c.
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that Solon is man looking at once within and beyond himself 
in order to discover a sure orient for political action by 
which he may mediate the human misery which confronts him.
This is not humanism. Humanism is the heterodox mode of 
Greek intellection, and its termihus is sophism, the denial 
of the possibility of real transcendence. Solon indeed is 
one of the fathers of the orthodox position. That God has 
not addressed Solon directly does not mean that the divine 
will is irrelevant to Solon. Quite the contrary. It means 
that in the absence of revelation, Solon is left with phi­
losophy— with love of the wisdom which in its most elevated 
nature is divine. The discovery of wisdom, and with it, the 
correct measure, is the hard business of philosophy, and the 
strenuous discipline which this requires brings to maturity 
the human soul and accents the divine element within it.
One brief fragment quoted by Clement of Alexandria reveals 
Solon's own struggle to learn of the divine plan for the 
world. "Difficult indeed is it to conceive the inscrutable 
measure of his wisdom, within which alone abideth the power 
to bring all things to fulfillment."^ This difficult task 
is philosophy itself.
Moses, the prophet, conveys the word of Yahweh to the 
Pharaoh, but Yahweh himself, through signs and wonders, 
works the liberation of Israel. Solon assays the situation
Cf. Plutarch, Solon, II, 2.
4 5XXXI.
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from the vantage point of a human whose loyalty is to Zeus, 
and he determines that present existence is unjust. Upon 
this conclusion he deliberates the proper course which will 
rectify the civic misery which he beholds. Deliberation is 
followed by legislation, a course of action put forth in 
speech as public policy. The content of the legislation is 
basic in its rectificatory thrust. Debts are abolished; 
those who were enslaved are freed; exiles are recovered.
The beginning of free political life in Athens is a good 
deal less dramatic than the foundation of the Israelite the- 
opolity through divine liberation. Thus, there are commen­
tators who admonish us that Solon was a "practical man," not 
a philosopher or idealist, even that he was a party politic­
ian.4  ̂ These are spurious distinctions, for praxis is that 
activity in history which builds unto permanence, and in so 
building, couples the reality of being to the mortal exis­
tence of necessity and survival. Philosophy is the tutor of 
this enduring practicality. The Solonic liberation estab­
lishes the polis as a moral entity whose permanent business 
is to guarantee social peace under conditions of justice 
with freedom. There is no "milk and honey" in or about 
Solonic Athens, but there is legislation forbidding the ex­
port of cereals so that the hungry may have bread. The 
proverb, "philosophy bakes no bread" has no support in the 
biography of Solon, for in his reform the ideal— "the inscru-
4®Woodhouse, Solon the Liberator, pp. 167-168. Forrest, 
Emergence of Greek Democracy, pp. 160-161.
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table measure of his wisdom”— is understood to address such 
unphilosophic matters as hunger and exile. The Mosaic and 
Solonic episodes show that revelation and philosophy share 
a common interest in these concrete consequences of injus­
tice.
It is clear in the fragments of Solon that the freedom 
of the people, though an indispensable condition of life in 
the well-ordered society, is not the primary goal of public 
life. Freedom emerges as more a means to the ends of peace, 
justice, and order. Solon is the statesman who oversees a 
variegated community. ^  In such a community the harmonious 
balance of forces requires that freedom be present so that 
the several forces might contribute their due. But the ends 
for which freedom serves as the means are likewise the limit­
ing conditions of freedom. For freedom to have positive im­
port in the affairs of life, it cannot be random; it must 
have scope.
Aristotle quotes Solon;
"To the common people I have given such a measure 
of privilege as sufficeth them, neither robbing them of 
the rights they had, nor holding out the hope of greater 
ones; and I have taken equal thought for those who were 
possessed of power and who were looked up to because of 
their wealth, careful that they, too, should suffer no 
indignity. I have taken a stand which enables me to 
hold a stout shield over both groups, and I have allowed 
neither to triumph unjustly over the other."
In another passage he explains what he believes to 
be the right way of dealing with the people;
"The populace will follow its leaders best if it
^See Solon's description of the variety of endeavors and rewards, XL, 43-62.
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is neither left too free nor subjected to too much 
restraint. For excess giveth birth to arrogance, when 
great prosperity attendeth upon men whose minds lack sober judgment."48
In these dicta, Solon at least begins to approach the 
schematic elegance of the Fourth Evangelist's structure of 
freedom. If freedom in Solonic Athens does not culminate in 
conscious participation of all in Peace, Justice, Order (who 
in Hesiod are divine personages), and in the measure which 
is resident within this trinity, political life is nonethe­
less conducted with their presence in view.^® In the time 
of Solon these divine powers are present in the heart of 
Solon, and Solon is present in Athens as the legislator 
By the time of Aeschylus, they have become distributed in 
society and the political community is ennobled as a result 
of the extension of the Solonic virtues. The content of 
Solon's soul is the beginning of Athens as it was to be for 
European history. In Athens at the time of Solon freedom is 
predominantly negative— freedom from bondage; freedom from 
abuse. Only in Solon himself has freedom become positive, 
opening the self to conscious participation in the correct 
measure.
^®VI and VII. Constitution of Athens, XII.
49Solon's commitment to justice and order (eunomia) is 
stated in his great political elegy (Linforth, XII, 14 and 
33). In adding peace (eir§ne) to this list apropos of Solon, 
we follow Solmsen (Hesiod and Aeschylus, p. 123). Solmsen's 
inference is sound, for Solon's whole project is undertaken 
so as to avoid civil war— hence to secure peace.
50See XII, 30. Solon's exhortation from the heart 
recalls Hesiod's exhortation to the heart.
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From the work of Solon in Athens the conclusion follows 
that in any society which is not in that condition of divi­
sive misery which spoils public and private life at oncef 
the divine virtues of peace, justice, and order are at work, 
guiding human freedom. Their presence is hidden from the 
"hard nosed realist" who is a frequent commentator on polit­
ical affairs. He sees only the rough and hard form in which 
the power behind public policy is bartered and dispensed, 
perceiving not the restraining excellences which prevent the 
self-destruction of the community. The frequent opacity of 
the redeeming virtues makes Solon doubly valuable to polit­
ical science, for in his character and work, the otherwise 
indiscernible presences which save the community are preem­
inently visible.
At the time of Solon, Athens is not yet the free and ' 
excellent polity which is celebrated in the classical state­
ment of Pericles. Solon is in microcosm the Athens which is 
to be; he is truly a seminal figure. Just as the excellen­
ces of peace, justice, and order are present in the soul of 
Solon, so also is the positive freedom which was to become 
the characteristic trait of the great Athenian age. As we 
have argued before, the content of the truth which is the 
guiding ethos of Greek life is already fully drawn in the 
prophetic utterances of Hesiod. Later development occurs in 
terms of the increasing sophistication of the form in which 
the truth is presented. In Hesiod, the truth about the life 
of the person and the community is rendered in a poetic— a
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pre-intellectual— manner. By the time of Solon it has taken 
the vestments of philosophy, and that is to say that the 
truth has become a concern of the working intellect. The 
freedom of Solon is an Anselmian affair. Solon believes in 
the righteousness of Zeus so that he might have sure ground­
ing for his intellectual scrutiny of the ways of mortals.
The Solonic breakthrough in the realm of the intellect 
is the discovery of causality in the course of human affairs. 
This discovery of Solon makes him the founder of the science 
of politics. The insight is given in the following state­
ments :
The ruin of our state will never come by the doom 
of Zeus or through the will of the blessed and immortal 
gods; for Pallas Athena, valiant daughter of a valiant 
sire, is our stout-hearted guardian, and she holdeth 
over us her protective arms. It is the townsfolk them­
selves and their false-hearted leaders who would fain 
destroy our great city through wantonness and love of 
money. But they are destined to suffer sorely for their 
outrageous behavior. They know not how to hold in check 
their full-fed lust, or, content with the merriment the 
banquet affords, to take their pleasure soberly and in 
order.
These things my heart prompteth me to teach the 
Athenians, and to make them understand that lawlessness 
worketh more harm to the state than any other cause.
But a law-abiding spirit createth order and harmony, and 
at the same time putteth chains upon evil-doers.
If ye have suffered the melancholy consequences of 
your own incompetence, do not attribute this evil for­
tune to the gods. Ye have yourselves raised these men 
to power over you, and have reduced yourselves by this 
course to a wretched state of servitude.51
XII, 1-8, 30-33. XIV, 1-4. These passages are from 
the later period of Solon's life, after he had left the 
archonship and the tyranny of Peisistratus had come to power 
with popular support. Solon's gloomy reaction to the sus­
pension of constitutional government is understandable, but
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Solon's advance over Hesiod occurs in two respects. First 
is his move to correct injustice by coupling a reform of the 
constitutional structure of the community with the Hesiodian 
type of appeal to the heart. Second is the maturation in 
understanding of the consequences of injustice. As we have 
observed, Hesiod announces the destructive consequences of 
unrighteous conduct for the whole city, but he maintains the 
archaic conception of divine agency as the efficient cause 
of the destruction. The Zeus of Solon however is acquitted 
of even the most meagre responsibility for political evil. 
For Solon the reward for injustice has become immanent; in­
justice upsets the fragile balance amongst men, and so con­
tains within itself the poison which will soon afflict its 
practitioners.
Jaeger's comments on the parallel between Solon's ob­
servations and the development of Ionian physics do much to 
explain the importance of the innovation. Jaeger notes the 
understanding of Thales and Anaximander that there is lawful 
process in the natural universe.
Solon, like them, was impelled to demonstrate the exis­
tence of an immanent order in the course of nature and 
human life, and with it an inherent meaning and an 
essential norm in reality. He is clearly presupposing 
a law connecting cause and effect in nature, and ex­
pressly setting forth as a parallel to it the rule of 
law in the social order, when he says elsewhere "From 
the clouds come snow and hail, thunder follows the 
lightning, and by powerful men the city is brought low,
his worst fears did not materialize. Pesistratus is usually 
included amongst the great statesmen of Athens, a man not un­
like some of the better dictators in the developing world today.
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and the demos in its ignorance comes into the power ofa despot."52
Jaeger goes on to speculate that Solon coupled his 
understanding of causal law, derived from physics, with his­
torical observation, and through this process, became able to 
stay the otherwise inevitable doom. This assumption is en­
tirely reasonable, since Attica was a backward country, and 
in the preceding century the cycle of exploitation of the 
poor, civil war, popular tyranny, violent and lawless rule 
had run its course in several Greek poleis in Europe and 
Asia. Thus, Solon's understanding of the causal process and 
his move to foil its progress is relevant to our concern 
with freedom. For Solon, the political science of causes 
issues into a policy science of remedies. If rampant ava­
rice in the polis is seen to cause injustice, and injustice 
to cause civil war, then legislative remedies must be forth­
coming which will curb avarice and its effects. If there is 
a political law that selfishness leads to destruction, then 
by implication there is a counter law that adherence to un­
selfish constitutional principle will cause peace and happi­
ness. Solon discovered both causal processes, and he chose 
to follow the creative, life-enhancing pattern, and to reject 
the other.
This course of thought points us to Solon the statesman 
as the new paradigm for the free man. We saw that Hesiod 
exhibited the higher intermediacy of which human freedom is
52Jaeger, Paideia, I, 140.
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capable in his address from a superior heart to those of 
baser heart. In this, Hesiod exhibited freedom to forego 
injustice in favor of divinely countenanced conduct; this 
may be called spiritual freedom. In keeping with the gen­
eral shift in mode which occurs between Hesiod and Solon, we 
may identify the higher intermediacy as it manifests itself 
in Solon as intellectual freedom. The world of Hesiod is a 
picture world in which principle is embedded in concrete 
representative types, both immortal and mortal. The world 
of Solon is one which is well on the way toward breaking 
with mythic representation; it is becoming a discursive 
world in which thought assumes its prosaic form. The world 
of Aeschylus will show yet a further formal development, as 
the old picture teaching is taken up and manipulated by con­
sciousness so as to render both meaning and lesson. In each 
of these formal developments, the freedom of man's higher 
intermediacy occurs in a novel form. In Solon it is freedom 
of thought.
For freedom to become political, it must be an intel­
lectual freedom, for without employment of the deliberative 
resources of the mind, it would be impossible to reckon the 
course of action for political society. The intellectual 
freedom which Solon displays is at once a negative and a 
positive freedom. It is negative in that it indicates a 
detachment of the intellect and a disengagement of the ego 
from the routine circumstances which are the milieu for self. 
It is positive in that it requires action which participates
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in a higher order of reality than the former routine. The 
record of Solon's career illumines the concrete meaning of 
these concepts. Solon was widely considered by his contem­
poraries to be a fool because he was free from the tyrant's 
ambition. He was free from that ambition because he embraced 
the ambition of the true statesman. Solon's self-extrication 
from the damning sequence of historical causes is a capital 
event in the history of political order, for it is the first 
event of this type. Solon is able to become political savior 
for the country by freeing himself from the selfish and ulti­
mately destructive ambition that was pervasive in his class. 
To be sure, Solon's intellectual freedom does not consist in 
the discovery of an Archimedean point? he is in the world—  
he is even "of" the world— but the world to which he has had 
recourse is the real world wherein lies the power to correct 
and reverse the mindless course of sensual reality when it 
is left to the mercy of material inclination. The real 
world is the free world wherein justice is the cord which 
binds all together in harmony. Solon's original breakthrough 
then is his ability to negate his routine circumstances 
through an effort of mind. This same mind which could negate 
the fallen world of present existence could likewise posit 
the new world of the future. The attachment to the future 
explains Solon's effort to constitutionalize the reform.
Aristotle tells us that Solon was chosen as archon by 
both parties after he had written an elegy "in which he does 
battle on behalf of each party against the other and acts as
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mediator, and after this exhorts them jointly to stop the
53quarrel that prevailed between them." Solon's contempo­
raries— themselves partisans— recognized in Solon a quality 
which they found absent in themselves, a power to bring 
peace, justice, order. It is this positive power to make 
the world of experience better by deliberate imposition of 
divine form upon recalcitrant matter that we have identified 
as Solon's intellectual freedom. Solon's deliberation is 
followed by a constitutional revision, and that action estab­
lishes the political character of Solon's positive freedom.
In Solon the apperception of divine order inspires a 
concrete political program which serves to elevate the qual­
ity of life in the polis. In this aspect of Solon's charac­
ter and work, there is a positive gain over the human inter­
mediacy as it appears in Hesiod. When freedom has become 
mental and political in the practical sense, the form of 
humanity itself has become enlarged. When this development 
has occurred, mankind has become reasonable. In Hesiod there 
is freely chosen righteousness without noetic reason, for 
arbitration is the work of the heart. As we have seen, the 
arbitration of the heart does not disappear in Solon; rather, 
it is supplemented by a mental capacity which apprehends the 
correct measure, and makes that divine measure a political 
standard. In developmental terms this accretion represents 
a great gain over the Hesiodian form of righteousness, for 
when the correct measure has ceased to be a concern which is
^Constitution of Athens, V.
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resident only in the sphere of feeling, it has become a more 
stable and more generally available fixture than before.
With the appearance of mental freedom, the correct measure 
can be political; it can be public property, a boon for all, 
including those many who by themselves could never have par­
taken of the true measure without the guidance of political 
leadership. This implication of the political freedom of 
Solon becomes manifest in the drama of Aeschylus. As the 
content of Hesiod has become canonical for Solon, Solon has 
imposed upon that content the form of the working mind, of 
reason.
The Solonic synthesis of the heart's affective longing 
for righteousness with the mind which deliberates the con­
stitutional measures necessary to attain right order results 
in the appearance of a new type of man, the statesman.
Solon is the proto-typical statesman, and in his conduct we 
behold the fruition of a freedom which in Hesiod was sug­
gested but not settled. This is positive freedom, expressed 
as positive resistance to evil. Hesiod, as we have seen, 
feared that the unrighteous setting for his life might cor­
rupt him and his son, requiring that they choose unrighteous­
ness in order to survive. In Solon there is no such doubt 
to dilute an otherwise steadfast commitment to righteousness. 
There seem to be two reasons for this. One is that Solon, 
unlike Hesiod, has become a creature of reason as well as 
devotion; as a self, he is thus better equipped to do battle 
with the forces of unrighteousness. The other, more powerful
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reason is that unlike Hesiod, Solon has come to head the 
polity; as a person in the world his position is one of mas­
tery. Hesiod is at the mercy of those who give judgments; 
in the instance of Solon, the tables have been turned. The 
reversal of roles which distinguishes the position of Solon 
from that of Hesiod is important, for it conditions the pos­
sibilities for injustice which inhere in each role. Injus­
tice for Hesiod would have meant becoming as his brother 
Perses, a petty swindler; for Solon injustice would involve 
becoming a tyrant, a usurper on a grand scale, who employs a 
public trust in the service of his own fortune. The freedom 
to resist injustice is always primarily the power to resist 
the injustice which emanates from self. Power does not al­
ways corrupt; Plutarch wrote:
When he turned his back on the tyranny, many people rid­
iculed him in language whose tone he has preserved in 
the following lines, which he puts into the mouth of one 
of his critics:
"Solon is not gifted with wisdom and sagacity. God 
put good things into his hands, but he failed to grasp 
them. He cast his net and caught his fish, but, in his 
wonder and delight, he did not draw it in: both his 
courage and his wit were unequal to the occasion. If I 
could seize the power, acquire vast wealth, and be lord 
of Athens for but a single day, I would give my body to 
be flayed for a wineskin and consent to the annihilation 
of my race."54
This speech is the utterance of composite mankind in its 
fallen state of negative, random freedom. It is the secret 
confession of the many who, without power to forego unrigh­
teousness, seek after positions of public trust. The appear-
54XXII, Plutarch, Solon, XIV, 5. See also Linforth, 
VIII and XI.
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ance of a Solon is unsettling to this sort of political crea­
ture; in his consciousness the presence of the Solonic 
statesman signals a world-reversal, a great absurdity.
In the fourth century we hear the echo of the speech 
which Solon has attributed to his detractors. This is the 
speech of Callicles, another aspiring politico.
Callicles: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest
or joking?
Chaerephon: In my opinion, Callicles, he is in deadly
earnest, but there is nothing like asking him.
Callicles: By heaven, that is just what I am anxious
to do. Tell me, Socrates, are we to consider you ser­
ious now or jesting? For if you are serious and what 
you say is true, then surely the life of us mortals 
must be turned upside down and apparently we are every­
where doing the opposite of what we s h o u l d . 55
The political leader who exhibits the free righteousness of 
heart and mind appears as a jester, or as a turner upside 
down of life, to those who are without this positive free­
dom. The latter appearance is the more accurate, for this 
Solonic freedom to do right does involve world reversal; the 
opponents of Solon are participants in a negative and fallen
a * 1— -
world of theft and murder, while Solon and his issue are 
participants in a world that has been politically restored.
As Plato has shown with the portrait of Callicles, there is 
little possibility for communication between the free and 
the unfree. The latter can be driven to silence because 
their position is philosophically untenable, but they cannot 
be persuaded. Their self-centered rapaciousness exceeds 
their concern for the permanent and universal realities of
^ Gorgias, 481b, tr. W. D. Woodhead.
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life. Although he builds upon the Solonic base, Plato goes 
beyond the received Greek rubric. The problems which Plato 
ventilates in the Callicles encounter lead him to construct 
a saviour polis which is permeated with the fourth moment of 
freedom, i.e., with wholly achieved righteousness. This 
Platonic "freedom" is not a recognizably human freedom be­
cause it has, like the freedom of the prophets, eclipsed the 
dynamic suspension of man as the intermediate character.
But the Platonic course is not the course of Solon.
Solon is at once a lover of God and man. His great 
prayer begins with a plea, not for wisdom, or even for righ­
teousness, but for prosperity gotten righteously.5® There 
is nothing in Solon of the later, paradoxical understanding 
of freedom which we have seen in the Stoic corruption of 
classical thought. Solon is the consummately practical 
philosopher; his vision is no less concrete than heavenly.
He gives advice as to the interests and pursuits which are 
proper to man at the several stages of life. The common­
place joys and concerns of life are for him, like Hesiod, 
matters of importance. Solon believed that "holy Justice" 
is near to the world, observing, rewarding, punishing through 
the means of the causal arrangement that is immanent in 
nature and in history.
For Solon, the human search for possession, power and 
worth is a legitimate quest, and he showed by his example 
that when the human enterprise has debauched itself through
56x l , 1-13.
theft, abuse, vanity, that the good leader of men can set
life again on the proper path. With Solon as with Hesiod,
the exhortation to man to seek the correct measure as a
guide to conduct is an attempt to ennoble human freedom, and
thus to make it a positive freedom which looks beyond the
self. Solon admonishes the rich,
Calm the eager tumult of your hearts. You have forced 
your way forward to a surfeit of good things. Confine 
your swelling thoughts within reasonable bounds. For 
we shall not comply with your present disposition, and 
you yourselves will not find it meet for your own in­
terests. 57
This suggests a society in which all will be free. The many 
will be free because authority will check the immoderate 
ambition of the rich, and the rich will themselves remain 
free because authority— through curbing them— protects their 
own permanent interests.
In such a society, political authority must balance the 
competing forces. The job of the balancer is done more com­
pletely if the balance of the parties can rest upon a more 
basic internal balance within the personal and trans-personal 
constituents of the society. Thus, "calm your hearts," 
"moderate your thoughts" mean "Learn; order your lives and 
vocations as I have ordered the polis." In relation to the 
issue of freedom, this Solonic advice suggests contrary 
visions of the nature of the free society. Will the free 
society be a contractual convenience in which freedom happens 
as a sort of muted anarchy, as in the old liberal view; or
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will it be a diversified community in which different inter­
ests are pursued in organic subordination to a permanent 
commitment to right conduct and social justice? The latter 
alternative is the solution of Solon. We must remember that 
for Solon, justice is substantive and freedom is derivative. 
For this reason, Solon is more than a broker who balances 
the freedom of one interest agairlst that of a competing 
interest. Solon's work shows us that balancing of this sort 
is basic to the statesman's craft, but it is only basic.
The historical fact is that Athens did not erupt again in 
wholesale butchery until the Thirty— pupils not of Solon but 
of the sophists— took power with Spartan assistance. In the 
intervening two centuries, internal peace, justice, and ex­
tensive personal and political freedom were generally ascen­
dant. The reason for this is hardly that Solon balanced the 
competing forces so masterfully that they stayed balanced 
until military disaster struck; indeed, the Solonic balance 
was undone during Solon's lifetime. Instead, the Solonic 
balance was no more than a protective shield which permitted 
the new spirit of constitutional justice to take hold in the 
hearts and minds of the Athenians.
In the lifetime of Solon, the new spirit of justice 
with freedom was but a fledgling force in the total mix of 
Athenian events. The new order was at first dependent upon 
the person of its author, in much the same way that the 
United States Constitution was dependent upon the person of 
Washington for popular legitimacy. The proof of the success
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of Solon's attempt to constitutionalize the Hesiodian vision 
is not then to be found in the time of Solon. The testator 
of this success is god-like Aeschylus, of all Athenians most 
perfect, who related to his forebears in much the same way 
that Deutero Isaiah related to his predecessors. In his 
drama we witness the completion of the search for freedom 
with justice and the vision of its permanence. For a study 
which seeks to understand the origins of freedom in Mediter­
ranean antiquity, Aeschylus is the end of the beginning.
VI. AESCHYLUS: A CONCLUSION
There is a twofold tie between Solon and Aeschylus.
Not only does the content of the Aeschylean drama incorpo­
rate and enlarge the symbolic heritage of Hesiod and Solon, 
but that same drama is in a sense a memorial to the person 
of Solon. Along with the great mythical personages, the 
historical Solon is a prototype of the tragic hero.1 Solon 
was called to power because he composed and acted out mini­
dramas which addressed the public evil; when in power he 
strove mightily to lead the polis to the high plane of con­
stitutional order; he died an ostensible failure during the 
Peisistratid suspension of the constitution. Solon thus 
provides both form and content for the tragic.figures, espe­
cially for such a figure as King Pelasgus of the Suppliants. 
In the record left by Solon, we behold a freedom which is 
preponderantly negative, the freedom of liberation from 
bondage. Aeschylus is witness to.the ultimate success of 
this liberative program, for in the extant plays he shows us 
twice a whole community which is freely given in the spirit 
of positive justice. It was the understanding of Aeschylus 
that the example of Solon had become generalized throughout 
the citizen body.
■̂ See Gerald F. Else, The Origin and Early Form of Greek 
Tragedy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 67
68. Else speculates that Thespis, the first tragedian and 




The position of Aeschylus in Greece is equivalent to 
that of Deutero Isaiah in Israel as regards the emergent 
reality of freedom from justice. The uses of '‘free" in 
Aeschylus generally parallel in meaning the uses of "redeem" 
in Deutero Isaiah. Thus, with Aeschylus freedom is made 
permanent as the implication of divine justice. For both 
writers this understanding obtains as the result of a 
greater inquiry into the historical process and its known 
consequence of suffering, despair, and death. Despite the 
very significant differences between Israelite and Greek 
symbolism, there is a remarkable similarity between the un­
derstanding of history of Deutero Isaiah and that of 
2Aeschylus. For both, received history has been the arena 
of death due to the unwillingness (Deutero Isaiah) or in­
ability (Aeschylus) of mankind to turn away from injustice,
The major difference in symbolism lies in the diver­
gent symbolizations of history itself. We have not consid­
ered this issue in the text, for a discussion there would 
tend to detract from the parallelism which the study demon­
strates between Israel and Greece regarding the emergence of 
human freedom from the apperception of divine justice.
Among others, Hadas has commented on the most telling lin­
guistic difference between Hebrew and Greek. Hebrew has but 
two tenses, past and future, and thus, the whole structure 
of the Israelite imagination is inevitably historical. Greek 
has a complicated grammar with many tenses, but the aorist 
is the most salient expression of the Greek imagination.
The aorist translates into English as simple past, and in 
daily communication it had that meaning. In literature how­
ever it conveys a sense of timeless present. The greater 
meaning of the sentence, "Xerxes' outrage destroyed him," 
is that Xerxes' outrage is always destroying him. Consider 
the contrast with "Abram believed Yahweh." While it is cer­
tain that J was able to recognize Abram as a universal type, 
the believer, his primary meaning here is that Abram was the 
ancestor who at a point in history entered into the covenant. 
Hadas writes, "The Greeks seem almost to have lacked a sense
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division, bondage and murder to that justice which brings 
reunion and life. For both, there is conviction that human
of history; everything, whenever it happened, is conceived 
of as present." (Hellenistic Culture, p. 55.) This unhis- 
torical mentality has not troubled us with Hesiod (whose 
Theogony does show a decided sense of history of an almost 
Israelite sort) or with Solon. But with Aeschylus it does 
present a problem of interpretation. Xerxes was a vivid 
memory to every adult Athenian, but only eight years after 
his defeat, Aeschylus cast him as a timeless figure, no dif­
ferent in any respect from the characters he took from leg­
end. In the Prometheia we can conclude with most commenta­
tors that Zeus was bad then; he is good now? he will be good 
in the future; of dike we can conclude that it meant retri­
bution and now it means justice. These conclusions are 
right, but there is more to the matter, for Aeschylus never 
makes things that simple.
Aeschylus seems to imply that the new was present all 
along in the old, and that the old still lingers and threat­
ens beneath the new. For example, in Eumenides (927 ff.) we 
are told that the name and even the disposition of the 
Furies has been changed, but Aeschylus makes it abundantly 
clear that distribution of rewards— often in the form of 
punishment— will continue to be proper to the nature of the 
Eumenides. Are they much different from the Odysseus about 
whom Auerbach observes that he returned home after twenty 
eventful years "exactly the same as he was when he left"? 
Aristotle's metaphysics, with its identification of formal 
cause and final cause is probably the clearest expression of 
this way of thinking, and the Zeus of Aeschylus sometimes 
seems like the God of Aristotle, i.e., not as an active 
will, but as grand superintendent of a fixed process. This 
same phenomenon makes political interpretation difficult; 
hence the views of accomplished scholars conflict starkly. 
Does Aeschylus take a position on specific historical events 
such as the reform of the Areopagus, or does the Areopagus 
appear only to represent some universal reality in a time­
less present? The commentator must decide according to his 
own informed judgment, and regrettably, his own prejudices. 
We believe that a comprehensive study of this problem by one 
who is qualified to do it would show that Aeschylus believed 
in the possibility of real change which makes the past a 
definite past, but that the confines of received mental cul­
ture made it impossible for him to express this meaning un­
equivocally. We suspect further that these conflicting ten­
dencies can be traced back to the influences of Hesiod and 
Homer respectively. See Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Rep­
resentation of Reality in Western Literature, tr. Willard 
Trask (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1957), pp. 14-
20.
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devices alone will not alter the course of the existential 
project. Thus, in both, we observe the liberative interven­
tion of divinity in the historical course of division and 
strife, and in both there is the promise of a future which 
will be better than the past.
It is appropriate for this study to end its search for 
the origins of freedom with Aeschylus, for that author con­
firms, more fully than any other, the thesis which was advo­
cated in the beginning. We advanced the idea that history, 
unmediated, is the fallen domain of human existence; it is 
the domain of polarity, strife and bondage. We argued that 
freedom is concomitant with the penetration into that realm
i
of the divine-human unity which lies before history or be­
yond history."* The political name of this unity is justice, 
and those who are participants in justice are free. This 
understanding is the core of the Aeschylean teaching. For 
Aeschylus, as for Deutero Isaiah, history has become trans­
parent unto liberation.
Our discussion of the Aeschylean treatment of history 
is divided into two ranges of analysis, the immediate and 
the mediate. This is to say, the seven remaining plays of 
Aeschylus address both the immediate historical circum-
^In the extant plays, Aeschylus does not use the cate­
gory "before history" which is implicit in Hesiod's Golden 
Age or in Plato's Age of Cronos. Rather, Aeschylus' ground 
of the divine justice which liberates is Zeus who begins as 
a partisan, historical character, but who through suffering 
and learning rises beyond historical strife. This mature 
Zeus is transcendent divinity which holds the power to stop 
the curse, to recreate and restore.
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stances of the century to which the generation of Aeschylus 
is the direct heir as well as the mediate, symbolic history 
of the legends. In the tragedies, these two types of his­
tory are necessarily juxtaposed, the immediate upon the medi­
ate, but we find it helpful to distinguish between these 
factual and symbolic, immediate and mediate levels of his­
torical concern.
1. Tyranny
Justice is productive unto the overcoming of division 
and cruelty in history. For Hesiod and Solon, the concrete 
terms of this division were the strife between aristocracy 
and commons within the polis. As we have seen, Solon legis­
lated justly and so liberated the people from the economic 
outrage of unjust masters. By the time that Aeschylus 
wrote, the terms of historical division had changed. The 
unjust division against which Aeschylus inveighs is the po­
litical polarity between tyrant and polis. In three plays 
we observe Aeschylus1 understanding of the pattern of tyr­
anny. These are the Prometheus Bound, the Persians, and the 
Libation Bearers. It is necessary to caution that Aeschylean 
symbolism is extremely dense at times, and that we look to 
these symbols only as they enlighten us as to Aeschylus' 
understanding of the immediate historical problem, tyranny.**
4Podlecki comments that the Peisistratid tyranny ended 
when Aeschylus was a youth, and thus that Aeschylus' per­
sonal experience embraced the transition from tyranny to 
constitutional democracy. (Podlecki refers to the demise of 
Hippias, the evil son of Peisistratus, who had been a good
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For the purposes indicated here, the Prometheus Bound 
is considered as an allegory which describes how a tyranny 
is formed and what happens after a tyrant comes to power.
It is based on the Hesiodian story of the conflict between 
Zeus and Prometheus. Early in the play, Zeus is identified 
as tyrant.5 This is a serious charge. Tyrannis is an Asian 
word which appears in Greek in the mid-seventh century, re­
ferring at first to Gyges, the Lydian courtier who murdered 
the king and then took as his own both kingdom and queen.
By the time of Aeschylus the term is decidedly pejorative; 
its use connotes an accusation that the ruler has come to
gpower by violent and outrageous means. Zeus had taken 
power by subjugating his father, relegating him to Tartarus 
where he could no longer threaten. Prometheus had sided 
with Zeus in the struggle for power, but when Zeus gained 
power he had Prometheus chained to a rock in a distant place 
because, "This is a sickness rooted and inherent in the 
nature of a tyranny: that he who holds it does not trust
ruler.) Podlecki observes also that the Prometheus Bound is 
the first document which brings together in one text the sev­
eral complaints about tyranny that were current in other 
fifth century sources. He further notes that many of the 
characteristics of tyranny which were treated systematically 
in Aristotle's Politics V are traits which were first col­
lated in Prometheus Bound. See Anthony J. Podlecki, The 
Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy (Ann Arbor: Uni­
versity of Michigan Press, 1968), pp. 118-122.
5220-230.
gSee Forrest, Emergence of Greek Democracy, pp. 78-83.
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7his friends." In this play Prometheus is a sympathetic 
character, and when he claims that he is made to suffer un­
justly (ekdika), we can believe that this is the position of 
Aeschylus regarding all who are subject to tyrants.8 The 
link of injustice to unfreedom, and conversely, of justice 
to freedom, first made explicit in Solon, is a prominent 
feature of Aeschylean thought. Prometheus is in bondage be­
cause of the tyrant's sentence, and the chorus hopes that 
he may be freed.9 Still, the bondage of Prometheus is not 
slavery; that distinction is reserved for those who serve 
the tyrant obediently and in whom the tyrant places trust. 
Prometheus identifies his own lot as misfortune, but Hermes, 
faithful messenger of Zeus, is a slave (latris) I n  sum­
mary then, the Prometheus Bound illustrates that in a tyr­
anny, the ruler comes to power by irregular means, that he 
rules unjustly, and that in consequence of his injustice, 
all who inhabit the domain are in one way or another unfree.
In another play, the Persians, Aeschylus examines the 
character of the tyrant and the consequences of his. rule. 
Technically, Xerxes is not a tyrant; he is the legitimate 
king of Persia who acceded to the throne upon his father's
^224-225, tr. David Grene. All Aeschylus quotations 
are from David Grene and Richmond Lattimore, eds., The Com­






natural death. But except for this, his barbarian vanity
shows the nature of his rule to be tyrannical. Xerxes, a
man, is worshipped as a god, a practise as repellent to the
Greeks as to the Israelites.11 The subjects of Xerxes are
no different from draft animals; they can be harnessed and
driven at the will of the king. Xerxes' most prominent
trait is his arrogance which leads to outrage, his total
12lack of forbearance. This outrageous mien of Xerxes ex­
tends beyond the range of mortal affairs into crime against
nature. He sought "To check the sacred waters of the
1 3Hellespont by chains, just as if it were a slave." This 
wholly immoderate disposition of person which inspired the 
construction of the pontoon bridge is also the same force 
which will lead eventually to the tyrant's downfall.14 
Darius credits his son's defeat to the will of the gods, but 
it is plain that this analysis borrows upon the Solonic un­
derstanding of causality. One who is governed by outrage 
strains his resources and abilities, and in time the project 
born of such a strain is destined to collapse. The gods here 
are guarantors of the causal order. Finally the Persians 
documents what no Athenian needed to be told: Xerxes' out­
rageous ambition resulted in death for many thousands of his 
countrymen and allies. From this play then we intuit a
1;LSee 150-160.
12808.
12745-746, tr. Seth G. Benardete.
14739-752.
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tacit recognition of the identity of slavery with death and 
of freedom with life.
The third drama which addresses the immediate histori­
cal issue of the tyrant is the Libation Bearers. In this 
play Aeschylus examines one pragmatic solution to the prob­
lem posed by the tyrant. The tyrant here is the violent 
usurper Aegisthus. The chorus, even the tyrant's niece, 
proclaim themselves to be slave (doulos) because of the tyr­
a n n y .  There is much talk of right throughout this play, 
including prayers to Zeus pleading that right be done. The 
conviction of all is that blood for blood is r i g h t . A t  
last the hero Orestes appears and slays the tyrant along with 
his mother, the tyrant's murderous female consort. After 
the tyrannicide the following exchange occurs:
Orestes:
To all men of Argos in the time to come I say
they shall be witness, how these evil things were done.
I go, an outcast wanderer from this land, and leave
behind, in life, in death, the name of what I did.
Chorus:
No, what you did was well done. Do not therefore bind
your mouth to foul speech. Keep no evil on your lips.
You liberated all the Argive city when
you lopped the heads of these two snakes with one clean 
stroke.
As far as this chorus can see, the end of the tyrant is the 
end of the trouble. This is a purely negative liberation
1577 and 135.
16355 passim.
171040-1047, tr. Richmond Lattimore.
however, a matter which the short sighted chorus cannot com­
prehend. The negativity of Orestes' act is complete, and it 
will not open onto a repositioning of life because it in­
volved the commission of a particularly offensive kind of 
murder, a matricide. Even as the chorus absolves Orestes of 
guilt the Furies descend upon the matricide to meet out hor­
rible retribution. The chorus cannot see the Furies, and it 
imagines that Orestes is simply over-wrought with anxiety 
about the recent events, but again, imperfect vision is the 
source of their misunderstanding. Their psychological expla­
nation is wrong. To Orestes, and to Aeschylus his mover, 
the Furies are the entirely real consequence of Orestes' act,
and their presence belies the notion that true right or jus-
18tice can obtain from an exchange of blood for blood. The 
chorus' claim that Orestes' killing of the tyrants is right 
springs from a conventional and partisan understanding of 
right. But for Aeschylus, the discoverer of the whole righ­
teousness of God, the view of the chorus is inadequate and 
ultimately false.
With the appearance of the Furies, our analysis must 
quit the domain of immediate history with its pragmatic mea­
sures aimed at mollification of the human predicament. Their 
arrival at the moment of triumph over the tyrant displays 
the Aeschylean conviction that the true solutions do not lie
■^Our understanding that Orestes is really guilty, even 
though he acts in obedience to Apollo, finds support in 
Jaeger, Paidiea, I, 257-258. Jaeger views Orestes as the 
point of collision between two opposed efforts to uphold
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within the pragmatic range of thought and deed. The Furies, 
along with the Persuasion which will ultimately tame them, 
are resident in the mediate history whose elucidation is the 
guiding aim of Aeschylean tragedy.
2. The Liberative Suspension of Fate 
The symbols of mediate history with which Aeschylus 
deals are the various fate stories which appear in Homer and 
in the lesser collections. We observed earlier that the 
Iliad presents a picture of humanity that is lost in history. 
Polarity and strife have eclipsed the light of human unity 
and of the virtues which proceed from that sacred and per­
fect condition of life. Death, not life, is the inexorable 
pattern of the Iliad. This same Greek pessimism is venti­
lated in two legends which appear in the Odyssey; it is not 
too much to say that they symbolize the orthodox Greek view 
of man in history, an orthodoxy against which Hesiod is the 
first rebel. These are the stories of the accursed houses 
of Laius and Atreus. Even more than the story of the Trojan 
war, these are historical legends because their courses em­
brace more than one generation. Aeschylus dealt with these 
cycles respectively in the trilogy of which the Seven 
Against Thebes is the survivor and in the Oresteian trilogy. 
We recall in Hesiod the apocalypse of the two cities, the 
one just and happy, the other unjust and doomed. A similar
divine justice. With his absolution these opposed under- 
standings are reconciled.
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but diachronous contrast obtains when we set the Seven 
against the Oresteia. The Seven is a story of history which 
is unmediated by the spirit of divine Justice, while the 
Oresteia is a story about divine liberation from the help­
lessness of historical division and destruction.
The Seven Against Thebes is the last play in a trilogy
dealing with the Oedipus cycle. The play itself contains
only a part of the whole story, i.e., the assault of the
seven champions from Argos, the defeat of the invaders, the
death of Eteocles and Polyneices, and the refusal of Antigone
19to obey the law of the city.
To appreciate the full meaning of Aeschylus' handling 
of this material, it is necessary that we consider what has 
happened before the beginning of the extant drama. Laius, 
king of Thebes, laments his childlessness and consults the 
Delphic oracle about the matter. He is told that any child 
born to him through his wife, Jocaste, would be his murderer. 
Despite the oracle's warning, Laius begat a child. Upon the 
birth of Oedipus, Laius exposed the child, hoping to avert 
fulfilment of the prophecy. Oedipus was rescued however, 
and was adopted by the royal couple of Corinth. When he had 
grown up, the oracle told him that he was fated to murder his 
father and marry his mother. In the hope of avoiding this, 
Oedipus quit Corinth forever and journeyed toward Thebes.
On the way, he met King Laius, argued with him, and killed
•^This final encounter which introduces Antigone and 
Ismene is a later interpolation into the text.
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him. On reaching Thebes, he rid the city of the Sphinx, and 
for this he was made king. He married the widowed queen, 
Jocaste, who bore him Eteocles, Polyneices, Ismene, and 
Antigone. While he was king, famine struck the land. Delphi 
revealed that the famine would end only if the murderer of 
Laius were exiled. Oedipus, who did not know that the man 
he had killed was Laius, placed a curse upon the unknown 
homicide, and decreed his exile. Also, the two sons of 
Oedipus behaved toward their father with extreme insolence, 
so he placed a curse on them. In time, Tiresias revealed 
the whole truth about Oedipus. Upon this Jocaste committed 
suicide and Oedipus blinded himself and went into exile.
Thus the two accursed sons became heir to the kingship.
They agreed to rule the land in alternate years, with 
Eteocles to rule for the first year, while Polyneices re­
sided in Argos. At the end of the year, Eteocles repudiated
the agreement, and thus Polyneices marched on Thebes in
20alliance with the seven Argive champions.
2®This agreement between Eteocles and Polyneices to 
share the kingship is basic to this study's treatment of the 
Seven. We must observe however that since the two earlier 
plays in the trilogy are lost, our understanding that 
Aeschylus subscribed to this tradition is speculative. Our 
assumption is warranted by the fact that the agreement be­
tween the brothers is part of the dominant tradition of the 
Oedipus story. (See Robert Graves, The Greek Myths, II, 15- 
16.) There is a lesser tradition that Polyneices agreed to 
give up his claim to the kingship, and later reneged and 
made war in an attempt to become king. Gilbert Murray be­
lieved that Aeschylus subscribed to the dominant tradition 
because in the Seven Aeschylus permits Polyneices to claim 
dike, while Eteocles makes no such explicit claim. See 
Gilbert Murray, Aeschylus; The Creator of Tragedy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 132.
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The pattern thus is one of historical division and sub­
sequent strife and injustice. The division of male against 
female opens onto the generational division of son against 
father in the case of Oedipus and Laius, and of father 
against son in the case of Oedipus and his heirs. The curse 
upon the royal house of Thebes reverberates down through the 
history of that land, eventually endangering the country 
itself in the fratricidal war of Eteocles and Polyneices.
The curse is emblematic of the unfreedom of the members of 
the royal household, and both the king and the citizen body 
fear that the consequences of the curse will involve slavery 
for the country.21 This treatment of the legend is mediate 
history. That is to say, it is poetically heightened common 
sense, expressing the meaning that whenever the political 
leadership is itself unable to act freely due to human limi­
tation so hardened as to constitute a curse, then the common 
future becomes fraught with injustice and bondage. It may 
be true that the country is spared the fate of slavery to 
Argive conquerors because Eteocles bows heroically to the
dictate of the curse and so saves the city by engaging in
22combat with his brother so that both are killed. This
2169-129.
22This is the view of Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, "Seven 
Against Thebes: The Tragedy of War," Aeschylus; A Collec­
tion of Critical Essays, ed. Marsh H. McCall, Jr. (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 57-59. Kitto re­
jected this interpretation of the play, arguing that the 
significance of Eteocles is exhausted in "Man's relation to 
God, fate, the Universe." (See H. D. F. Kitto, Greek Trag­
edy: A Literary Study, 3rd ed. [New York: Barnes and
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exercise in soteriology however tells more about the con­
fines of the Laius legend in which the death or exile of the 
king saves Thebes than about the true understanding of 
Aeschylus, for the discussion which precedes the death of 
Eteocles suggests a saving alternative course which Eteocles 
refuses to explore.
But what then is the cause of the trouble in king and 
city? To conclude that it is the curse is not the ultimate 
solution of Aeschylus. Tragedy was a device for public edu­
cation, and Aeschylus attempted to teach his fellow citizens 
what it means to be accursed. The curse in the drama of 
Aeschylus is like sin in Deutero Isaiah; it is the refusal 
to be free. It is persistence in the partial, one-sided, 
self-centered apperception of reality which causes the self 
to field a project that proceeds without regard to the uni­
versal measure whose power it is to bring harmony to all 
things. In the Seven this becomes clear when we examine the 
brothers' respective positions relative to complete justice, 
and the attitude of Eteocles to the curse.
Much of the play is devoted to description of the dec­
orations on the shields of the seven champions. Most are 
decorated with fearsome monsters, and their purpose is to 
arouse terror in the enemy. The seventh champion, Polyneices
Noble, Inc., 1961], pp. 45, 49-50.) It seems that if 
Aeschylus had intended the death of Eteocles to be under­
stood as a saving sacrifice for the city, the chorus would 
say something to that effect in its lament. It does not.
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himself, bears a shield which is wholly different from the 
others.
He bears a new-made, rounded shield 
and a twofold device contrived thereon; 
a woman leading modestly a man 
conducts him, pictured as a warrior, 
wrought all in gold. She claims she is Justice, 
and the inscription reads: I will bring him home
and he shall have his city and shall walk 
in his ancestral house.23
After hearing this Eteocles responds that the cause of 
Polyneices is bereft of justice, implying thus that his own 
position is completely just. We know, as did the Athenian 
audience, that neither aspirant to the throne has a legiti­
mate claim to a monopoly of justice, for each is given in 
some way to injustice. The cause of Polyneices is just be­
cause he is an heir to the kingship and has agreed with his 
joint heir, Eteocles, to share that position. But his cause 
is unjust because it is clear that if he defeats Eteocles, 
his government will be overshadowed— probably dominated— by 
his Argive ally, King Adrastus. In this event the country 
will be reduced to bondage. Contrariwise the cause of 
Eteocles is patently unjust because he has broken his agree­
ment with his brother, and in his disregard for this con­
tract, he displays something of the tyrant. But since he 
protects the city from the almost barbaric designs of the 
invaders with whom Polyneices is in league, Eteocles is a 
participant in justice. The full situation shows then that 
each brother has a partial claim to justice, but that the
23642-648, tr. David Grene.
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cause of each is darkened by the refusal to reckon with its 
own companion injustice. Were the two brothers to think and 
act in true respect for justice, even at this late stage a 
reconciliation might be possible. This does not happen.
When he learns of Polyneices1 assault on the seventh 
gate, Eteocles changes from king to hero. He accepts— nay—  
he invites the curse to run its course. The dialogue of 
Eteocles with the chorus in lines 672-719 is the thematic 
heart of this drama, for they ventilate the opposition of 
the old, fated, unfree view of history with the newer, moral 
view for which divinity has become a positive force in the 
rectification of conflict and in the erasure of accursed 
fate. The chorus urges Eteocles to avoid direct combat with 
Polyneices, explaining to him that his resolve to do so is 
the result of a terrible passion. To Eteocles however, that 
fratricidal— suicidal— passion is itself the product of the 
gods' demand that the curse be fulfilled. The following 
exchange capsulizes the impasse between the two positions: 
Chorus:
Bitter-biting indeed
is the passion that urges you
to accomplish manslaying,
bitter in fruit, where the blood to be shed is unlawful. 
Eteocles:
Yes, for the hateful black
curse of my father loved
sits on my dry and tearless eyes
and tells me first of gain and then of death.
Chorus:
Resist its urging: coward
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you shall not be called 
if you rule your life well.
Forth from your house the black-robed Fury
shall go, when from your hands
the Gods shall receive a sacrifice.
Eteocles:
We are already past the care of Gods.
For them our death is the admirable offering.
Why then delay, fawning upon our doom?24
The hero's great moment is the moment of doom, and for this 
the whole vocabulary of which freedom is a part is incompre­
hensible to him. If freedom is affiliated with life and 
bondage with death, then the sort of character whom this 
obdurate Eteocles personifies is more a bondman than free­
man.
There is a mystery about the Seven Against Thebes. At 
first it seems that this drama is poorly organized, that its 
contrary thematic positions are unresolved. In this dis­
order however lies the play's true virtue. We must under­
stand that its author did not know himself as an exponent of 
"Greek culture," that instead he recognized himself as the 
teacher of Athens. If Athens were to persist in the Solonic 
way of justice and freedom, then the old, heroic mentality 
must be tempered with the newer truth of divine Justice which
is able to relieve mortal existence in history of its ac-
2 5cursed character. It is for this reason that Aeschylus 
24693-704.
25Solmsen understands these contrary strains to be an 
expression of Aeschylus' belief that the developed city of 
the fifth century was able to withstand the curse, but the 
family was still prone to hereditary evil. (See Hesiod and
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exposes the hero Eteocles as one who is victim to a passion 
which makes it impossible for him to rule his life well.
The refusal of Eteocles to remove himself from the power of 
the curse is, for Aeschylus, the substance of the curse it­
self. The author bows to tradition in making the salvation 
of the country coincidental with the hero's resignation to 
the curse, but that which has gone before must have left the 
careful observer with the impression that the country might 
have stood in no need of salvation had its two kings chosen 
to act differently.
The paradigm of mediate history then which emerges from 
the Seven is accursed history, wherein each succeeding gen­
eration is helpless to forsake the foibles of its predeces­
sor. The ignorance and malaise which are proper to this 
mediate pattern are the underlying cause of the immediate 
political evil, in Aeschylus' time the outrage of the tyrant. 
Nine years after the Seven, with the production of the 
Oresteia, Aeschylus dramatized a new paradigm for mediate 
history which broke entirely from the solution of salvation
Aeschylus, pp. 218-219). This is so because urban life per­
mits a higher degree of individuation than does the life of 
the extended family in the countryside. If the children of 
Atreus can be distinguished in thought as beings separate 
from Atreus himself, why then should one whom Atreus has 
wronged put a curse on innocent children? Hadas also be­
lieves that Aeschylus attempts to teach individual responsi­
bility, and he cites a prophetic parallel. Jeremiah 32.29 
says, "In those days they shall say no more, the fathers 
have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on 
edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity: every
man that eateth the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on 
edge." See Hadas, Hellenistic Culture, p. 132.
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through heroic doom. The Oresteia approaches as nearly as 
could a gentile symbolism the tidings of Deutero Isaiah, 
"Comfort, comfort my people, says your God." In the 
Oresteia, Aeschylus banishes accursed history to an irre­
trievable past, and teaches his audience to look to the 
future and to life. The symbolism of this trilogy amounts 
to the spiritual charter for a free people.
As we have recognized, the immediate problem of the 
tyrant is the central issue of the Libation Bearers. That 
drama is the middle work in the Oresteian trilogy. It is 
preceded by the Agamemnon and it is followed by the 
Eumenides. With regard to the mediate history to which 
Aeschylus is narrator, the tyranny of Aegisthus and 
Clytemnestra and the descent of the Furies upon Orestes are 
all the consequences of a curse similar to the curse upon 
the house of Laius. The accursed' ancestor in this cycle is 
Atreus, and the curse upon his house is complete, bathing 
each member so deeply in an historically rooted guilt as to 
deny any claim to right or to free conduct. The tradition 
is that the ancient Mycenaean king Pelops had two sons,
Atreus and Thyestes. The brothers quarreled over the throne, 
and Atreus succeeded in expelling Thyestes. Later, Thyestes 
returned to the court of Atreus with his children, all of 
them suppliants. Atreus pretended to forgive Thyestes and 
prepared a feast in his honor. The main dish at this feast 
was made from the flesh of Thyestes1 children. When Thyestes 
discovered what he had been eating he cursed the house of
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Atreus and fled with his surviving son, Aegisthus. Atreus 
had two sons, Agamemnon, who married Clytemnestra, and 
Menelaus, who married Helen. Clytemnestra bore Iphigenia, 
Electra, and Orestes. Upon the violation of Helen, Agamem­
non sought to make war against Troy, but the winds were such 
that the fleet could not sail. To remedy this, Agamemnon 
sacrificed Iphigenia to Artemis and then set sail for the 
protracted war with Troy.
The Agamemnon begins shortly before the return of 
Agamemnon from Troy. The main event in the play is the mur­
der of Agamemnon by his wife, Clytemnestra, with the collab­
oration of Agamemnon's hereditary enemy, Aegisthus. Cly­
temnestra 's excuse for slaying her husband is that he had 
sacrificed their daughter.26 We can believe that this—  
along with hatred, lust, and ambition— was her motive, the 
"efficient cause" of the king's murder, but the larger sig­
nificance of the event is not lost on Aegisthus.
Now I can say once more that the high gods look down 
on mortal crimes to vindicate the right at last, 
now that I see this man— sweet sight— before me here 
sprawled in the tangling nets of fury,* to atone 
the calculated evil of his father's h a n d . 2 ?
The death of Agamemnon has fulfilled the will of those ex­
alted gods whose function it is to enforce curses, the
261521-1529.
271578-1582, tr. Richmond Lattimore. *"nets of fury"
= peplois Erinyon; the translation misleads here. Aeschylus 
is identifying which of the high gods he means. A direct 
translation is, "nets of the Furies."
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Furies.28 When, after Orestes of the next generation has 
slain this couple of murderous tyrants, no mortals remain in 
the household who might act as efficient instruments of the 
curse in striking Orestes, himself the grandson of Atreus.
The Furies must descend and deal with the accursed directly.
With the Eumenides, the final play of the trilogy, the 
action is at a point parallel to that of the Seven Against 
Thebes. It is the time of the third generation, and by the 
received laws of mediate history, Orestes should be made to 
bear the consequences of the curse. In this drama Aeschylus 
has shifted the setting to Athens so that he may abolish the 
curse upon the house of Atreus through founding the consti­
tutional machinery of Athens. This is to say then that with 
the same effort the author of the Eumenides resolves both 
the immediate historical problem of the tyrant and the medi­
ate historical evil of helplessness before the curse. The 
mediate evil is ended through divine intervention in his­
tory; the curse is cancelled. It is not cancelled simply by 
heavenly fiat, but by a practical, constitutional assembly, 
guided by divine right, which has both will and authority to
2®Both individual volition and the fated pattern of 
curse figure integrally in the murderous cycle of the 
Oresteia, and it is impossible to say which of the two is 
preponderant. Each has its own standing. One commentator 
explains this by citing a New Testament parallel. The be­
trayal of Jesus by Judas, as well as the denial by Peter are 
both foretold, and both are essential to the pattern of 
events. Yet the gospels hold Judas and Peter fully respon­
sible for their conduct. Likewise Aeschylus holds the chil­
dren of Pelops responsible. See N. G. L. Hammond, "Personal 
Freedom and Its Limitations in the Oresteia,1 in McCall, 
Aeschylus, pp. 92-94.
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mediate the human experience of evil in history. This con­
stitutional court is created by divine decree. The meaning 
of Aeschylus thus is that true government is divine; it 
raises human history above the gradient of strife, curse and 
doom, and guides it to justice and to life.
In the Eumenides there are three matters which require 
closer observation. These are the presence of Athena, the 
transformation of the Furies, and the charge to the Athenian 
council.
Athena is the commanding deity in the Eumenides, but 
she is not the only one. Actually there are two genuses of 
deity in the play, and we believe that we are able to dis­
cern within one of these a further division as to species.
The deities in the Eumenides are the Furies, Apollo, and 
Athena. The Furies belong to the old— one should say, the 
oldest— generation of deity. They are not even Titans, gods 
proper. They are the daughters of Night who is herself 
sprung direct from the primal Chaos.29 That is to say they 
are among the most elemental forces of nature, representa­
tives of natural law in its most primitive dress. We shall 
have occasion shortly to observe how Gilbert Murray applied 
the Anaximander fragment to the events of the Eumenides.
The Furies, goddesses of retribution, are the personification 
of the basic natural reality with which the fragment deals.
We should imagine the food chain of the wild in which the 
hare takes the life of the grass, the young wolf the life of
29Theogony, 120 ff.
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the hare, and the opossum and vulture await the end of the 
old wolf who lies in the grass, rattling with pneumonia.
The Furies are attendant upon each transaction in this pro­
cess. Each pays retribution in time for his own prior vora­
ciousness, and in this there is the obvious justice of reap­
ing where one has sown. When this nutritive pattern of bal­
ance becomes the governing law in human affairs, then each 
act of justice carries with itself, in dialectical fashion, 
its antithesis, opening the way for new vengeance. This is 
because of its partial character; justice for one amounts to 
injustice to another, and injustice cries out for retribu­
tion. The Furies personify the cosmic force which propels 
all life— humanity included— to this pattern of predation.
Next come the Olympians, Apollo and Athena. Both speak 
for Z e u s . 30 Both are figurations of Zeus. Apollo resembles 
the young Zeus, the Zeus of old, the intractable tyrant 
about whom Aeschylus informs us in the Prometheus Bound.
Athena represents the maturity of the Father. She is the 
truly divine Zeus who had learned and restored in the Unbind­
ing of Prometheus.
This tri-level schema of divinity in the Eumenides is 
coupled with a dual meaning of the term dike. In the ear­
lier portions of this study, our attention was to the Hesiod- 
ian concept of dikS, whose meaning corresponds generally to 
the prophetic tsedaqah. This meaning is present in
30614 f. and 735 f.
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Aeschylus; indeed, it is ascendant. But dike, in various 
forms, is also one of the commonest terms of the Oresteia.
In the mouth of most speakers, it has a conventional, non- 
Hesiodian-Platonic meaning. It means not the whole righ­
teousness which rectifies and cures the human evil, but the 
simple and unpromising rectification of blood for blood.
The justice of the predator fallen to the scavenger is the 
commonplace justice, both for Apollo, who orders the tyran­
nicide and matricide, and for the Furies, .who attempt to 
punish it. One suspects that it is also the notion of 
justice to which many of Aeschylus' fellow Athenians sub­
scribed. Opposed to this is the righteousness of divine 
Zeus whose daughter Athena brings the murder cycle to its 
end and persuades the Furies to accept the new, divine un­
derstanding of dike. ̂
31 . .Kitto has carefully documented the complicity of
Zeus in each fateful act of Agamemnon which leads the king 
at last to his death in retribution for the killing of 
Iphigenia and also for the horrible bloodshed at Troy.
(Greek Tragedy, III, 1.) No different from Zeus's complic­
ity in Agamemnon's retribution for the violation of Helen 
is Apollo's guidance of Orestes in his retribution for the 
murder of his father. That the act will bring down the 
Furies upon his client seems to be of less concern to Apollo 
than his interest in vengeance. Both young Zeus who takes 
retribution against wicked Cronos and Apollo who orders ret­
ribution against tyrant Aegisthus are in accord with the 
Furies' understanding of dike. In function, they are furies 
in these pursuits. Solmsen also has recognized the close 
connection of Zeus, Apollo, and the Furies in the Oresteia. 
He reports: "In some passages the Erinyes are actually
thought of as included in the dispensation of Zeus."
(Hesiod and Aeschylus, pp. 186-187.)
32we may model these relationships as follows:
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For a discussion which is concerned with Aeschylus' 
teaching about the mediate, symbolic history of Greece, the 
transformation of the Furies which occurs in the Eumenides 
is so momentous that if this play had been lost, we would 
know almost nothing about the hope which prompted Aeschylus 
to instruct his countrymen. The Furies' job is to wreak
Generation: Deity: Dike:
pre-Olympian Furies retributive justice
Olympian Zeus-Apollo retributive justice
Olympian Zeus-Athena civic righteousness
We believe that in this play Athena represents the 
higher, Hesiodian-Solonic understanding of dike. Yet the 
vocabulary which Aeschylus gives to Athena is strangely bare 
of dike. Athena asks rhetorically if anyone who fears noth­
ing can be righteous (699); since she is advising that citi­
zens be fearful, this seems to be a fear which will produce 
political justice. Elsewhere, in her exhortation to the 
Furies (881 f.) adherence to Persuasion is coupled to con­
siderations about dike. In this passage, dike does seem to 
mean positive righteousness which overcomes particular in­
terests. But on the other hand, the higher conception of 
dike is not at work in Athena's reasons for her stand in 
favor of Orestes (734 f.). She accepts completely Apollo's 
utterly partisan, anti-feminist defense of Orestes. After 
this, however, Apollo seems to slip out through the back 
door; whatever he has stood for in this play is not even 
worth a polite farewell.
Kitto comments on line 461 of the Libation Bearers: 
"'Ares (Violence) will confront Ares; Dike will confront 
Dike.' But if Dike conflicts with Dike (as presently Olym­
pians conflict with Erinyes), the universe is chaotic, and 
Dike cannot yet be 'Justice.'" (Greek Tragedy, p. 82).
This conflict of opposing views of right is what Athena ends 
in the Eumenides, and thus, the whole justice which restores 
life is present more by example than by word in her pains­
taking effort to halt the curse, to calm and transform the 
Furies, to reconcile them with Olympians and the Athenian 
mortals who entertain a vision of justice which supersedes 
mindless retribution. This is manifestly the case if we 
decide to see in the encounter an attempt to persuade the
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punishment upon evildoers, especially those who are guilty 
of blood crime. They are the enforcers of curses. In this 
play they are intent on visiting the curse upon Orestes be­
cause he is heir of Atreus and because he has slain his 
mother. In the Eumenides, Athena presides over the court 
which tries Orestes. He is prosecuted by the Furies and 
defended by Apollo. The jury is made up of Athenian mortals 
and they divide evenly on the question of whether Orestes 
should be punished. Athena, here representing Zeus, breaks 
the tie in favor of Orestes.
It seems most important that nowhere in the drama is 
Orestes actually acquitted of the matricide, as a known 
killer who pleads self-defense might be acquitted by a jury. 
Rather, it is decided that Orestes will not be punished.
The outcome is more like a full pardon than an acquittal.33 
The court, with Athena's supervision, simply agrees to stop 
the curse; it will go no farther. Athena announces: "The
man before us has escaped the charge of blood." Literally: 
"The man has escaped blood justice (aimatos diken)."34
old families of Athens to accept the new, democratic order 
without recourse to violence.
33jflurray also understood the verdict on Orestes to be 
a pardon sent from Zeus. He related this to the greater 
problem of theodicy posed in the Prometheus Bound. That 
play, in which Zeus is tyrant, suggested the theology of the 
evil god which became so prominent in the gnostic movements 
of later antiquity. But unlike the gnostics, Aeschylus did 
not propose escape from the world as it is experienced. 
Rather, the God, Zeus himself, learned through suffering, 
and in so learning, became Savior to the world. See Gilbert 
Murray, Aeschylus: The Creator of Tragedy, chapter III.
34752.
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This language does not mean that he is acquitted of crime.
It means instead that Orestes will not be made to pay the 
penalty for murder. In keeping with the spirit of the play, 
the jury's function here is more political than narrowly 
judicial. The court decides, as might an American governor 
in similar circumstances, that the greater cause of justice 
will not be served by enforcing the law. Thus, the guilty 
is pardoned; his guilt is ignored, not repudiated. Aeschylus 
underlines the seriousness of Orestes' act by having an even 
half of the members of the court vote for conviction. Coin­
cidental with the pardon of Orestes is Athena's successful 
persuasion of the terrible Furies. They will no longer be 
Furies, but Good Spirits, Eumenides, to the Athenian polis.
In these events, Aeschylus teaches his Athenian audi­
ence a double lesson about mediate history. Orestes, as 
mortal, represents guilty Atreus, and the Furies represent 
the whole pre-Olympian pantheon of shame and cruelty whose 
doings Hesiod witnessed. Both Atrean mankind and hostile 
deity are put into an impotent past. Aeschylus has decreed 
a radical division in the mediate history of Greece which 
affects both men and gods. With Athena's establishment of 
the machinery of constitutional justice, the process of his­
tory has changed. No longer are curse and blind fate to 
dominate the destiny of man. Guilt is cancelled and can no 
longer dictate the future. The understanding of Aeschylus 
in these matters is equivalent to commensurate teachings of 
Deutero Isaiah and of Paul. For Paul, the law convicts and
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leads to death, but the new, good tidings open the future
to life and freedom. Thus Murray writes, "Not Aigisthos,
not Clytemnestra, not Orestes; but the Law, however we
phrase it, by whatever instrument it works, is the true and
inevitable slayer." And what is the Law? Murray found its
adequate expression in the Anaximander fragment: "All
things pay atonement to one another for their injustice ac-
3 5cording to the rule of time." This use of the Anaximander 
fragment is most perspicacious, for it, better than any 
other statement, encompasses the whole range of thought, 
word, and deed against which Aeschylus and his predecessors 
asserted the creative and restorative nature of Zeus. Upon 
the Aeschylean pardon of Orestes and the transformation of 
the Furies, it is possible to say of Athens as well as Jeru­
salem "that her warfare is ended, that her iniquity is par­
doned," that she has received "double for all her sins."36
35Murray, Aeschylus, p. 199. Much the same lesson ob­
tains from Podlecki's examination of the immediate political 
implications of the Oresteia. In the Agamemnon there is a 
dialectic between dike in the higher sense and the same 
term's plural forms which connote legal justice. Of the 
cause of the Trojan war, Podlecki writes, "Agamemnon and his 
brother are the prosecutors, the 'extractors of justice.'
But this is justice of a very primitive kind, the mere sat­
isfaction of claims for what is due, raw retribution at its 
lowest level. In general, it can be said that the princi­
pals in the drama never rise above this minimal conception." 
The Eumenides, by contrast, teaches that the way to life and 
freedom follows from the divine, supra-legal orientation to 
righteousness which puts into the background the bloody 
spiral which is provoked by the application of mere law.
See Podlecki, Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy, 
chapter V. The above quotation is from page 70.
3^isaiah 40.2.
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The judgment of the court upon Orestes— like the 
straight judgments which the prophets of Israel demanded and 
which Solon in Athens dispensed— is begotten of a devotion 
to justice which is at once liberative and merciful.3? in 
the Eumenides then, Aeschylus has in fact provided a founda­
tion in the reflective, mediate symbolism from which Greece 
drew instruction for the earlier rectification and libera­
tion performed by Solon. Solonic practise is parent to 
Aeschylean theory. Royal Orestes/ no less than the meanest 
hektemore, has been victim of a miserable domination whose 
alteration is quite beyond his power. That he is absolved 
of matricide, and indeed, of all the guilt of which Atreus 
was author, is a merciful disburdenment. In this Aeschylean 
symbolism mercy and the negative moment of freedom can be 
seen as one and the same event. The spirit of justice in­
spires the merciful attitude from which liberation follows 
as the practical consequence. The liberation of Orestes 
gains potency in the repositioning of life unto a future 
which is distinct from the tyrannical and guilty past. This
•^This understanding of the condition of Orestes before 
the court's pardon as one of bondage is supported well by 
the text. Early in the text, before they leave Delphi, the 
Furies declare: "Let him hide under the ground, he shall
never go free./ Cursed suppliant, he shall feel against his 
head/ another murderer rising out of the same seed." (174- 
177) To be accursed is to be unfree. Aeschylus is the ear­
liest author of whom this writer is aware to use the vocab­
ulary of freedom in the metaphorical sense of moral achieve­
ment and moral failure. (See also 225 and 340.) This met­
aphor has been most meaningful to the European imagination, 
but it is likewise hazardous since it is the embryo of the 
paradoxical understanding of freedom which estranges real 
meaning from material reality.
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repositioning will occur according to practical, constitu­
tional devices which permanently embody the spirit of divine 
justice.
In the Eumenides, the positive future is alive and at 
work in the present resolution of the plight of Orestes. 
Aeschylus chooses for his constitutional tribunal a fabulous 
version of the Areopagus. He chooses the Areopagus because 
it has the force of antiquity, but in the Eumenides it is a 
modernized council in which membership has become possible 
for all citizens, not only for th6 old families.38 The con-
38interpretations of the Areopagus passage are wonder­
ful in their variety, ranging from "Aeschylus was conserva­
tive" to "Aeschylus was radical." These opinions are based 
on educated guesses, and sometimes show the political sym­
pathies of their advocates. Our own opinion is that Aeschy­
lus did not use his productions to deliver coded propaganda 
messages in favor of any particular party. We believe rather 
that Aeschylus continued the work of Solon, attempting to get 
the competing parties to subordinate their particular inter­
ests to the higher Justice. If this assumption is correct, 
then the primary significance of the Areopagus is that it 
symbolizes constitutional justice as corrective against the 
justice of the feud. This primary significance does not ex­
haust other possibilities.
Not long before the production of the Oresteia, the 
radical (democratic) group had reduced the powers of the 
Areopagus, an aristocratic body, leaving it jurisdiction in 
homicide and blasphemy cases. Besides this, Ephialtes, the 
radical leader, had been murdered. It seems to us that in 
the Eumenides, Aeschylus' emphasis on the remaining homicide 
jurisdiction serves to shore up the status of this oldest 
Athenian body. It seems also that Aeschylus is presenting a 
democratized picture of the Areopagus, but of this we cannot 
be certain. Athena says (487) , "I will pick the finest [ta 
beltata = the best] of my citizens." The lexicon is of some 
help here, but it is not decisive. The term in question is 
the superlative of agathos, the standard word for "good."
The question is, does this term mean "best" in the aristo­
cratic sense of a class that is able to define its culture 
as best, or does it mean "best" in the sense of moral sensi­
tivity and practical achievement? We believe that it means 
the latter. It has a clearly aristocratic meaning only in
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stitutional tribunal is a gift to the Athenians from the 
patron goddess Athena. Her dedicatory address contains this 
advice:
No anarchy, no rule of a single master. Thus 
I advise my citizens to govern and to grace, 
and not to cast fear utterly from your city. What 
man who fears nothing at all is ever righteous? Such 
be your just terrors, and you may deserve and have 
salvation for your citadel, your land's defence, 
such as is nowhere else found among men, neither 
among the Scythians, nor the land that Pelops held.
I establish this tribunal. It shall be untouched 
by money-making, grave but quick to wrath, watchful 
to protect those who sleep, a sentry on the land.
These words I have unreeled are for my citizens, 
advice into the future. All must stand upright now, 
take each man his ballot in his hand, think on 
his oath, and make his j u d g m e n t .39
The contrast between the land of Pelops and Athens sets 
the tenor of Athena's counsel. It is from the land of 
Pelops that the difficulty which is the theme of the Oresteia 
derives. There, King Atreus acted without fear, and we be­
hold the consequences. "Fear" here is a form of deima which 
conveys the idea of great terror. Atreus in the land of
Xenophon, long after Aeschylus. Before Aeschylus, it ap­
pears only in Homer, and there, only in the comparative. In 
Suppliants, 1054, it means best in a pragmatic sense, and 
in Agamemnon, 378, a difficult passage, it appears in a con­
text which is moral, threatening the dike of punishment 
against those who ignore the Dike of moderation. Aeschylus 
puts into his Areopagus the best people who can be found, 
and these of course will be the ones who heed most stead­
fastly Athena's injunction. The radical leaning of this 
support for open government, based on merit, is balanced 
however by the command against venality (7 04-705). It is 
hard to see this as anything but a complaint against the 
innovation of paid juries. See entry under belteros in Henry 
George Lindell and Robert Scotts, A Greek-English Lexicon 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1968).
39696-710.
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Pelops differed from Solon in the land of Athens in that he 
had no fear. He had no fearful respect for the gods to whom 
homicide is offensive, but more importantly, he had no ter­
ror about the consequences of his own conduct. Thus he per­
petrated both murder and cannibalism. The comparison of 
Solon to Atreus is apt here, for Solon conducted his career 
in daily terror of the consequences of the shedding of 
Athenian blood. The lesson of Aeschylus is that a country 
which would avoid the curse must live in abiding terror of 
accursed, outrageous behavior. It is this terror which sen­
sitizes the person and the greater polity to the life-assur­
ing authority of transcendent justice: "What man who fears
nothing at all is ever righteous?" In a country which prac­
tises this fear which is productive of justice, there will 
be, in the modern phrase, "ordered liberty." "No anarchy, 
no rule of single master [despotes]." In such a country it 
will be possible for the citizenry to stand upright and to 
make the kinds of decisions that are necessary to assure sal­
vation from the accursed current of historical guilt.
3. Conclusion
The Oresteian trilogy is Aeschylus' surviving master­
piece. It is the story of the political mediation of the 
evils of tyranny and helplessness. The ascendant power of 
this liberative mediation is divine justice. When it is 
appropriated for human guidance man obtains release from 
fated tyranny and tyrannical fate. We conclude this study 
of the origins of freedom with the discussion of Aeschylean
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freedom because in the Eumenides, and more completely in the 
Suppliants, appear all of the meanings, save one, which we 
have identified as being integral to freedom as it first 
appeared in Mediterranean antiquity. These meanings are:
(1) Freedom is a modality of divine-human unity, understood 
theoretically as logos and practically as justice. (2) Free­
dom appears within a structured reality, involving negation 
and position relative to the principle of unity. (3) In its 
pristine showing, freedom is antinomian. (4) Freedom is 
primarily economic. (Aeschylean drama does not include this 
meaning.) (5) Freedom is complete only when there is uni­
versal participation in political authority. With the ap­
pearance at last of this understanding the period of origins 
has reached completion in the writing of Aeschylus. Politi­
cal freedom is the great oak to which the liberation of the 
slave is seed.
We shall offer concluding observations about each of 
these meanings presently, but before that, it is necessary 
to summarize the contents of the Suppliants. The Suppliants 
is simple in plot and generally undramatic. The fifty 
daughters of Danaeus have fled, with their father, from 
Egypt to Argos, where they appear as suppliants seeking pro­
tection. They have fled from an ill-mannered group of 
cousins who want to marry them. Under Egyptian law, the 
claims of the cousins are valid, and the maidens should have 
accepted the projected marriages. The daughters fasten 
themselves at Argos to the statues of the gods and refuse to
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move. This presents a great difficulty for King Pelasgus 
and his countrymen. The cousins are in pursuit, and if the 
city accepts the Danaeds as suppliants, it places itself in 
danger of attack. For the city of accept the Danaeds more­
over makes it an accomplice to the lawlessness of the maid­
ens' refusal. But to turn them over to their hated cousins 
would involve injustice to strangers (who are of Argive de­
scent) and sacrilege against the gods, since the maidens 
cling to the statues and threaten to hang themselves from 
those same statues if the city refuses protection. Obvi­
ously there is no neat solution to the difficulty, for nei­
ther side of the dispute is wholly right. The cousins are 
violent and loathsome, and the Danaeds are lawless and im­
moderate in their contempt for marriage. At length, king 
and citizen decide to offer asylum to the maidens. After 
this, a herald from the cousins arrives and behaves menac­
ingly. Pelasgus rebuffs him and the play ends shortly. The 
latter two components of this trilogy are lost. Their con­
tents are known in part, but are unimportant here. What 
commends this rather inert production for our summary treat­
ment of freedom in its time of origin is not the action, of 
which there is little, but the more subtle materials within 
it. It is a drama about how a king and his subjects make a 
difficult decision. The king, in announcing the decision to 
the Egyptian herald, refers to himself as the "tongue of 
freedom's voice.
4 0 9 4 8 .
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Our first conclusion about the meaning of freedom is 
that freedom is a modality of divine-human unity, understood 
theoretically as logos and practically as justice. Corol­
lary to this is the observation that justice or right is 
authoritative, and this authority mandates unity. In the 
Eumenides Athena is justice personified and her counsel is 
an authoritative force in the lifting of the curse. Her 
character in this drama emphasizes the divine and creative 
aspect that is present in all true statesmanship. Her ana­
logue in Israel is the prophet who bears the authority of 
the nation's God. In the Suppliants, Aeschylus' figure of 
King Pelasgus brings this meaning nearer to direct human 
experience. The central passage in this entire drama is 
that employing the famous metaphor of the diver.
We need profound, preserving care, that plunges 
Like a diver deep in troubled seas,
Keen and unblurred his eye, to make the end 
Without disaster for us and for the.city . . .41
The king is the diver who descends into the fear-inspiring 
nature of Zeus, and by this descent becomes vested with de­
cisive authority. But how is freedom involved in this? By 
the most commonplace understanding, both Athena and Pelasgus, 
as just authorities, are free. But Aeschylus understands 
freedom to be resident in both the gradients of leadership 
and response. In the Eumenides and again in the Suppliants, 
the key term is "persuasion." The Suppliants is most in­
structive in this regard. Even in the hour of grave public
■̂*•407-410, tr. Seth G. Benardete.
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danger, the king explicitly refuses to dictate to the people; 
instead he persuades them to do that which is right.42 Con­
sent to the sovereign's rightful advice makes all partici­
pants in sovereignty and thus in freedom.
Consent to rightful authority has a unifying effect.
It unites humanity with divinity by reconciling human im­
pulse with the divine will. It unites man with man by re­
placing pragmatic severality with the pure practicality of 
purpose which transcends particular ambition. In these two 
Aeschylean dramas there are two symbols of this unity. In 
the Suppliants the vision of Aeschylus approaches the monis­
tic organicism of Micah's vision of Yahweh's pastoral lead­
ership. The people's vote to protect the maidens was swift 
and unanimous.42 It seems that there was no discussion, but 
that all were moved spontaneously by the king's persuasion. 
The corresponding picture in the Eumenides suggests the 
more complicated "Athenian" pattern of unity which Pericles 
would celebrate. There the vote on Orestes' guilt was tied, 
but there is nonetheless a theme here of human unity which 
is stronger than diversity. The diversity on the issue at 
hand is mitigated by the underlying unity which is symbol­
ized by public allegiance to the common forum, an allegiance 
which makes it possible for dissenting groups to accept un­
welcome decisions without recourse to violence. It is this 




become the mode of free European nations in the modern per­
iod.
The second meaning of freedom, i.e., that it is a 
structured reality involving negation and position, follows 
closely upon the former understanding about freedom and 
authority. We recognized this structure of freedom first in 
the Fourth Evangelist's freedom pericope and we have seen 
its underlying presence in all of the archaic materials to 
which that teaching points. In Aeschylus the structure of 
freedom is most explicit in the story of Orestes in the 
Eumenides. Orestes is a victim of negative circumstances, 
the curse upon the Atreid family. At the advice of Apollo 
he flies to Athens where Athena and the court negate the 
curse. Upon this liberative negation, the life of Orestes 
takes a new position. He returns to his homeland where he 
will be k i n g . 44 with the end of the murderous curse Orestes 
and the family which he represents are positioned unto life.
In respect of the structure of freedom a second inference 
may be drawn from the Eumenides. This is that the negative 
moment of freedom which pervaded the work of Solon had by 
the time of Aeschylus been productive of a free and positive 
commitment to justice which was shared throughout the polis.
We must remember that the Athens about which Aeschylus wrote 
was the country which had stood with iron determination 
against the vast might of Persia. It is impossible that 
Athens could have done this at the time when Solon became
44754-761.
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archon. The persuasive authority of Solon and the tragedians 
had taught the Athenians how to be free.
The third meaning attaching to freedom is that in its 
pristine showing, freedom is antinomian. The inaccessibility 
of law to freedom was proclaimed explicitly in Paul's letter 
to the Galatians, and was exemplified in the earlier pro­
phetic opposition to the kings who were law incarnate. The 
connection of freedom with lawful conduct is a later event 
which is born of the belief that the laws are an ample em­
bodiment of the divine will. Aeschylus, who is still in 
the period of origins, refuses to embrace this mistaken 
accomodation. In both the Eumenides and the Suppliants, the 
liberative activity is conducted in response to a right 
which is at odds with law. In the Suppliants the Danaeds 
are in violation of the established law of their native land, 
but Pelasgus and his subjects join the Danaeds in viewing 
that law as an instrument of bondage. The antinomian strain 
is even more prominent in the Eumertides. Orestes is a matri­
cide, and one symbolic meaning of the Furies is that they 
are representative of the legal penalty for such a crime.
The law is suspended, however, not because Athena and the 
court do not take blood crime seriously, but because in this 
instance the greater cause of justice is better served by 
suspension of the law. The fundamentally antinomian char­
acter of justice and freedom survives in the modern age in 
such activities as nonviolent civil disobedience, and perhaps 
even in certain lawless acts of governmental officials. The
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obvious danger posed by lawlessness provokes the attempt to 
identify freedom with lawfulness, but this idea is at odds 
with the ancient witness.
The fourth meaning of freedom is that freedom is pri­
marily an economic affair, with moral and political freedom 
as secondary devolutions. We began our search for the ori­
gins of freedom with attention to the statements from the 
Hellenistic and early Roman periods of late antiquity. 
Although the Stoic and New Testament materials all exhibited 
a strongly spiritual understanding of freedom, we found in 
the Fourth Gospel, with its comment about the son who does 
not continue in the house forever a double clue as to where 
we should begin our inquiry into the ancient materials and 
as to what we should attend in this search. From the house­
hold of Abram to the polis of Solon, it has been clear that 
the primary experience of unfreedom consists in an economic 
relationship in which one person is bound in service to an­
other. The Exodus narratives, the prophets, Hesiod, and
Solon have indicated that economic measures which serve to 
despoil those who are vulnerable to arbitrary authority con­
stitute an unrighteousness which is offensive to God himself. 
It follows that freedom is primarily the right of a person 
to his own body and its produce. That is to say, it is pri­
marily an economic affair.
It seems strange that Aeschylus, who in other respects 
gathers together the early meanings of freedom, is completely
358
silent about this most basic reality of freedom. It is pos­
sible that this aspect of freedqm received treatment in the 
Aeschylean plays which did not survive. This is not very 
likely, however, for with regard to this economic aspect of 
freedom, the historical reality of Aeschylus and the writer's 
own consciousness were beyond the period of origins. The 
reforms of Solon, Peisistratus, and Cleisthenes, as well as 
the rapid expansion of manufacture and trade in Athens, had 
taken the sharp edge off the economic issue. For the Athen­
ian majority, economic freedom had been achieved due to the 
thought and action of earlier generations of liberators. It 
is for this reason that we find in Aeschylus an understand­
ing which is almost completely absent from his predecessors, 
i.e., that freedom should be explicitly political.
Aeschylus ends our search for the origins of freedom 
because those origins are complete when the political impli­
cation of liberation and the repositioning of life is made 
explicit. Thus, from Aeschylus we learn the fifth and 
final meaning of freedom, that freedom is complete only when 
there is universal participation in political authority.
The political possibility of freedom is implicit in the four 
prior meanings, and by the time of Aeschylus, Athenian polit­
ical experience has begun to manifest this universal involve­
ment of free citizens. Thus, what we find in Aeschylus on
this subject is not an original idea, but rather reflection
on extant reality. Corollary to the appearance of political
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freedom is the understanding that "free" may be predicated 
on the deciding person, for participatory political insti­
tutions presuppose the power of moral arbitration and prag­
matic reckoning in the constituent body.
In both the Suppliants and the Eumenides, we find that 
important decisions are made by the citizen body. In nei­
ther drama is the primarily economic nature of political 
decisions acknowledged; Aeschylus does not tell us that 
political freedom and participatory institutions are a means 
of protecting the economic freedom of the commons. Instead, 
Aeschylus shuns the pragmatic in favor of the practical. 
Economic pragmatism in politics simply balances one finite 
historical force against another; pure practicality looks 
beyond the evanescent possibilities available in history.
The moral commitment of the polis to justice will enhance 
the destiny of the community more certainly than the resolu­
tion of particular issues of partisan interest. It seems 
certain that Aeschylus drew this lesson about moral commit­
ment and civic survival from the Athenian determination not 
to bow to Persia at any cost. That determination was in­
structed by a universal, "profound, preserving care, that 
plunges like a diver deep in troubled seas." Both of the
dramas which show us free political participation are set in
crisis situations.
Commitment to divine justice as the measure for human 
existence in history began with one man, with Hesiod.
Aeschylus believed that in his time and country, that commit­
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ment had become general. But neither the Athenians nor 
Aeschylus were "idealist," in the sense in which that term 
is often employed. Rather, the ideal of justice was resi­
dent in the Athenian populace; thus they were capable of 
freedom in determining the course of public action. In his 
attention to the political freedom of the popular assemblies 
in the Suppliants and the Eumenides, Aeschylus highlights 
two characteristics of this freedom which are of commanding 
importance. First is that the people respond positively to 
leadership, a matter which we have discussed earlier. 
Aeschylus equates popular freedom with democracy, but it is 
certain that Aeschylean democracy is essentially different
from the degenerate democracy of which we learn in Plato 
4  *5and Aristotle. Aeschylean democracy consists in careful 
response to careful guidance. It is government by popular 
consent, not the frenzied autism in which freedom loops back 
upon itself. The second characteristic of universal politi­
cal freedom which Aeschylus emphasizes is the heavy and per-
^^See especially Suppliants, 698-699: "May the people
who strengthen [kratunei] the city protect its dignity as 
well." This word usage, as well as the insistence on popu­
lar consultation in decision making, gives the Suppliants 
its reputation as a democratic production. A considerable 
body of scholarly opinion understands this drama as Aeschy­
lus' expression of gratitude and praise to democratic Argos 
for its receiving Themistocles as suppliant after his ostra­
cism from Athens, since Argos incurred the enmity of Sparta 
by this act. Beyond this is the implication that democratic 
and just Argos should be the peninsular ally of Athens 
rather than aristocratic Sparta. Since the early 1950's it 
has been generally accepted that the Suppliants was produced 
in 463. Athens formed an alliance with Argos in 461. It is 
possible that Aeschylus influenced this important shift 
which cemented its democratic institutions. The evidence
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ilous burden that this freedom imposes upon the citizenry. 
They are responsible for their joint destiny in a dangerous 
and uncertain world, and the saving alternative is that they 
decide justly. In the Suppliants the decision to protect 
the Danaeds is a decision which the populace makes, knowing 
full well that the Egyptian cousins will make war against 
the country while the Danaeds cannot. For the Argive assem­
bly, fear of Zeus is more compelling than fear of violent 
barbarians. In the Eumenides the Athenian court decides in 
favor of Orestes before Athena has persuaded the Furies to 
become Eumenides. Apollo, the advocate of Orestes, has made 
no threats against the country should the court rule against 
his client, but the Furies have promised dire punishment if 
the court refuses to convict. Despite the inauspicious 
circumstances, Aeschylus seems to tell us that at least half 
of the people of his native land will choose the right alter­
native, and that those who so choose may count on the bless­
ing of God to see the project through.
In the letter to Philemon, the promise to Abram, the 
leadership of Moses, the injunction of the prophets, the 
true words of Hesiod, the legislation of Solon, and the drama 
of Aeschylus we have seen the reality of freedom. It is a 
reality which unites the spiritual and material provinces of 
human existence, imparting to concrete human existence in
supporting this hypothesis is presented in lucid detail in 
Podlecki, Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy^, chap­
ter IV.
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history a share in life eternal. The reality of freedom 
cannot be present in an atmosphere corrupted with injustice; 
in that circumstance, only the name will persist. We con­
sider again the comment of Philo on the passage from Euripi­
des, for it bespeaks a danger which is no less relevant to 
our own time than to Hellenistic Alexandria.
The name of freedom is worth all the world;
If one has little, let him think that much.
I saw the whole audience so carried away by enthusiasm 
that they stood upright to their full height, and rais­
ing their voices above the actors, burst into shout 
after shout of applause combining praise of the maxim 
with praise of the poet, who glorifies not only freedom 
for what it does, but even its name.46
Aeschylus and the other early sources show us something 
essentially different from this enthusiasm. They show a 
steady, unyielding faith in divine justice that is produc­
tive unto redemption and repair. Only after centuries of 
exploration of the nature of divine justice is the commit­
ment in its favor given a name which embraces both the com­
mitment and its consequences. That name is freedom.
4 6see chapter II, section 2.
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